docs(release): add v5.1 changelog for interception architecture rewrite

feat(interception): dynamically register SecurityLevel binder interceptors
keystore2 may return a different BBinder for each getSecurityLevel call, so the initial registration during setup might not cover all binder instances that client apps receive. Intercept getSecurityLevel replies to register our hook on every new BBinder, deduplicated by identity hash.
2026-03-21 15:06:52 +01:00 · 2026-03-21 06:09:00 +01:00 · 2026-03-21 05:41:56 +01:00 · 2026-03-20 08:16:12 +01:00 · 2026-03-20 06:58:10 +01:00 · 2026-03-20 06:26:08 +01:00
47 changed files with 1633 additions and 3337 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Ensure shell scripts always have LF line endings, even on Windows.
+# These get packaged into flashable zips and run on Android devices.
+*.sh text eol=lf
+module/daemon text eol=lf
@@ -149,21 +149,3 @@ jobs:
        env:
          VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-
-      - name: Bump update.json
-        run: |
-          COUNT=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
-          RELEASE_NAME=$(basename zips/*Release*.zip)
-          ZIP_URL="https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/download/${VER}/${RELEASE_NAME}"
-          jq ".versionCode = $COUNT | .zipUrl = \"$ZIP_URL\"" module/update.json > /tmp/update.json
-          mv /tmp/update.json module/update.json
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-          git add module/update.json
-          git diff --cached --quiet || {
-            git commit -m "chore(release): bump update.json to $VER [skip ci]"
-            git push origin HEAD:main
-          }
-        env:
-          VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -5,6 +5,3 @@ app/build
 build
 native-certgen/target
 app/src/main/jniLibs
-
-# Internal planning/strategy plane, never publish
-.omc/
@@ -1,139 +1,259 @@
 <p align="center">
-  <h1 align="center">TEESimulator-RS</h1>
+  <h1 align="center">🔐 TEESimulator</h1>
  <p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
+  <p align="center">Hardware attestation. Software keys. Zero detection.</p>
  <p align="center">
-    <a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
-    <a href="https://t.me/superpowers9"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?logo=telegram" alt="Telegram"></a>
+    <a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.2-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.2">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?style=for-the-badge&logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
  </p>
 </p>

 ---

 > [!NOTE]
-> Fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) with native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and AOSP-compliant attestation behavior. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
+> **This is a personal fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** with additional hardening, native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and anti-detection features. For the upstream project, see the original repo.

-## What It Does
+---

-TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level inside the `keystore2` process and generates entire certificate chains from scratch, signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions. Apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate device.
+## 🧬 What is TEESimulator?

-This is not TrickyStore. TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the internals are different: native Rust cert generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and AOSP-spec attestation behavior.
+TEESimulator is a **complete software simulation** of Android's hardware-backed [Trusted Execution Environment](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation). Instead of patching certificates from the real TEE after the fact, TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level and generates entire certificate chains from scratch — signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions, indistinguishable from hardware-generated keys.

-## Requirements
+The result: **apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate, unmodified device** — even on rooted hardware with an unlocked bootloader.
+
+> **This is not TrickyStore.** TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the architecture is fundamentally different: native Rust certificate generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and a multi-layer defense against detector apps.
+
+---
+
+## 🔥 Why TEESimulator?
+
+🔐 **Native Cert Generation** — v4.0 generates X.509 certificate chains in Rust with `ring` and manual DER encoding. No BouncyCastle overhead, no Java crypto quirks, byte-perfect issuer chain linkage.
+
+🎯 **Binder-Level Interception** — Hooks `ioctl()` on `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside the `keystore2` process. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions before the HAL ever sees them.
+
+🛡️ **Detector Resistant** — Per-UID rate limiting blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding. Oversized challenges rejected with real KeyMint error codes. Chain consistency verified byte-for-byte.
+
+💾 **Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. Apps that store attestation keys (banking, biometrics) don't break after a restart.
+
+🔧 **Drop-In Replacement** — Same config paths as TrickyStore (`/data/adb/tricky_store/`). Swap the module ZIP, keep your keybox and target list.
+
+---
+
+## ✨ Features
+
+**Core Attestation Engine**
+- [x] **Full certificate chain generation** — leaf + intermediates + root, signed by your keybox
+- [x] **Native Rust certgen** — `libcertgen.so` built with `ring`, `rsa`, and manual DER assembly
+- [x] **BouncyCastle fallback** — unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519) fall back to Java
+- [x] **ASN.1 attestation extensions** — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17 with all AOSP-specified tags
+- [x] **Multi-keybox support** — different keybox files per app group via `target.txt`
+
+**Interception Layer**
+- [x] **Binder ioctl hook** — `lsplt` PLT hook on `libc.so` inside `keystore2` process
+- [x] **generateKey / importKey / getKeyEntry** — all three transaction types intercepted
+- [x] **256KB native payload cap** — oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly
+- [x] **Challenge validation** — rejects >128-byte attestation challenges with `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH`
+
+**Hardening**
+- [x] **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst window, software fallback on overflow
+- [x] **importKey eviction guard** — retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import cache attacks
+- [x] **Key persistence** — file-backed storage with file-level locking, survives reboots and keybox rotations
+- [x] **Global exception handler** — uncaught exceptions logged, daemon stays alive
+
+**Configuration**
+- [x] **Live config reload** — `FileObserver` watches all config files, changes apply immediately
+- [x] **Security patch spoofing** — per-package `system`, `vendor`, `boot` patch levels with dynamic templates
+- [x] **Lifecycle scripts** — KSU Action button clears key cache, uninstall removes all traces
+
+---
+
+## 📋 Requirements

 > [!IMPORTANT]
-> A valid `keybox.xml` is required for hardware-level attestation. Without one, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware checks.
+> TEESimulator requires root access and a valid `keybox.xml` for hardware-level attestation results. Without a keybox, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware attestation checks.

-1. Android 10+
-2. Root manager: KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch
-3. `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
+**You need:**
+1. Android 10 or above
+2. A supported root manager (KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch)
+3. A hardware-backed `keybox.xml` placed at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`

-## Quick Start
+---

-1. Download the latest ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases)
-2. Install via your root manager and reboot
-3. Place your keybox at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
-4. Configure targets in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
-5. Verify with Play Integrity or Key Attestation Demo
+## 📱 Compatibility

-## Architecture
+### Root Managers

-**Native Cert Generation** — `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 chains in Rust using `ring` and manual DER encoding. BouncyCastle fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
+| Manager | Status | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| KernelSU | ✅ Tested | Full support including Action button and lifecycle scripts |
+| Magisk | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
+| APatch | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |

-**Binder Interception** — PLT hook on `ioctl()` in `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside `keystore2`. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions.
+### Tested Devices

-**AOSP Compliance** — Self-signed certs for non-attested keys (matching `ta/src/keys.rs`), correct AuthorizationList tag ordering, version-guarded extension fields, `authorize_create` enforcement.
+| Device | Android | TEE | Status |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Redmi 14C (2409BRN2CA) | 14 (SDK 34) | Beanpod KeyMaster | ✅ Daily driver |

-**Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. File-backed with file-level locking.
+> Tested against DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, and Key Attestation Demo. If you test on a different device, [open an issue](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/issues) with your results.

-**Rate Limiting** — Per-UID hardware keygen cap (2/30s window, 2 concurrent). Overflow falls to software certs.
+---

-## Configuration
+## 🚀 Quick Start

-All config files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are hot-reloaded via `FileObserver`.
+1. **Download** the latest release ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases)
+2. **Install** via your root manager (KSU / Magisk / APatch) and reboot
+3. **Place your keybox** at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
+4. **Configure targets** in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
+5. **Verify** — check Play Integrity or run Key Attestation Demo

-### target.txt
+TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore, TrickyStoreOSS, and their forks. Existing config files are compatible.

-Controls which apps get intercepted and the simulation mode.
+---

-| Suffix | Mode |
-|--------|------|
-| `!` | Force software key generation |
-| `?` | Force leaf certificate patching (real TEE key, patched cert) |
-| *(none)* | Automatic selection |
+## 🔨 Building from Source

-Multi-keybox support via `[filename.xml]` headers:
+The CI workflow builds on every push to `main`. You can also build locally or trigger a build from your own fork.
+
+**Prerequisites:** JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator.git
+cd TEESimulator
+./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
+```
+
+Output ZIPs land in `out/`. The Gradle build automatically invokes `cargo ndk` to cross-compile `libcertgen.so` before packaging.
+
+To rebuild from a fork, push to `main` or use **Actions → Build → Run workflow**. The workflow installs all toolchains (Java, Rust, cargo-ndk, ccache) and uploads Release + Debug ZIPs as artifacts.
+
+---
+
+## ⚙️ Configuration
+
+All configuration files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are monitored by `FileObserver` — changes take effect immediately without rebooting.
+
+### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust
+
+This file provides the master cryptographic identity. It contains a private key and a hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. TEESimulator signs all generated certificates with this key, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
+
+```xml
+<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<AndroidAttestation>
+    <Keybox DeviceID="...">
+        <Key algorithm="ecdsa|rsa">
+            <PrivateKey format="pem">...</PrivateKey>
+            <CertificateChain>...</CertificateChain>
+        </Key>
+    </Keybox>
+</AndroidAttestation>
+```
+
+### Target Packages (`target.txt`)
+
+Controls which apps get intercepted and what simulation mode to use.
+
+#### Mode Suffixes
+
+*   **`!` → Force Generation** — Creates a complete software-based virtual key. Full TEE simulation.
+*   **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking** — Real TEE key generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and patched.
+*   **No symbol → Automatic** — Module selects the best mode for your device.
+
+#### Multi-Keybox
+
+Specify different keybox files for different app groups. Apps listed after a `[filename.xml]` line use that keybox. Apps before any declaration use the default `keybox.xml`.

 ```
+# Default keybox
 com.google.android.gms!
 io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?

+# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps
 [aosp_keybox.xml]
 com.google.android.gsf
+
+# Another keybox
+[demo_keybox.xml]
+org.matrix.demo
 ```

-### security_patch.txt
+### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`)

-Override patch levels reported in attestation certificates. Global defaults at top, per-package overrides with `[package.name]`.
+Configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` reported in attestation certificates. This only affects attestation data — it does not change actual system properties.
+
+#### Global and Per-Package
+
+Settings at the top of the file are global defaults. Add `[package.name]` to override for specific apps.
+
+#### Keys

 | Key | Scope |
-|-----|-------|
+|---|---|
 | `system` | OS patch level |
 | `vendor` | Vendor patch level |
 | `boot` | Boot/kernel patch level |
-| `all` | Sets all three |
+| `all` | Shorthand — sets all three at once |

-Special values: `today`, `YYYY-MM-DD` templates, `no` (omit tag), `device_default`, `prop` (read from system property).
+#### Special Keywords
+
+| Keyword | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| `today` | Current date, dynamically resolved on each attestation |
+| `YYYY-MM-DD` templates | Semi-dynamic — `YYYY-MM-05` resolves to the 5th of the current month |
+| `no` | Omit this patch level tag entirely from the attestation |
+| `device_default` | Use the device's real hardware value |
+| `prop` | Read from `ro.build.version.security_patch` (matches what detectors see via getprop) |
+
+#### Example

 ```
+# Global — default for all apps
 system=YYYY-MM-05
 vendor=device_default
 boot=no

+# Override for GMS
 [com.google.android.gms]
-system=2025-10-01
+system=2024-10-01
+
+# Custom config for a demo app
+[org.matrix.demo]
+all=2025-09-15
+boot=device_default
 ```

-## Building from Source
+---

-Prerequisites: JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
-
-```bash
-git clone --recursive https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS.git
-cd TEESimulator-RS
-./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
-```
-
-Output ZIPs in `out/`. Gradle invokes `cargo ndk` automatically to cross-compile `libcertgen.so`.
-
-Push to `main` or use **Actions > Build > Run workflow** to trigger CI.
-
-## Compatibility
-
-| Root Manager | Status |
-|---|---|
-| KernelSU | Tested (Action button + lifecycle scripts) |
-| Magisk | Supported |
-| APatch | Supported |
-
-## Community
+## 💬 Community

 <p align="center">
  <a href="https://t.me/superpowers9">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/SuperPowers_Telegram-Join-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/⚡_JOIN_THE_GRID-SuperPowers_Telegram-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram&logoColor=cyan&labelColor=0d1117&color=00d4ff" alt="Telegram">
  </a>
 </p>

-## Credits
+---

- [JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) — original TEESimulator and interception architecture
- [5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore) — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception
- [LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt) — PLT hook library
- [ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring) — Rust cryptography library
- [MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd) — AOSP compliance work via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157)
- [fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524) — contributor and collaborator
- [huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares) — collaborator and tester
+## 🙏 Credits

-## License
+- **[JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** — original author of TEESimulator and the interception architecture
+- **[5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore)** — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception on Android
+- **[LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt)** — PLT hook library used for binder interception
+- **[ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring)** — Rust cryptography library powering native cert generation
+- **[MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd)** — AOSP compliance improvements via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157), including authorize_create enforcement, attestation extension alignment, and binder transaction filtering
+- **[fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524)** — a real contributor and collaborator on this project
+- **[huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares)** — collaborator and tester

-[GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE)
+---
+
+## 📄 License
+
+This project is licensed under the [GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
+
+---
+
+<p align="center">
+  <b>🔐 Because the best attestation is the one the TEE never generated.</b>
+</p>
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import com.android.build.api.artifact.SingleArtifact
 import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
 import javax.inject.Inject
 import org.gradle.process.ExecOperations
-import org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget

 plugins {
    alias(libs.plugins.android.application)
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)

 val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
 val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
-val verName = "v6.0.1"
+val verName = "v5.1"

 android {
    namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
@@ -66,12 +65,6 @@ android {
    }
 }

-kotlin {
-    compilerOptions {
-        jvmTarget.set(JvmTarget.JVM_21)
-    }
-}
-
 dependencies {
    compileOnly(project(":stub"))
    compileOnly(libs.annotation)
@@ -98,7 +91,6 @@ val buildRustCertgen by tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
    outputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs"))

    environment("ANDROID_NDK_HOME", android.ndkDirectory.absolutePath)
-    environment("PATH", "${System.getProperty("user.home")}/.cargo/bin:${System.getenv("PATH") ?: ""}")
 }

 // AGP auto-detects jniLibs/ as an input to mergeJniLibFolders — wire the dependency
@@ -108,34 +100,6 @@ tasks.configureEach {
    }
 }

-// Auto-rewrite module/update.json on every packaging build so versionCode and
-// zipUrl track gitCommitCount automatically, matching module.prop.
-val refreshUpdateJson by tasks.registering {
-    group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
-    description = "Rewrite module/update.json to match current verName and gitCommitCount."
-
-    val updateJsonFile = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("module/update.json")
-    val capturedVerName = verName
-    val capturedCount = gitCommitCount
-
-    inputs.property("verName", capturedVerName)
-    inputs.property("gitCommitCount", capturedCount)
-    outputs.file(updateJsonFile)
-
-    doLast {
-        val fullVer = "$capturedVerName-$capturedCount"
-        updateJsonFile.writeText(
-            """{
-  "version": "$fullVer",
-  "versionCode": $capturedCount,
-  "zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/download/$fullVer/TEESimulator-RS-$fullVer-Release.zip",
-  "changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
-}
-"""
-        )
-    }
-}
-
 androidComponents {
    onVariants(selector().all()) { variant ->
        val capitalized = variant.name.replaceFirstChar { it.uppercase() }
@@ -157,10 +121,9 @@ androidComponents {
                    dependsOn("package${capitalized}")
                } else {
                    dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
-                    dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
                }
+                dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
                dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
-                dependsOn(refreshUpdateJson)

                if (isDebug) {
                    from(variant.artifacts.get(SingleArtifact.APK)) {
@@ -177,12 +140,11 @@ androidComponents {
                    }
                }

-                val nativeLibsDir = if (isDebug) {
-                    "intermediates/merged_native_libs/${variant.name}/merge${capitalized}NativeLibs/out/lib"
-                } else {
-                    "intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
-                }
-                from(project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(nativeLibsDir)) {
+                from(
+                    project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(
+                        "intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
+                    )
+                ) {
                    into("lib")
                    include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
                }
@@ -235,15 +235,20 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
    struct RegistrationEntry {
        wp<IBinder> target;
        sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
+        // Transaction codes to intercept. Empty = intercept all (legacy behavior).
        std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
    };

+    // Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
    mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_;
    std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_;

 public:
    BinderInterceptor() = default;

+    // Checks if a specific Binder+code combination should be intercepted.
+    // Returns true if the binder is registered AND the code is in its filter
+    // (or the filter is empty, meaning intercept everything).
    bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const {
        std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
        auto it = registry_.find(target);
@@ -354,9 +359,7 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
    if (!txn_data || txn_data->target.ptr == 0)
        return;

-    // AIDL methods use codes in [FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION, LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION] (1..0x00ffffff).
-    // System transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP, SHELL_COMMAND) use codes above that range.
-    // Skip those — intercepting a ping adds measurable latency that timing detectors flag.
+    // Skip system transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) to avoid latency detectors
    if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
        return;

@@ -428,29 +431,44 @@ void processBinderReadBuffer(const binder_write_read &bwr) {
    uintptr_t ptr = bwr.read_buffer;
    uintptr_t end = ptr + bwr.read_consumed;

+    LOGV("[Hook] Processing Read Buffer: Size=%llu, Consumed=%llu", bwr.read_size, bwr.read_consumed);
+
    while (ptr < end) {
+        // Ensure we can read at least the command header
        if (end - ptr < sizeof(uint32_t))
            break;

        uint32_t cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(ptr);
        ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+        // Calculate payload size from the ioctl command code
        size_t cmd_size = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);

+        // Log the command using our generated to-string function
+        LOGV("[Driver -> User] Command: %s (0x%x), DataSize: %zu", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd), cmd, cmd_size);
+
+        // Safety check: ensure the command's data does not exceed the buffer
        if (ptr + cmd_size > end) {
-            LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overrun parsing command 0x%x", cmd);
+            LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overflow detected while parsing command %s", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd));
            break;
        }

-        if (__builtin_expect(cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX, 0)) {
-            binder_transaction_data *txn;
+        // We are primarily interested in BR_TRANSACTION commands to intercept
+        if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
+            binder_transaction_data *txn = nullptr;
+
            if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
-                txn = &reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr)->transaction_data;
+                // The data is wrapped in a secctx struct
+                auto *wrapper = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr);
+                txn = &wrapper->transaction_data;
            } else {
                txn = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data *>(ptr);
            }
+
            inspectAndRewriteTransaction(txn);
        }

+        // Advance pointer to the next command
        ptr += cmd_size;
    }
 }
@@ -470,17 +488,13 @@ int intercepted_ioctl(int fd, int request, ...) {
    // 1. Call original kernel ioctl to let the driver do its work
    int result = g_original_ioctl(fd, request, arg);

+    // 2. After the call returns, check if it was a BINDER_WRITE_READ and if it succeeded
    if (result >= 0 && request == BINDER_WRITE_READ && arg != nullptr) {
        const auto *bwr = static_cast<const binder_write_read *>(arg);
-        // Fast reject: only enter the parser if the buffer could contain a BR_TRANSACTION.
-        // Pings, ref ops, and looper management never produce BR_TRANSACTION, so scanning
-        // their buffers is pure overhead (~2-5us per ioctl in debug builds).
-        if (bwr->read_consumed >= sizeof(uint32_t)) {
-            uint32_t first_cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(bwr->read_buffer);
-            if (first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX
-                || bwr->read_consumed > sizeof(uint32_t) + _IOC_SIZE(first_cmd)) {
-                processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
-            }
+
+        // We only care about data read FROM the driver (i.e., incoming commands)
+        if (bwr->read_consumed > 0) {
+            processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
        }
    }

@@ -523,11 +537,14 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
    if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback)
        return BAD_VALUE;

+    // We can only intercept local Binders (BBinder), not remote proxies (BpBinder)
    if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) {
        LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies.");
        return BAD_TYPE;
    }

+    // Read optional transaction code filter. If present: int32 count + count * uint32 codes.
+    // If absent or count <= 0: intercept all transaction codes (legacy behavior).
    std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
    int32_t code_count = 0;
    if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
@@ -595,15 +612,8 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
    Parcel pre_req, pre_resp;
    writeTransactionData(pre_req, tx_id, target, code, flags, request);

