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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
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# Ensure shell scripts always have LF line endings, even on Windows.
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# These get packaged into flashable zips and run on Android devices.
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*.sh text eol=lf
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module/daemon text eol=lf
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@@ -1,259 +1,139 @@
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<p align="center">
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<h1 align="center">🔐 TEESimulator</h1>
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<h1 align="center">TEESimulator-RS</h1>
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<p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
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<p align="center">Hardware attestation. Software keys. Zero detection.</p>
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<p align="center">
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||||
<a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.2-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.2">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?style=for-the-badge&logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
|
||||
<a href="https://t.me/superpowers9"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?logo=telegram" alt="Telegram"></a>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</p>
|
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|
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---
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|
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> [!NOTE]
|
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> **This is a personal fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** with additional hardening, native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and anti-detection features. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
|
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> Fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) with native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and AOSP-compliant attestation behavior. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
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|
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---
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## What It Does
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## 🧬 What is TEESimulator?
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TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level inside the `keystore2` process and generates entire certificate chains from scratch, signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions. Apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate device.
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TEESimulator is a **complete software simulation** of Android's hardware-backed [Trusted Execution Environment](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation). Instead of patching certificates from the real TEE after the fact, TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level and generates entire certificate chains from scratch — signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions, indistinguishable from hardware-generated keys.
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This is not TrickyStore. TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the internals are different: native Rust cert generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and AOSP-spec attestation behavior.
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The result: **apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate, unmodified device** — even on rooted hardware with an unlocked bootloader.
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> **This is not TrickyStore.** TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the architecture is fundamentally different: native Rust certificate generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and a multi-layer defense against detector apps.
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|
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---
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## 🔥 Why TEESimulator?
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🔐 **Native Cert Generation** — v4.0 generates X.509 certificate chains in Rust with `ring` and manual DER encoding. No BouncyCastle overhead, no Java crypto quirks, byte-perfect issuer chain linkage.
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🎯 **Binder-Level Interception** — Hooks `ioctl()` on `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside the `keystore2` process. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions before the HAL ever sees them.
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|
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🛡️ **Detector Resistant** — Per-UID rate limiting blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding. Oversized challenges rejected with real KeyMint error codes. Chain consistency verified byte-for-byte.
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💾 **Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. Apps that store attestation keys (banking, biometrics) don't break after a restart.
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|
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🔧 **Drop-In Replacement** — Same config paths as TrickyStore (`/data/adb/tricky_store/`). Swap the module ZIP, keep your keybox and target list.
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|
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---
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|
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## ✨ Features
|
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|
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**Core Attestation Engine**
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- [x] **Full certificate chain generation** — leaf + intermediates + root, signed by your keybox
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- [x] **Native Rust certgen** — `libcertgen.so` built with `ring`, `rsa`, and manual DER assembly
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- [x] **BouncyCastle fallback** — unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519) fall back to Java
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- [x] **ASN.1 attestation extensions** — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17 with all AOSP-specified tags
|
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- [x] **Multi-keybox support** — different keybox files per app group via `target.txt`
|
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|
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**Interception Layer**
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- [x] **Binder ioctl hook** — `lsplt` PLT hook on `libc.so` inside `keystore2` process
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- [x] **generateKey / importKey / getKeyEntry** — all three transaction types intercepted
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- [x] **256KB native payload cap** — oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly
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- [x] **Challenge validation** — rejects >128-byte attestation challenges with `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH`
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**Hardening**
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- [x] **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst window, software fallback on overflow
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- [x] **importKey eviction guard** — retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import cache attacks
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- [x] **Key persistence** — file-backed storage with file-level locking, survives reboots and keybox rotations
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- [x] **Global exception handler** — uncaught exceptions logged, daemon stays alive
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|
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**Configuration**
|
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- [x] **Live config reload** — `FileObserver` watches all config files, changes apply immediately
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- [x] **Security patch spoofing** — per-package `system`, `vendor`, `boot` patch levels with dynamic templates
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- [x] **Lifecycle scripts** — KSU Action button clears key cache, uninstall removes all traces
|
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|
||||
---
|
||||
|
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## 📋 Requirements
|
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## Requirements
|
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|
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> [!IMPORTANT]
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> TEESimulator requires root access and a valid `keybox.xml` for hardware-level attestation results. Without a keybox, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware attestation checks.
|
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> A valid `keybox.xml` is required for hardware-level attestation. Without one, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware checks.
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|
||||
**You need:**
|
||||
1. Android 10 or above
|
||||
2. A supported root manager (KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch)
|
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3. A hardware-backed `keybox.xml` placed at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
|
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1. Android 10+
|
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2. Root manager: KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch
|
||||
3. `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Quick Start
|
||||
|
||||
## 📱 Compatibility
|
||||
1. Download the latest ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases)
|
||||
2. Install via your root manager and reboot
|
||||
3. Place your keybox at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
|
||||
4. Configure targets in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
|
||||
5. Verify with Play Integrity or Key Attestation Demo
|
||||
|
||||
### Root Managers
|
||||
## Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
| Manager | Status | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| KernelSU | ✅ Tested | Full support including Action button and lifecycle scripts |
|
||||
| Magisk | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
|
||||
| APatch | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
|
||||
**Native Cert Generation** — `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 chains in Rust using `ring` and manual DER encoding. BouncyCastle fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
|
||||
|
||||
### Tested Devices
|
||||
**Binder Interception** — PLT hook on `ioctl()` in `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside `keystore2`. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions.
|
||||
|
||||
| Device | Android | TEE | Status |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Redmi 14C (2409BRN2CA) | 14 (SDK 34) | Beanpod KeyMaster | ✅ Daily driver |
|
||||
**AOSP Compliance** — Self-signed certs for non-attested keys (matching `ta/src/keys.rs`), correct AuthorizationList tag ordering, version-guarded extension fields, `authorize_create` enforcement.
|
||||
|
||||
> Tested against DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, and Key Attestation Demo. If you test on a different device, [open an issue](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/issues) with your results.
|
||||
**Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. File-backed with file-level locking.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
**Rate Limiting** — Per-UID hardware keygen cap (2/30s window, 2 concurrent). Overflow falls to software certs.
|
||||
|
||||
## 🚀 Quick Start
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Download** the latest release ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases)
|
||||
2. **Install** via your root manager (KSU / Magisk / APatch) and reboot
|
||||
3. **Place your keybox** at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
|
||||
4. **Configure targets** in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
|
||||
5. **Verify** — check Play Integrity or run Key Attestation Demo
|
||||
All config files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are hot-reloaded via `FileObserver`.
|
||||
|
||||
TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore, TrickyStoreOSS, and their forks. Existing config files are compatible.
|
||||
### target.txt
|
||||
|
||||
---
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||||
Controls which apps get intercepted and the simulation mode.
|
||||
|
||||
## 🔨 Building from Source
|
||||
| Suffix | Mode |
|
||||
|--------|------|
|
||||
| `!` | Force software key generation |
|
||||
| `?` | Force leaf certificate patching (real TEE key, patched cert) |
|
||||
| *(none)* | Automatic selection |
|
||||
|
||||
The CI workflow builds on every push to `main`. You can also build locally or trigger a build from your own fork.
|
||||
|
||||
**Prerequisites:** JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator.git
|
||||
cd TEESimulator
|
||||
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output ZIPs land in `out/`. The Gradle build automatically invokes `cargo ndk` to cross-compile `libcertgen.so` before packaging.
|
||||
|
||||
To rebuild from a fork, push to `main` or use **Actions → Build → Run workflow**. The workflow installs all toolchains (Java, Rust, cargo-ndk, ccache) and uploads Release + Debug ZIPs as artifacts.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## ⚙️ Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
All configuration files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are monitored by `FileObserver` — changes take effect immediately without rebooting.
|
||||
|
||||
### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust
|
||||
|
||||
This file provides the master cryptographic identity. It contains a private key and a hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. TEESimulator signs all generated certificates with this key, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
|
||||
|
||||
```xml
|
||||
<?xml version="1.0"?>
|
||||
<AndroidAttestation>
|
||||
<Keybox DeviceID="...">
|
||||
<Key algorithm="ecdsa|rsa">
|
||||
<PrivateKey format="pem">...</PrivateKey>
|
||||
<CertificateChain>...</CertificateChain>
|
||||
</Key>
|
||||
</Keybox>
|
||||
</AndroidAttestation>
|
||||
```
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||||
|
||||
### Target Packages (`target.txt`)
|
||||
|
||||
Controls which apps get intercepted and what simulation mode to use.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Mode Suffixes
|
||||
|
||||
* **`!` → Force Generation** — Creates a complete software-based virtual key. Full TEE simulation.
|
||||
* **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking** — Real TEE key generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and patched.
|
||||
* **No symbol → Automatic** — Module selects the best mode for your device.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Multi-Keybox
|
||||
|
||||
Specify different keybox files for different app groups. Apps listed after a `[filename.xml]` line use that keybox. Apps before any declaration use the default `keybox.xml`.
|
||||
Multi-keybox support via `[filename.xml]` headers:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
# Default keybox
|
||||
com.google.android.gms!
|
||||
io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?
|
||||
|
||||
# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps
|
||||
[aosp_keybox.xml]
|
||||
com.google.android.gsf
|
||||
|
||||
# Another keybox
|
||||
[demo_keybox.xml]
|
||||
org.matrix.demo
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`)
|
||||
### security_patch.txt
|
||||
|
||||
Configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` reported in attestation certificates. This only affects attestation data — it does not change actual system properties.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Global and Per-Package
|
||||
|
||||
Settings at the top of the file are global defaults. Add `[package.name]` to override for specific apps.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Keys
|
||||
Override patch levels reported in attestation certificates. Global defaults at top, per-package overrides with `[package.name]`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Key | Scope |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
|-----|-------|
|
||||
| `system` | OS patch level |
|
||||
| `vendor` | Vendor patch level |
|
||||
| `boot` | Boot/kernel patch level |
|
||||
| `all` | Shorthand — sets all three at once |
|
||||
| `all` | Sets all three |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Special Keywords
|
||||
|
||||
| Keyword | Effect |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `today` | Current date, dynamically resolved on each attestation |
|
||||
| `YYYY-MM-DD` templates | Semi-dynamic — `YYYY-MM-05` resolves to the 5th of the current month |
|
||||
| `no` | Omit this patch level tag entirely from the attestation |
|
||||
| `device_default` | Use the device's real hardware value |
|
||||
| `prop` | Read from `ro.build.version.security_patch` (matches what detectors see via getprop) |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example
|
||||
Special values: `today`, `YYYY-MM-DD` templates, `no` (omit tag), `device_default`, `prop` (read from system property).
