Enginex0 cf4fb127f2 feat(keystore): virtualize grant plane
Duck-Detector's grant-domain probes generate an attested key, then
reach it through a second access plane -- IKeystoreService.grant() then
getKeyEntry(Domain.GRANT, grantId) -- and compare the certificate
chains. We synthesized the owner key but never virtualized the GRANT
plane, so grant reads fell through to the real keystore2, which has no
record of the synthetic key. That single fall-through produced six RED
rows.

Virtualize the plane so every access path returns the same synthesized
KeyEntryResponse:

- SoftwareGrant state model in the shim companion: issue/resolve/
  revoke/purge, caller-bound and access-vector-aware (Change 1).
- grant/ungrant/getKeyEntry(GRANT) handlers in Keystore2Interceptor.
  resolveGrant() enforces caller-binding (non-grantee -> KEY_NOT_FOUND,
  PR #57 probe 4) and the GET_INFO=0x4 access-vector gate (missing ->
  PERMISSION_DENIED, PR #57 probe 3); a valid read returns the owner's
  exact KeyEntryResponse for a coherent chain (Change 2).
- Purge grants on key teardown and clearAll, so grants die with the
  key and re-key orphans them -- matching real keystore2 (Change 3).

The Domain.GRANT read is resolved before the package-scoped
shouldSkipUid filter: isolated grantees (bindIsolatedService) have no
package mapping and would otherwise be dropped to the real keystore2,
leaving three grant rows Unavailable. Caller-binding in resolveGrant()
is the real access gate, mirroring keystore2's grantee+id row keying.

Verified on-device (generate mode, build #237): all four grant rows
clean, TEE tamper score 28 -> 18, zero adjacent regression.

Refs Phase 9 .omc/plans/tee-fingerprint-phase-9-grant-plane-coherence.md
2026-05-30 13:42:31 +01:00
2026-01-11 16:24:34 +01:00
2026-05-20 07:05:02 +01:00
2025-11-22 10:34:59 +01:00
2025-11-22 10:34:59 +01:00

TEESimulator-RS

Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android

Build Android 10+ Telegram


Note

Fork of JingMatrix/TEESimulator with native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and AOSP-compliant attestation behavior. For the upstream project, see the original repo.

What It Does

TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the ioctl level inside the keystore2 process and generates entire certificate chains from scratch, signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions. Apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate device.

This is not TrickyStore. TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the internals are different: native Rust cert generation, binder-level interception via lsplt, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and AOSP-spec attestation behavior.

Requirements

Important

A valid keybox.xml is required for hardware-level attestation. Without one, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware checks.

  1. Android 10+
  2. Root manager: KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch
  3. keybox.xml at /data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml

Quick Start

  1. Download the latest ZIP from Releases
  2. Install via your root manager and reboot
  3. Place your keybox at /data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml
  4. Configure targets in /data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt
  5. Verify with Play Integrity or Key Attestation Demo

Architecture

Native Cert Generationlibcertgen.so generates X.509 chains in Rust using ring and manual DER encoding. BouncyCastle fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).

Binder Interception — PLT hook on ioctl() in libc.so via lsplt inside keystore2. Intercepts generateKey, importKey, and getKeyEntry transactions.

AOSP Compliance — Self-signed certs for non-attested keys (matching ta/src/keys.rs), correct AuthorizationList tag ordering, version-guarded extension fields, authorize_create enforcement.

Key Persistence — Generated keys survive reboots. File-backed with file-level locking.

Rate Limiting — Per-UID hardware keygen cap (2/30s window, 2 concurrent). Overflow falls to software certs.

Configuration

All config files live at /data/adb/tricky_store/ and are hot-reloaded via FileObserver.

target.txt

Controls which apps get intercepted and the simulation mode.

Suffix Mode
! Force software key generation
? Force leaf certificate patching (real TEE key, patched cert)
(none) Automatic selection

Multi-keybox support via [filename.xml] headers:

com.google.android.gms!
io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?

[aosp_keybox.xml]
com.google.android.gsf

security_patch.txt

Override patch levels reported in attestation certificates. Global defaults at top, per-package overrides with [package.name].

Key Scope
system OS patch level
vendor Vendor patch level
boot Boot/kernel patch level
all Sets all three

Special values: today, YYYY-MM-DD templates, no (omit tag), device_default, prop (read from system property).

system=YYYY-MM-05
vendor=device_default
boot=no

[com.google.android.gms]
system=2025-10-01

Building from Source

Prerequisites: JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with aarch64-linux-android target, cargo-ndk.

git clone --recursive https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS.git
cd TEESimulator-RS
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug

Output ZIPs in out/. Gradle invokes cargo ndk automatically to cross-compile libcertgen.so.

Push to main or use Actions > Build > Run workflow to trigger CI.

Compatibility

Root Manager Status
KernelSU Tested (Action button + lifecycle scripts)
Magisk Supported
APatch Supported

Community

Telegram

Credits

  • JingMatrix — original TEESimulator and interception architecture
  • 5ec1cff — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception
  • LSPlt — PLT hook library
  • ring — Rust cryptography library
  • MhmRdd — AOSP compliance work via upstream PR #157
  • fatalcoder524 — contributor and collaborator
  • huguangares — collaborator and tester

License

GNU General Public License v3.0

S
Description
Software simulation for Android hardware-backed key pairs with key attestation | https://t.me/superpowers9
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