-    status_t pre_status = callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp);
-    if (pre_status != OK) {
-        // Block when interceptor is dead to prevent privacy leak to third-party apps
-        if (callback->pingBinder() != OK) {
-            LOGE("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Interceptor DEAD. Blocking to prevent attestation leak.", tx_id);
-            result = DEAD_OBJECT;
-            return true;
-        }
-        LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed (not dead). Forwarding.", tx_id);
+    if (callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp) != OK) {
+        LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed. Forwarding original call.", tx_id);
        return false;
    }

@@ -657,8 +667,7 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
        VALIDATE_STATUS(tx_id, post_req.appendFrom(reply, 0, reply_size));
    }

-    status_t post_status = callback->transact(intercept::kPostTransact, post_req, &post_resp);
-    if (post_status == OK) {
+    if (callback->transact(intercept::kPostTransact, post_req, &post_resp) == OK) {
        int32_t post_action = post_resp.readInt32();
        if (post_action == intercept::kActionOverrideReply && reply) {
            result = post_resp.readInt32(); // Read new status
@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ import android.content.Context
 import android.content.ContextWrapper
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.Looper
-import java.io.File
 import java.security.Security
 import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.BootStateManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.AbstractKeystoreInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.Keystore2Interceptor
@@ -25,6 +23,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
 object App {
    // The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor.
    private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L
+    // The sleep duration in milliseconds for the main service loop to keep the process alive.
+    private const val SERVICE_SLEEP_MS = 1000000L

    /**
     * The main entry point of the TEESimulator application.
@@ -40,20 +40,11 @@ object App {
        }

        try {
-            purgeDebugDiagnostics()
            prepareEnvironment()
-
-            // Spoof boot-state props before any hook attaches, so keystore2's
-            // cached snapshot reflects the spoofed values.
-            BootStateManager.apply()
-
-            // Load the package configuration.
-            ConfigurationManager.initialize()
-
            // Initialize and start the appropriate keystore interceptors.
            initializeInterceptors()

-            // Set up the device's boot key and hash, which are crucial for attestation.
+            ConfigurationManager.initialize()
            AndroidDeviceUtils.setupBootKeyAndHash()

            // Android ships with a stripped-down Bouncy Castle provider under the name "BC".
@@ -73,25 +64,6 @@ object App {
        }
    }

-    /**
-     * Release builds never emit diagnostics. Sweep any `.bin` dumps a prior
-     * debug install left in the world-readable temp dir so they can't act as a
-     * detection artifact for apps that probe /data/local/tmp.
-     */
-    private fun purgeDebugDiagnostics() {
-        if (SystemLogger.isDebugBuild) return
-        val stale =
-            File("/data/local/tmp").listFiles { _, name ->
-                name.startsWith("teesim-") && name.endsWith(".bin")
-            } ?: return
-        stale.forEach { runCatching { it.delete() } }
-        if (stale.isNotEmpty()) {
-            // warning() bypasses the rate limiter, so this once-per-boot audit
-            // line survives the noisy startup window.
-            SystemLogger.warning("Purged ${stale.size} stale debug diagnostic(s) from /data/local/tmp")
-        }
-    }
-
    /** Initializes the necessary Android framework internals to satisfy KeyStore requirements. */
    private fun prepareEnvironment() {
        // 1. Prepare Main Looper
@@ -43,12 +43,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
        securityLevel: Int,
    ): Extension {
        val keyDescription = buildKeyDescription(params, uid, securityLevel)
-        SystemLogger.verbose {
-            val formattedString = keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
+        var formattedString =
+            keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
                AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
            }
-            "Forged attestation data: $formattedString"
-        }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Forged attestation data: ${formattedString}")
        return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, DEROctetString(keyDescription.encoded))
    }

@@ -116,7 +115,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
            }

        val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(uid)
-        SystemLogger.info("Attestation patch levels for uid=$uid: os=$osPatch, vendor=$vendorPatch, boot=$bootPatch")
        properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL] =
            if (bootPatch != DO_NOT_REPORT) {
                DERTaggedObject(
@@ -131,6 +129,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
        return properties
    }

+    /** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
    private fun buildKeyDescription(
        params: KeyMintAttestation,
        uid: Int,
@@ -149,11 +148,15 @@ object AttestationBuilder {

        val fields =
            arrayOf(
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
-                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
-                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
-                DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)),
+                ASN1Integer(
+                    AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
+                ), // attestationVersion
+                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
+                ASN1Integer(
+                    AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
+                ), // keymasterVersion
+                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
+                DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
                DEROctetString(uniqueId),
                softwareEnforced,
                teeEnforced,
@@ -161,24 +164,37 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
        return DERSequence(fields)
    }

+    /**
+     * Computes the unique ID per the KeyMint HAL spec:
+     * HMAC-SHA256(T || C || R, HBK) truncated to 128 bits.
+     *
+     * T = temporal counter (creationTime / 2592000000, i.e. 30-day periods since epoch)
+     * C = DER-encoded ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID
+     * R = 0x00 (no factory reset since ID rotation)
+     * HBK = device-unique secret generated once during module installation
+     */
    private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
        val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
+
        val message =
            ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
                .putLong(temporalCounter)
                .put(aaidDer)
-                .put(0x00)
+                .put(0x00) // RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = false
                .array()
+
        val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
        mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
        return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
    }

+    /** Device-unique key seed, generated once at module installation. */
    private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
        val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
        if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
            file.readBytes()
        } else {
+            // Fallback: generate in-memory (won't persist across reboots)
            SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
            ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
        }
@@ -261,14 +277,20 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                DERTaggedObject(
                    true,
                    AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
-                    DERSet(params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
+                    DERSet(
+                        params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()
+                    ),
                )
            )
        }

        if (params.rollbackResistance == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
            )
        }

@@ -286,19 +308,31 @@ object AttestationBuilder {

        if (params.allowWhileOnBody == true) {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
            )
        }

        if (params.trustedUserPresenceRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
            )
        }

        if (params.trustedConfirmationRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
            )
        }

@@ -428,6 +462,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
            )
        )

+        // ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is only included when an attestation challenge is present.
        if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
            list.add(
                DERTaggedObject(
@@ -437,7 +472,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                )
            )
        }
-
        if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
            list.add(
                DERTaggedObject(
@@ -448,11 +482,8 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
            )
        }

-        if (params.callerNonce == true) {
-            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_CALLER_NONCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
-            )
-        }
+        // Keystore2-enforced tags belong in softwareEnforced, not teeEnforced.
+        // The HAL does not enforce these; keystore2's authorize_create handles them.
        params.activeDateTime?.let {
            list.add(
                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
@@ -460,22 +491,38 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
        }
        params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.time),
+                )
            )
        }
        params.usageExpireDateTime?.let {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.time),
+                )
            )
        }
        params.usageCountLimit?.let {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, ASN1Integer(it.toLong()))
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.toLong()),
+                )
            )
        }
        if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
            )
        }

@@ -507,9 +554,15 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
     */
    @Throws(Throwable::class)
    internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
+        // AOSP keystore_attestation_id.cpp: gather_attestation_application_id()
+        // uses a hardcoded identity for AID_SYSTEM (1000) and AID_ROOT (0):
+        //   packageName = "AndroidSystem", versionCode = 1, no signing digests.
        val appUid = uid % 100000
        if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
-            return buildApplicationIdDer(listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L), emptySet())
+            return buildApplicationIdDer(
+                listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L),
+                emptySet(),
+            )
        }

        val pm =
@@ -95,5 +95,5 @@ object AttestationConstants {

    // --- Other Constants ---
    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
-    const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128
+    const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
 }
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBox
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.toHex
-import java.util.Date

 /**
 * Handles the modification (patching) of Android Key Attestation extensions within certificates.
@@ -37,12 +36,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
     * @return A new, cryptographically valid, patched certificate chain. Returns the original chain
     *   on any failure.
     */
-    fun patchCertificateChain(
-        originalChain: Array<Certificate>?,
-        uid: Int,
-        notBefore: Date? = null,
-        notAfter: Date? = null,
-    ): Array<Certificate> {
+    fun patchCertificateChain(originalChain: Array<Certificate>?, uid: Int): Array<Certificate> {
        if (originalChain.isNullOrEmpty()) {
            SystemLogger.error("Attempted to patch a null or empty certificate chain for UID $uid.")
            return originalChain ?: emptyArray()
@@ -69,8 +63,6 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
                        keybox,
                        originalLeaf.sigAlgName,
                        uid,
-                        notBefore,
-                        notAfter,
                    )

                // 4. Construct the NEW, VALID chain by prepending the patched leaf to the keybox's
@@ -119,27 +111,17 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
        keybox: KeyBox,
        sigAlgName: String,
        uid: Int,
-        notBefore: Date? = null,
-        notAfter: Date? = null,
    ): Certificate {
        // The issuer of our new leaf is the subject of the first certificate in our custom keybox
        // chain.
        val newIssuer = X509CertificateHolder(keybox.certificates[0].encoded).subject

-        val effectiveNotBefore = notBefore ?: originalLeafHolder.notBefore
-        val effectiveNotAfter = notAfter ?: originalLeafHolder.notAfter
-        if (notBefore != null || notAfter != null) {
-            SystemLogger.debug(
-                "Overriding cert dates: notBefore=${effectiveNotBefore} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notBefore}), notAfter=${effectiveNotAfter} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notAfter})"
-            )
-        }
-
        val builder =
            X509v3CertificateBuilder(
                newIssuer,
                originalLeafHolder.serialNumber,
-                effectiveNotBefore,
-                effectiveNotAfter,
+                originalLeafHolder.notBefore,
+                originalLeafHolder.notAfter,
                originalLeafHolder.subject,
                originalLeafHolder.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
            )
@@ -164,7 +146,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
        // Log the signature of the newly created certificate to observe its non-deterministic
        // nature.
        val signatureBytes = (newCertificate as X509Certificate).signature
-        SystemLogger.verbose { "Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}" }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}")

        return newCertificate
    }
@@ -286,10 +268,8 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
    private fun createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsed: ParsedAttestation, uid: Int): Extension {
        val (allFields, teeEnforcedMap, originalRootOfTrust) = parsed

-        SystemLogger.verbose {
-            val formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
-            "Original attestation data: $formattedString"
-        }
+        var formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Original attestation data: ${formattedString}")

        // Build the new Root of Trust and add/replace it in the map.
        val newRootOfTrust = AttestationBuilder.buildRootOfTrust(originalRootOfTrust)
@@ -316,10 +296,8 @@ object AttestationPatcher {

        allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] = sortedTeeEnforced
        val patchedSequence = DERSequence(allFields)
-        SystemLogger.verbose {
-            val formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
-            "Patched  attestation data: $formattedString"
-        }
+        formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Patched  attestation data: ${formattedString}")
        val patchedOctets = DEROctetString(patchedSequence)

        return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, patchedOctets)
@@ -1,14 +1,8 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation

 import android.annotation.SuppressLint
-import android.os.Build
-import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
-import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
-import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
 import java.security.KeyStore
-import java.security.SecureRandom
 import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
-import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1ObjectIdentifier
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1OctetString
@@ -58,97 +52,14 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
        val bootPatchLevel: Int?,
    )

-    // A unique alias for the key used to perform the TEE functionality check.
    private const val TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_AttestationCheck"

-    // Alias for the device-ID attestation capability probe.
-    private const val DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_DeviceIdCheck"
-
-    /**
-     * Lazily determines if the device's TEE is functional by attempting to generate an
-     * attestation-backed key pair. The result is cached.
-     */
-    val isTeeFunctional: Boolean by lazy { checkTeeFunctionality() }
-
-    /**
-     * Lazily mirrors whether the real TEE can attest device identifiers/properties (the tags added
-     * by `setDevicePropertiesAttestationIncluded`). Hardware that never provisioned device IDs
-     * returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS; the synthesizer consults this so it never forges a capability the
-     * real silicon lacks. Cached.
-     */
-    val canAttestDeviceIds: Boolean by lazy { checkDeviceIdAttestation() }
-
    /**
     * Lazily fetches and parses attestation data from a genuinely generated certificate. The result
     * is cached. Returns null if the TEE is not functional or parsing fails.
     */
    val CachedAttestationData: AttestationData? by lazy { fetchAttestationData() }

-    /**
-     * Checks if the TEE is working correctly by generating a key in the Android Keystore with an
-     * attestation challenge.
-     *
-     * @return `true` if a key with attestation was generated successfully, `false` otherwise.
-     */
-    private fun checkTeeFunctionality(): Boolean {
-        SystemLogger.info("Performing TEE functionality check...")
-        return try {
-            val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
-            val keyPairGenerator =
-                KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
-
-            // A random challenge is required for attestation.
-            val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
-
-            val spec =
-                KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
-                    .setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
-                    .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
-                    .setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
-                    .build()
-
-            keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
-            keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
-
-            SystemLogger.info("TEE functionality check successful.")
-            true
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.warning("TEE functionality check failed.", e)
-            false
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Probes whether the real TEE can satisfy device-ID/property attestation, mirroring its actual
-     * capability. Gated behind [isTeeFunctional] so a dead TEE never triggers a second doomed
-     * probe — it simply reports `false` (cannot attest), the faithful result for such hardware.
-     */
-    private fun checkDeviceIdAttestation(): Boolean {
-        if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < Build.VERSION_CODES.S) return false
-        if (!isTeeFunctional) return false
-        return try {
-            val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
-            val keyPairGenerator =
-                KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
-            val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
-            val spec =
-                KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
-                    .setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
-                    .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
-                    .setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
-                    .setDevicePropertiesAttestationIncluded(true)
-                    .build()
-            keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
-            keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
-            runCatching { keyStore.deleteEntry(DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS) }
-            SystemLogger.info("Device-ID attestation supported by TEE.")
-            true
-        } catch (_: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.info("Device-ID attestation not supported by TEE; mirroring as cannot-attest.")
-            false
-        }
-    }
-
    /**
     * Retrieves the attestation certificate generated during the TEE check. The key entry is
     * deleted after retrieval to clean up.
@@ -156,8 +67,6 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
     * @return The leaf `X509Certificate` containing the attestation, or `null` if unavailable.
     */
    private fun getAttestationCertificate(): X509Certificate? {
-        if (!isTeeFunctional) return null
-
        return try {
            val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
            val certChain = keyStore.getCertificateChain(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS)
@@ -191,12 +100,11 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {

            // The extension's value is an ASN.1 sequence.
            val keyDescriptionSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
-            SystemLogger.verbose {
-                val formattedString = keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
+            var formattedString =
+                keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
                    AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
                }
-                "Cached attestation data: $formattedString"
-            }
+            SystemLogger.verbose("Cached attestation data: ${formattedString}")
            val fields = keyDescriptionSeq.toArray()

            val attestVersion =
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation

 import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
 import java.math.BigInteger
 import java.util.Date
 import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
@@ -17,11 +16,12 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 // Reference:
 // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
 data class KeyMintAttestation(
-    val keySize: Int,
    val algorithm: Int,
    val ecCurve: Int?,
    val ecCurveName: String,
+    val keySize: Int,
    val origin: Int?,
+    val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
    val blockMode: List<Int>,
    val padding: List<Int>,
    val purpose: List<Int>,
@@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
    val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
    val model: ByteArray?,
    val secondImei: ByteArray?,
+    // Enforcement tags
    val activeDateTime: Date?,
    val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
    val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
    val usageCountLimit: Int?,
    val callerNonce: Boolean?,
-    val nonce: ByteArray?,
    val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
    val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
    val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
    val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
    val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
    val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
-    val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
    val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
    val maxBootLevel: Int?,
    val minMacLength: Int?,
@@ -64,11 +63,13 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
    constructor(
        params: Array<KeyParameter>
    ) : this(
-        keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
-
        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
        algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,

+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
+        // For EC keys, derive keySize from EC_CURVE when KEY_SIZE is absent.
+        keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
+
        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
        ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE),
        ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
@@ -76,6 +77,9 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
        origin = params.findOrigin(Tag.ORIGIN),

+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, field = BoolValue)]
+        noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
+
        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)]
        blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE),

@@ -117,12 +121,13 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
        manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
        model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
        secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
+
+        // Enforcement tags
        activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
        originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
        usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
        usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
        callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
-        nonce = params.findBlob(Tag.NONCE),
        unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
        includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
        rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
@@ -130,7 +135,6 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
        allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
        trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
        trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
-        noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
        maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
        maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
        minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
@@ -140,13 +144,21 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
        params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
    }

-    fun isAttestKey(): Boolean = purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
+    fun isAttestKey(): Boolean {
+        return purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
+    }

-    fun isImportKey(): Boolean = origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
+    fun isImportKey(): Boolean {
+        return origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
+    }
 }

 // --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays ---

+/** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
+    this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.boolValue
+
 /** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findInteger(tag: Int): Int? =
    this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.integer
@@ -179,7 +191,7 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBlob(tag: Int): ByteArray? =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllBlockMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
    this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.blockMode }

-/** Maps to AOSP field = BlockMode (Repeated) */
+/** Maps to AOSP field = PaddingMode (Repeated) */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllPaddingMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
    this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.paddingMode }

@@ -191,9 +203,7 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
    this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }

-private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
-    if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
-
+/** Derives keySize from EC_CURVE tag when KEY_SIZE is not explicitly provided. */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
    val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
    return when (curveId) {
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-package org.matrix.TEESimulator.config
-
-import android.os.SystemProperties
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
-
-object BootStateManager {
-    private val targets =
-        linkedMapOf(
-            "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" to "green",
-            "ro.boot.flash.locked" to "1",
-            "ro.boot.veritymode" to "enforcing",
-            "ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state" to "locked",
-        )
-
-    private val fillIfAbsent =
-        linkedMapOf(
-            "ro.boot.vbmeta.invalidate_on_error" to "yes",
-            "ro.boot.vbmeta.avb_version" to "1.2",
-            "ro.boot.vbmeta.hash_alg" to "sha256",
-            "ro.boot.vbmeta.size" to "11904",
-        )
-
-    fun apply() {
-        for ((name, target) in targets) {
-            val current = SystemProperties.get(name, "")
-            if (current.isEmpty()) {
-                SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name absent on this device, skip")
-                continue
-            }
-            if (current == target) {
-                SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name already $target, skip")
-                continue
-            }
-            SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: setting $name=$target (was: '$current')")
-            AndroidDeviceUtils.setProperty(name, target)
-        }
-        for ((name, value) in fillIfAbsent) {
-            val current = SystemProperties.get(name, "")
-            if (current.isNotEmpty()) {
-                SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name already '$current', skip")
-                continue
-            }
-            SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: filling absent $name=$value")
-            AndroidDeviceUtils.setProperty(name, value)
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.ServiceManager
 import java.io.File
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager

@@ -66,6 +65,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
        // Initial load of all configuration files.
        loadTargetPackages(File(configRoot, TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE))
        loadPatchLevelConfig(File(configRoot, PATCH_LEVEL_FILE))
+
        // Start watching for any subsequent file changes.
        ConfigObserver.startWatching()
        SystemLogger.info("Configuration initialized and file observer started.")
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
        return packages.firstNotNullOfOrNull { pkg -> packageKeyboxes[pkg] } ?: DEFAULT_KEYBOX_FILE
    }

+    /** Determines if the certificate for a given UID needs to be patched. */
    fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean {
        val mode = getPackageModeForUid(uid)
        return mode == Mode.PATCH || mode == Mode.AUTO
@@ -91,19 +92,13 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
    /** Determines if a new certificate needs to be generated for a given UID. */
    fun shouldGenerate(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.GENERATE

+    /** Determines if no operation is needed for a given UID. */
    fun shouldSkipUid(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == null

-    fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean {
-        for (pkg in getPackagesForUid(uid)) {
-            when (packageModes[pkg]) {
-                Mode.GENERATE, Mode.PATCH -> return false
-                Mode.AUTO -> return true
-                null -> continue
-            }
-        }
-        return false
-    }
+    /** Determines if the UID is in AUTO mode (no explicit ! or ? suffix). */
+    fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.AUTO

+    /** Resolves the operating mode for a given UID based on its packages and the TEE status. */
    private fun getPackageModeForUid(uid: Int): Mode? {
        val packages = getPackagesForUid(uid)
        if (packages.isEmpty()) return null
@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
            when (packageModes[pkg]) {
                Mode.GENERATE -> return Mode.GENERATE
                Mode.PATCH -> return Mode.PATCH
-                Mode.AUTO -> return if (DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional) Mode.PATCH else Mode.GENERATE
+                Mode.AUTO -> return Mode.AUTO
                null -> continue
            }
        }
@@ -161,24 +156,25 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                    return@forEach
                }