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
# Global — default for all apps
|
||||
system=YYYY-MM-05
|
||||
vendor=device_default
|
||||
boot=no
|
||||
|
||||
# Override for GMS
|
||||
[com.google.android.gms]
|
||||
system=2024-10-01
|
||||
|
||||
# Custom config for a demo app
|
||||
[org.matrix.demo]
|
||||
all=2025-09-15
|
||||
boot=device_default
|
||||
system=2025-10-01
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Building from Source
|
||||
|
||||
## 💬 Community
|
||||
Prerequisites: JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
git clone --recursive https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS.git
|
||||
cd TEESimulator-RS
|
||||
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output ZIPs in `out/`. Gradle invokes `cargo ndk` automatically to cross-compile `libcertgen.so`.
|
||||
|
||||
Push to `main` or use **Actions > Build > Run workflow** to trigger CI.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
| Root Manager | Status |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| KernelSU | Tested (Action button + lifecycle scripts) |
|
||||
| Magisk | Supported |
|
||||
| APatch | Supported |
|
||||
|
||||
## Community
|
||||
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<a href="https://t.me/superpowers9">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/⚡_JOIN_THE_GRID-SuperPowers_Telegram-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram&logoColor=cyan&labelColor=0d1117&color=00d4ff" alt="Telegram">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/SuperPowers_Telegram-Join-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Credits
|
||||
|
||||
## 🙏 Credits
|
||||
- [JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) — original TEESimulator and interception architecture
|
||||
- [5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore) — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception
|
||||
- [LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt) — PLT hook library
|
||||
- [ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring) — Rust cryptography library
|
||||
- [MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd) — AOSP compliance work via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157)
|
||||
- [fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524) — contributor and collaborator
|
||||
- [huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares) — collaborator and tester
|
||||
|
||||
- **[JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** — original author of TEESimulator and the interception architecture
|
||||
- **[5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore)** — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception on Android
|
||||
- **[LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt)** — PLT hook library used for binder interception
|
||||
- **[ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring)** — Rust cryptography library powering native cert generation
|
||||
- **[MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd)** — AOSP compliance improvements via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157), including authorize_create enforcement, attestation extension alignment, and binder transaction filtering
|
||||
- **[fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524)** — a real contributor and collaborator on this project
|
||||
- **[huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares)** — collaborator and tester
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 📄 License
|
||||
|
||||
This project is licensed under the [GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<b>🔐 Because the best attestation is the one the TEE never generated.</b>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
[GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)
|
||||
|
||||
val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
|
||||
val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
|
||||
val verName = "v5.1"
|
||||
val verName = "v6.0.0"
|
||||
|
||||
android {
|
||||
namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
|
||||
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
dependsOn("package${capitalized}")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
|
||||
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
|
||||
}
|
||||
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
|
||||
dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
|
||||
|
||||
if (isDebug) {
|
||||
@@ -140,11 +140,12 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
from(
|
||||
project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(
|
||||
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
|
||||
)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
val nativeLibsDir = if (isDebug) {
|
||||
"intermediates/merged_native_libs/${variant.name}/merge${capitalized}NativeLibs/out/lib"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
|
||||
}
|
||||
from(project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(nativeLibsDir)) {
|
||||
into("lib")
|
||||
include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,20 +235,15 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
|
||||
struct RegistrationEntry {
|
||||
wp<IBinder> target;
|
||||
sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
|
||||
// Transaction codes to intercept. Empty = intercept all (legacy behavior).
|
||||
std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
|
||||
mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_;
|
||||
std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_;
|
||||
|
||||
public:
|
||||
BinderInterceptor() = default;
|
||||
|
||||
// Checks if a specific Binder+code combination should be intercepted.
|
||||
// Returns true if the binder is registered AND the code is in its filter
|
||||
// (or the filter is empty, meaning intercept everything).
|
||||
bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const {
|
||||
std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
|
||||
auto it = registry_.find(target);
|
||||
@@ -359,7 +354,9 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
|
||||
if (!txn_data || txn_data->target.ptr == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
// Skip system transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) to avoid latency detectors
|
||||
// AIDL methods use codes in [FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION, LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION] (1..0x00ffffff).
|
||||
// System transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP, SHELL_COMMAND) use codes above that range.
|
||||
// Skip those — intercepting a ping adds measurable latency that timing detectors flag.
|
||||
if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -431,44 +428,29 @@ void processBinderReadBuffer(const binder_write_read &bwr) {
|
||||
uintptr_t ptr = bwr.read_buffer;
|
||||
uintptr_t end = ptr + bwr.read_consumed;
|
||||
|
||||
LOGV("[Hook] Processing Read Buffer: Size=%llu, Consumed=%llu", bwr.read_size, bwr.read_consumed);
|
||||
|
||||
while (ptr < end) {
|
||||
// Ensure we can read at least the command header
|
||||
if (end - ptr < sizeof(uint32_t))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(ptr);
|
||||
ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate payload size from the ioctl command code
|
||||
size_t cmd_size = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
|
||||
|
||||
// Log the command using our generated to-string function
|
||||
LOGV("[Driver -> User] Command: %s (0x%x), DataSize: %zu", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd), cmd, cmd_size);
|
||||
|
||||
// Safety check: ensure the command's data does not exceed the buffer
|
||||
if (ptr + cmd_size > end) {
|
||||
LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overflow detected while parsing command %s", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd));
|
||||
LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overrun parsing command 0x%x", cmd);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We are primarily interested in BR_TRANSACTION commands to intercept
|
||||
if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
|
||||
binder_transaction_data *txn = nullptr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (__builtin_expect(cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX, 0)) {
|
||||
binder_transaction_data *txn;
|
||||
if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
|
||||
// The data is wrapped in a secctx struct
|
||||
auto *wrapper = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr);
|
||||
txn = &wrapper->transaction_data;
|
||||
txn = &reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr)->transaction_data;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
txn = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data *>(ptr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
inspectAndRewriteTransaction(txn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Advance pointer to the next command
|
||||
ptr += cmd_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -488,13 +470,17 @@ int intercepted_ioctl(int fd, int request, ...) {
|
||||
// 1. Call original kernel ioctl to let the driver do its work
|
||||
int result = g_original_ioctl(fd, request, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. After the call returns, check if it was a BINDER_WRITE_READ and if it succeeded
|
||||
if (result >= 0 && request == BINDER_WRITE_READ && arg != nullptr) {
|
||||
const auto *bwr = static_cast<const binder_write_read *>(arg);
|
||||
|
||||
// We only care about data read FROM the driver (i.e., incoming commands)
|
||||
if (bwr->read_consumed > 0) {
|
||||
processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
|
||||
// Fast reject: only enter the parser if the buffer could contain a BR_TRANSACTION.
|
||||
// Pings, ref ops, and looper management never produce BR_TRANSACTION, so scanning
|
||||
// their buffers is pure overhead (~2-5us per ioctl in debug builds).
|
||||
if (bwr->read_consumed >= sizeof(uint32_t)) {
|
||||
uint32_t first_cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(bwr->read_buffer);
|
||||
if (first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX
|
||||
|| bwr->read_consumed > sizeof(uint32_t) + _IOC_SIZE(first_cmd)) {
|
||||
processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -537,14 +523,11 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
|
||||
if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback)
|
||||
return BAD_VALUE;
|
||||
|
||||
// We can only intercept local Binders (BBinder), not remote proxies (BpBinder)
|
||||
if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies.");
|
||||
return BAD_TYPE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Read optional transaction code filter. If present: int32 count + count * uint32 codes.
|
||||
// If absent or count <= 0: intercept all transaction codes (legacy behavior).
|
||||
std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
|
||||
int32_t code_count = 0;
|
||||
if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
|
||||
@@ -612,8 +595,15 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
|
||||
Parcel pre_req, pre_resp;
|
||||
writeTransactionData(pre_req, tx_id, target, code, flags, request);
|
||||
|
||||
if (callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp) != OK) {
|
||||
LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed. Forwarding original call.", tx_id);
|
||||
status_t pre_status = callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp);
|
||||
if (pre_status != OK) {
|
||||
// Block when interceptor is dead to prevent privacy leak to third-party apps
|
||||
if (callback->pingBinder() != OK) {
|
||||
LOGE("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Interceptor DEAD. Blocking to prevent attestation leak.", tx_id);
|
||||
result = DEAD_OBJECT;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed (not dead). Forwarding.", tx_id);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -667,7 +657,8 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
|
||||
VALIDATE_STATUS(tx_id, post_req.appendFrom(reply, 0, reply_size));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (callback->transact(intercept::kPostTransact, post_req, &post_resp) == OK) {
|
||||
status_t post_status = callback->transact(intercept::kPostTransact, post_req, &post_resp);
|
||||
if (post_status == OK) {
|
||||
int32_t post_action = post_resp.readInt32();
|
||||
if (post_action == intercept::kActionOverrideReply && reply) {
|
||||
result = post_resp.readInt32(); // Read new status
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
|
||||
object App {
|
||||
// The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor.
|
||||
private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L
|
||||
// The sleep duration in milliseconds for the main service loop to keep the process alive.
|
||||
private const val SERVICE_SLEEP_MS = 1000000L
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The main entry point of the TEESimulator application.
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +42,9 @@ object App {
|
||||
// Initialize and start the appropriate keystore interceptors.
|
||||
initializeInterceptors()
|
||||
|
||||
// Load the package configuration.
|
||||
ConfigurationManager.initialize()
|
||||
// Set up the device's boot key and hash, which are crucial for attestation.
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.setupBootKeyAndHash()
|
||||
|
||||
// Android ships with a stripped-down Bouncy Castle provider under the name "BC".