+                val mode: Mode
+                val rawPkg: String
                when {
-                    // Suffix '!' means force GENERATE mode.
                    trimmedLine.endsWith("!") -> {
-                        val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
-                        newModes[pkg] = Mode.GENERATE
-                        newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
+                        mode = Mode.GENERATE
+                        rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
                    }
-                    // Suffix '?' means force PATCH mode.
                    trimmedLine.endsWith("?") -> {
-                        val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
-                        newModes[pkg] = Mode.PATCH
-                        newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
+                        mode = Mode.PATCH
+                        rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
                    }
                    else -> {
-                        newModes[trimmedLine] = Mode.AUTO
-                        newKeyboxes[trimmedLine] = currentKeybox
+                        mode = Mode.AUTO
+                        rawPkg = trimmedLine
                    }
                }
+
+                newModes[rawPkg] = mode
+                newKeyboxes[rawPkg] = currentKeybox
            }

            // Atomically update the configuration maps.
@@ -255,14 +251,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
            }

            // Parse global and per-package configurations.
-            var newGlobalLevel = parseLines(contextLines[""])
-            // TrickyAddon writes Pixel bulletin dates for boot/vendor but system=prop
-            // resolves to the real device prop — force boot/vendor through the same path
-            // to prevent cross-component date mismatches on non-Pixel devices.
-            if (newGlobalLevel?.system.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true)) {
-                SystemLogger.info("system=prop: forcing boot/vendor to derive from device props (were: boot=${newGlobalLevel?.boot}, vendor=${newGlobalLevel?.vendor})")
-                newGlobalLevel = newGlobalLevel?.copy(boot = "prop", vendor = "prop")
-            }
+            val newGlobalLevel = parseLines(contextLines[""])
            contextLines.remove("") // Remove global context to iterate over packages next

            for ((pkg, lines) in contextLines) {
@@ -293,10 +282,8 @@ object ConfigurationManager {

            val file = if (event != DELETE) File(configRoot, path) else null
            when (path) {
-                TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> file?.let { loadTargetPackages(it) }
-                    ?: SystemLogger.warning("$TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE was deleted.")
-                PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> file?.let { loadPatchLevelConfig(it) }
-                    ?: SystemLogger.warning("$PATCH_LEVEL_FILE was deleted.")
+                TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> loadTargetPackages(file!!)
+                PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> loadPatchLevelConfig(file!!)
                // Any change to an XML file is assumed to be a keybox.
                // The cache in KeyBoxManager will handle reloading it on its next use.
                else ->
@@ -306,15 +293,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                        )
                        KeyBoxManager.invalidateCache(path)
                        if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT > Build.VERSION_CODES.R) {
-                            // Drop only the patched cert chains so the next
-                            // attestation request re-signs with the new keybox.
-                            // Do NOT drop generatedKeys — that would destroy
-                            // every alias/private key in memory and on disk,
-                            // logging users out of any app that pinned a
-                            // persisted keystore alias.
+                            // Clear cached keys possibly containing old certificates
                            org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
                                .KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
-                                .invalidatePatchedChains("updating $file")
+                                .clearAllGeneratedKeys("updating $file")
                        }
                    }
            }
@@ -344,6 +326,8 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
        return iPackageManager
    }

+    /** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
+    /** Checks a SELinux permission for a caller identified by PID against the keystore context. */
    fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean {
        return try {
            val callerCtx =
@@ -356,6 +340,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
        }
    }

+    /** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
    fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
        val userId = uid / 100000
        return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
@@ -367,6 +352,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
        }
    }

+    /** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
    fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
        return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
            try {
@@ -293,6 +293,12 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
            }
        }

+        /**
+         * Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service.
+         *
+         * @param filteredCodes If non-empty, only these transaction codes will be intercepted at
+         *   the native level. All other codes pass through without the round-trip to Java.
+         */
        fun register(
            backdoor: IBinder,
            target: IBinder,
@@ -68,8 +68,13 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
        }
    }

+    /**
+     * Transaction codes this interceptor needs to handle at the native level. Override in
+     * subclasses to filter; empty means intercept everything (legacy behavior).
+     */
    protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf()

+    /** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
    private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
        keystoreService = service
        SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")
@@ -19,28 +19,11 @@ object InterceptorUtils {

    private const val EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC = -8

-    private fun synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode: Int): String =
-        when (errorCode) {
-            2 -> "Error::Rc(SYSTEM_ERROR)"
-            4 -> "Error::Rc(PERMISSION_DENIED)"
-            6 -> "Error::Rc(VALUE_CORRUPTED)"
-            7 -> "Error::Rc(KEY_NOT_FOUND)"
-            10 -> "Error::Rc(BACKEND_BUSY)"
-            -3 -> "Error::Km(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)"
-            -6 -> "Error::Km(INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE)"
-            -7 -> "Error::Km(INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM)"
-            -29 -> "Error::Km(TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS)"
-            -49 -> "Error::Km(UNSUPPORTED_TAG)"
-            -75 -> "Error::Km(INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH)"
-            -76 -> "Error::Km(INVALID_TAG)"
-            else -> if (errorCode > 0) "Error::Rc($errorCode)" else "Error::Km($errorCode)"
-        }
-
    fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
        val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
            writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
-            writeString(synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode))
-            writeInt(0) // empty remote stack trace header (AOSP Status.cpp:196)
+            writeString(null)
+            writeInt(0)
            writeInt(errorCode)
        }
        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
@@ -116,21 +99,12 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
    fun <T : Parcelable?> createTypedObjectReply(
        obj: T,
        flags: Int = 0,
-        diagnosticTag: String? = null,
    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
        val parcel =
            Parcel.obtain().apply {
                writeNoException()
                writeTypedObject(obj, flags)
            }
-        if (diagnosticTag != null && SystemLogger.isDebugBuild) {
-            val savedPos = parcel.dataPosition()
-            val wire = parcel.marshall()
-            parcel.setDataPosition(savedPos)
-            val path = "/data/local/tmp/teesim-$diagnosticTag.bin"
-            runCatching { java.io.File(path).writeBytes(wire) }
-            SystemLogger.debug("[$diagnosticTag] reply len=${wire.size} path=$path")
-        }
        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
    }

@@ -156,29 +130,28 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
        return exception != null
    }

+    /**
+     * Creates an `OverrideReply` that writes a `ServiceSpecificException` with the given error
+     * code via EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC.
+     */
    fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
        errorCode: Int
-    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply = createErrorReply(errorCode)
-
-    fun normalizeServiceSpecificReply(reply: Parcel): Parcel? {
-        reply.setDataPosition(0)
-        if (reply.readInt() != EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
-            reply.setDataPosition(0)
-            return null
-        }
-        // Advance position past message and stack header to reach errorCode.
-        reply.readString()
-        reply.readInt()
-        val errorCode = reply.readInt()
-        reply.setDataPosition(0)
-        return Parcel.obtain().apply {
-            writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
-            writeString(synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode))
-            writeInt(0)
-            writeInt(errorCode)
-        }
+    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+        val parcel =
+            Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                writeException(android.os.ServiceSpecificException(errorCode))
+            }
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
    }

+    /**
+     * Patches the system-level authorization values (OS_PATCHLEVEL, VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
+     * BOOT_PATCHLEVEL) in an authorization array to match the configured patch levels for the
+     * given calling UID. Each authorization's original [Authorization.securityLevel] is preserved.
+     *
+     * When a patch level is configured as "no" ([AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT]), the original
+     * hardware value is kept as-is.
+     */
    fun patchAuthorizations(
        authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
        callingUid: Int,
@@ -5,18 +5,18 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.Parcel
-import android.os.ServiceManager
 import android.system.keystore2.Domain
+import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreSecurityLevel
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
 import java.security.SecureRandom
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
+import java.util.Collections
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.GeneratedKeyPersistence
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
        else null
    private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
-    private val GRANT_TRANSACTION = InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "grant")
-    private val UNGRANT_TRANSACTION = InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "ungrant")
+    private val GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getSecurityLevel")

    private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
        stubBinderClass.declaredFields
@@ -61,21 +61,19 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
    }

-    private const val RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
-    private const val RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED = 6
-
-    // KeyStoreManager.grantKeyAccess() became a public app API in Android 16 (API 36). Before that,
-    // grant was a hidden API and SELinux denied untrusted_app, so a synthetic-key grant must answer
-    // PERMISSION_DENIED pre-36 and a coherent virtualized grant on 36+.
-    private const val GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK = 36
-    private val deletedSoftwareKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
+    // Keys whose certs were updated via updateSubcomponent; skip re-patching on getKeyEntry.
    private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()

-    fun forgetDeletedKey(keyId: KeyIdentifier) {
-        if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
-            SystemLogger.debug("Cleared deletion marker for ${keyId.alias}")
-        }
-    }
+    // Backdoor binder for registering new interceptors at runtime.
+    private var backdoorBinder: IBinder? = null
+
+    // Per-security-level interceptor instances, keyed by SecurityLevel constant.
+    private val securityLevelInterceptors = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor>()
+
+    // Identity set of SecurityLevel binders already registered with the native hook,
+    // tracked by System.identityHashCode to avoid re-registering the same BBinder.
+    private val registeredSecurityLevelBinders: MutableSet<Int> =
+        Collections.newSetFromMap(ConcurrentHashMap())

    override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
    override val processName = "keystore2"
@@ -89,8 +87,7 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
                LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
                GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
-                GRANT_TRANSACTION,
-                UNGRANT_TRANSACTION,
+                GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION,
            )
            .toIntArray()
    }
@@ -100,29 +97,9 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
     * security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
     */
    override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
+        backdoorBinder = backdoor
        val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service)
        setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor)
-        setupMaintenanceInterceptor(backdoor)
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Hooks the keystore2 daemon's `android.security.maintenance` binder, which is hosted by the
-     * same process, so synthetic key state follows real key-lifecycle events. Best-effort: if the
-     * service is absent the synthetic plane simply forgoes lifecycle parity.
-     */
-    private fun setupMaintenanceInterceptor(backdoor: IBinder) {
-        runCatching {
-                ServiceManager.getService("android.security.maintenance")?.let { maintenance ->
-                    SystemLogger.info("Found maintenance binder. Registering interceptor...")
-                    register(
-                        backdoor,
-                        maintenance,
-                        Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor,
-                        Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor.interceptedCodes,
-                    )
-                } ?: SystemLogger.warning("Maintenance binder not found; skipping lifecycle parity.")
-            }
-            .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept maintenance binder.", it) }
    }

    private fun setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(service: IKeystoreService, backdoor: IBinder) {
@@ -132,11 +109,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                    SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
                    val interceptor =
                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
-                    register(
+                    securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT] = interceptor
+                    registerSecurityLevelBinder(
                        backdoor,
                        tee.asBinder(),
                        interceptor,
-                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
                    )
                    interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
                }
@@ -149,11 +126,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                    SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
                    val interceptor =
                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
-                    register(
+                    securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX] = interceptor
+                    registerSecurityLevelBinder(
                        backdoor,
                        strongbox.asBinder(),
                        interceptor,
-                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
                    )
                    interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
                }
@@ -161,6 +138,30 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
            .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept StrongBox SecurityLevel.", it) }
    }

+    /**
+     * Registers an interceptor for a SecurityLevel binder, tracking the binder identity
+     * to avoid duplicate registrations when keystore2 returns the same BBinder.
+     */
+    private fun registerSecurityLevelBinder(
+        backdoor: IBinder,
+        binder: IBinder,
+        interceptor: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor,
+    ) {
+        val identity = System.identityHashCode(binder)
+        if (registeredSecurityLevelBinders.add(identity)) {
+            register(
+                backdoor,
+                binder,
+                interceptor,
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
+            )
+        } else {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "SecurityLevel binder $binder (identity=$identity) already registered, skipping."
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
    override fun onPreTransact(
        txId: Long,
        target: IBinder,
@@ -183,23 +184,9 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {

            if (isGMS || ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)) {
                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            } else {
+                return TransactionResult.Continue
            }
-
-            return runCatching {
-                    val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
-                    if (ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)) {
-                        TransactionResult.Continue
-                    } else {
-                        TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-                    }
-                }
-                .getOrElse {
-                    SystemLogger.error(
-                        "[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to parse parameters for ${transactionNames[code]!!}",
-                        it,
-                    )
-                    TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-                }
        } else if (
            code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION ||
                code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION ||
@@ -207,47 +194,19 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
        ) {
            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)

-            if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION) {
-                if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
-                    return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
+                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+
+            if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION)
                return handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid, data)
-            }

            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
            val descriptor =
                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost

-            // Domain.GRANT read (Android 16+ KeyStoreManager grant). Served for ANY grantee uid —
-            // including isolated services (bindIsolatedService) with no package mapping — so resolve
-            // it before the package-scoped skip; caller-binding in resolveGrant() is the real access
-            // gate. On Android <= 15 no grants are ever issued (grant() denies), so softwareGrants is
-            // empty and this falls through to the real keystore2.
-            if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION && descriptor.domain == Domain.GRANT) {
-                val grant =
-                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.resolveGrant(descriptor.nspace, callingUid)
-                if (grant == null) {
-                    // Ours but wrong caller -> KEY_NOT_FOUND (caller-binding); not ours -> real keystore2.
-                    return if (
-                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.softwareGrants.containsKey(descriptor.nspace)
-                    )
-                        InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
-                    else TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-                }
-                if ((grant.accessVector and 0x4) == 0) { // GET_INFO = 0x4 (access-vector gate)
-                    return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
-                }
-                val response =
-                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(grant.ownerKeyId)
-                        ?: return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
-                // Same object the owner read returns -> coherent chain across planes.
-                return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
-            }
-
-            if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
-                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-
            if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
+                // Handle delete by alias (APP domain) or nspace (KEY_ID domain).
                val keyId =
                    if (descriptor.alias != null) {
                        KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
@@ -266,7 +225,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(keyId)
                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
                    if (isSoftwareKey) {
-                        deletedSoftwareKeys.add(keyId)
                        SystemLogger.info(
                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${keyId.alias}, replying with empty response."
                        )
@@ -277,51 +235,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
            }

            if (descriptor.alias == null) {
-                if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
-                    // The probe pipeline (and some AOSP callers) switch follow-up
-                    // operations to KEY_ID semantics after generateKey returns a
-                    // KEY_ID descriptor. Without this branch, our software keys
-                    // are invisible to KEY_ID-based getKeyEntry calls and the
-                    // request falls through to the real keystore2 daemon, which
-                    // legitimately responds with KEY_NOT_FOUND. Duck Detector's
-                    // TimingSideChannelProbe captures that exception during its
-                    // warmup phase and surfaces it as
-                    // "Captured private binder exception during timing skip".
-                    // Resolving by KEY_ID and returning the cached response keeps
-                    // the call on the happy path, eliminating the warmup signal.
-                    val info = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
-                        callingUid, descriptor.nspace
-                    )
-                    if (info?.response != null) {
-                        SystemLogger.info(
-                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Found generated response via KEY_ID nspace=${descriptor.nspace}"
-                        )
-                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(info.response)
-                    }
-                    val teeResp = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findTeeResponseByKeyId(
-                        callingUid, descriptor.nspace
-                    )
-                    if (teeResp != null) {
-                        SystemLogger.info(
-                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Found TEE response via KEY_ID nspace=${descriptor.nspace}"
-                        )
-                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(teeResp)
-                    }
-                }
-                // Domain.GRANT is handled earlier (before the package-scoped skip); an alias-less
-                // read reaching here is KEY_ID or unknown, so it falls through to the real keystore2.
                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
            }
            val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)

-            val response = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
-            if (response == null) {
-                if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
-                    SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Returning KEY_NOT_FOUND for deleted key ${descriptor.alias}")
-                    return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
-                }
-                return TransactionResult.Continue
-            }
+            val response =
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
+                    ?: return TransactionResult.Continue

            if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId))
                SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key")
@@ -331,57 +251,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it.keyParameter)
            }
            return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
-        } else if (code == GRANT_TRANSACTION) {
-            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code] ?: "grant", callingUid, callingPid)
-            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
-            val key =
-                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
-                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-            val granteeUid = data.readInt()
-            val accessVector = data.readInt()
-            // Synthetic (generatedKeys) AND patch-mode (teeResponses) keys are ours; both must grant
-            // coherently so the Domain.GRANT readback returns the same chain the owner read returns.
-            // Real hardware keys fall through to the real keystore2, which applies the same SELinux
-            // gate the platform would.
-            val ownerKeyId =
-                resolveOwnerKeyId(key, callingUid)
-                    ?.takeIf { KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.ownsKeyResponse(it) }
-                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-            // Version-gated to mirror the real TEE 1:1. Pre-Android-16, grant was a hidden API and
-            // SELinux denied untrusted_app, so keystore2 returns PERMISSION_DENIED. Android 16
-            // (API 36) exposes KeyStoreManager.grantKeyAccess(), so an app grants its own key:
-            // issue a coherent, caller-bound, access-vector-carrying grant whose Domain.GRANT read
-            // returns the owner's chain.
-            if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK) {
-                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
-            }
-            val grantId =
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.issueGrant(ownerKeyId, granteeUid, accessVector)
-            val reply =
-                KeyDescriptor().apply {
-                    domain = Domain.GRANT
-                    nspace = grantId
-                    alias = null
-                    blob = null
-                }
-            return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(reply)
-        } else if (code == UNGRANT_TRANSACTION) {
-            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code] ?: "ungrant", callingUid, callingPid)
-            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
-            val key =
-                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
-                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-            val granteeUid = data.readInt()
-            val ownerKeyId =
-                resolveOwnerKeyId(key, callingUid)
-                    ?.takeIf { KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.ownsKeyResponse(it) }
-                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-            // Same version gate as grant(): denied pre-36, revoke the virtualized grant on 36+.
-            if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK) {
-                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
-            }
-            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.revokeGrant(ownerKeyId, granteeUid)
-            return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
+        } else if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
+            // Pass through to post-hook so we can register interceptors for newly-created
+            // SecurityLevel binders. keystore2 may create a new BBinder per call, so the
+            // initial registration in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors might not cover all
+            // binder instances that clients receive.
+            logTransaction(txId, "getSecurityLevel", callingUid, callingPid)
+            return TransactionResult.Continue
        } else {
            logTransaction(
                txId,
@@ -407,11 +283,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
        reply: Parcel?,
        resultCode: Int,
    ): TransactionResult {
-        if (target != keystoreService || reply == null) return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-        if (InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply)) {
-            val normalized = InterceptorUtils.normalizeServiceSpecificReply(reply)
-            return if (normalized != null) TransactionResult.OverrideReply(normalized)
-            else TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
+            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+
+        if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
+            return handlePostGetSecurityLevel(txId, data, reply)
        }

        if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
@@ -437,8 +313,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
            logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)

            return runCatching {
+                    val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
+                    val params =
+                        ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)
+                            ?: throw Exception("Abort updating entries for invalid parameters.")
                    val updatedKeyDescriptors =
-                        ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, reply)
+                        ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, params, reply)
                    InterceptorUtils.createTypedArrayReply(updatedKeyDescriptors)
                }
                .getOrElse {
@@ -468,8 +348,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                    val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!!
                    val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)

+                    // Skip patching for keys whose certs were explicitly set via updateSubcomponent.
                    if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) {
-                        SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: userUpdated=true, skipping patch" }
                        SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.")
                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
                    }
@@ -480,36 +360,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                            authorizations?.map { it.keyParameter }?.toTypedArray() ?: emptyArray()
                        )

-                    SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: isImport=${parsedParameters.isImportKey()} origin=${parsedParameters.origin} inImportedKeys=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)} hasPatchedChain=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId) != null} isAttestKey=${parsedParameters.isAttestKey()}" }
-
-                    if (parsedParameters.isImportKey()) {
-                        val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
-                        if (retainedChain == null) {
-                            SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, no retained chain, skip" }
-                            SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation).")
-                            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-                        }
-                        SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, SERVING RETAINED CHAIN (detection vector!)" }
-                        SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId")
-                        CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain).getOrThrow()
-                        response.metadata.authorizations =
-                            InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
-                                response.metadata.authorizations,
-                                callingUid,
-                            )
-                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
-                    }
-
-                    if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)) {
-                        SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: in importedKeys set, skip" }
-                        SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping attest-key override for imported key $keyId")
-                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-                    }
-
-                    if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey()) {
+                    if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey() &&
+                        !KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)
+                    ) {
                        SystemLogger.warning(
                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
                        )
+                        // Attest keys that are not under our control should be overriden.
                        val keyData =
                            CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
                                callingUid,
@@ -541,42 +398,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                                parsedParameters,
                            )
                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
-
-                        // Snapshot metadata bytes for the same reason as the
-                        // primary doSoftwareKeyGen path — loss-less restore
-                        // after reboot.
-                        val metadataBytesForPersist = response.metadata?.let { md ->
-                            runCatching {
-                                val parcel = android.os.Parcel.obtain()
-                                try {
-                                    md.writeToParcel(parcel, 0)
-                                    parcel.marshall()
-                                } finally {
-                                    parcel.recycle()
-                                }
-                            }.getOrNull()
-                        }
-                        GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
-                            keyId = keyId,
-                            keyPair = keyData.first,
-                            secretKey = null,
-                            nspace = newNspace,
-                            securityLevel = response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
-                            certChain = keyData.second,
-                            algorithm = parsedParameters.algorithm,
-                            keySize = parsedParameters.keySize,
-                            ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve ?: 0,
-                            purposes = parsedParameters.purpose,
-                            digests = parsedParameters.digest,
-                            isAttestationKey = true,
-                            metadataBytes = metadataBytesForPersist,
-                        )
-
                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
                    }

                    val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)

+                    // Check if we should perform attestation patch.
                    if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
                        SystemLogger.info(
                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
@@ -584,6 +411,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
                    }

+                    // First, try to retrieve the already-patched chain from our cache to ensure
+                    // consistency.
                    val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)

                    val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
@@ -593,12 +422,16 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                        )
                        finalChain = cachedChain
                    } else {
+                        // If no chain is cached (e.g., key existed before simulator started),
+                        // perform a live patch as a fallback. This may still be detectable.
                        SystemLogger.info(
                            "[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
                        )
                        finalChain =
                            AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
+
                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
+                        SystemLogger.debug("Cached patched certificate chain for $keyId.")
                    }

                    CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
@@ -622,34 +455,18 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
    }

-    /**
-     * Resolves the owner [KeyIdentifier] a grant/ungrant call targets. APP/alias keys map
-     * directly; KEY_ID keys are looked up by nspace (mirrors the deleteKey resolver). Returns
-     * null for anything not addressable, so callers fall through to the real keystore2.
-     */
-    private fun resolveOwnerKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? =
-        when {
-            descriptor.alias != null -> KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
-            descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID ->
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor.nspace)
-                    ?.let { info ->
-                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
-                            .firstOrNull { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
-                            ?.key
-                    }
-            else -> null
-        }
-
    private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
        val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
            ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost

+        // Resolve by nspace (KEY_ID) or alias (APP), same as createOperation.
        val generatedKeyInfo =
            when (descriptor.domain) {
                Domain.KEY_ID ->
                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
-                        callingUid, descriptor.nspace
+                        callingUid,
+                        descriptor.nspace,
                    )
                Domain.APP ->
                    descriptor.alias?.let {
@@ -659,23 +476,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
            }

        if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
-            // Patch-mode key (cached in teeResponses, not generatedKeys): the real keystore2 applies
-            // the update, so drop our stale cached chain. Otherwise getKeyEntry replays the
-            // pre-update generated attestation (duck STALE_TEE_RESPONSE_AFTER_KEY_ID_UPDATE).
-            when (descriptor.domain) {
-                Domain.KEY_ID ->
-                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.evictTeeResponseByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor.nspace)
-                Domain.APP ->
-                    descriptor.alias?.let {
-                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.evictTeeResponse(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it))
-                    }
-                else -> {}
-            }
-            descriptor.alias?.let {
-                val kid = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)
-                userUpdatedKeys.add(kid)
-                SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE] updateSubcomponent $kid: not generated key, added to userUpdatedKeys" }
-            }
+            // Hardware key: mark so getKeyEntry skips cert re-patching.
+            descriptor.alias?.let { userUpdatedKeys.add(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)) }
            return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
        }

@@ -686,13 +488,73 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {

        metadata.certificate = publicCert
        metadata.certificateChain = certificateChain
-
-        GeneratedKeyPersistence.rePersistIfNeeded(callingUid, generatedKeyInfo)
-
        SystemLogger.verbose(
            "Key updated with sizes: [publicCert, certificateChain] = [${publicCert?.size}, ${certificateChain?.size}]"
        )

        return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
    }
+
+    /**
+     * Intercepts the reply from getSecurityLevel to dynamically register our interceptor
+     * for the returned IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
+     *
+     * keystore2 may create a new BBinder for each getSecurityLevel call, so the binder
+     * registered during initial setup (in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors) might not be the
+     * same one that client apps receive. By intercepting every getSecurityLevel reply, we
+     * ensure that all SecurityLevel binders are covered.
+     */
+    private fun handlePostGetSecurityLevel(
+        txId: Long,
+        data: Parcel,
+        reply: Parcel,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        val backdoor = backdoorBinder
+        if (backdoor == null) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] post-getSecurityLevel: backdoor not available")
+            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        }
+
+        return runCatching {
+            // Read the security level argument from the original request.
+            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+            val requestedLevel = data.readInt()
+
+            // hasException already consumed the exception header from the reply.
+            // Next item is the IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
+            val secLevelBinder = reply.readStrongBinder()
+            if (secLevelBinder == null) {
+                SystemLogger.verbose(
+                    "[TX_ID: $txId] getSecurityLevel($requestedLevel) returned null binder"
+                )
+                return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+            }
+
+            // Only intercept TEE and StrongBox security levels.
+            if (requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT &&
+                requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX
+            ) {
+                return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+            }
+
+            // Get or create the interceptor for this security level. The interceptor may not
+            // exist yet if the initial setupSecurityLevelInterceptors call failed for this level.
+            val interceptor = securityLevelInterceptors.getOrPut(requestedLevel) {
+                val secLevelInterface =
+                    IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub.asInterface(secLevelBinder)
+                SystemLogger.info(
+                    "[TX_ID: $txId] Late-creating interceptor for security level $requestedLevel"
+                )
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(secLevelInterface, requestedLevel).also {
+                    it.loadPersistedKeys()
+                }
+            }
+
+            registerSecurityLevelBinder(backdoor, secLevelBinder, interceptor)
+            TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        }.getOrElse {
+            SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to process post-getSecurityLevel.", it)
+            TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        }
+    }
 }
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
-
-import android.os.IBinder
-import android.os.Parcel
-import android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance
-import android.system.keystore2.Domain
-import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
-
-/**
- * Intercepts the keystore2 daemon's `android.security.maintenance` binder so our synthetic key
- * state follows the same lifecycle events the platform applies to real keys.
- *
- * This is a pure side-effect hook: every handled transaction mutates only our own synthetic state
- * and then returns [TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost], so the real keystore2 still performs the
- * real operation. We never fabricate a maintenance reply, so real key lifecycle is never disturbed.
- *
- * Mounted via `register()` from [Keystore2Interceptor.onInterceptorReady]; the maintenance binder is
- * hosted by the same keystore2 process, so the already-injected native hook reaches it too.
- */
-object Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
-    private val stubClass = IKeystoreMaintenance.Stub::class.java
-
-    private val CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION =
-        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "clearNamespace")
-    private val DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION =
-        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "deleteAllKeys")
-    private val MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION =
-        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "migrateKeyNamespace")
-
-    /** Only the lifecycle transactions we mirror; unresolved codes (-1) are dropped. */
-    val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
-        listOf(
-                CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION,
-                DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION,
-                MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION,
-            )
-            .filter { it != -1 }
-            .toIntArray()
-    }
-
-    override fun onPreTransact(
-        txId: Long,
-        target: IBinder,
-        code: Int,
-        flags: Int,
-        callingUid: Int,
-        callingPid: Int,
-        data: Parcel,
-    ): TransactionResult {
-        when (code) {
-            CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION -> handleClearNamespace(data)
-            DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION ->
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.clearAllGeneratedKeys("maintenance.deleteAllKeys")
-            MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION -> handleMigrateKeyNamespace(data, callingUid)
-        }
-        // Always let the real keystore2 perform the real lifecycle operation.
-        return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-    }
-
-    private fun handleClearNamespace(data: Parcel) {
-        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreMaintenance.DESCRIPTOR)
-        val domain = data.readInt()
-        val nspace = data.readLong()
-        // Only Domain.APP namespaces map to our per-uid synthetic keys; nspace is the app uid.
-        if (domain == Domain.APP) {
-            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.clearNamespaceKeys(nspace.toInt())
-        }
-    }
-
-    private fun handleMigrateKeyNamespace(data: Parcel, callingUid: Int) {
-        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreMaintenance.DESCRIPTOR)
-        val source = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) ?: return
-        val destination = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) ?: return
-        val srcId = resolveSyntheticKeyId(source, callingUid) ?: return
-        if (!KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(srcId)) return // not ours
-
-        val dstId = resolveDestinationKeyId(destination, callingUid)
-        if (dstId == null) {
-            // Migrated out of our trackable (Domain.APP/alias) space -> drop our shadow so reads
-            // fall through to the real keystore2, which now owns it at the new namespace.
-            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(srcId)
-        } else {
-            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.migrateGeneratedKey(srcId, dstId)
-        }
-    }
-
-    /** Resolves a synthetic owner key from a source descriptor (Domain.APP alias or KEY_ID). */
-    private fun resolveSyntheticKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? =
-        when {
-            descriptor.alias != null -> KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
-            descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID ->
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
-                    .firstOrNull { it.key.uid == callingUid && it.value.nspace == descriptor.nspace }
-                    ?.key
-            else -> null
-        }
-
-    /** Destination must be an addressable Domain.APP alias for us to keep tracking the key. */
-    private fun resolveDestinationKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? {
-        val alias = descriptor.alias ?: return null
-        if (descriptor.domain != Domain.APP) return null
-        val uid = if (descriptor.nspace > 0) descriptor.nspace.toInt() else callingUid
-        return KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
-    }
-}
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(

    /**
     * Converts the legacy parameters into the modern [KeyMintAttestation] data structure, which is
-     * required by the refactored [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
+     * required by [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
     */
    fun toKeyMintAttestation(): KeyMintAttestation {
        // This conversion acts as a bridge, allowing our new generic components
        // to be used by the legacy interceptor.
        return KeyMintAttestation(
-            keySize = this.keySize,
            algorithm = this.algorithm,
-            ecCurve = 0,
+            ecCurve = 0, // Not explicitly available in legacy args, but not critical
            ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
-            origin = null,
+            keySize = this.keySize,
+            origin = null, // Not needed to build attestaion
+            noAuthRequired = null,
            blockMode = listOf<Int>(),
            padding = listOf<Int>(),
            purpose = this.purpose,
@@ -436,7 +437,6 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
            usageExpireDateTime = null,
            usageCountLimit = null,
            callerNonce = null,
-            nonce = null,
            unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
            includeUniqueId = null,
            rollbackResistance = null,
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
            allowWhileOnBody = null,
            trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
            trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
-            noAuthRequired = null,
            maxUsesPerBoot = null,
            maxBootLevel = null,
            minMacLength = null,
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import android.system.keystore2.Domain
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
 import java.util.TreeMap
-import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger

@@ -22,15 +21,6 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
    // Estimate for maximum size of a Binder response in bytes.
    private const val RESPONSE_SIZE_LIMIT = 358400

-    // Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
-    private data class ListEntriesParams(
-        val domain: Int,
-        val namespace: Long,
-        val startPastAlias: String?,
-    )
-
-    private val pendingParams = ConcurrentHashMap<Long, ListEntriesParams>()
-
    // Based on AOSP function `estimate_safe_amount_to_return` in utils.rs.
    private fun estimateSafeAmountToReturn(
        keyDescriptors: Array<KeyDescriptor>,
@@ -60,7 +50,7 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
    }

    // Parse and store parameters for later use (in post-transaction).
-    fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): Boolean {
+    fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): ListEntriesParams? {
        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)

        val domain = data.readInt()
@@ -71,20 +61,21 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
        // See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
        // Note that all generated keys belong to Domain::APP.
        if (domain == Domain.APP) {
-            pendingParams[txId] = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
-            SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached ${pendingParams[txId]}.")
-            return true
+            val params = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
+            SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached $params.")
+            return params
        }

-        return false
+        return null
    }

    // Merge software-backed keys with hardware-backed keys in the reply parcel.
-    fun injectGeneratedKeys(txId: Long, callingUid: Int, reply: Parcel): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
-        val params =
-            pendingParams.remove(txId)
-                ?: throw IllegalStateException("No params found for listing entries")
-
+    fun injectGeneratedKeys(
+        txId: Long,
+        callingUid: Int,
+        params: ListEntriesParams,
+        reply: Parcel,
+    ): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
        // By default we use the calling uid as namespace if domain is Domain::APP.
        // The namespace parameter is thus ignored for non-privileged applications.
        // See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
@@ -140,3 +131,6 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
            }
    }
 }
+
+// Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
+data class ListEntriesParams(val domain: Int, val namespace: Long, val startPastAlias: String?)
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
-
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
-
-object AuthorizeCreate {
-
-    fun check(
-        keyParams: KeyMintAttestation?,
-        opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
-        rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>? = null,
-    ): Int? {
-        if (keyParams == null) return null
-        val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
-        // Algorithm-level rejection runs before purpose-list check (AOSP HAL behavior)
-        return checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
-            ?: checkPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
-            ?: checkTemporalValidity(keyParams, purpose)
-            ?: checkCallerNonce(keyParams, purpose, rawOpParams)
-    }
-
-    private fun checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
-        val algo = keyParams.algorithm
-        if ((algo == Algorithm.EC || algo == Algorithm.RSA) &&
-            (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT)
-        ) {
-            return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
-        }
-        if (algo == Algorithm.RSA && purpose == KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY)
-            return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
-        return null
-    }
-
-    private fun checkPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
-        if (purpose == KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY)
-            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
-        if (purpose !in keyParams.purpose)
-            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
-        return null
-    }
-
-    private fun checkTemporalValidity(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
-        val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
-
-        keyParams.activeDateTime?.let { activeDate ->
-            if (now < activeDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyNotYetValid
-        }
-
-        keyParams.originationExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
-            if (purpose == KeyPurpose.SIGN || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) {
-                if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
-            }
-        }
-
-        keyParams.usageExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
-            if (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.DECRYPT) {
-                if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
-            }
-        }
-
-        return null
-    }
-
-    private fun checkCallerNonce(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int, rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>?): Int? {
-        if (purpose != KeyPurpose.SIGN && purpose != KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) return null
-        if (keyParams.callerNonce == true) return null
-        if (rawOpParams?.any { it.tag == Tag.NONCE } == true)
-            return KeystoreErrorCodes.callerNonceProhibited
-        return null
-    }
-}
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
+

 data class PersistedKeyData(
    val uid: Int,
@@ -29,47 +29,13 @@ data class PersistedKeyData(
    val ecCurve: Int,
    val purposes: List<Int>,
    val digests: List<Int>,
-    /** PKCS#8-encoded private key for asymmetric records, empty for symmetric. */
    val privateKeyBytes: ByteArray,
    val certChainBytes: List<ByteArray>,
-    /**
-     * Byte-identical KeyMetadata parcel snapshot. Restoring authorizations
-     * directly from these bytes preserves tag count, order, and exact
-     * security-level annotations across reboots — the kind of structural
-     * details apps fingerprint to decide whether the alias is still
-     * "the same key".
-     */
-    val metadataBytes: ByteArray,
-    /**
-     * Raw secret material for symmetric records (AES, HMAC, 3DES). Empty
-     * for asymmetric. Critical for AndroidX security crypto MasterKey
-     * (AES-GCM-256) — without this every reboot regenerates a fresh AES
-     * key and EncryptedSharedPreferences becomes undecryptable, which is
-     * what banking apps interpret as session expiry and force a relogin.
-     */
-    val symmetricKeyBytes: ByteArray,
-    val symmetricAlgorithm: String,
 )

 object GeneratedKeyPersistence {

-    /**
-     * Single source of truth for the on-disk format. Bump this every time
-     * the layout changes; older numbers are silently skipped on read so
-     * stale dev artifacts and pre-fix upstream files can't be partially
-     * rehydrated into broken in-memory state.
-     *
-     * History:
-     *   1 — original upstream layout (no metadata snapshot, no symmetric
-     *       block; restored keys lose authorization tags and AES master
-     *       keys altogether — apps relying on persisted keystore state
-     *       across reboots get logged out)
-     *   2 — transitional dev-only format that added metadata but still
-     *       missed the symmetric block; never shipped
-     *   3 — current: byte-identical KeyMetadata snapshot + raw symmetric
-     *       key material so AES/HMAC keys survive reboots
-     */
-    private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 3
+    private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 1
    private val PERSISTENCE_DIR = File(CONFIG_PATH, "persistent_keys")

    // Per-filename locks to prevent concurrent writes to the same key file
@@ -81,8 +47,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {

    fun save(
        keyId: KeyIdentifier,
-        keyPair: KeyPair?,
-        secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
+        keyPair: KeyPair,
        nspace: Long,
        securityLevel: Int,
        certChain: List<Certificate>,
@@ -92,11 +57,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
        purposes: List<Int>,
        digests: List<Int>,
        isAttestationKey: Boolean,
-        metadataBytes: ByteArray? = null,
    ) {
-        require(keyPair != null || secretKey != null) {
-            "Either keyPair or secretKey must be provided"
-        }
        val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
        val lock = getLockForKey(filename)
        SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Acquiring lock for $filename")
@@ -126,8 +87,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
                        out.writeInt(digests.size)
                        digests.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }

-                        // Asymmetric key block (empty for symmetric-only).
-                        val pkBytes = keyPair?.private?.encoded ?: ByteArray(0)
+                        val pkBytes = keyPair.private.encoded
                        out.writeInt(pkBytes.size)
                        out.write(pkBytes)

@@ -137,23 +97,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
                            out.writeInt(encoded.size)
                            out.write(encoded)
                        }
-
-                        // Metadata snapshot (always present, may be empty
-                        // if the live KeyMetadata could not be marshalled).
-                        val mdBytes = metadataBytes ?: ByteArray(0)
-                        out.writeInt(mdBytes.size)
-                        if (mdBytes.isNotEmpty()) out.write(mdBytes)
-
-                        // Symmetric key block (empty for asymmetric keys).
-                        if (secretKey != null) {
-                            val skBytes = secretKey.encoded
-                            out.writeUTF(secretKey.algorithm)
-                            out.writeInt(skBytes.size)
-                            out.write(skBytes)
-                        } else {
-                            out.writeUTF("")
-                            out.writeInt(0)
-                        }
                    }
                } catch (e: Exception) {
                    tmpFile.delete()
@@ -246,17 +189,8 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
                DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(file))).use { input ->
                    val version = input.readInt()
                    if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
-                        // Old upstream files (v1) and dev-only intermediate
-                        // files (v2) are missing the metadata snapshot
-                        // and/or symmetric key block — restoring them
-                        // would put broken state in memory (apps relying
-                        // on those records get logged out). Skip and let
-                        // the next generateKey re-create cleanly with the
-                        // new format. Affected apps re-login once after
-                        // upgrade, then never again.
-                        SystemLogger.info(
-                            "Skipping ${file.name}: legacy format version $version. " +
-                            "It will be replaced on next generateKey for this alias."
+                        SystemLogger.warning(
+                            "Skipping ${file.name}: unknown format version $version"
                        )
                        return@runCatching
                    }
@@ -278,7 +212,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {

                    val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
                    val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
-                    if (pkLen > 0) input.readFully(pkBytes)
+                    input.readFully(pkBytes)

                    val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
                    val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
@@ -288,17 +222,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
                        certBytes
                    }

-                    val metaLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 256 * 1024, "metaLen")
-                    val metadataBytes = ByteArray(metaLen).also {
-                        if (metaLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
-                    }
-
-                    val skAlgo = input.readUTF()
-                    val skLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "skLen")
-                    val skBytes = ByteArray(skLen).also {
-                        if (skLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
-                    }
-
                    if (storedSecLevel == securityLevel) {
                        result.add(
                            PersistedKeyData(
@@ -314,9 +237,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
                                digests = digests,
                                privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
                                certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
-                                metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
-                                symmetricKeyBytes = skBytes,
-                                symmetricAlgorithm = skAlgo,
                            )
                        )
                    }
@@ -330,97 +250,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
        return result
    }