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,11 +43,12 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
): Extension {
|
||||
val keyDescription = buildKeyDescription(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
var formattedString =
|
||||
keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Forged attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
"Forged attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, DEROctetString(keyDescription.encoded))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(uid)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Attestation patch levels for uid=$uid: os=$osPatch, vendor=$vendorPatch, boot=$bootPatch")
|
||||
properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL] =
|
||||
if (bootPatch != DO_NOT_REPORT) {
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
@@ -129,7 +131,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
return properties
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
|
||||
private fun buildKeyDescription(
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
@@ -148,15 +149,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
|
||||
val fields =
|
||||
arrayOf(
|
||||
ASN1Integer(
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
|
||||
), // attestationVersion
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
|
||||
ASN1Integer(
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
|
||||
), // keymasterVersion
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
|
||||
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
|
||||
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
|
||||
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
|
||||
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)),
|
||||
DEROctetString(uniqueId),
|
||||
softwareEnforced,
|
||||
teeEnforced,
|
||||
@@ -164,37 +161,24 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
return DERSequence(fields)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Computes the unique ID per the KeyMint HAL spec:
|
||||
* HMAC-SHA256(T || C || R, HBK) truncated to 128 bits.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* T = temporal counter (creationTime / 2592000000, i.e. 30-day periods since epoch)
|
||||
* C = DER-encoded ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID
|
||||
* R = 0x00 (no factory reset since ID rotation)
|
||||
* HBK = device-unique secret generated once during module installation
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
|
||||
val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
|
||||
|
||||
val message =
|
||||
ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
|
||||
.putLong(temporalCounter)
|
||||
.put(aaidDer)
|
||||
.put(0x00) // RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = false
|
||||
.put(0x00)
|
||||
.array()
|
||||
|
||||
val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
|
||||
mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
|
||||
return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Device-unique key seed, generated once at module installation. */
|
||||
private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
|
||||
val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
|
||||
if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
|
||||
file.readBytes()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Fallback: generate in-memory (won't persist across reboots)
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
|
||||
ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -277,20 +261,14 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
|
||||
DERSet(
|
||||
params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()
|
||||
),
|
||||
DERSet(params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.rollbackResistance == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE,
|
||||
DERNull.INSTANCE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -308,31 +286,19 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.allowWhileOnBody == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY,
|
||||
DERNull.INSTANCE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.trustedUserPresenceRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
|
||||
DERNull.INSTANCE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.trustedConfirmationRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
|
||||
DERNull.INSTANCE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -462,7 +428,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is only included when an attestation challenge is present.
|
||||
if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
@@ -472,6 +437,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
@@ -482,8 +448,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Keystore2-enforced tags belong in softwareEnforced, not teeEnforced.
|
||||
// The HAL does not enforce these; keystore2's authorize_create handles them.
|
||||
if (params.callerNonce == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_CALLER_NONCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.activeDateTime?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
|
||||
@@ -491,38 +460,22 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(it.time),
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.usageExpireDateTime?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(it.time),
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.usageCountLimit?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(it.toLong()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, ASN1Integer(it.toLong()))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED,
|
||||
DERNull.INSTANCE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -554,15 +507,9 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Throws(Throwable::class)
|
||||
internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
|
||||
// AOSP keystore_attestation_id.cpp: gather_attestation_application_id()
|
||||
// uses a hardcoded identity for AID_SYSTEM (1000) and AID_ROOT (0):
|
||||
// packageName = "AndroidSystem", versionCode = 1, no signing digests.
|
||||
val appUid = uid % 100000
|
||||
if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
|
||||
return buildApplicationIdDer(
|
||||
listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L),
|
||||
emptySet(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return buildApplicationIdDer(listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L), emptySet())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val pm =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -95,5 +95,5 @@ object AttestationConstants {
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Other Constants ---
|
||||
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
|
||||
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
|
||||
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBox
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.toHex
|
||||
import java.util.Date
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Handles the modification (patching) of Android Key Attestation extensions within certificates.
|
||||
@@ -36,7 +37,12 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
* @return A new, cryptographically valid, patched certificate chain. Returns the original chain
|
||||
* on any failure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun patchCertificateChain(originalChain: Array<Certificate>?, uid: Int): Array<Certificate> {
|
||||
fun patchCertificateChain(
|
||||
originalChain: Array<Certificate>?,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
notBefore: Date? = null,
|
||||
notAfter: Date? = null,
|
||||
): Array<Certificate> {
|
||||
if (originalChain.isNullOrEmpty()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Attempted to patch a null or empty certificate chain for UID $uid.")
|
||||
return originalChain ?: emptyArray()
|
||||
@@ -63,6 +69,8 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
keybox,
|
||||
originalLeaf.sigAlgName,
|
||||
uid,
|
||||
notBefore,
|
||||
notAfter,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Construct the NEW, VALID chain by prepending the patched leaf to the keybox's
|
||||
@@ -111,17 +119,27 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
keybox: KeyBox,
|
||||
sigAlgName: String,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
notBefore: Date? = null,
|
||||
notAfter: Date? = null,
|
||||
): Certificate {
|
||||
// The issuer of our new leaf is the subject of the first certificate in our custom keybox
|
||||
// chain.
|
||||
val newIssuer = X509CertificateHolder(keybox.certificates[0].encoded).subject
|
||||
|
||||
val effectiveNotBefore = notBefore ?: originalLeafHolder.notBefore
|
||||
val effectiveNotAfter = notAfter ?: originalLeafHolder.notAfter
|
||||
if (notBefore != null || notAfter != null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug(
|
||||
"Overriding cert dates: notBefore=${effectiveNotBefore} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notBefore}), notAfter=${effectiveNotAfter} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notAfter})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val builder =
|
||||
X509v3CertificateBuilder(
|
||||
newIssuer,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.serialNumber,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.notBefore,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.notAfter,
|
||||
effectiveNotBefore,
|
||||
effectiveNotAfter,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.subject,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -146,7 +164,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
// Log the signature of the newly created certificate to observe its non-deterministic
|
||||
// nature.
|
||||
val signatureBytes = (newCertificate as X509Certificate).signature
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}")
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose { "Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}" }
|
||||
|
||||
return newCertificate
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -268,8 +286,10 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
private fun createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsed: ParsedAttestation, uid: Int): Extension {
|
||||
val (allFields, teeEnforcedMap, originalRootOfTrust) = parsed
|
||||
|
||||
var formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Original attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
"Original attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the new Root of Trust and add/replace it in the map.
|
||||
val newRootOfTrust = AttestationBuilder.buildRootOfTrust(originalRootOfTrust)
|
||||
@@ -296,8 +316,10 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
|
||||
allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] = sortedTeeEnforced
|
||||
val patchedSequence = DERSequence(allFields)
|
||||
formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Patched attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
"Patched attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
val patchedOctets = DEROctetString(patchedSequence)
|
||||
|
||||
return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, patchedOctets)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
|
||||
|
||||
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
|
||||
import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
|
||||
import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
|
||||
import java.security.KeyStore
|
||||
import java.security.SecureRandom
|
||||
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
|
||||
import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1ObjectIdentifier
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1OctetString
|
||||
@@ -52,14 +57,55 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
val bootPatchLevel: Int?,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// A unique alias for the key used to perform the TEE functionality check.
|
||||
private const val TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_AttestationCheck"
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Lazily determines if the device's TEE is functional by attempting to generate an
|
||||
* attestation-backed key pair. The result is cached.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val isTeeFunctional: Boolean by lazy { checkTeeFunctionality() }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Lazily fetches and parses attestation data from a genuinely generated certificate. The result
|
||||
* is cached. Returns null if the TEE is not functional or parsing fails.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val CachedAttestationData: AttestationData? by lazy { fetchAttestationData() }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Checks if the TEE is working correctly by generating a key in the Android Keystore with an
|
||||
* attestation challenge.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @return `true` if a key with attestation was generated successfully, `false` otherwise.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun checkTeeFunctionality(): Boolean {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Performing TEE functionality check...")
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
|
||||
val keyPairGenerator =
|
||||
KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
|
||||
|
||||
// A random challenge is required for attestation.
|
||||
val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
|
||||
|
||||
val spec =
|
||||
KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
|
||||
.setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
|
||||
.setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
|
||||
.setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
|
||||
.build()
|
||||
|
||||
keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
|
||||
keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("TEE functionality check successful.")
|
||||
true
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("TEE functionality check failed.", e)
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Retrieves the attestation certificate generated during the TEE check. The key entry is
|
||||
* deleted after retrieval to clean up.
|
||||
@@ -67,6 +113,8 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
* @return The leaf `X509Certificate` containing the attestation, or `null` if unavailable.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun getAttestationCertificate(): X509Certificate? {
|
||||
if (!isTeeFunctional) return null
|
||||
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
|
||||
val certChain = keyStore.getCertificateChain(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS)
|
||||
@@ -100,11 +148,12 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
|
||||
// The extension's value is an ASN.1 sequence.
|
||||
val keyDescriptionSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
|
||||
var formattedString =
|
||||
keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Cached attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
"Cached attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
val fields = keyDescriptionSeq.toArray()
|
||||
|
||||
val attestVersion =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
|
||||
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
|
||||
import java.math.BigInteger
|
||||
import java.util.Date
|
||||
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
|
||||
@@ -16,12 +17,11 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
|
||||
// Reference:
|
||||
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
|
||||
data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
val keySize: Int,
|
||||
val algorithm: Int,
|
||||
val ecCurve: Int?,
|
||||
val ecCurveName: String,
|
||||
val keySize: Int,
|
||||
val origin: Int?,
|
||||
val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val blockMode: List<Int>,
|
||||
val padding: List<Int>,
|
||||
val purpose: List<Int>,
|
||||
@@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val model: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val secondImei: ByteArray?,
|
||||
// Enforcement tags
|
||||
val activeDateTime: Date?,
|
||||
val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
|
||||
val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
|
||||
val usageCountLimit: Int?,
|
||||
val callerNonce: Boolean?,
|
||||
val nonce: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
|
||||
val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
|
||||
val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
|
||||
val maxBootLevel: Int?,
|
||||
val minMacLength: Int?,
|
||||
@@ -63,13 +64,11 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
constructor(
|
||||
params: Array<KeyParameter>
|
||||
) : this(
|
||||
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
|
||||
algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
|
||||
// For EC keys, derive keySize from EC_CURVE when KEY_SIZE is absent.