-    // Re-persist updates the cert chain for an already-persisted key without
-    // reconstructing authorization parameters from the response. This avoids
-    // pulling keymint Tag dependencies into this file and is correct because
-    // the only field that changes post-generation is the patched cert chain.
-    fun rePersistIfNeeded(
-        callingUid: Int,
-        generatedKeyInfo: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo,
-    ) {
-        val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
-        if (metadata == null) {
-            SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: no metadata, skipping")
-            return
-        }
-        val secLevel = metadata.keySecurityLevel
-
-        val entry = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries.find { (id, info) ->
-            id.uid == callingUid && info.nspace == generatedKeyInfo.nspace
-        }
-        if (entry == null) {
-            SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: key not found in map for uid=$callingUid nspace=${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}")
-            return
-        }
-
-        val keyId = entry.key
-        val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
-        val existing = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, filename)
-
-        if (!existing.exists()) {
-            SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: no existing file for $keyId, skipping")
-            return
-        }
-
-        val newChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(metadata)
-        if (newChain == null) {
-            SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: could not extract cert chain for $keyId")
-            return
-        }
-
-        val persisted = runCatching {
-            DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(existing))).use { input ->
-                val version = input.readInt()
-                if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
-                    SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: legacy format version $version for $keyId, will not re-persist (next generateKey replaces it)")
-                    return
-                }
-                readPersistedKeyData(input)
-            }
-        }.getOrNull()
-        if (persisted == null) {
-            SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: failed to read existing data for $keyId")
-            return
-        }
-
-        val keyPair = generatedKeyInfo.keyPair
-        val secretKey = generatedKeyInfo.secretKey
-        if (keyPair == null && secretKey == null) {
-            SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: no key material for $keyId")
-            return
-        }
-        // Serialize the live KeyMetadata (now contains the user-installed cert
-        // chain via updateSubcomponent) so the next boot restores byte-identical
-        // metadata. KeyMetadata is binder-free, so marshall() is safe here.
-        val metadataBytes = runCatching {
-            android.os.Parcel.obtain().let { parcel ->
-                try {
-                    metadata.writeToParcel(parcel, 0)
-                    parcel.marshall()
-                } finally {
-                    parcel.recycle()
-                }
-            }
-        }.getOrNull()
-        save(
-            keyId = keyId,
-            keyPair = keyPair,
-            secretKey = secretKey,
-            nspace = generatedKeyInfo.nspace,
-            securityLevel = secLevel,
-            certChain = newChain.toList(),
-            algorithm = persisted.algorithm,
-            keySize = persisted.keySize,
-            ecCurve = persisted.ecCurve,
-            purposes = persisted.purposes,
-            digests = persisted.digests,
-            isAttestationKey = persisted.isAttestationKey,
-            metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
-        )
-        SystemLogger.debug("Re-persisted key $keyId with updated cert chain")
-    }
-
-    // Corrupted binary files can have arbitrary length fields — cap allocations
    private fun requireBounds(value: Int, max: Int, name: String): Int {
        require(value in 0..max) { "$name out of bounds: $value (max $max)" }
        return value
@@ -431,64 +260,4 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
            .digest("$uid:$alias".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
        return digest.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) } + ".bin"
    }
-
-    // Reads all fields after the version int has already been consumed
-    // and validated by the caller.
-    private fun readPersistedKeyData(input: DataInputStream): PersistedKeyData {
-        val secLevel = input.readInt()
-        val uid = input.readInt()
-        val alias = input.readUTF()
-        val nspace = input.readLong()
-        val isAttestKey = input.readBoolean()
-        val algo = input.readInt()
-        val kSize = input.readInt()
-        val curve = input.readInt()
-
-        val purposeCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "purposeCount")
-        val purposes = (0 until purposeCount).map { input.readInt() }
-
-        val digestCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "digestCount")
-        val digests = (0 until digestCount).map { input.readInt() }
-
-        val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
-        val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
-        if (pkLen > 0) input.readFully(pkBytes)
-
-        val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
-        val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
-            val certLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 65536, "certLen")
-            val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
-            input.readFully(certBytes)
-            certBytes
-        }
-
-        val metaLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 256 * 1024, "metaLen")
-        val metadataBytes = ByteArray(metaLen).also {
-            if (metaLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
-        }
-
-        val skAlgo = input.readUTF()
-        val skLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "skLen")
-        val skBytes = ByteArray(skLen).also {
-            if (skLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
-        }
-
-        return PersistedKeyData(
-            uid = uid,
-            alias = alias,
-            nspace = nspace,
-            securityLevel = secLevel,
-            isAttestationKey = isAttestKey,
-            algorithm = algo,
-            keySize = kSize,
-            ecCurve = curve,
-            purposes = purposes,
-            digests = digests,
-            privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
-            certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
-            metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
-            symmetricKeyBytes = skBytes,
-            symmetricAlgorithm = skAlgo,
-        )
-    }
 }
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils
 class OperationInterceptor(
    private val original: IKeystoreOperation,
    private val backdoor: IBinder,
-    private val isAead: Boolean,
 ) : BinderInterceptor() {

    override fun onPreTransact(
@@ -28,10 +27,6 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
        val methodName = transactionNames[code] ?: "unknown code=$code"
        logTransaction(txId, methodName, callingUid, callingPid, true)

-        if (code == UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION && !isAead) {
-            return InterceptorUtils.createServiceSpecificErrorReply(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
-        }
-
        if (code == FINISH_TRANSACTION || code == ABORT_TRANSACTION) {
            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.removeOperationInterceptor(target, backdoor)
        }
@@ -49,8 +44,8 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
        private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
            InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")

-        val INTERCEPTED_CODES =
-            intArrayOf(UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION, FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
+        /** Only intercept finish/abort for cleanup. Other ops pass through without round-trip. */
+        val INTERCEPTED_CODES = intArrayOf(FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)

        private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
            IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
+import android.os.RemoteException
 import android.os.ServiceSpecificException
-import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyParameters
 import java.security.KeyPair
@@ -20,16 +20,48 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger

+/** Keystore2 error codes for ServiceSpecificException. Negative = KeyMint, positive = Keystore. */
+internal object KeystoreErrorCode {
+    const val INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE = -28
+    const val VERIFICATION_FAILED = -30
+    const val UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE = -2
+    const val INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE = -3
+    const val SYSTEM_ERROR = 4
+    const val TOO_MUCH_DATA = 21
+    const val KEY_EXPIRED = -25
+    const val KEY_NOT_YET_VALID = -24
+
+    /** KeyMint ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED */
+    const val CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED = -55
+
+    /** KeyMint ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT */
+    const val INVALID_ARGUMENT = -38
+
+    /** KeyMint ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG */
+    const val INVALID_TAG = -40
+
+    /** Keystore2 ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED */
+    const val PERMISSION_DENIED = 6
+
+    /** Keystore2 ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND */
+    const val KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
+}
+
+// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
 private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
-    fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
-        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
-    }
+    fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?)
+
    fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
+
    fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
+
    fun abort()
+
+    /** Returns parameters from the begin phase (e.g. GCM nonce), or null if none. */
    fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? = null
 }

+// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
 private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
    fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
        val digest =
@@ -39,18 +71,17 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
                Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
                else -> "NONE"
            }
-        return when (params.algorithm) {
-            Algorithm.EC -> "${digest}withECDSA"
-            Algorithm.RSA -> {
-                val isPss = params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
-                if (isPss) "${digest}withRSA/PSS" else "${digest}withRSA"
+        val keyAlgo =
+            when (params.algorithm) {
+                Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
+                Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
+                else ->
+                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                        KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
+                        "Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
+                    )
            }
-            else ->
-                throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                    KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
-                    "Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
-                )
-        }
+        return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
    }

    fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
@@ -60,7 +91,7 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
                Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
                else ->
                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
+                        KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
                        "Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
                    )
            }
@@ -68,29 +99,32 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
            when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) {
                BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB"
                BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC"
-                BlockMode.CTR -> "CTR"
                BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM"
-                else -> "ECB"
+                else -> "ECB" // Default for RSA
            }
        val padding =
            when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) {
                PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
                PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
                PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
-                PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN -> "PKCS1Padding"
                PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
-                else -> "NoPadding"
+                else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
            }
        return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
    }
 }

+// Concrete implementation for Signing.
 private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
    private val signature: Signature =
        Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
            initSign(keyPair.private)
        }

+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+    }
+
    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
        if (data != null) signature.update(data)
        return null
@@ -104,12 +138,17 @@ private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimi
    override fun abort() {}
 }

+// Concrete implementation for Verification.
 private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
    private val signature: Signature =
        Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
            initVerify(keyPair.public)
        }

+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+    }
+
    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
        if (data != null) signature.update(data)
        return null
@@ -117,11 +156,16 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri

    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
        if (data != null) update(data)
-        if (signature == null) {
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature to verify is null")
-        }
+        if (signature == null)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+                "Signature to verify is null",
+            )
        if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature verification failed")
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+                "Signature/MAC verification failed",
+            )
        }
        return null
    }
@@ -129,27 +173,19 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
    override fun abort() {}
 }

+// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
 private class CipherPrimitive(
    cryptoKey: java.security.Key,
    params: KeyMintAttestation,
    private val opMode: Int,
 ) : CryptoPrimitive {
-    private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
    private val cipher: Cipher =
        Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
-            val nonce = params.nonce
-            if (nonce != null && isAead) {
-                init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec(128, nonce))
-            } else if (nonce != null) {
-                init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec(nonce))
-            } else {
-                init(opMode, cryptoKey)
-            }
+            init(opMode, cryptoKey)
        }

-    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
-        if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
-        if (aadInput != null) cipher.updateAAD(aadInput)
+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        if (data != null) cipher.updateAAD(data)
    }

    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
@@ -158,6 +194,9 @@ private class CipherPrimitive(
    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
        if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()

+    override fun abort() {}
+
+    /** Returns the cipher IV as a NONCE parameter for GCM operations. */
    override fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? {
        val iv = cipher.iv ?: return null
        return arrayOf(
@@ -167,20 +206,23 @@ private class CipherPrimitive(
            }
        )
    }
-
-    override fun abort() {}
 }

+// Concrete implementation for ECDH Key Agreement.
 private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
    private val agreement: javax.crypto.KeyAgreement =
        javax.crypto.KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH").apply { init(keyPair.private) }

+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+    }
+
    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = null

    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
        if (data == null)
            throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
+                KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
                "Peer public key required for key agreement",
            )
        val peerKey =
@@ -193,19 +235,51 @@ private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
    override fun abort() {}
 }

+/**
+ * A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
+ * delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
+ *
+ * Tracks operation lifecycle: once [finish] or [abort] is called, subsequent calls throw
+ * [ServiceSpecificException] with [KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE].
+ */
 class SoftwareOperation(
    private val txId: Long,
    keyPair: KeyPair?,
    secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
    params: KeyMintAttestation,
-    private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L,
+    var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null,
 ) {
    private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
-    @Volatile var finalized = false
-        private set

-    var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null
+    @Volatile private var finalized = false

+    init {
+        val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
+        val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
+        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
+
+        primitive =
+            when (purpose) {
+                KeyPurpose.SIGN -> Signer(keyPair!!, params)
+                KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> Verifier(keyPair!!, params)
+                KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> {
+                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair!!.public
+                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
+                }
+                KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> {
+                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair!!.private
+                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
+                }
+                KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair!!)
+                else ->
+                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                        KeystoreErrorCode.UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
+                        "Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
+                    )
+            }
+    }
+
+    /** Parameters produced during begin (e.g. GCM nonce), to populate CreateOperationResponse. */
    val beginParameters: KeyParameters?
        get() {
            val params = primitive.getBeginParameters() ?: return null
@@ -213,258 +287,107 @@ class SoftwareOperation(
            return KeyParameters().apply { keyParameter = params }
        }

-    init {
-        val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
-        val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
-        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
-
-        if (purpose == null) {
-            // Defensive: if params somehow restored without a PURPOSE tag
-            // (corrupt v2 metadata, mismatched authorizations array on load,
-            // or future format drift) the original code crashed with NPE
-            // because Signer/Verifier/Cipher all dereference keyPair!!
-            // before checking purpose. Surface a clean keystore error
-            // instead so callers see a normal-looking operation failure
-            // they can recover from rather than the process appearing to
-            // silently corrupt their session.
-            SystemLogger.warning(
-                "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Purpose missing on restored key " +
-                "(authorizations=${params.purpose}, keyPair=${if (keyPair != null) "present" else "null"}, " +
-                "secretKey=${if (secretKey != null) "present" else "null"}). " +
-                "Returning unsupportedPurpose."
-            )
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
-                "Restored key has no PURPOSE authorization",
-            )
-        }
-
-        primitive =
-            when (purpose) {
-                KeyPurpose.SIGN -> {
-                    val kp = keyPair ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
-                        "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] SIGN requested but keyPair is null",
-                    )
-                    Signer(kp, params)
-                }
-                KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> {
-                    val kp = keyPair ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
-                        "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] VERIFY requested but keyPair is null",
-                    )
-                    Verifier(kp, params)
-                }
-                KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> {
-                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair?.public
-                        ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                            KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
-                            "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] ENCRYPT requires either secretKey or keyPair.public",
-                        )
-                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
-                }
-                KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> {
-                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair?.private
-                        ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                            KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
-                            "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] DECRYPT requires either secretKey or keyPair.private",
-                        )
-                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
-                }
-                KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> {
-                    val kp = keyPair ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
-                        "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] AGREE_KEY requested but keyPair is null",
-                    )
-                    KeyAgreementPrimitive(kp)
-                }
-                else ->
-                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
-                        "Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
-                    )
-            }
-    }
-
    private fun checkActive() {
-        if (finalized) {
-            SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Rejected: operation already finalized (pruned or completed)")
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidOperationHandle)
-        }
+        if (finalized)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE,
+                "Operation already finalized.",
+            )
    }

-    private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
-        if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA) {
-            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Input too large: ${data.size} > $MAX_RECEIVE_DATA, throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA(${KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData})")
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData)
-        }
-    }
-
-    fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
-        SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() ENTRY inputSize=${aadInput?.size ?: 0} primitive=${primitive::class.simpleName}")
+    fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
        checkActive()
-        checkInputLength(aadInput)
        try {
-            primitive.updateAad(aadInput)
-            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() RETURNED_NORMALLY (unexpected for non-AEAD)")
-        } catch (throwable: Throwable) {
-            val top = throwable.stackTrace.firstOrNull()?.toString() ?: "<no-frame>"
-            val code = (throwable as? ServiceSpecificException)?.errorCode
-            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() THREW class=${throwable::class.java.name} code=$code msg=${throwable.message} top=$top")
-            throw throwable
+            primitive.updateAad(data)
+        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
+            finalized = true
+            throw e
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            finalized = true
+            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to updateAad.", e)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
        }
    }

    fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
-        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] update() inputSize=${data?.size ?: 0}")
        checkActive()
-        checkInputLength(data)
        try {
            return primitive.update(data)
        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
+            finalized = true
            throw e
        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            finalized = true
            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
-            throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
        }
    }

    fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
        checkActive()
-        checkInputLength(data)
        try {
-            val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
            val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
-            if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
-                val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
-                val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
-                if (delayMs > 0) LockSupport.parkNanos(delayMs * 1_000_000)
-            }
-            finalized = true
-            onFinishCallback?.invoke()
            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
+            onFinishCallback?.invoke()
            return result
        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
            throw e
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
-            throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
+        } finally {
+            finalized = true
        }
    }

    fun abort() {
+        checkActive()
        finalized = true
        primitive.abort()
        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
    }
+}

-    private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
-        is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, e.message)
-        is javax.crypto.BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument, e.message)
-        is javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidInputLength, e.message)
-        is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleKey, e.message)
-        else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.unknownError, e.message)
+/** Binder interface for [SoftwareOperation]. Synchronized and input-length validated. */
+class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
+    IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
+
+    private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
+        if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.TOO_MUCH_DATA)
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
+        synchronized(this) {
+            checkInputLength(aadInput)
+            operation.updateAad(aadInput)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        synchronized(this) {
+            checkInputLength(input)
+            return operation.update(input)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        synchronized(this) {
+            checkInputLength(input)
+            checkInputLength(signature)
+            return operation.finish(input, signature)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun abort() {
+        synchronized(this) { operation.abort() }
    }

    companion object {
        private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
    }
 }
-
-internal object KeystoreErrorCodes {
-    val tooMuchData: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.system.keystore2.ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21)
-    }
-
-    val invalidOperationHandle: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28)
-    }
-
-    val invalidTag: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -76)
-    }
-
-    val verificationFailed: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30)
-    }
-
-    val invalidArgument: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38)
-    }
-
-    val invalidInputLength: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21)
-    }
-
-    val incompatibleKey: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31)
-    }
-
-    val incompatiblePurpose: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -13)
-    }
-
-    val unsupportedPurpose: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -14)
-    }
-
-    val incompatibleAlgorithm: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18)
-    }
-
-    val keyNotYetValid: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -39)
-    }
-
-    val keyExpired: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -40)
-    }
-
-    val callerNonceProhibited: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55)
-    }
-
-    val unknownError: Int by lazy {
-        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000)
-    }
-
-    fun resolveField(className: String, fieldName: String, fallback: Int): Int =
-        runCatching {
-            Class.forName(className).getField(fieldName).getInt(null)
-        }.getOrElse {
-            SystemLogger.debug("Resolved $className.$fieldName via fallback: $fallback")
-            fallback
-        }
-}
-
-class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
-    IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
-
-    @Synchronized
-    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
-        SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() ENTRY callingUid=${android.os.Binder.getCallingUid()} size=${aadInput?.size ?: 0}")
-        try {
-            operation.updateAad(aadInput)
-            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() RETURNED_NORMALLY")
-        } catch (throwable: Throwable) {
-            val code = (throwable as? ServiceSpecificException)?.errorCode
-            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() PROPAGATING class=${throwable::class.java.name} code=$code msg=${throwable.message}")
-            throw throwable
-        }
-    }
-
-    @Synchronized
-    override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
-        return operation.update(input)
-    }
-
-    @Synchronized
-    override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
-        return operation.finish(input, signature)
-    }
-
-    @Synchronized
-    override fun abort() {
-        operation.abort()
-    }
-}
@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
    }

+    val hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        HardwareAuthenticatorType::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
+    }
+
+    val keyOriginNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        KeyOrigin::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
+    }
+
    val paddingNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
        PaddingMode::class
            .java
@@ -81,22 +97,33 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
            when (param.tag) {
                Tag.ALGORITHM -> algorithmNames[value.algorithm]
                Tag.BLOCK_MODE -> blockModeNames[value.blockMode]
+                Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
                Tag.EC_CURVE -> ecCurveNames[value.ecCurve]
+                Tag.ORIGIN -> keyOriginNames[value.origin]
                Tag.PADDING -> paddingNames[value.paddingMode]
                Tag.PURPOSE -> purposeNames[value.keyPurpose]
-                Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
+                Tag.USER_AUTH_TYPE ->
+                    hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames[value.hardwareAuthenticatorType]
                Tag.AUTH_TIMEOUT,
+                Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
                Tag.KEY_SIZE,
-                Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH -> value.integer.toString()
+                Tag.MAC_LENGTH,
+                Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+                Tag.OS_VERSION,
+                Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL,
+                Tag.USER_ID,
+                Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> value.integer.toString()
                Tag.CERTIFICATE_SERIAL -> BigInteger(value.blob).toString()
                Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME,
                Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER,
                Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE,
+                Tag.CREATION_DATETIME,
                Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
                Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME -> Date(value.dateTime).toString()
                Tag.CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT -> X500Name(X500Principal(value.blob).name).toString()
+                Tag.USER_SECURE_ID,
                Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT -> value.longInteger.toString()
-                Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> "true"
+                Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> value.boolValue.toString()
                Tag.ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
                Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND,
                Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE,
@@ -1,86 +1,42 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging

 import android.util.Log
-import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
-import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.BuildConfig

 /**
 * A centralized logging utility for the TEESimulator application. This object provides a consistent
 * logging tag and format for all application logs, making it easier to filter and debug in Logcat.
- *
- * Includes a rate limiter that caps logd syscalls during binder stress to prevent thread pool
- * contention. The first [RATE_LIMIT_BURST] messages per [RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS] window are logged
- * normally; subsequent messages are suppressed and a summary is emitted when the window resets.
 */
 object SystemLogger {
-    @PublishedApi internal const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
+    // The tag used for all log messages from this application.
+    private const val TAG = "TEESimulator"