|
||||
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
|
||||
ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE),
|
||||
ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
|
||||
@@ -77,9 +76,6 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
|
||||
origin = params.findOrigin(Tag.ORIGIN),
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, field = BoolValue)]
|
||||
noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)]
|
||||
blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -121,13 +117,12 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
|
||||
model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
|
||||
secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
|
||||
|
||||
// Enforcement tags
|
||||
activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
|
||||
originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
|
||||
usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
|
||||
usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
|
||||
callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
|
||||
nonce = params.findBlob(Tag.NONCE),
|
||||
unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
|
||||
includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
|
||||
rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
|
||||
@@ -135,6 +130,7 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
|
||||
trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
|
||||
trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
|
||||
noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
|
||||
maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
|
||||
maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
|
||||
minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
|
||||
@@ -144,21 +140,13 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun isAttestKey(): Boolean {
|
||||
return purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fun isAttestKey(): Boolean = purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
|
||||
|
||||
fun isImportKey(): Boolean {
|
||||
return origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
|
||||
}
|
||||
fun isImportKey(): Boolean = origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays ---
|
||||
|
||||
/** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
|
||||
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.boolValue
|
||||
|
||||
/** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findInteger(tag: Int): Int? =
|
||||
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.integer
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +179,7 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBlob(tag: Int): ByteArray? =
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllBlockMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
|
||||
this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.blockMode }
|
||||
|
||||
/** Maps to AOSP field = PaddingMode (Repeated) */
|
||||
/** Maps to AOSP field = BlockMode (Repeated) */
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllPaddingMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
|
||||
this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.paddingMode }
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -203,7 +191,9 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
|
||||
this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }
|
||||
|
||||
/** Derives keySize from EC_CURVE tag when KEY_SIZE is not explicitly provided. */
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
|
||||
if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
|
||||
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
|
||||
val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
|
||||
return when (curveId) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import android.os.IBinder
|
||||
import android.os.ServiceManager
|
||||
import java.io.File
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -65,7 +66,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
// Initial load of all configuration files.
|
||||
loadTargetPackages(File(configRoot, TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE))
|
||||
loadPatchLevelConfig(File(configRoot, PATCH_LEVEL_FILE))
|
||||
|
||||
// Start watching for any subsequent file changes.
|
||||
ConfigObserver.startWatching()
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Configuration initialized and file observer started.")
|
||||
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
return packages.firstNotNullOfOrNull { pkg -> packageKeyboxes[pkg] } ?: DEFAULT_KEYBOX_FILE
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Determines if the certificate for a given UID needs to be patched. */
|
||||
fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
val mode = getPackageModeForUid(uid)
|
||||
return mode == Mode.PATCH || mode == Mode.AUTO
|
||||
@@ -92,13 +91,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
/** Determines if a new certificate needs to be generated for a given UID. */
|
||||
fun shouldGenerate(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
|
||||
/** Determines if no operation is needed for a given UID. */
|
||||
fun shouldSkipUid(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == null
|
||||
|
||||
/** Determines if the UID is in AUTO mode (no explicit ! or ? suffix). */
|
||||
fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.AUTO
|
||||
|
||||
/** Resolves the operating mode for a given UID based on its packages and the TEE status. */
|
||||
private fun getPackageModeForUid(uid: Int): Mode? {
|
||||
val packages = getPackagesForUid(uid)
|
||||
if (packages.isEmpty()) return null
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +103,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
when (packageModes[pkg]) {
|
||||
Mode.GENERATE -> return Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
Mode.PATCH -> return Mode.PATCH
|
||||
Mode.AUTO -> return Mode.AUTO
|
||||
Mode.AUTO -> return if (DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional) Mode.PATCH else Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
null -> continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -156,25 +152,24 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
return@forEach
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val mode: Mode
|
||||
val rawPkg: String
|
||||
when {
|
||||
// Suffix '!' means force GENERATE mode.
|
||||
trimmedLine.endsWith("!") -> {
|
||||
mode = Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
|
||||
val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
|
||||
newModes[pkg] = Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Suffix '?' means force PATCH mode.
|
||||
trimmedLine.endsWith("?") -> {
|
||||
mode = Mode.PATCH
|
||||
rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
|
||||
val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
|
||||
newModes[pkg] = Mode.PATCH
|
||||
newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> {
|
||||
mode = Mode.AUTO
|
||||
rawPkg = trimmedLine
|
||||
newModes[trimmedLine] = Mode.AUTO
|
||||
newKeyboxes[trimmedLine] = currentKeybox
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newModes[rawPkg] = mode
|
||||
newKeyboxes[rawPkg] = currentKeybox
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Atomically update the configuration maps.
|
||||
@@ -251,7 +246,14 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse global and per-package configurations.
|
||||
val newGlobalLevel = parseLines(contextLines[""])
|
||||
var newGlobalLevel = parseLines(contextLines[""])
|
||||
// TrickyAddon writes Pixel bulletin dates for boot/vendor but system=prop
|
||||
// resolves to the real device prop — force boot/vendor through the same path
|
||||
// to prevent cross-component date mismatches on non-Pixel devices.
|
||||
if (newGlobalLevel?.system.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("system=prop: forcing boot/vendor to derive from device props (were: boot=${newGlobalLevel?.boot}, vendor=${newGlobalLevel?.vendor})")
|
||||
newGlobalLevel = newGlobalLevel?.copy(boot = "prop", vendor = "prop")
|
||||
}
|
||||
contextLines.remove("") // Remove global context to iterate over packages next
|
||||
|
||||
for ((pkg, lines) in contextLines) {
|
||||
@@ -282,8 +284,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
|
||||
val file = if (event != DELETE) File(configRoot, path) else null
|
||||
when (path) {
|
||||
TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> loadTargetPackages(file!!)
|
||||
PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> loadPatchLevelConfig(file!!)
|
||||
TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> file?.let { loadTargetPackages(it) }
|
||||
?: SystemLogger.warning("$TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE was deleted.")
|
||||
PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> file?.let { loadPatchLevelConfig(it) }
|
||||
?: SystemLogger.warning("$PATCH_LEVEL_FILE was deleted.")
|
||||
// Any change to an XML file is assumed to be a keybox.
|
||||
// The cache in KeyBoxManager will handle reloading it on its next use.
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
@@ -326,8 +330,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
return iPackageManager
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
|
||||
/** Checks a SELinux permission for a caller identified by PID against the keystore context. */
|
||||
fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val callerCtx =
|
||||
@@ -340,7 +342,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
|
||||
fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
|
||||
val userId = uid / 100000
|
||||
return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
|
||||
@@ -352,7 +353,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
|
||||
fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
|
||||
return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -293,12 +293,6 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param filteredCodes If non-empty, only these transaction codes will be intercepted at
|
||||
* the native level. All other codes pass through without the round-trip to Java.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun register(
|
||||
backdoor: IBinder,
|
||||
target: IBinder,
|
||||
|
||||
-5
@@ -68,13 +68,8 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Transaction codes this interceptor needs to handle at the native level. Override in
|
||||
* subclasses to filter; empty means intercept everything (legacy behavior).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf()
|
||||
|
||||
/** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
|
||||
private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
|
||||
keystoreService = service
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-13
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
|
||||
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
|
||||
writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
|
||||
writeString(null)
|
||||
writeInt(0)
|
||||
writeInt(0) // empty remote stack trace header (AOSP Status.cpp:196)
|
||||
writeInt(errorCode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
|
||||
@@ -130,10 +130,6 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
|
||||
return exception != null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Creates an `OverrideReply` that writes a `ServiceSpecificException` with the given error
|
||||
* code via EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
|
||||
errorCode: Int
|
||||
): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
|
||||
@@ -144,14 +140,6 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
|
||||
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Patches the system-level authorization values (OS_PATCHLEVEL, VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
|
||||
* BOOT_PATCHLEVEL) in an authorization array to match the configured patch levels for the
|
||||
* given calling UID. Each authorization's original [Authorization.securityLevel] is preserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* When a patch level is configured as "no" ([AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT]), the original
|
||||
* hardware value is kept as-is.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun patchAuthorizations(
|
||||
authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
|
||||
callingUid: Int,
|
||||
|
||||
+85
-148
@@ -6,17 +6,16 @@ import android.os.Build
|
||||
import android.os.IBinder
|
||||
import android.os.Parcel
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.Domain
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreSecurityLevel
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
|
||||
import java.security.SecureRandom
|
||||
import java.security.cert.Certificate
|
||||
import java.util.Collections
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.GeneratedKeyPersistence
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
@@ -49,8 +48,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
else null
|
||||
private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
|
||||
private val GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getSecurityLevel")
|
||||
|
||||
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
stubBinderClass.declaredFields
|
||||
@@ -61,20 +58,10 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Keys whose certs were updated via updateSubcomponent; skip re-patching on getKeyEntry.
|
||||
private const val RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
|
||||
private val deletedSoftwareKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
|
||||
private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
|
||||
|
||||
// Backdoor binder for registering new interceptors at runtime.
|
||||
private var backdoorBinder: IBinder? = null
|
||||
|
||||
// Per-security-level interceptor instances, keyed by SecurityLevel constant.
|
||||
private val securityLevelInterceptors = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor>()
|
||||
|
||||
// Identity set of SecurityLevel binders already registered with the native hook,
|
||||
// tracked by System.identityHashCode to avoid re-registering the same BBinder.
|
||||
private val registeredSecurityLevelBinders: MutableSet<Int> =
|
||||
Collections.newSetFromMap(ConcurrentHashMap())
|
||||
|
||||
override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
|
||||
override val processName = "keystore2"
|
||||
override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore2` libTEESimulator.so entry"
|
||||
@@ -87,7 +74,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.toIntArray()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -97,7 +83,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
* security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
|
||||
backdoorBinder = backdoor
|
||||
val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service)
|
||||
setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -109,11 +94,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
|
||||
val interceptor =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
|
||||
securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT] = interceptor
|
||||
registerSecurityLevelBinder(
|
||||
register(
|
||||
backdoor,
|
||||
tee.asBinder(),
|
||||
interceptor,
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -126,11 +111,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
|
||||
val interceptor =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
|
||||
securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX] = interceptor
|
||||
registerSecurityLevelBinder(
|
||||
register(
|
||||
backdoor,
|
||||
strongbox.asBinder(),
|
||||
interceptor,
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -138,30 +123,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept StrongBox SecurityLevel.", it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Registers an interceptor for a SecurityLevel binder, tracking the binder identity
|
||||
* to avoid duplicate registrations when keystore2 returns the same BBinder.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun registerSecurityLevelBinder(
|
||||
backdoor: IBinder,
|
||||
binder: IBinder,
|
||||
interceptor: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
val identity = System.identityHashCode(binder)
|
||||
if (registeredSecurityLevelBinders.add(identity)) {
|
||||
register(
|
||||
backdoor,
|
||||
binder,
|
||||
interceptor,
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug(
|
||||
"SecurityLevel binder $binder (identity=$identity) already registered, skipping."
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onPreTransact(
|
||||
txId: Long,
|
||||
target: IBinder,
|
||||
@@ -184,9 +145,23 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
|
||||
if (isGMS || ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)) {
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
|
||||
if (ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)) {
|
||||
TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to parse parameters for ${transactionNames[code]!!}",
|
||||
it,
|
||||
)
|
||||
TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (
|
||||
code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION ||
|
||||
code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION ||
|
||||
@@ -206,7 +181,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
// Handle delete by alias (APP domain) or nspace (KEY_ID domain).
|
||||
val keyId =
|
||||
if (descriptor.alias != null) {
|
||||
KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
|
||||
@@ -225,6 +199,7 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(keyId)
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
|
||||
if (isSoftwareKey) {
|
||||
deletedSoftwareKeys.add(keyId)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${keyId.alias}, replying with empty response."