-    @PublishedApi internal val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
-
-    // Rate limiter: allow BURST messages per WINDOW, then suppress until window resets.
-    private const val RATE_LIMIT_BURST = 15
-    private const val RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 1000L
-    private val windowStart = AtomicLong(System.currentTimeMillis())
-    private val windowCount = AtomicInteger(0)
-    private val suppressedCount = AtomicInteger(0)
-
-    /**
-     * Returns true if this message should be emitted. Resets the window if expired
-     * and emits a suppression summary for the previous window.
-     */
-    @PublishedApi internal fun acquireLogPermit(): Boolean {
-        val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
-        val start = windowStart.get()
-        if (now - start > RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS) {
-            // Window expired: reset and emit suppression summary if needed.
-            if (windowStart.compareAndSet(start, now)) {
-                val suppressed = suppressedCount.getAndSet(0)
-                windowCount.set(1) // this call counts as #1 in the new window
-                if (suppressed > 0) {
-                    Log.i(TAG, "[rate-limit] suppressed $suppressed log messages in previous window")
-                }
-                return true
-            }
-        }
-        val count = windowCount.incrementAndGet()
-        if (count <= RATE_LIMIT_BURST) return true
-        suppressedCount.incrementAndGet()
-        return false
-    }
+    private val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG

    /**
     * Logs a debug message. Use this for fine-grained information that is useful for debugging.
+     *
+     * @param message The message to log.
     */
    fun debug(message: String) {
        if (!isDebugBuild) return
-        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
        Log.d(TAG, message)
    }

-    /** Lazy debug: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
-    inline fun debug(message: () -> String) {
-        if (!isDebugBuild) return
-        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
-        Log.d(TAG, message())
-    }
-
    /**
     * Logs an informational message. Use this to report major application lifecycle events.
+     *
+     * @param message The message to log.
     */
    fun info(message: String) {
-        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
        Log.i(TAG, message)
    }

-    /** Lazy info: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
-    inline fun info(message: () -> String) {
-        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
-        Log.i(TAG, message())
-    }
-
    /**
-     * Logs a warning message. Warnings are never rate-limited.
+     * Logs a warning message. Use this to report unexpected but non-fatal issues.
+     *
+     * @param message The message to log.
+     * @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
     */
    fun warning(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
        if (throwable != null) {
@@ -91,7 +47,11 @@ object SystemLogger {
    }

    /**
-     * Logs an error message. Errors are never rate-limited.
+     * Logs an error message. Use this to report fatal errors or exceptions that disrupt
+     * functionality.
+     *
+     * @param message The message to log.
+     * @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
     */
    fun error(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
        if (throwable != null) {
@@ -104,22 +64,11 @@ object SystemLogger {
    /**
     * Logs a verbose message. This level is for highly detailed logs that are generally not needed
     * unless tracking a very specific issue.
+     *
+     * @param message The message to log.
     */
    fun verbose(message: String) {
        if (!isDebugBuild) return
-        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
        Log.v(TAG, message)
    }
-
-    /** Lazy verbose: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
-    inline fun verbose(message: () -> String) {
-        if (!isDebugBuild) return
-        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
-        Log.v(TAG, message())
-    }
-
-    inline fun trace(message: () -> String) {
-        if (!isDebugBuild) return
-        Log.w(TAG, message())
-    }
 }
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 */
 object CertificateGenerator {

+    // RFC 5280 GeneralizedTime maximum: 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (millis since epoch).
    private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L

    /**
@@ -93,27 +94,20 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
            )

        return try {
-                // AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge + no attestKey = self-signed, depth 1
-                if (challenge == null && attestKeyAlias == null) {
-                    SystemLogger.trace { "[certgen] no-challenge key: self-signed, depth=1, purposes=${params.purpose}" }
-                    return listOf(buildSelfSignedCertificate(subjectKeyPair, params))
-                }
-
                val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)

-                val attestKeyInfo =
+                val (signingKey, issuer) =
                    if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
-                        getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)
-                    } else null
-
-                val (signingKey, issuer) = attestKeyInfo
-                    ?.let { it.first to it.second }
-                    ?: (keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox))
+                        getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second }
+                            ?: (keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox))
+                    } else {
+                        keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)
+                    }

                val leafCert =
                    buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)

-                if (attestKeyInfo != null) {
+                if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
                    listOf(leafCert)
                } else {
                    listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
@@ -205,14 +199,16 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
    private fun buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(purposes: List<Int>): Int {
        var bits = 0
        for (purpose in purposes) {
-            bits = bits or when (purpose) {
-                KeyPurpose.SIGN -> KeyUsage.digitalSignature
-                KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeyUsage.dataEncipherment
-                KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyEncipherment
-                KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyAgreement
-                KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyCertSign
-                else -> 0
-            }
+            bits =
+                bits or
+                    when (purpose) {
+                        KeyPurpose.SIGN -> KeyUsage.digitalSignature
+                        KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeyUsage.dataEncipherment
+                        KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyEncipherment
+                        KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyAgreement
+                        KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyCertSign
+                        else -> 0
+                    }
        }
        return bits
    }
@@ -227,6 +223,8 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
        securityLevel: Int,
    ): Certificate {
        val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
+
+        // Default validity: epoch to 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (matches add_required_parameters).
        val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
        val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)

@@ -245,17 +243,21 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
        if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
            builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
        }
-        if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
-            builder.addExtension(
-                AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
-            )
-        }
+        // Add our custom, simulated attestation extension.
+        builder.addExtension(
+            AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
+        )

+        // The signature algorithm must match the SIGNING key, not the subject key.
+        // An EC attestation key may sign an RSA subject key's certificate (or vice versa).
        val signerAlgorithm =
-            when (signingKeyPair.private.algorithm) {
-                "EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
-                "RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
-                else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported signing key: ${signingKeyPair.private.algorithm}")
+            when (signingKeyPair.private) {
+                is java.security.interfaces.ECKey -> "SHA256withECDSA"
+                is java.security.interfaces.RSAKey -> "SHA256withRSA"
+                else ->
+                    throw IllegalArgumentException(
+                        "Unsupported signing key type: ${signingKeyPair.private.javaClass}"
+                    )
            }
        val contentSigner =
            JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
@@ -264,39 +266,4 @@ object CertificateGenerator {

        return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
    }
-
-    // AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:452-478, ta/src/cert.rs:111-114
-    private fun buildSelfSignedCertificate(
-        keyPair: KeyPair,
-        params: KeyMintAttestation,
-    ): Certificate {
-        val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
-        val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
-        val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
-
-        val builder = JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
-            subject,
-            params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
-            notBefore,
-            notAfter,
-            subject,
-            keyPair.public,
-        )
-
-        val keyUsageBits = buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(params.purpose)
-        if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
-            builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
-        }
-
-        val signerAlgorithm = when (keyPair.private.algorithm) {
-            "EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
-            "RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
-            else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported key: ${keyPair.private.algorithm}")
-        }
-        val contentSigner = JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
-            .setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
-            .build(keyPair.private)
-
-        return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
-    }
 }
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util

+import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.SystemProperties
 import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
@@ -90,33 +91,27 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
        attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?,
        expectedSize: Int,
    ): ByteArray {
+        // 1. Attempt to get the value from the system property.
        getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
            SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
-            persistToFile(propertyName, it)
            return it
        }

+        // 2. Fallback to the value from a cached TEE attestation.
        try {
            attestationValueProvider()?.let {
                SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
-                setProperty(propertyName, it)
-                persistToFile(propertyName, it)
+                setProperty(propertyName, it) // Persist for consistency
                return it
            }
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            SystemLogger.error("Failed to get $propertyName from attestation.", e)
        }

-        readFromFile(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
-            SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from persistent file: ${it.toHex()}")
-            setProperty(propertyName, it)
-            return it
-        }
-
+        // 3. As a final fallback, generate a random value.
        return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also {
            SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}")
            setProperty(propertyName, it)
-            persistToFile(propertyName, it)
        }
    }

@@ -163,55 +158,10 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
        }
    }

-    internal fun setProperty(name: String, value: String) {
-        try {
-            SystemLogger.debug("Setting system property '$name' to: $value")
-            val command = arrayOf("resetprop", name, value)
-            val process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command)
-            val exitCode = process.waitFor()
-
-            if (exitCode != 0) {
-                val errorOutput = process.errorStream.bufferedReader().readText()
-                SystemLogger.error(
-                    "resetprop for '$name' failed with exit code $exitCode: $errorOutput"
-                )
-            }
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to set '$name' property via resetprop.", e)
-        }
-    }
-
+    /** Generates a cryptographically random byte array of a specified length. */
    private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray =
        ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) }

-    private val PERSIST_DIR = File("/data/adb/tricky_store")
-
-    private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File = when (propertyName) {
-        "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
-        "ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
-        else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
-    }
-
-    private fun persistToFile(propertyName: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
-        try {
-            fileForProperty(propertyName).writeBytes(bytes)
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist $propertyName to file.", e)
-        }
-    }
-
-    private fun readFromFile(propertyName: String, expectedSize: Int): ByteArray? {
-        return try {
-            val file = fileForProperty(propertyName)
-            if (!file.exists()) return null
-            val bytes = file.readBytes()
-            if (bytes.size == expectedSize) bytes else null
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to read $propertyName from file.", e)
-            null
-        }
-    }
-
    // --- Patch Level Properties ---

    fun getPatchLevel(uid: Int): Int {
@@ -290,12 +240,11 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
        val resolvedValue = resolveDateKeywords(value)

        return when {
+            // "device_default" indicates falling back to the system property.
            resolvedValue.equals("device_default", ignoreCase = true) -> null
-            // Resolve from live system prop — matches what detectors see via getprop,
-            // even when PIF has spoofed ro.build.version.security_patch via resetprop
-            resolvedValue.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true) ->
-                parsePatchLevelValue(SystemProperties.get("ro.build.version.security_patch", ""), isLong)
+            // "no" indicates this value should not be reported.
            resolvedValue.equals("no", ignoreCase = true) -> DO_NOT_REPORT
+            // Otherwise, parse the resolved date string.
            else -> parsePatchLevelValue(resolvedValue, isLong)
        }
    }
@@ -345,9 +294,7 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                6 -> { // YYYYMM
                    val year = normalized.substring(0, 4).toInt()
                    val month = normalized.substring(4, 6).toInt()
-                    // Synthesizing day=01 from YYYY-MM disagrees with real device bulletins;
-                    // propagate null so callers fall back to a YYYY-MM-DD source.
-                    if (isLong) null else year * 100 + month
+                    if (isLong) year * 10000 + month * 100 + 1 else year * 100 + month
                }
                else -> null
            }
@@ -395,26 +342,20 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
        )

    /**
-     * Retrieves the attestation version for the given security level. The value follows the device
-     * OS: cached attestation data wins, then attestVersionMap[SDK_INT], then 400 as last resort.
-     * A static StrongBox=300 floor would force a major-version mismatch with the TEE chain on
-     * Android 16 devices that report keymaster 400 across both security levels.
+     * Retrieves the attestation version based on security level and OS version. StrongBox (level 2)
+     * requires version 300.
     *
     * @param securityLevel The security level of the attestation (1 for TEE, 2 for StrongBox).
     * @return The appropriate attestation version number.
     */
    fun getAttestVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
-        val cached = DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
-        val version = cached
+        // StrongBox security level requires an attestation version of at least 300.
+        if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) {
+            return 300
+        }
+        return DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
            ?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
            ?: 400 // Default to a recent version
-        val source = when {
-            cached != null -> "cache"
-            attestVersionMap.containsKey(Build.VERSION.SDK_INT) -> "map"
-            else -> "default"
-        }
-        SystemLogger.debug("attestVersion=$version source=$source securityLevel=$securityLevel")
-        return version
    }

    /**
@@ -423,11 +364,17 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
     * @param securityLevel The security level, used to determine the correct attestation version.
     * @return The appropriate Keymaster or KeyMint version number.
     */
-    fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
+    fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
+        val attestVersion = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
+        return if (attestVersion >= 100) attestVersion else 41 // Keymaster 4.1 for older versions
+    }

    // --- APEX and Module Hash Properties ---

-    // Minimal protobuf parser for apex_manifest.pb (field 1: name, field 2: version)
+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/android-latest-release:system/apex/proto/apex_manifest.proto
+    // --- Minimal Protobuf Parser for ApexManifest ---
+    // Field 1: name (string)
+    // Field 2: version (int64)
    private class MinimalApexManifestParser(private val data: ByteArray) {
        var pos = 0

@@ -441,13 +388,13 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                val wireType = (tag and 0x07).toInt()

                when (fieldNum) {
-                    1L -> {
+                    1L -> { // name
                        val length = readVarint().toInt()
                        if (pos + length > data.size) return null
                        name = String(data, pos, length, Charsets.UTF_8)
                        pos += length
                    }
-                    2L -> {
+                    2L -> { // version
                        version = readVarint()
                    }
                    else -> skipField(wireType)
@@ -475,18 +422,19 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {

        private fun skipField(wireType: Int) {
            when (wireType) {
-                0 -> readVarint()
-                1 -> pos += 8
-                2 -> {
+                0 -> readVarint() // Varint
+                1 -> pos += 8 // 64-bit
+                2 -> { // Length-delimited
                    val len = readVarint().toInt()
                    pos += len
                }
-                5 -> pos += 4
+                5 -> pos += 4 // 32-bit
                else -> throw IllegalStateException("Unknown wire type $wireType")
            }
        }
    }

+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/apex/libs/libapexutil/apexutil.cpp
    private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
        val results = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
        val apexRoot = File("/apex")
@@ -495,14 +443,22 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
            return@lazy emptyList()
        }

+        // Logic from: GetActivePackages in apexutil.cpp
        apexRoot.listFiles()?.forEach { file ->
            if (!file.isDirectory) return@forEach
            val name = file.name

+            // 1. Ignore "." (and implicitly "..")
            if (name.startsWith(".")) return@forEach
+
+            // 2. Ignore directories containing '@' (active mounts usually don't have version in
+            // path)
            if (name.contains("@")) return@forEach
+
+            // 3. Ignore "sharedlibs"
            if (name == "sharedlibs") return@forEach

+            // 4. Parse apex_manifest.pb
            val manifestFile = File(file, "apex_manifest.pb")
            if (manifestFile.exists()) {
                runCatching {
@@ -513,46 +469,59 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
            }
        }

+        // Ensure uniqueness (though filesystem scan usually prevents exact dupes,
+        // strictly speaking we want to behave like a Map keyed by package name)
        results.distinctBy { it.first }
    }

+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
    val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy {
        DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash
            ?: runCatching {
+                    // 1. Create a container to hold the sort key (name encoded) and the full data
+                    // (sequence encoded)
                    data class ModuleEntry(
-                        val nameEncoded: ByteArray,
-                        val fullEncoded: ByteArray,
+                        val nameEncoded: ByteArray, // The sort key
+                        val fullEncoded: ByteArray, // The data to hash
                    )

                    val modules =
                        apexInfos.map { (packageName, versionCode) ->
+                            // Create the components
                            val nameOctet = DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
                            val versionInt = ASN1Integer(versionCode)

+                            // Create the Sequence: SEQUENCE { packageName, version }
                            val vec = ASN1EncodableVector()
                            vec.add(nameOctet)
                            vec.add(versionInt)
                            val sequence = DERSequence(vec)

-                            // AOSP sorts by encoded name only, not full sequence
+                            // We store the encoded name separately because Rust sorts ONLY by this
                            ModuleEntry(
                                nameEncoded = nameOctet.encoded,
                                fullEncoded = sequence.encoded,
                            )
                        }

+                    // 2. Sort manually based on the encoded Package Name (lexicographically)
+                    // This mimics the Rust 'impl DerOrd for ModuleInfo' which delegates to
+                    // 'self.name'
                    val sortedModules =
                        modules.sortedWith { m1, m2 ->
                            compareByteArrays(m1.nameEncoded, m2.nameEncoded)
                        }

+                    // 3. Concatenate the full sequences in the specific sorted order
                    val payloadStream = ByteArrayOutputStream()
                    sortedModules.forEach { payloadStream.write(it.fullEncoded) }
                    val payload = payloadStream.toByteArray()

-                    // Wrap in DER SET tag manually — DERSet() re-sorts by full encoding
+                    // 4. Wrap manually in a DER SET tag (0x31)
+                    // We cannot use DERSet(vector) because it would re-sort incorrectly.
                    val finalDerSet = encodeAsDerSet(payload)

+                    // 5. Compute SHA-256
                    MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(finalDerSet)
                }
                .getOrElse {
@@ -561,6 +530,7 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                }
    }

+    /** Compares two byte arrays lexicographically (unsigned). */
    private fun compareByteArrays(a: ByteArray, b: ByteArray): Int {
        val length = minOf(a.size, b.size)
        for (i in 0 until length) {
@@ -573,25 +543,31 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
        return a.size - b.size
    }

+    /** Manually wraps the payload in an ASN.1 SET (0x31) tag with correct length encoding. */
    private fun encodeAsDerSet(payload: ByteArray): ByteArray {
        val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
-        out.write(0x31)
+        out.write(0x31) // ASN.1 Tag for SET
        writeDerLength(out, payload.size)
        out.write(payload)
        return out.toByteArray()
    }

+    /** Writes the ASN.1 length field to the stream. */
    private fun writeDerLength(out: ByteArrayOutputStream, length: Int) {
        if (length < 128) {
+            // Short form
            out.write(length)
        } else {
+            // Long form
            var size = length
            val bytes = ArrayList<Byte>()
            while (size > 0) {
                bytes.add((size and 0xFF).toByte())
                size = size ushr 8
            }
+            // First byte: 0x80 | number of length bytes
            out.write(0x80 or bytes.size)
+            // Write length bytes in big-endian (reverse of how we extracted them)
            for (i in bytes.indices.reversed()) {
                out.write(bytes[i].toInt())
            }
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
-
-import android.annotation.SuppressLint
-import android.content.Context
-import android.content.pm.PackageManager
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
-
-object AndroidPermissionUtils {
-
-    @SuppressLint("PrivateApi", "DiscouragedPrivateApi")
-    private fun getGlobalContext(): Context? {
-        return try {
-            // 1. Get the hidden ActivityThread class via reflection
-            val activityThreadClass = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread")
-            
-            // 2. Invoke the static currentActivityThread() method
-            val currentActivityThreadMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("currentActivityThread")
-            currentActivityThreadMethod.isAccessible = true
-            val activityThread = currentActivityThreadMethod.invoke(null)
-            
-            if (activityThread == null) {
-                SystemLogger.warning("Reflection: ActivityThread.currentActivityThread() returned null")
-                return null
-            }
-
-            // 3. Try to get the application context
-            val getApplicationMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getApplication")
-            getApplicationMethod.isAccessible = true
-            val application = getApplicationMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
-            
-            if (application != null) return application
-
-            // 4. Fallback to getSystemContext() if application is null (often happens in system_server)
-            val getSystemContextMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getSystemContext")
-            getSystemContextMethod.isAccessible = true
-            getSystemContextMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
-
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Reflection failed to get global context for permission check", e)
-            null
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Core permission check.
-     */
-    fun hasPermission(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
-        val context = getGlobalContext() ?: run {
-            SystemLogger.warning("AndroidPermissionUtils: Context is null, failing permission check safely.")
-            return false
-        }
-        
-        val result = context.checkPermission(permission, -1, uid)
-        return result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
-    }
-
-    fun hasDeviceAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
-        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE")
-    }
-
-    fun hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
-        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.REQUEST_UNIQUE_ID_ATTESTATION")
-    }
-
-    fun hasManageUsersPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
-        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS")
-    }
-
-    fun hasDumpPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
-        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.DUMP")
-    }
-}
@@ -8,6 +8,21 @@ import kotlin.math.exp
 import kotlin.math.ln
 import kotlin.math.max

+/**
+ * Simulates realistic TEE hardware latency for software key generation.
+ *
+ * The delay model is derived from 64+ timing measurements across QTEE (Qualcomm) and Trustonic
+ * (MediaTek) hardware. It combines four independent noise sources that model different physical
+ * latency origins in a real TrustZone-based TEE:
+ *
+ * 1. Base crypto processing (log-normal): hardware RNG + key derivation + cert signing
+ * 2. Binder/kernel transit (exponential): IPC scheduling, context switches
+ * 3. TrustZone scheduler jitter (Gaussian): world-switch non-determinism
+ * 4. Cold-start penalty (half-normal): first operation after idle is slower due to TEE
+ *    secure world re-initialization and TLB/cache warming
+ *
+ * Per-boot session bias models manufacturing variance between TEE hardware instances.
+ */
 object TeeLatencySimulator {

    private val rng = SecureRandom()
@@ -41,6 +56,11 @@ object TeeLatencySimulator {
        return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
    }

+    /**
+     * Log-normal base delay. Parameters tuned to match observed hardware profiles:
+     * EC P-256 on QTEE averages ~65ms, RSA-2048 ~75ms, AES ~40ms.
+     * Sigma kept low (0.08) to match the tight clustering seen in real measurements.
+     */
    private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
        val (mu, sigma) =
            when (algorithm) {
@@ -2,45 +2,10 @@
 MODDIR=${0%/*}
 CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store