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -239,9 +214,14 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
|
||||
|
||||
val response =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
val response = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
|
||||
if (response == null) {
|
||||
if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Returning KEY_NOT_FOUND for deleted key ${descriptor.alias}")
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId))
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key")
|
||||
@@ -251,13 +231,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it.keyParameter)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
} else if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
// Pass through to post-hook so we can register interceptors for newly-created
|
||||
// SecurityLevel binders. keystore2 may create a new BBinder per call, so the
|
||||
// initial registration in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors might not cover all
|
||||
// binder instances that clients receive.
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, "getSecurityLevel", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
return TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logTransaction(
|
||||
txId,
|
||||
@@ -286,10 +259,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
return handlePostGetSecurityLevel(txId, data, reply)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
@@ -313,12 +282,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
|
||||
val params =
|
||||
ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)
|
||||
?: throw Exception("Abort updating entries for invalid parameters.")
|
||||
val updatedKeyDescriptors =
|
||||
ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, params, reply)
|
||||
ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, reply)
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.createTypedArrayReply(updatedKeyDescriptors)
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrElse {
|
||||
@@ -348,8 +313,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!!
|
||||
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
|
||||
|
||||
// Skip patching for keys whose certs were explicitly set via updateSubcomponent.
|
||||
if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: userUpdated=true, skipping patch" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -360,13 +325,36 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
authorizations?.map { it.keyParameter }?.toTypedArray() ?: emptyArray()
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey() &&
|
||||
!KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: isImport=${parsedParameters.isImportKey()} origin=${parsedParameters.origin} inImportedKeys=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)} hasPatchedChain=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId) != null} isAttestKey=${parsedParameters.isAttestKey()}" }
|
||||
|
||||
if (parsedParameters.isImportKey()) {
|
||||
val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
|
||||
if (retainedChain == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, no retained chain, skip" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation).")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, SERVING RETAINED CHAIN (detection vector!)" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId")
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain).getOrThrow()
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations,
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: in importedKeys set, skip" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping attest-key override for imported key $keyId")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Attest keys that are not under our control should be overriden.
|
||||
val keyData =
|
||||
CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
@@ -398,12 +386,26 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
parsedParameters,
|
||||
)
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
|
||||
|
||||
GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
|
||||
keyId = keyId,
|
||||
keyPair = keyData.first,
|
||||
nspace = newNspace,
|
||||
securityLevel = response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
|
||||
certChain = keyData.second,
|
||||
algorithm = parsedParameters.algorithm,
|
||||
keySize = parsedParameters.keySize,
|
||||
ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve ?: 0,
|
||||
purposes = parsedParameters.purpose,
|
||||
digests = parsedParameters.digest,
|
||||
isAttestationKey = true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we should perform attestation patch.
|
||||
if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
|
||||
@@ -411,8 +413,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// First, try to retrieve the already-patched chain from our cache to ensure
|
||||
// consistency.
|
||||
val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
|
||||
|
||||
val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
|
||||
@@ -422,16 +422,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
)
|
||||
finalChain = cachedChain
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// If no chain is cached (e.g., key existed before simulator started),
|
||||
// perform a live patch as a fallback. This may still be detectable.
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
|
||||
)
|
||||
finalChain =
|
||||
AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
|
||||
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Cached patched certificate chain for $keyId.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
|
||||
@@ -460,13 +456,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
// Resolve by nspace (KEY_ID) or alias (APP), same as createOperation.
|
||||
val generatedKeyInfo =
|
||||
when (descriptor.domain) {
|
||||
Domain.KEY_ID ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
descriptor.nspace,
|
||||
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
|
||||
)
|
||||
Domain.APP ->
|
||||
descriptor.alias?.let {
|
||||
@@ -476,8 +470,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
|
||||
// Hardware key: mark so getKeyEntry skips cert re-patching.
|
||||
descriptor.alias?.let { userUpdatedKeys.add(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)) }
|
||||
descriptor.alias?.let {
|
||||
val kid = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)
|
||||
userUpdatedKeys.add(kid)
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE] updateSubcomponent $kid: not generated key, added to userUpdatedKeys" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -488,73 +485,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
|
||||
metadata.certificate = publicCert
|
||||
metadata.certificateChain = certificateChain
|
||||
|
||||
GeneratedKeyPersistence.rePersistIfNeeded(callingUid, generatedKeyInfo)
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose(
|
||||
"Key updated with sizes: [publicCert, certificateChain] = [${publicCert?.size}, ${certificateChain?.size}]"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Intercepts the reply from getSecurityLevel to dynamically register our interceptor
|
||||
* for the returned IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* keystore2 may create a new BBinder for each getSecurityLevel call, so the binder
|
||||
* registered during initial setup (in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors) might not be the
|
||||
* same one that client apps receive. By intercepting every getSecurityLevel reply, we
|
||||
* ensure that all SecurityLevel binders are covered.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun handlePostGetSecurityLevel(
|
||||
txId: Long,
|
||||
data: Parcel,
|
||||
reply: Parcel,
|
||||
): TransactionResult {
|
||||
val backdoor = backdoorBinder
|
||||
if (backdoor == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] post-getSecurityLevel: backdoor not available")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
// Read the security level argument from the original request.
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val requestedLevel = data.readInt()
|
||||
|
||||
// hasException already consumed the exception header from the reply.
|
||||
// Next item is the IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
|
||||
val secLevelBinder = reply.readStrongBinder()
|
||||
if (secLevelBinder == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] getSecurityLevel($requestedLevel) returned null binder"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Only intercept TEE and StrongBox security levels.
|
||||
if (requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT &&
|
||||
requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get or create the interceptor for this security level. The interceptor may not
|
||||
// exist yet if the initial setupSecurityLevelInterceptors call failed for this level.
|
||||
val interceptor = securityLevelInterceptors.getOrPut(requestedLevel) {
|
||||
val secLevelInterface =
|
||||
IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub.asInterface(secLevelBinder)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Late-creating interceptor for security level $requestedLevel"
|
||||
)
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(secLevelInterface, requestedLevel).also {
|
||||
it.loadPersistedKeys()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
registerSecurityLevelBinder(backdoor, secLevelBinder, interceptor)
|
||||
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to process post-getSecurityLevel.", it)
|
||||
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+7
-6
@@ -399,18 +399,17 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Converts the legacy parameters into the modern [KeyMintAttestation] data structure, which is
|
||||
* required by [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
|
||||
* required by the refactored [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun toKeyMintAttestation(): KeyMintAttestation {
|
||||
// This conversion acts as a bridge, allowing our new generic components
|
||||
// to be used by the legacy interceptor.
|
||||
return KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
algorithm = this.algorithm,
|
||||
ecCurve = 0, // Not explicitly available in legacy args, but not critical
|
||||
ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
|
||||
keySize = this.keySize,
|
||||
origin = null, // Not needed to build attestaion
|
||||
noAuthRequired = null,
|
||||
algorithm = this.algorithm,
|
||||
ecCurve = 0,
|
||||
ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
|
||||
origin = null,
|
||||
blockMode = listOf<Int>(),
|
||||
padding = listOf<Int>(),
|
||||
purpose = this.purpose,
|
||||
@@ -437,6 +436,7 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
|
||||
usageExpireDateTime = null,
|
||||
usageCountLimit = null,
|
||||
callerNonce = null,
|
||||
nonce = null,
|
||||
unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
|
||||
includeUniqueId = null,
|
||||
rollbackResistance = null,
|
||||
@@ -444,6 +444,7 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
|
||||
allowWhileOnBody = null,
|
||||
trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
|
||||
trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
|
||||
noAuthRequired = null,
|
||||
maxUsesPerBoot = null,
|
||||
maxBootLevel = null,
|
||||
minMacLength = null,
|
||||
|
||||
+20
-14
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import android.system.keystore2.Domain
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
|
||||
import java.util.TreeMap
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,6 +22,15 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
|
||||
// Estimate for maximum size of a Binder response in bytes.
|
||||
private const val RESPONSE_SIZE_LIMIT = 358400
|
||||
|
||||
// Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
|
||||
private data class ListEntriesParams(
|
||||
val domain: Int,
|
||||
val namespace: Long,
|
||||
val startPastAlias: String?,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
private val pendingParams = ConcurrentHashMap<Long, ListEntriesParams>()
|
||||
|
||||
// Based on AOSP function `estimate_safe_amount_to_return` in utils.rs.
|
||||
private fun estimateSafeAmountToReturn(
|
||||
keyDescriptors: Array<KeyDescriptor>,
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +60,7 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse and store parameters for later use (in post-transaction).
|
||||
fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): ListEntriesParams? {
|
||||
fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): Boolean {
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
|
||||
val domain = data.readInt()
|
||||
@@ -61,21 +71,20 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
|
||||
// See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
|
||||
// Note that all generated keys belong to Domain::APP.
|
||||
if (domain == Domain.APP) {
|
||||
val params = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached $params.")
|
||||
return params
|
||||
pendingParams[txId] = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached ${pendingParams[txId]}.")