-. "$MODDIR/action_i18n.sh"
-
-echo "  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
-echo "  ⚠️  $(_msg confirm_header)"
-echo "  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
-echo " "
-echo "  $(_msg confirm_warning_1)"
-echo "  $(_msg confirm_warning_2)"
-echo " "
-echo "  🔊  $(_msg confirm_vol_up)"
-echo "  🔉  $(_msg confirm_vol_down)"
-echo " "
-
-confirm() {
-    # Sample getevent in 1s bursts; a piped stream block-buffers and misses
-    # a single key-press before the timeout.
-    deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + 10 ))
-    while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$deadline" ]; do
-        events=$(/system/bin/timeout 1 /system/bin/getevent -l 2>/dev/null)
-        case "$events" in
-            *KEY_VOLUMEUP*)   return 0 ;;
-            *KEY_VOLUMEDOWN*) return 1 ;;
-        esac
-    done
-    return 1
-}
-
-if ! confirm; then
-    echo " "
-    echo "  ❌ $(_msg confirm_cancelled)"
-    exit 0
-fi
-
 if [ -d "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" ]; then
    rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
    mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
-    echo " "
-    echo "  ✅ $(_msg confirm_cleared)"
+    echo "Persistent key storage cleared"
 else
-    echo " "
-    echo "  ℹ️  $(_msg confirm_not_found)"
+    echo "No persistent key storage found"
 fi
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-ACTION_LANG="en"
-_detect_lang() {
-    local raw
-    raw=$(getprop persist.sys.locale 2>/dev/null)
-    [ -z "$raw" ] && raw=$(getprop ro.product.locale 2>/dev/null)
-    [ -z "$raw" ] && raw=$(getprop ro.system.locale 2>/dev/null)
-    local code=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | sed 's/_/-/g')
-    case "$code" in
-        zh-Hans*|zh-CN*) code="zh-CN" ;;
-        zh-Hant*|zh-TW*|zh-HK*) code="zh-TW" ;;
-        pt-BR*) code="pt-BR" ;;
-        pt*) code="pt-BR" ;;
-        es-ES*|es*) code="es-ES" ;;
-        *-*) code="${code%%-*}" ;;
-    esac
-    case "$code" in
-        ar|az|bn|de|el|es-ES|fa|fr|id|it|ja|ko|pl|pt-BR|ru|th|tl|tr|uk|vi|zh-CN|zh-TW) ACTION_LANG="$code" ;;
-    esac
-}
-_detect_lang
-
-_msg() {
-    case "$ACTION_LANG" in
-    zh-CN) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "清除持久化密钥存储" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "这将删除所有缓存的证明密钥。" ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "使用证明的应用将在下次使用时重新注册。" ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "音量+ = 确认清除" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "音量- = 取消（10秒后默认）" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "已取消 - 密钥已保留" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "持久化密钥存储已清除" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "未找到持久化密钥存储" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    zh-TW) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "清除持久化金鑰儲存" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "這將刪除所有快取的證明金鑰。" ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "使用證明的應用程式將在下次使用時重新註冊。" ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "音量+ = 確認清除" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "音量- = 取消（10秒後預設）" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "已取消 - 金鑰已保留" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "持久化金鑰儲存已清除" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "未找到持久化金鑰儲存" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    ja) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "永続キーストレージを消去" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "キャッシュされた証明キーをすべて削除します。" ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "証明を使用するアプリは次回使用時に再登録されます。" ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "音量+ = 消去を確認" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "音量- = キャンセル（10秒後デフォルト）" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "キャンセルされました - キーは保持されます" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "永続キーストレージを消去しました" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "永続キーストレージが見つかりません" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    ko) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "영구 키 저장소 지우기" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "캐시된 모든 증명 키를 삭제합니다." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "증명을 사용하는 앱은 다음 사용 시 재등록됩니다." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "볼륨+ = 지우기 확인" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "볼륨- = 취소 (10초 후 기본값)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "취소됨 - 키 유지됨" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "영구 키 저장소가 지워졌습니다" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "영구 키 저장소를 찾을 수 없습니다" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    ru) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Очистить постоянное хранилище ключей" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Это удалит все кэшированные ключи аттестации." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Приложения, использующие аттестацию, перерегистрируются при следующем использовании." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Громкость+ = Подтвердить очистку" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Громкость- = Отмена (по умолчанию через 10с)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Отменено - ключи сохранены" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Постоянное хранилище ключей очищено" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Постоянное хранилище ключей не найдено" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    de) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Persistenten Schlüsselspeicher löschen" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Dies löscht alle zwischengespeicherten Attestierungsschlüssel." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Apps mit Attestierung registrieren sich bei der nächsten Nutzung neu." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Laut+ = Löschen bestätigen" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Leise- = Abbrechen (Standard nach 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Abgebrochen - Schlüssel beibehalten" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Persistenter Schlüsselspeicher gelöscht" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Kein persistenter Schlüsselspeicher gefunden" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    fr) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Effacer le stockage de clés persistant" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Ceci supprime toutes les clés d'attestation en cache." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Les apps utilisant l'attestation se réinscriront à la prochaine utilisation." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Confirmer l'effacement" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Annuler (par défaut après 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Annulé - clés conservées" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Stockage de clés persistant effacé" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Aucun stockage de clés persistant trouvé" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    es-ES) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Borrar almacenamiento persistente de claves" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Esto elimina todas las claves de atestación en caché." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Las apps que usan atestación se volverán a registrar en el próximo uso." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Confirmar borrado" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Cancelar (predeterminado tras 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Cancelado - claves conservadas" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Almacenamiento persistente de claves borrado" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "No se encontró almacenamiento persistente de claves" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    pt-BR) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Limpar armazenamento persistente de chaves" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Isso exclui todas as chaves de atestação em cache." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Apps que usam atestação serão re-registrados no próximo uso." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Confirmar limpeza" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Cancelar (padrão após 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Cancelado - chaves preservadas" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Armazenamento persistente de chaves limpo" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Nenhum armazenamento persistente de chaves encontrado" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    it) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Cancella archivio chiavi persistente" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Questo elimina tutte le chiavi di attestazione in cache." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Le app che usano l'attestazione si re-registreranno al prossimo utilizzo." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Conferma cancellazione" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Annulla (predefinito dopo 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Annullato - chiavi conservate" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Archivio chiavi persistente cancellato" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Nessun archivio chiavi persistente trovato" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    tr) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Kalıcı Anahtar Deposunu Temizle" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Bu, önbelleğe alınmış tüm doğrulama anahtarlarını siler." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Doğrulama kullanan uygulamalar bir sonraki kullanımda yeniden kaydolacak." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Ses+ = Temizlemeyi onayla" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Ses- = İptal (10sn sonra varsayılan)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "İptal edildi - anahtarlar korundu" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Kalıcı anahtar deposu temizlendi" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Kalıcı anahtar deposu bulunamadı" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    id) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Hapus Penyimpanan Kunci Persisten" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Ini menghapus semua kunci atestasi yang di-cache." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Aplikasi yang menggunakan atestasi akan mendaftar ulang saat digunakan." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Konfirmasi hapus" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Batal (default setelah 10 detik)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Dibatalkan - kunci dipertahankan" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Penyimpanan kunci persisten dihapus" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Penyimpanan kunci persisten tidak ditemukan" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    vi) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Xóa lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Thao tác này xóa tất cả khóa chứng thực được lưu cache." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Các ứng dụng dùng chứng thực sẽ đăng ký lại khi sử dụng tiếp theo." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Xác nhận xóa" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Hủy (mặc định sau 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Đã hủy - giữ nguyên khóa" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Đã xóa lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Không tìm thấy lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    ar) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "مسح تخزين المفاتيح الدائم" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "يؤدي هذا إلى حذف جميع مفاتيح التصديق المخزنة مؤقتاً." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "التطبيقات التي تستخدم التصديق ستعيد التسجيل في الاستخدام التالي." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "رفع الصوت = تأكيد المسح" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "خفض الصوت = إلغاء (افتراضي بعد 10 ثوانٍ)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "تم الإلغاء - تم الاحتفاظ بالمفاتيح" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "تم مسح تخزين المفاتيح الدائم" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "لم يتم العثور على تخزين مفاتيح دائم" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    th) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "ล้างที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวร" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "การดำเนินการนี้จะลบคีย์การรับรองที่แคชไว้ทั้งหมด" ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "แอปที่ใช้การรับรองจะลงทะเบียนใหม่ในการใช้งานครั้งถัดไป" ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "เพิ่มเสียง = ยืนยันการล้าง" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "ลดเสียง = ยกเลิก (ค่าเริ่มต้นหลัง 10 วินาที)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "ยกเลิกแล้ว - คีย์ยังคงอยู่" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "ล้างที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวรแล้ว" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "ไม่พบที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวร" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    uk) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Очистити постійне сховище ключів" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Це видаляє всі кешовані ключі атестації." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Програми, що використовують атестацію, повторно зареєструються при наступному використанні." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Гучність+ = Підтвердити очищення" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Гучність- = Скасувати (за замовчуванням через 10с)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Скасовано - ключі збережено" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Постійне сховище ключів очищено" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Постійне сховище ключів не знайдено" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    pl) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Wyczyść trwały magazyn kluczy" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "To usuwa wszystkie buforowane klucze atestacji." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Aplikacje używające atestacji zarejestrują się ponownie przy następnym użyciu." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Głośność+ = Potwierdź czyszczenie" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Głośność- = Anuluj (domyślnie po 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Anulowano - klucze zachowane" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Trwały magazyn kluczy wyczyszczony" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Nie znaleziono trwałego magazynu kluczy" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    az) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Davamlı Açar Yaddaşını Təmizlə" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Bu, keşlənmiş bütün təsdiqləmə açarlarını silir." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Təsdiqləmədən istifadə edən tətbiqlər növbəti istifadədə yenidən qeydiyyatdan keçəcək." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Səs+ = Təmizləməni təsdiqlə" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Səs- = Ləğv et (10 saniyə sonra defolt)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Ləğv edildi - açarlar saxlanıldı" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Davamlı açar yaddaşı təmizləndi" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Davamlı açar yaddaşı tapılmadı" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    bn) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পরিষ্কার করুন" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "এটি সমস্ত ক্যাশড অ্যাটেস্টেশন কী মুছে ফেলে।" ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "অ্যাটেস্টেশন ব্যবহারকারী অ্যাপগুলি পরবর্তী ব্যবহারে পুনরায় নিবন্ধন করবে।" ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "ভলিউম+ = পরিষ্কার নিশ্চিত করুন" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "ভলিউম- = বাতিল (১০ সেকেন্ডে ডিফল্ট)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "বাতিল করা হয়েছে - কী সংরক্ষিত" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পরিষ্কার করা হয়েছে" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "কোনো স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পাওয়া যায়নি" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    el) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Εκκαθάριση Μόνιμου Αποθηκευτικού Χώρου Κλειδιών" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Διαγράφει όλα τα προσωρινά αποθηκευμένα κλειδιά πιστοποίησης." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Οι εφαρμογές που χρησιμοποιούν πιστοποίηση θα επανεγγραφούν στην επόμενη χρήση." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Ένταση+ = Επιβεβαίωση εκκαθάρισης" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Ένταση- = Ακύρωση (προεπιλογή μετά από 10 δευτ)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Ακυρώθηκε - τα κλειδιά διατηρήθηκαν" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Ο μόνιμος αποθηκευτικός χώρος κλειδιών εκκαθαρίστηκε" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Δεν βρέθηκε μόνιμος αποθηκευτικός χώρος κλειδιών" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    fa) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "پاک کردن ذخیره‌سازی دائمی کلید" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "این کار همه کلیدهای تأیید کش‌شده را حذف می‌کند." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "برنامه‌های استفاده‌کننده از تأیید در استفاده بعدی دوباره ثبت‌نام می‌کنند." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "صدا+ = تأیید پاک کردن" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "صدا- = لغو (پیش‌فرض پس از ۱۰ ثانیه)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "لغو شد - کلیدها حفظ شدند" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "ذخیره‌سازی دائمی کلید پاک شد" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "ذخیره‌سازی دائمی کلید یافت نشد" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    tl) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Burahin ang Persistent Key Storage" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Buburahin nito ang lahat ng naka-cache na attestation keys." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Magre-rehistro muli ang mga app na gumagamit ng attestation sa susunod na paggamit." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Kumpirmahin ang pagbura" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Kanselahin (default pagkatapos ng 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Nakansela - napanatili ang mga key" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Nabura ang persistent key storage" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "Walang nahanap na persistent key storage" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    *) case "$1" in
-        confirm_header)     echo "Clear Persistent Key Storage" ;;
-        confirm_warning_1)  echo "This deletes all cached attestation keys." ;;
-        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Apps using attestation will re-enroll on next use." ;;
-        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+  = Confirm clear" ;;
-        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol-  = Cancel (default after 10s)" ;;
-        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Cancelled - keys preserved" ;;
-        confirm_cleared)    echo "Persistent key storage cleared" ;;
-        confirm_not_found)  echo "No persistent key storage found" ;;
-    esac ;;
-    esac
-}
@@ -1,175 +1,50 @@
-## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-282
+## TEESimulator-RS v5.1: Interception Architecture Rewrite

-AUTO-mode key attestation now forges plain attestation from the keybox instead of deferring to the real TEE.
+Major release. 27 files changed, 2300 lines rewritten. The entire Kotlin interception layer has been rebuilt with a clean architecture, proper AIDL alignment, and significantly lower binder overhead.

-### Detection coverage
- AUTO dispatch probed the device with `checkTeeFunctionality`, which only proves the TEE can mint one EC key. It says nothing about RSA attestation, device-ID attestation, or whether a patched chain survives RSA verify. Plain attestation requests (attest-key OFF, challenge present) were routed to PATCH and deferred to hardware, so devices that can't back that surfaced KeyAttestation reds: `ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED` (-49) and `BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01`.
- AUTO targets carrying an attestation challenge now take the FORGE path, the same one attest-key-ON already used: a synthetic chain built from the keybox and rooted under the Google root key. Requests with no challenge still pass through to real hardware, so KeyDetector's hardware-backed checks are unaffected.
+### Interception Layer Rewrite
+- KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor completely restructured: GeneratedKeyInfo now carries full KeyMintAttestation instead of nullable stub, eliminating scattered null checks across every operation path
+- SoftwareOperation rewritten with sealed CryptoPrimitive interface separating Signer, Verifier, Encryptor, and Decryptor into isolated implementations with proper JCA algorithm mapping
+- KeystoreErrorCode centralized object replaces scattered magic numbers for all KeyMint and Keystore2 error codes
+- listEntries moved from pre-transact parameter caching to post-transact injection, eliminating a race condition where cached params could go stale
+- deleteKey now handles both APP domain (by alias) and KEY_ID domain (by nspace) resolution paths correctly
+- AuthorizeCreate and AndroidPermissionUtils removed, authorization logic consolidated into the operation dispatch path
+- DeviceAttestationService removed, attestation routing simplified into the main interceptor

-### Verified
- Offline conformance against real FORGE captures: uid10389 and uid10154 chains are GREEN; the root SPKI byte-matches `GOOGLE_ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY`.
+### Software Crypto Operations
+- GCM nonce returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations, matching real KeyMint HAL behavior
+- updateAad correctly throws INVALID_TAG on non-AEAD operations instead of silently succeeding
+- Cipher algorithm mapping cleaned up: dropped CTR block mode and RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding that caused JCA provider mismatches
+- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes instead of raw exceptions

---
+### Attestation & Certificate Generation
+- CertificateGenerator rewritten with clean Kotlin Pair return type instead of Android's util.Pair
+- AttestationBuilder field ordering aligned with AOSP KeyDescription ASN.1 schema
+- Unique ID computation follows KeyMint HAL spec: HMAC-SHA256(temporal_counter || AAID || reset_flag, HBK) truncated to 128 bits
+- Patch level logging removed from hot path to reduce logcat noise on every attestation

-## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-280
+### Configuration & Device Properties
+- ConfigurationManager target package parsing refactored: mode/package extraction deduplicated across GENERATE/PATCH/AUTO branches
+- system=prop forced boot/vendor override removed, now respects explicit per-component patch level configuration
+- FileObserver delete handler simplified with direct file access instead of defensive null-checks
+- AndroidDeviceUtils expanded with additional device property accessors for attestation fields

-Clears the Duck Detector generate-mode parcel fingerprint that real Android 16 hardware also trips, fixes RSA attestation under an EC-only keybox, and restores device-property attestation for Play Integrity hardware apps such as BHIM and UPI. Generate-mode fix field-confirmed on Android 16.
+### Binder Performance
+- Safe parcel reads at 6 deserialization sites, replacing force-unwrap NPE paths with early-return on null. A single NPE generates a full stack trace that blocks the binder thread for ~2ms
+- teeResponses cache populated on generateKey/importKey post-transact, reducing getKeyEntry from 2+ binder round-trips to 1
+- pingBinder liveness check removed from pre-transact failure path, eliminating a synchronous IPC call on every failed transaction
+- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI entirely for PING/INTERFACE/DUMP

-### Detection coverage
- Generate-mode fingerprint: Duck reads the reply at a flat 12-byte stride and flags the sentinel tuple at positions 12 and 13 that the device's native ALGORITHM-first authorization order lands on. Real A16 silicon trips the same probe, so faithful mirroring stayed flagged. `normalizeAuthorizationLayout` marshals the auth array, runs Duck's exact predicate, and applies a minimal deterministic reorder only when it would match. Count, values, security levels, and the cert chain are untouched, and the reorder keys on the byte condition, never on a package. Applied on both the patch and forge reply paths. (#33)
- `updateAad` on a non-AEAD operation now answers per vendor: Samsung and Xiaomi-MTK TEEs return success, others return INVALID_TAG, matching Duck's OperationErrorPathProbe on both the sign/verify and cipher paths.
+### Dynamic SecurityLevel Binder Registration
+- Intercepts getSecurityLevel replies to register hooks on every new BBinder instance keystore2 returns, not just the initial one from setup
+- Identity hash deduplication prevents double-hooking when keystore2 returns the same binder across multiple calls
+- Resolves apps that call getSecurityLevel independently and receive a different binder than the one registered at startup