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return null
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Merge software-backed keys with hardware-backed keys in the reply parcel.
|
||||
fun injectGeneratedKeys(
|
||||
txId: Long,
|
||||
callingUid: Int,
|
||||
params: ListEntriesParams,
|
||||
reply: Parcel,
|
||||
): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
|
||||
fun injectGeneratedKeys(txId: Long, callingUid: Int, reply: Parcel): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
|
||||
val params =
|
||||
pendingParams.remove(txId)
|
||||
?: throw IllegalStateException("No params found for listing entries")
|
||||
|
||||
// By default we use the calling uid as namespace if domain is Domain::APP.
|
||||
// The namespace parameter is thus ignored for non-privileged applications.
|
||||
// See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
|
||||
@@ -131,6 +140,3 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
|
||||
data class ListEntriesParams(val domain: Int, val namespace: Long, val startPastAlias: String?)
|
||||
|
||||
+74
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
|
||||
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
|
||||
|
||||
object AuthorizeCreate {
|
||||
|
||||
fun check(
|
||||
keyParams: KeyMintAttestation?,
|
||||
opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>? = null,
|
||||
): Int? {
|
||||
if (keyParams == null) return null
|
||||
val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
|
||||
// Algorithm-level rejection runs before purpose-list check (AOSP HAL behavior)
|
||||
return checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
|
||||
?: checkPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
|
||||
?: checkTemporalValidity(keyParams, purpose)
|
||||
?: checkCallerNonce(keyParams, purpose, rawOpParams)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
|
||||
val algo = keyParams.algorithm
|
||||
if ((algo == Algorithm.EC || algo == Algorithm.RSA) &&
|
||||
(purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (algo == Algorithm.RSA && purpose == KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
|
||||
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
|
||||
if (purpose !in keyParams.purpose)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkTemporalValidity(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
|
||||
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
|
||||
|
||||
keyParams.activeDateTime?.let { activeDate ->
|
||||
if (now < activeDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyNotYetValid
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyParams.originationExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
|
||||
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.SIGN || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) {
|
||||
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyParams.usageExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
|
||||
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.DECRYPT) {
|
||||
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkCallerNonce(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int, rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>?): Int? {
|
||||
if (purpose != KeyPurpose.SIGN && purpose != KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) return null
|
||||
if (keyParams.callerNonce == true) return null
|
||||
if (rawOpParams?.any { it.tag == Tag.NONCE } == true)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.callerNonceProhibited
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+117
-1
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
|
||||
|
||||
data class PersistedKeyData(
|
||||
val uid: Int,
|
||||
@@ -250,6 +250,77 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
return result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-persist updates the cert chain for an already-persisted key without
|
||||
// reconstructing authorization parameters from the response. This avoids
|
||||
// pulling keymint Tag dependencies into this file and is correct because
|
||||
// the only field that changes post-generation is the patched cert chain.
|
||||
fun rePersistIfNeeded(
|
||||
callingUid: Int,
|
||||
generatedKeyInfo: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
|
||||
if (metadata == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: no metadata, skipping")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
val secLevel = metadata.keySecurityLevel
|
||||
|
||||
val entry = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries.find { (id, info) ->
|
||||
id.uid == callingUid && info.nspace == generatedKeyInfo.nspace
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (entry == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: key not found in map for uid=$callingUid nspace=${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyId = entry.key
|
||||
val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
|
||||
val existing = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, filename)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!existing.exists()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: no existing file for $keyId, skipping")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val newChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(metadata)
|
||||
if (newChain == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: could not extract cert chain for $keyId")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val persisted = runCatching {
|
||||
DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(existing))).use { input ->
|
||||
val version = input.readInt()
|
||||
if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: unknown format version $version for $keyId")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
readPersistedKeyData(input)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
if (persisted == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: failed to read existing data for $keyId")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyPair = generatedKeyInfo.keyPair ?: return
|
||||
save(
|
||||
keyId = keyId,
|
||||
keyPair = keyPair,
|
||||
nspace = generatedKeyInfo.nspace,
|
||||
securityLevel = secLevel,
|
||||
certChain = newChain.toList(),
|
||||
algorithm = persisted.algorithm,
|
||||
keySize = persisted.keySize,
|
||||
ecCurve = persisted.ecCurve,
|
||||
purposes = persisted.purposes,
|
||||
digests = persisted.digests,
|
||||
isAttestationKey = persisted.isAttestationKey,
|
||||
)
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Re-persisted key $keyId with updated cert chain")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Corrupted binary files can have arbitrary length fields — cap allocations
|
||||
private fun requireBounds(value: Int, max: Int, name: String): Int {
|
||||
require(value in 0..max) { "$name out of bounds: $value (max $max)" }
|
||||
return value
|
||||
@@ -260,4 +331,49 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
.digest("$uid:$alias".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
|
||||
return digest.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) } + ".bin"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reads all fields after version has already been consumed
|
||||
private fun readPersistedKeyData(input: DataInputStream): PersistedKeyData {
|
||||
val secLevel = input.readInt()
|
||||
val uid = input.readInt()
|
||||
val alias = input.readUTF()
|
||||
val nspace = input.readLong()
|
||||
val isAttestKey = input.readBoolean()
|
||||
val algo = input.readInt()
|
||||
val kSize = input.readInt()
|
||||
val curve = input.readInt()
|
||||
|
||||
val purposeCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "purposeCount")
|
||||
val purposes = (0 until purposeCount).map { input.readInt() }
|
||||
|
||||
val digestCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "digestCount")
|
||||
val digests = (0 until digestCount).map { input.readInt() }
|
||||
|
||||
val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
|
||||
val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
|
||||
input.readFully(pkBytes)
|
||||
|
||||
val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
|
||||
val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
|
||||
val certLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 65536, "certLen")
|
||||
val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
|
||||
input.readFully(certBytes)
|
||||
certBytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return PersistedKeyData(
|
||||
uid = uid,
|
||||
alias = alias,
|
||||
nspace = nspace,
|
||||
securityLevel = secLevel,
|
||||
isAttestationKey = isAttestKey,
|
||||
algorithm = algo,
|
||||
keySize = kSize,
|
||||
ecCurve = curve,
|
||||
purposes = purposes,
|
||||
digests = digests,
|
||||
privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
|
||||
certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+532
-562
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
-1
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
|
||||
private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")
|
||||
|
||||
/** Only intercept finish/abort for cleanup. Other ops pass through without round-trip. */
|
||||
val INTERCEPTED_CODES = intArrayOf(FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
|
||||
|
||||
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
|
||||
+175
-161
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
|
||||
import android.os.RemoteException
|
||||
import android.os.ServiceSpecificException
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyParameters
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPair
|
||||
@@ -20,48 +20,16 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
/** Keystore2 error codes for ServiceSpecificException. Negative = KeyMint, positive = Keystore. */
|
||||
internal object KeystoreErrorCode {
|
||||
const val INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE = -28
|
||||
const val VERIFICATION_FAILED = -30
|
||||
const val UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE = -2
|
||||
const val INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE = -3
|
||||
const val SYSTEM_ERROR = 4
|
||||
const val TOO_MUCH_DATA = 21
|
||||
const val KEY_EXPIRED = -25
|
||||
const val KEY_NOT_YET_VALID = -24
|
||||
|
||||
/** KeyMint ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED */
|
||||
const val CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED = -55
|
||||
|
||||
/** KeyMint ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT */
|
||||
const val INVALID_ARGUMENT = -38
|
||||
|
||||
/** KeyMint ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG */
|
||||
const val INVALID_TAG = -40
|
||||
|
||||
/** Keystore2 ResponseCode::PERMISSION_DENIED */
|
||||
const val PERMISSION_DENIED = 6
|
||||
|
||||
/** Keystore2 ResponseCode::KEY_NOT_FOUND */
|
||||
const val KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
|
||||
private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?)
|
||||
|
||||
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
|
||||
|
||||
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
|
||||
|
||||
fun abort()
|
||||
|
||||
/** Returns parameters from the begin phase (e.g. GCM nonce), or null if none. */
|
||||
fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? = null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
|
||||
private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
|
||||
val digest =
|
||||
@@ -71,17 +39,18 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
|
||||
else -> "NONE"
|
||||
}
|
||||
val keyAlgo =
|
||||
when (params.algorithm) {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
|
||||
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return when (params.algorithm) {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> "${digest}withECDSA"
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> {
|
||||
val isPss = params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
|
||||
if (isPss) "${digest}withRSA/PSS" else "${digest}withRSA"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
|
||||
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +60,7 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
|
||||
"Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -99,32 +68,29 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) {
|
||||
BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB"
|
||||
BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC"
|
||||
BlockMode.CTR -> "CTR"
|
||||
BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM"
|
||||
else -> "ECB" // Default for RSA
|
||||
else -> "ECB"
|
||||
}
|
||||
val padding =
|
||||
when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) {
|
||||
PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN -> "PKCS1Padding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
|
||||
else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
|
||||
else -> "NoPadding"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for Signing.
|
||||
private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val signature: Signature =
|
||||
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
|
||||
initSign(keyPair.private)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
if (data != null) signature.update(data)
|
||||
return null
|
||||
@@ -138,17 +104,12 @@ private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimi
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for Verification.
|
||||
private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val signature: Signature =
|
||||
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
|
||||
initVerify(keyPair.public)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
if (data != null) signature.update(data)
|
||||
return null
|
||||
@@ -156,16 +117,11 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
|
||||
|
||||
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
if (data != null) update(data)
|
||||
if (signature == null)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
|
||||
"Signature to verify is null",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (signature == null) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature to verify is null")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
|
||||
"Signature/MAC verification failed",
|
||||
)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature verification failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -173,19 +129,27 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
|
||||
private class CipherPrimitive(
|
||||
cryptoKey: java.security.Key,
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
private val opMode: Int,
|
||||
) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
|
||||
private val cipher: Cipher =
|
||||
Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey)
|
||||
val nonce = params.nonce
|
||||
if (nonce != null && isAead) {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec(128, nonce))
|
||||
} else if (nonce != null) {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec(nonce))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
if (data != null) cipher.updateAAD(data)
|
||||
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
|
||||
if (aadInput != null) cipher.updateAAD(aadInput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
|
||||
@@ -194,9 +158,6 @@ private class CipherPrimitive(
|
||||
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
|
||||
if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()
|
||||
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Returns the cipher IV as a NONCE parameter for GCM operations. */
|
||||
override fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? {
|
||||
val iv = cipher.iv ?: return null
|
||||
return arrayOf(
|
||||
@@ -206,23 +167,20 @@ private class CipherPrimitive(
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for ECDH Key Agreement.
|
||||
private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val agreement: javax.crypto.KeyAgreement =
|
||||
javax.crypto.KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH").apply { init(keyPair.private) }
|
||||
|
||||
override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = null
|
||||
|
||||
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
if (data == null)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
|
||||
"Peer public key required for key agreement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
val peerKey =
|
||||
@@ -235,23 +193,25 @@ private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
|
||||
* delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Tracks operation lifecycle: once [finish] or [abort] is called, subsequent calls throw
|
||||
* [ServiceSpecificException] with [KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE].
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class SoftwareOperation(
|
||||
private val txId: Long,
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair?,
|
||||
secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null,
|
||||
private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
|
||||
@Volatile var finalized = false
|
||||
private set
|
||||
|
||||
@Volatile private var finalized = false
|
||||
var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null
|
||||
|
||||
val beginParameters: KeyParameters?
|
||||
get() {
|
||||
val params = primitive.getBeginParameters() ?: return null
|
||||
if (params.isEmpty()) return null
|
||||
return KeyParameters().apply { keyParameter = params }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
init {
|
||||
val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
|
||||
@@ -273,121 +233,175 @@ class SoftwareOperation(
|
||||
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair!!)