-### Attestation correctness (Android 16, EC and RSA)
- RSA leaf under an EC-only keybox: patching used to catch the no-RSA-key throw and return the chain untouched, leaking the device's real unlocked Root of Trust for RSA keys while EC keys patched cleanly. It now falls back to any keybox key (EC preferred) and signs the patched leaf with the keybox key's own algorithm, so the RSA leaf re-roots to the Google keybox under a forged locked RoT.
- RSA attest-key forge on an EC-only keybox: the forge path matched the algorithm exactly and threw -75 ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED on a miss, so an RSA ATTEST_KEY request never rooted and verifiers reported an unknown certificate. It now falls back to any attestation key, since an EC key validly ECDSA-signs an RSA-subject leaf. No-op on a dual keybox.
- A16 attestVersion: the device's KeyMint reports version 100 and the lazy cache shadowed the BAKLAVA-to-400 map, so the forge presented 100. It now caches the AOSP value per SDK and presents the correct 400.
- Algorithm-split key on restore: a persisted record holding an EC private key under an RSA leaf failed every signature as DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS. Restore now drops the record when the private key and served leaf disagree, so the next generateKey rebuilds a coherent key.
- Stale chain on regenerate: reusing an alias in generateKey now evicts the cached chain, matching keystore2, so getKeyEntry serves the current key instead of a stale forge from an earlier generation.
-
-### App compatibility
- Device-property attestation (BRAND, MODEL, and the rest) now forges unconditionally. The old gate probed the live TEE, which is dead on every device the module serves, so it rejected GMS Play Integrity's hardware path and broke BHIM and other UPI and Play-Integrity apps. Device-ID attestation (IMEI, serial) stays governed by the real KeyMint caller-permission rule: privileged callers get it, ordinary apps do not.
- getKeyEntry now reaches the owned-key lookup for skipped privileged UIDs, so framework attestKeyAlias resolution no longer returns "Invalid attestKeyAlias" for Key Attestation over Shizuku. Non-owned keys still skip post-processing, so a real app's key is never patched.
- Device-ID attestation over Shizuku (a privileged UID absent from target.txt) now takes the forge path instead of hitting the real TEE's CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66). "Use attest key" no longer double-roots: a reused persistent attest key is resolved by KEY_ID as well as alias, and an unresolved designated attest key refuses to emit a leaf rather than silently re-rooting under the keybox.
-
-### Diagnostics (debug builds only)
- Per-UID attestation dossier for targeted UIDs at /data/local/tmp/teesim/, recording the decoded chain on both forge and patch paths, key params, the keybox pick (including EC fail-safe), prop sources, forge failures, the emitted authorization shape, and served-versus-verified chains. Release builds strip this through R8 and stay silent. Keybox certificate serials log on every fetch for revocation triage.
-
-### Verified
- Android 16: generate-mode fingerprint signal gone, confirmed on device 2026-06-19.
-
---
-
-## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-251
-
-14 commits since v6.0.0-235. Clears the remaining Duck Detector grant-domain rows (incl. the Android 16 OnePlus report), restores Google Wallet and fingerprint compatibility, and removes the in-module patch-level/bulletin resolvers. Test device (SDK 35) TEE tamper score 28 → 8.
-
-### Detection coverage
- Grant plane virtualized: owner read and cross-app `Domain.GRANT` read return one identical chain. 6 RED rows cleared. (28 → 18)
- Generate-mode fingerprint: dropped 2 surplus authorizations (both patchlevels), USER_ID moved to SOFTWARE to mirror a captured device. (18 → 8)
- Android 16 grant: patch-mode keys now served on the grant plane, so owner and grant reads match — fixes CHAIN_SPLIT.
- Grant gated to SDK ≥ 36: Android 15 answers PERMISSION_DENIED, no synthetic over-capability.
- Stale-chain eviction: import and updateSubcomponent drop the cached attestation; no pre-mutation chain replays.
- Lifecycle coherence: clearNamespace / deleteAllKeys / migrateKeyNamespace mirror synthetic key and grant state — defeats delete-then-read probes.
- Device-ID attestation mirrors the real TEE: returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS where silicon can't attest, instead of forging it.
-
-### App compatibility
- Google Wallet: INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID stripped (not rejected) when the caller lacks the permission; card binding works. (PR #27)
- Fingerprint / vendor keys: KEY_ID miss skips the post-handler, so real HAL operations are no longer wrapped and broken. (PR #26)
-
-### Removed
- PatchLevelManager — auto-resolved the security-patch date from an installed PlayIntegrityFix module (with hot-reload) and applied it to props.
- BulletinPoller — scheduled security-bulletin refresh.
-
-### Other
- Release builds purge stale `teesim-*.bin` diagnostics from `/data/local/tmp` at boot.
- Vol-key confirmation rewritten to 1s `getevent` bursts (piped stream missed single presses on Magisk).
-
-### Verified
- SDK 35, Xiaomi 23106RN0DA: tamper 28 → 8; generate-mode signal gone; 4 grant rows UNAVAILABLE (correct for Android 15); no regressions.
- Android 16 grant fix built but unconfirmed on SDK 36 — needs an affected OnePlus user to confirm the grant rows clear.
-
---
-
-## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0-235
-
-11 commits since v6.0.0-224. Duck Detector generate-mode fingerprint cleared. Shizuku-routed BYO attestation fixed. Vol-key confirmation restored on Magisk.
-
-### Detection Coverage
- Duck Detector "TEE Simulator generate-mode fingerprint" cleared. `toAuthorizations` reordered to AOSP keymint reference order; KEY_SIZE moves from auth#4 to auth#2, breaking the byte-224 anchor the probe relied on. 0/31 matches on fresh self-probes (was 15/36).
- `persist.logd.size` variants blanked at boot via `service.sh`. Removes a logd-tuning side-channel.
-
-### BYO & Shizuku Routing
- Shizuku-routed BYO attestation no longer fails with `-49 UNSUPPORTED_TAG`. `shouldSkipUid` moved into `handleGenerateKey`, evaluated after BYO parameters are parsed.
- `createOperation` parallel fix: outer UID gate removed; the cache-or-forward lookup is the sole gate. BYO keys created under Shizuku UID can now be used for signing under the same UID.
- `forceGenerate` simplified: any attest-key or BYO request routes to software unconditionally.
- BYO attest-key miss returns the full keybox chain instead of a malformed depth-1 chain.
- AUTO TEE race dispatch removed. Resolution uses `DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional` only.
- Symmetric gen rejects `attestationKey != null` early with `INVALID_ARGUMENT`. Unsupported-algorithm branch returns `-38` instead of `-49`.
-
-### Action Button
- Vol+ / Vol- confirmation restored on Magisk. Streaming `getevent -lq` matched inline against `KEY_VOLUMEUP DOWN` / `KEY_VOLUMEDOWN DOWN`, wrapped in `/system/bin/timeout 10`. The prior polled approach timed out on six-events-per-keypress kernels.
-
-### Verified
- Android 15 (SDK 35), daemon PID 1466.
- Cross-device confirmation pending on OnePlus PKX110 and Samsung SM-S928B.
-
---
-
-## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0-224
-
-59 commits since v6.0.0-162. Self-sufficient spoofing infrastructure, Duck Detector TamperScore-4 cleared on Xiaomi A16, persistent symmetric key storage (PR #22), 22-language action button hardening.
-
-### Detection Coverage
- Duck Detector TimingSideChannelProbe cleared on Xiaomi A16 (SDK 35). Timing ratio dropped 1.555x to 1.055x, verdict WARNING to CLEAR. Threshold is > 1.1x.
- `KEY_ID` resolved from `teeResponses` instead of synthesized, matching real KeyMint binder behavior.
- Non-attested key cache mirrors attested path for byte-level metadata parity.
- `KEY_SIZE` emitted for EC keys; omitted when `ecCurve` is present, matching AOSP attestation_record.h.
- SSE messages synthesized canonically on non-AEAD `updateAad`; passthrough shape normalized.
- StrongBox attest version no longer hardcoded; resolved from device context.
- TEE op latency floor enforced to defeat micro-timing probes.
- Attest key resolution restored to nspace-aware lookup after revert/restore cycle.
-
-### Self-Sufficient Spoofing
- `PatchLevelManager` resolves OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels via PIF without external bulletin fetch.
- `BulletinPoller` refreshes bulletin data on a schedule, isolated from boot path via umbrella `try/catch`.
- Bootloader-lock props pushed via `resetprop` at boot; absent vbmeta complement props filled; `vbmeta.device_state` included.
- PIF hot-reload via `FileObserver`; empty source files skipped; future patch dates bounded by `MAX_FUTURE_DAYS`.
- Default `security_patch.txt` dropped at install time.
- `sepolicy.rule` allows UDP egress for DNS resolution.
-
-### Key Persistence (PR #22)
- Symmetric keys persist across reboots with byte-identical metadata.
- Keybox edits no longer wipe stored keys.
- Delete marker dropped on key regeneration to prevent stale state.
- Defensive symmetric fallback path with clean error codes.
-
-### Reliability
- `atomicWrite` preserves `[pkg]` sections; errors guarded in `updateTo`.
- `applyToProps` serialized against concurrent callers.
- `pollOnce` wrapped in umbrella `try/catch`; `BulletinPoller.start` failure isolated from spoofer init.
- Spoofer ordering fixed: runs before keystore hook to prevent attest-time prop drift.
- `isAutoMode` reads raw package mode; `system=prop` passive default respected.
- `mergedContents` propagates read errors instead of swallowing them.
- Date regex validation on `currentPatch`; YYYY-MM input skips day synthesis.
- Global key-assignment check requires `=` delimiter (no more partial matches).
- `validation_rejected` status emitted on invalid spoof input.
-
-### Action Button UX
- Vol+ required to clear `persistent_keys`. Vol- cancels. 10-second timeout defaults to cancel.
- Confirmation localized in 22 languages: ar, az, bn, de, el, es-ES, fa, fr, id, it, ja, ko, pl, pt-BR, ru, th, tl, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW.
- Every echoed string resolves through `_msg()` against device locale.
-
-### Build & Ops
- Kotlin `jvmTarget` raised to JVM 21.
- Gradle auto-rewrites `module/update.json` on packaging.
- `scripts/package.sh` locates user-local cargo; rust task receives cargo bin path.
- Verified on Xiaomi Android 16 (SDK 35) `v6.0.0-224-Release`. Daemon alive PID 1392. Pending cross-device confirm on OnePlus PKX110 (qcom sun) and Samsung SM-S928B (pineapple).
-
---
-
-## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0
-
-Repository consolidation release. All tee-rebuild work merged as the new main branch.
-
-### AOSP Self-Signed Cert Compliance
- No-challenge keys now generate self-signed certs (subject == issuer, depth 1), matching AOSP `ta/src/keys.rs:451-478`
- Both Kotlin (BouncyCastle) and Rust (native-certgen) paths corrected
- Eliminates attestation behavioral probes that detect keybox issuer on non-attested keys
-
-### Stability
- Binder stress crash hardening for concurrent generateKey calls
- AUTO mode TEE race for consistent attestation on devices with working G10
- Oversized transactions routed to software gen instead of crashing
- Operation-time params (BLOCK_MODE, PADDING, DIGEST) passed through to CipherPrimitive
-
-### Banking App Compatibility
- Bare `target.txt` entries now default to AUTO mode, resolved at config level to PATCH (working TEE) or GENERATE (broken TEE)
- Fixes BHIM and similar banking apps that require TEE-backed attestation keys
- Restores v5.0 behavior where AUTO was resolved before the interceptor dispatch, avoiding the non-deterministic `raceTeePatch` path
-
-### Infrastructure
- Version scheme changed to semver (v6.0.0)
- Repository moved to TEESimulator-RS as canonical source
+### Build & Packaging
+- Rust native build task integrated into Gradle with cargo-ndk for aarch64/armv7/x86/x86_64
+- Module ZIP includes all 4 native libraries (libTEESimulator, libsupervisor, libcertgen, libinject)
+- customize.sh extraction restored for supervisor daemon and native cert gen library
+- TeeLatencySimulator added as standalone utility for log-normal hardware latency emulation

 ---

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ install_file() {

 # --- Installation ---
 ui_print "- Extracting module files"
-for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh action_i18n.sh uninstall.sh; do
+for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh uninstall.sh; do
  install_file "$file" "$MODPATH"
 done

@@ -92,17 +92,6 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/target.txt" ]; then
  install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR"
 fi

-if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt" ]; then
-  ui_print "- Adding default security patch config (mirror device props)"
-  printf '%s\n' \
-    '# TEESimulator default: mirror live device props.' \
-    '# system=prop reads ro.build.version.security_patch at cert-gen time;' \
-    '# boot and vendor are auto-forced to prop too (ConfigurationManager.kt:253-256).' \
-    '# Override with explicit YYYY-MM-DD dates if you want active spoofing.' \
-    'system=prop' > "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt"
-  chmod 644 "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt"
-fi
-
 rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"

 if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk" ]; then
@@ -1,16 +1,2 @@
 allow keystore {adb_data_file shell_data_file} file *
 allow crash_dump keystore process *
-
-allow ksu self:tcp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
-allow ksu node:tcp_socket node_bind
-allow ksu port:tcp_socket name_connect
-allow magisk self:tcp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
-allow magisk node:tcp_socket node_bind
-allow magisk port:tcp_socket name_connect
-
-allow ksu self:udp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
-allow ksu node:udp_socket node_bind
-allow ksu port:udp_socket name_connect
-allow magisk self:udp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
-allow magisk node:udp_socket node_bind
-allow magisk port:udp_socket name_connect
@@ -3,14 +3,3 @@ cd $MODDIR

 # Fork-based supervisor for instant restart
 ./supervisor ./daemon "$MODDIR" &
-
-# Clear logd size persist properties once boot completes
-(
-  until [ "$(getprop sys.boot_completed)" = "1" ]; do
-    sleep 1
-  done
-  setprop persist.logd.size ""
-  setprop persist.logd.size.crash ""
-  setprop persist.logd.size.system ""
-  setprop persist.logd.size.main ""
-) &
@@ -10,4 +10,3 @@ done
 rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
 rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
 rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_hash.bin" "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_key.bin"
-rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt.next" "$CONFIG_DIR/last_bulletin_fetch.json"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
-  "version": "v6.0.1-282",
-  "versionCode": 282,
-  "zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/download/v6.0.1-282/TEESimulator-RS-v6.0.1-282-Release.zip",
-  "changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
+	"version": "v4.5",
+	"versionCode": 111,
+	"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.5/TEESimulator-v4.5-Release.zip",
+	"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
 }
@@ -14,69 +14,9 @@ const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11];
 // Extension OIDs
 const OID_KEY_USAGE: &[u64] = &[2, 5, 29, 15];

-// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge = self-signed leaf, chain depth 1
-pub fn build_self_signed_cert(
-    key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
-    params: &CertGenParams,
-) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
-    let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
-    let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
-
-    let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
-        serial.clone()
-    } else {
-        vec![1u8]
-    };
-
-    let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
-        subject.clone()
-    } else {
-        encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
-    };
-
-    let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
-    let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
-        // No keybox fallback available; use far-future (year 9999)
-        OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(253402300799)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365 * 30))
-    } else {
-        timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
-    };
-
-    let extensions_der = build_extensions(None, &params.purposes)?;
-
-    let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
-    let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
-    let validity_der = encode_validity(&not_before, &not_after);
-    let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
-
-    // issuer == subject (self-signed, per AOSP ta/src/cert.rs:111-114)
-    let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
-        &version_der,
-        &serial_der,
-        &sig_alg_der,
-        &subject_dn_der,
-        &validity_der,
-        &subject_dn_der,
-        &spki_der,
-        &extensions_tagged,
-    ]);
-
-    let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
-    let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
-
-    let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
-        &tbs_der,
-        &sig_alg_der,
-        &signature_bit_string,
-    ]);
-
-    Ok(vec![cert_der])
-}
-
 pub fn build_certificate_chain(
    key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
-    attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
+    attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
    keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
    params: &CertGenParams,
 ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
@@ -93,7 +33,7 @@ pub fn build_certificate_chain(

 fn build_leaf_cert(
    key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
-    attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
+    attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
    keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
    params: &CertGenParams,
 ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
@@ -123,6 +63,7 @@ fn build_leaf_cert(
        timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
    };

+    // Extensions
    let extensions_der = build_extensions(attestation_ext_der, &params.purposes)?;

    // TBS Certificate
@@ -315,19 +256,19 @@ fn extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
 }

-fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>, purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: &[u8], purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut extensions: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();

+    // KeyUsage extension (critical)
    let ku_byte = map_key_usage_byte(purposes);
    if ku_byte != 0 {
        let ku_ext = build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte);
        extensions.push(ku_ext);
    }

-    if let Some(attest_der) = attestation_ext_der {
-        let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attest_der);
-        extensions.push(attest_ext);
-    }
+    // Attestation extension (non-critical)
+    let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attestation_ext_der);
+    extensions.push(attest_ext);

    Ok(encode_der_sequence_of(&extensions))
 }
@@ -62,13 +62,14 @@ fn generate_attested_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<jbyteAr

    let keybox = keybox::parse_keybox(&params.keybox_cert_chain, &params.keybox_private_key)?;

-    let cert_chain = if params.attestation_challenge.is_some() {
-        let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(&params)?;
-        certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(&key_pair, Some(&attest_ext), &keybox, &params)?
-    } else {
-        tracing::info!("no attestation challenge, generating self-signed cert (depth 1)");
-        certbuilder::build_self_signed_cert(&key_pair, &params)?
-    };
+    let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(&params)?;
+
+    let cert_chain = certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(
+        &key_pair,
+        &attest_ext,
+        &keybox,
+        &params,
+    )?;

    let blob = assemble_result(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, &cert_chain);

@@ -10,12 +10,6 @@
 #   ./scripts/package.sh --rust --release             # build Rust crate first, then release
 set -euo pipefail

-# Gradle's buildRustCertgen resolves `cargo` against the daemon's inherited PATH,
-# not the env we inject via gradle's Exec.environment(). Prepend the per-user
-# rustup install so non-login shells (CI, IDE-launched terminals, fresh tmux)
-# still find it without sourcing /etc/profile.d/cargo-path.sh.
-[ -d "$HOME/.cargo/bin" ] && PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
-
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
 PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
 OUT_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/out"
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+public @interface HardwareAuthenticatorType {
+    int NONE = 0;
+    int PASSWORD = 1;
+    int FINGERPRINT = 2;
+    int ANY = -1;
+}
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 package android.os;

+/** Stub for android.os.SELinux. */
 public class SELinux {
    public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
            String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {
@@ -1,14 +1,21 @@
 package android.os;

+/**
+ * Stub for android.os.ServiceSpecificException.
+ *
+ * <p>Used by AIDL-generated binder stubs to report service-specific errors with numeric codes.
+ * The binder framework serializes this as EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC on the wire, preserving the integer
+ * error code for the client.
+ */
 public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
    public final int errorCode;

-    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
-        this.errorCode = errorCode;
-    }
-
    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
        super(message);
        this.errorCode = errorCode;
    }
+
+    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
+        this(errorCode, null);
+    }
 }
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-package android.security.maintenance;
-
-import android.os.IBinder;
-
-/**
- * Compile-time stub for the hidden keystore2 maintenance binder
- * ({@code android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance}).
- *
- * <p>This module is a {@code compileOnly} dependency, so the real framework class
- * (which carries the actual {@code TRANSACTION_*} codes) is loaded at runtime. We
- * only need the {@link #DESCRIPTOR} token to parse the transaction parcel and the
- * inner {@code Stub} class so {@code getTransactCode} can reflect the real codes.
- */
-public interface IKeystoreMaintenance {
-    String DESCRIPTOR = "android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance";
-
-    class Stub {
-        public static IKeystoreMaintenance asInterface(IBinder b) {
-            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
-        }
-    }
-}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Enginex0	4e83a846c9	docs(release): add v5.1 changelog for interception architecture rewrite	2026-03-21 15:06:52 +01:00
Enginex0	3aff09e7dd	feat(interception): dynamically register SecurityLevel binder interceptors keystore2 may return a different BBinder for each getSecurityLevel call, so the initial registration during setup might not cover all binder instances that client apps receive. Intercept getSecurityLevel replies to register our hook on every new BBinder, deduplicated by identity hash.	2026-03-21 06:09:00 +01:00
Enginex0	c7b0af2d29	fix(interception): restore G2 binder overhead mitigations from pre-PR157 Commit `b6f9d7b` introduced G2-specific fixes (ratio dropped from 5.00x to 2.10x) that were lost when resetting to upstream PR #157 at `94c8e5b`. Restores: try-catch safety in BinderInterceptor.onTransact, shouldPatch early-exit in getKeyEntry post-transact, safe parcel reads (!! to ?:) at 6 sites, teeResponses cache population in generateKey/importKey post-transact, uncaught exception handler in App.kt, and removes the pingBinder liveness check that added ~1.8x overhead per pre-transact.	2026-03-21 05:41:56 +01:00
Enginex0	13a1dd7887	feat(interception): add hardening fixes from pre-PR157 backup Ported challenge length validation, forced op rejection, system transaction skip, dead interceptor blocking, and createErrorReply. Removed size guards that broke G10. Fixed F14 error code to KeyMint space (-38).	2026-03-20 08:16:12 +01:00
Enginex0	21a3cb1ec0	fix(build): restore customize.sh and build.gradle.kts with all native libs PR 157 wholesale replacement dropped libsupervisor.so and libcertgen.so from both the ZIP include filter and the customize.sh extraction. service.sh calls ./supervisor and App.kt loads libcertgen.so, so the module would fail on install. Restores our versions with the Rust build task, 4-lib include filter, and supervisor/certgen extraction. Adopts PR 157's nativeLibsDir simplification (always use stripped libs).	2026-03-20 06:58:10 +01:00
Enginex0	2b31d4ef47	refactor(persistence): remove dead rePersistIfNeeded and helper Software keys receive their final cert chain at generation time and never go through onPostTransact patching, so re-persisting after patching is unreachable in PR 157's architecture.	2026-03-20 06:26:08 +01:00
Enginex0	38e9b547a5	feat(certgen): wire NativeCertGen and key persistence onto PR 157 base NativeCertGen serves as a fast path before BouncyCastle in doSoftwareGeneration, falling back gracefully when libcertgen.so is absent. GeneratedKeyPersistence saves software keys to disk asynchronously and restores them on daemon restart. Bump version to v5.1, restore TEESimulator-RS naming convention.	2026-03-20 06:23:05 +01:00
Enginex0	94c8e5b182	refactor(interception): reset Kotlin base to upstream PR #157 Our reimplementation of PR 157's logic had a silent divergence causing G10 to still fail under binder stress. Instead of hunting line-by-line, replace all shared Kotlin/Java/C++ files with PR 157's exact proven versions that pass all 63 conformance tests. Our Rust-exclusive files (NativeCertGen, GeneratedKeyPersistence, native-certgen crate) remain in the repo but are dormant until re-wired in a follow-up commit.	2026-03-20 05:41:15 +01:00