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
|
||||
"Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Parameters produced during begin (e.g. GCM nonce), to populate CreateOperationResponse. */
|
||||
val beginParameters: KeyParameters?
|
||||
get() {
|
||||
val params = primitive.getBeginParameters() ?: return null
|
||||
if (params.isEmpty()) return null
|
||||
return KeyParameters().apply { keyParameter = params }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkActive() {
|
||||
if (finalized)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE,
|
||||
"Operation already finalized.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (finalized) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Rejected: operation already finalized (pruned or completed)")
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidOperationHandle)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
try {
|
||||
primitive.updateAad(data)
|
||||
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to updateAad.", e)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
|
||||
private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Input too large: ${data.size} > $MAX_RECEIVE_DATA, throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA(${KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData})")
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() inputSize=${aadInput?.size ?: 0}")
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
checkInputLength(aadInput)
|
||||
primitive.updateAad(aadInput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] update() inputSize=${data?.size ?: 0}")
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
checkInputLength(data)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return primitive.update(data)
|
||||
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
|
||||
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
checkInputLength(data)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
|
||||
val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
|
||||
if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
|
||||
val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
|
||||
val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
|
||||
if (delayMs > 0) LockSupport.parkNanos(delayMs * 1_000_000)
|
||||
}
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
onFinishCallback?.invoke()
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun abort() {
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
primitive.abort()
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Binder interface for [SoftwareOperation]. Synchronized and input-length validated. */
|
||||
class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
|
||||
IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.TOO_MUCH_DATA)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
synchronized(this) {
|
||||
checkInputLength(aadInput)
|
||||
operation.updateAad(aadInput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
synchronized(this) {
|
||||
checkInputLength(input)
|
||||
return operation.update(input)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
synchronized(this) {
|
||||
checkInputLength(input)
|
||||
checkInputLength(signature)
|
||||
return operation.finish(input, signature)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun abort() {
|
||||
synchronized(this) { operation.abort() }
|
||||
private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
|
||||
is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, e.message)
|
||||
is javax.crypto.BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument, e.message)
|
||||
is javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidInputLength, e.message)
|
||||
is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleKey, e.message)
|
||||
else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.unknownError, e.message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
companion object {
|
||||
private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
internal object KeystoreErrorCodes {
|
||||
val tooMuchData: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.system.keystore2.ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidOperationHandle: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidTag: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -76)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val verificationFailed: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidArgument: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidInputLength: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val incompatibleKey: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val incompatiblePurpose: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -13)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val unsupportedPurpose: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val incompatibleAlgorithm: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyNotYetValid: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -39)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyExpired: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -40)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val callerNonceProhibited: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val unknownError: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun resolveField(className: String, fieldName: String, fallback: Int): Int =
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
Class.forName(className).getField(fieldName).getInt(null)
|
||||
}.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Resolved $className.$fieldName via fallback: $fallback")
|
||||
fallback
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
|
||||
IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
operation.updateAad(aadInput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
return operation.update(input)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
return operation.finish(input, signature)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
override fun abort() {
|
||||
operation.abort()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,22 +37,6 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
|
||||
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
HardwareAuthenticatorType::class
|
||||
.java
|
||||
.fields
|
||||
.filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
|
||||
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyOriginNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
KeyOrigin::class
|
||||
.java
|
||||
.fields
|
||||
.filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
|
||||
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val paddingNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
PaddingMode::class
|
||||
.java
|
||||
@@ -97,33 +81,22 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
|
||||
when (param.tag) {
|
||||
Tag.ALGORITHM -> algorithmNames[value.algorithm]
|
||||
Tag.BLOCK_MODE -> blockModeNames[value.blockMode]
|
||||
Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
|
||||
Tag.EC_CURVE -> ecCurveNames[value.ecCurve]
|
||||
Tag.ORIGIN -> keyOriginNames[value.origin]
|
||||
Tag.PADDING -> paddingNames[value.paddingMode]
|
||||
Tag.PURPOSE -> purposeNames[value.keyPurpose]
|
||||
Tag.USER_AUTH_TYPE ->
|
||||
hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames[value.hardwareAuthenticatorType]
|
||||
Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
|
||||
Tag.AUTH_TIMEOUT,
|
||||
Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
|
||||
Tag.KEY_SIZE,
|
||||
Tag.MAC_LENGTH,
|
||||
Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
|
||||
Tag.OS_VERSION,
|
||||
Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL,
|
||||
Tag.USER_ID,
|
||||
Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> value.integer.toString()
|
||||
Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH -> value.integer.toString()
|
||||
Tag.CERTIFICATE_SERIAL -> BigInteger(value.blob).toString()
|
||||
Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME,
|
||||
Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER,
|
||||
Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE,
|
||||
Tag.CREATION_DATETIME,
|
||||
Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
|
||||
Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME -> Date(value.dateTime).toString()
|
||||
Tag.CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT -> X500Name(X500Principal(value.blob).name).toString()
|
||||
Tag.USER_SECURE_ID,
|
||||
Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT -> value.longInteger.toString()
|
||||
Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> value.boolValue.toString()
|
||||
Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> "true"
|
||||
Tag.ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
|
||||
Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND,
|
||||
Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,42 +1,86 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
|
||||
|
||||
import android.util.Log
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.BuildConfig
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A centralized logging utility for the TEESimulator application. This object provides a consistent
|
||||
* logging tag and format for all application logs, making it easier to filter and debug in Logcat.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Includes a rate limiter that caps logd syscalls during binder stress to prevent thread pool
|
||||
* contention. The first [RATE_LIMIT_BURST] messages per [RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS] window are logged
|
||||
* normally; subsequent messages are suppressed and a summary is emitted when the window resets.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object SystemLogger {
|
||||
// The tag used for all log messages from this application.
|
||||
private const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
|
||||
@PublishedApi internal const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
|
||||
|
||||
private val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
|
||||
@PublishedApi internal val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
|
||||
|
||||
// Rate limiter: allow BURST messages per WINDOW, then suppress until window resets.
|
||||
private const val RATE_LIMIT_BURST = 15
|
||||
private const val RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 1000L
|
||||
private val windowStart = AtomicLong(System.currentTimeMillis())
|
||||
private val windowCount = AtomicInteger(0)
|
||||
private val suppressedCount = AtomicInteger(0)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Returns true if this message should be emitted. Resets the window if expired
|
||||
* and emits a suppression summary for the previous window.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@PublishedApi internal fun acquireLogPermit(): Boolean {
|
||||
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
|
||||
val start = windowStart.get()
|
||||
if (now - start > RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS) {
|
||||
// Window expired: reset and emit suppression summary if needed.
|
||||
if (windowStart.compareAndSet(start, now)) {
|
||||
val suppressed = suppressedCount.getAndSet(0)
|
||||
windowCount.set(1) // this call counts as #1 in the new window
|
||||
if (suppressed > 0) {
|
||||
Log.i(TAG, "[rate-limit] suppressed $suppressed log messages in previous window")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
val count = windowCount.incrementAndGet()
|
||||
if (count <= RATE_LIMIT_BURST) return true
|
||||
suppressedCount.incrementAndGet()
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs a debug message. Use this for fine-grained information that is useful for debugging.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun debug(message: String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.d(TAG, message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Lazy debug: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
|
||||
inline fun debug(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.d(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs an informational message. Use this to report major application lifecycle events.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun info(message: String) {
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.i(TAG, message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Lazy info: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
|
||||
inline fun info(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.i(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs a warning message. Use this to report unexpected but non-fatal issues.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
* @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
|
||||
* Logs a warning message. Warnings are never rate-limited.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun warning(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
|
||||
if (throwable != null) {
|
||||
@@ -47,11 +91,7 @@ object SystemLogger {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs an error message. Use this to report fatal errors or exceptions that disrupt
|
||||
* functionality.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
* @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
|
||||
* Logs an error message. Errors are never rate-limited.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun error(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
|
||||
if (throwable != null) {
|
||||
@@ -64,11 +104,22 @@ object SystemLogger {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs a verbose message. This level is for highly detailed logs that are generally not needed
|
||||
* unless tracking a very specific issue.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun verbose(message: String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.v(TAG, message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Lazy verbose: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
|
||||
inline fun verbose(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.v(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
inline fun trace(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
Log.w(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
|
||||
// RFC 5280 GeneralizedTime maximum: 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (millis since epoch).
|
||||
private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +93,12 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge + no attestKey = self-signed, depth 1
|
||||
if (challenge == null && attestKeyAlias == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[certgen] no-challenge key: self-signed, depth=1, purposes=${params.purpose}" }
|
||||
return listOf(buildSelfSignedCertificate(subjectKeyPair, params))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
|
||||
|
||||
val (signingKey, issuer) =
|
||||
@@ -199,16 +204,14 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
private fun buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(purposes: List<Int>): Int {
|
||||
var bits = 0
|
||||
for (purpose in purposes) {
|
||||
bits =
|
||||
bits or
|
||||
when (purpose) {
|
||||
KeyPurpose.SIGN -> KeyUsage.digitalSignature
|
||||
KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeyUsage.dataEncipherment
|
||||
KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyEncipherment
|
||||
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyAgreement
|
||||
KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyCertSign
|
||||
else -> 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
bits = bits or when (purpose) {
|
||||
KeyPurpose.SIGN -> KeyUsage.digitalSignature
|
||||
KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeyUsage.dataEncipherment
|
||||
KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyEncipherment
|
||||
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyAgreement
|
||||
KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyCertSign
|
||||
else -> 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return bits
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -223,8 +226,6 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
): Certificate {
|
||||
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
|
||||
// Default validity: epoch to 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (matches add_required_parameters).
|
||||
val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
|
||||
val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -243,21 +244,17 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
|
||||
builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Add our custom, simulated attestation extension.
|
||||
builder.addExtension(
|
||||
AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
|
||||
builder.addExtension(
|
||||
AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The signature algorithm must match the SIGNING key, not the subject key.
|
||||
// An EC attestation key may sign an RSA subject key's certificate (or vice versa).
|
||||
val signerAlgorithm =
|
||||
when (signingKeyPair.private) {
|
||||
is java.security.interfaces.ECKey -> "SHA256withECDSA"
|
||||
is java.security.interfaces.RSAKey -> "SHA256withRSA"
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw IllegalArgumentException(
|
||||
"Unsupported signing key type: ${signingKeyPair.private.javaClass}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
when (signingKeyPair.private.algorithm) {
|
||||
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
|
||||
"RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported signing key: ${signingKeyPair.private.algorithm}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val contentSigner =
|
||||
JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
|
||||
@@ -266,4 +263,39 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
|
||||
return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:452-478, ta/src/cert.rs:111-114
|
||||
private fun buildSelfSignedCertificate(
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair,
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
): Certificate {
|
||||
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
|
||||
val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
|
||||
|
||||
val builder = JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
|
||||
notBefore,
|
||||
notAfter,
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
keyPair.public,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val keyUsageBits = buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(params.purpose)
|
||||
if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
|
||||
builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val signerAlgorithm = when (keyPair.private.algorithm) {
|
||||
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
|
||||
"RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported key: ${keyPair.private.algorithm}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val contentSigner = JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
|
||||
.setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
|
||||
.build(keyPair.private)
|
||||
|
||||
return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -91,27 +91,33 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?,
|
||||
expectedSize: Int,
|
||||
): ByteArray {
|
||||
// 1. Attempt to get the value from the system property.
|
||||
getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
|
||||
return it
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Fallback to the value from a cached TEE attestation.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
attestationValueProvider()?.let {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it) // Persist for consistency
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it)
|
||||
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
|
||||
return it
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to get $propertyName from attestation.", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. As a final fallback, generate a random value.
|
||||
readFromFile(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from persistent file: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it)
|
||||
return it
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it)
|
||||
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,10 +164,37 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Generates a cryptographically random byte array of a specified length. */
|
||||
private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray =
|
||||
ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) }
|
||||
|
||||
private val PERSIST_DIR = File("/data/adb/tricky_store")
|
||||
|
||||
private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File = when (propertyName) {
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
|
||||
else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun persistToFile(propertyName: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fileForProperty(propertyName).writeBytes(bytes)
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist $propertyName to file.", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun readFromFile(propertyName: String, expectedSize: Int): ByteArray? {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val file = fileForProperty(propertyName)
|
||||
if (!file.exists()) return null
|
||||
val bytes = file.readBytes()
|
||||
if (bytes.size == expectedSize) bytes else null
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to read $propertyName from file.", e)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Patch Level Properties ---
|
||||
|
||||
fun getPatchLevel(uid: Int): Int {
|
||||
@@ -240,11 +273,12 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
val resolvedValue = resolveDateKeywords(value)
|
||||
|
||||
return when {
|
||||
// "device_default" indicates falling back to the system property.
|
||||
resolvedValue.equals("device_default", ignoreCase = true) -> null
|
||||
// "no" indicates this value should not be reported.
|
||||
// Resolve from live system prop — matches what detectors see via getprop,
|
||||
// even when PIF has spoofed ro.build.version.security_patch via resetprop
|
||||
resolvedValue.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true) ->
|
||||
parsePatchLevelValue(SystemProperties.get("ro.build.version.security_patch", ""), isLong)
|
||||
resolvedValue.equals("no", ignoreCase = true) -> DO_NOT_REPORT
|
||||
// Otherwise, parse the resolved date string.
|
||||
else -> parsePatchLevelValue(resolvedValue, isLong)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -353,9 +387,17 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) {
|
||||
return 300
|
||||
}
|
||||
return DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
|
||||
val cached = DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
|
||||
val version = cached
|
||||
?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
|
||||
?: 400 // Default to a recent version
|
||||
val source = when {
|
||||
cached != null -> "cache"
|
||||
attestVersionMap.containsKey(Build.VERSION.SDK_INT) -> "map"
|
||||
else -> "default"
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("attestVersion=$version source=$source securityLevel=$securityLevel")
|
||||
return version
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -364,17 +406,11 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
* @param securityLevel The security level, used to determine the correct attestation version.
|
||||
* @return The appropriate Keymaster or KeyMint version number.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
|
||||
val attestVersion = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
|
||||
return if (attestVersion >= 100) attestVersion else 41 // Keymaster 4.1 for older versions
|
||||
}
|
||||
fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
|
||||
|
||||
// --- APEX and Module Hash Properties ---
|
||||
|
||||
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/android-latest-release:system/apex/proto/apex_manifest.proto
|
||||
// --- Minimal Protobuf Parser for ApexManifest ---
|
||||
// Field 1: name (string)
|
||||
// Field 2: version (int64)
|
||||
// Minimal protobuf parser for apex_manifest.pb (field 1: name, field 2: version)
|
||||
private class MinimalApexManifestParser(private val data: ByteArray) {
|
||||
var pos = 0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -388,13 +424,13 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
val wireType = (tag and 0x07).toInt()
|
||||
|
||||
when (fieldNum) {
|
||||
1L -> { // name
|
||||
1L -> {
|
||||
val length = readVarint().toInt()
|
||||
if (pos + length > data.size) return null
|
||||
name = String(data, pos, length, Charsets.UTF_8)
|
||||
pos += length
|
||||
}
|
||||
2L -> { // version
|
||||
2L -> {
|
||||
version = readVarint()
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> skipField(wireType)
|
||||
@@ -422,19 +458,18 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
|
||||
private fun skipField(wireType: Int) {
|
||||
when (wireType) {
|
||||
0 -> readVarint() // Varint
|
||||
1 -> pos += 8 // 64-bit
|
||||
2 -> { // Length-delimited
|
||||
0 -> readVarint()
|
||||
1 -> pos += 8
|
||||
2 -> {
|
||||
val len = readVarint().toInt()
|
||||
pos += len
|
||||
}
|
||||
5 -> pos += 4 // 32-bit
|
||||
5 -> pos += 4
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalStateException("Unknown wire type $wireType")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/apex/libs/libapexutil/apexutil.cpp
|
||||
private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
|
||||
val results = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
|
||||
val apexRoot = File("/apex")
|
||||
@@ -443,22 +478,14 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
return@lazy emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Logic from: GetActivePackages in apexutil.cpp
|
||||
apexRoot.listFiles()?.forEach { file ->
|
||||
if (!file.isDirectory) return@forEach
|
||||
val name = file.name
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. Ignore "." (and implicitly "..")
|
||||
if (name.startsWith(".")) return@forEach
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Ignore directories containing '@' (active mounts usually don't have version in
|
||||
// path)
|
||||
if (name.contains("@")) return@forEach
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Ignore "sharedlibs"
|
||||
if (name == "sharedlibs") return@forEach
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Parse apex_manifest.pb
|
||||
val manifestFile = File(file, "apex_manifest.pb")
|
||||
if (manifestFile.exists()) {
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
@@ -469,59 +496,46 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure uniqueness (though filesystem scan usually prevents exact dupes,
|
||||
// strictly speaking we want to behave like a Map keyed by package name)
|
||||
results.distinctBy { it.first }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
|
||||
val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy {
|
||||
DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash
|
||||
?: runCatching {
|
||||
// 1. Create a container to hold the sort key (name encoded) and the full data
|
||||
// (sequence encoded)
|
||||
data class ModuleEntry(
|
||||
val nameEncoded: ByteArray, // The sort key
|
||||
val fullEncoded: ByteArray, // The data to hash
|
||||
val nameEncoded: ByteArray,
|
||||
val fullEncoded: ByteArray,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val modules =
|
||||
apexInfos.map { (packageName, versionCode) ->
|
||||
// Create the components
|
||||
val nameOctet = DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
|
||||
val versionInt = ASN1Integer(versionCode)
|
||||
|
||||
// Create the Sequence: SEQUENCE { packageName, version }
|
||||
val vec = ASN1EncodableVector()
|
||||
vec.add(nameOctet)
|
||||
vec.add(versionInt)
|
||||
val sequence = DERSequence(vec)
|
||||
|
||||
// We store the encoded name separately because Rust sorts ONLY by this
|
||||
// AOSP sorts by encoded name only, not full sequence
|
||||
ModuleEntry(
|
||||
nameEncoded = nameOctet.encoded,
|
||||
fullEncoded = sequence.encoded,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Sort manually based on the encoded Package Name (lexicographically)
|
||||
// This mimics the Rust 'impl DerOrd for ModuleInfo' which delegates to
|
||||
// 'self.name'
|
||||
val sortedModules =
|
||||
modules.sortedWith { m1, m2 ->
|
||||
compareByteArrays(m1.nameEncoded, m2.nameEncoded)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Concatenate the full sequences in the specific sorted order
|
||||
val payloadStream = ByteArrayOutputStream()
|
||||
sortedModules.forEach { payloadStream.write(it.fullEncoded) }
|
||||
val payload = payloadStream.toByteArray()
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Wrap manually in a DER SET tag (0x31)
|
||||
// We cannot use DERSet(vector) because it would re-sort incorrectly.
|
||||
// Wrap in DER SET tag manually — DERSet() re-sorts by full encoding
|
||||
val finalDerSet = encodeAsDerSet(payload)
|
||||
|
||||
// 5. Compute SHA-256
|
||||
MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(finalDerSet)
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrElse {
|
||||
@@ -530,7 +544,6 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Compares two byte arrays lexicographically (unsigned). */
|
||||
private fun compareByteArrays(a: ByteArray, b: ByteArray): Int {
|
||||
val length = minOf(a.size, b.size)
|
||||
for (i in 0 until length) {
|
||||
@@ -543,31 +556,25 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
return a.size - b.size
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Manually wraps the payload in an ASN.1 SET (0x31) tag with correct length encoding. */
|
||||
private fun encodeAsDerSet(payload: ByteArray): ByteArray {
|
||||
val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
|
||||
out.write(0x31) // ASN.1 Tag for SET
|
||||
out.write(0x31)
|
||||
writeDerLength(out, payload.size)
|
||||
out.write(payload)
|
||||
return out.toByteArray()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Writes the ASN.1 length field to the stream. */
|
||||
private fun writeDerLength(out: ByteArrayOutputStream, length: Int) {
|
||||
if (length < 128) {
|
||||
// Short form
|
||||
out.write(length)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Long form
|
||||
var size = length
|
||||
val bytes = ArrayList<Byte>()
|
||||
while (size > 0) {
|
||||
bytes.add((size and 0xFF).toByte())
|
||||
size = size ushr 8
|
||||
}
|
||||
// First byte: 0x80 | number of length bytes
|
||||
out.write(0x80 or bytes.size)
|
||||
// Write length bytes in big-endian (reverse of how we extracted them)
|
||||
for (i in bytes.indices.reversed()) {
|
||||
out.write(bytes[i].toInt())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
|
||||
|
||||
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
|
||||
import android.content.Context
|
||||
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
object AndroidPermissionUtils {
|
||||
|
||||
@SuppressLint("PrivateApi", "DiscouragedPrivateApi")
|
||||
private fun getGlobalContext(): Context? {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
// 1. Get the hidden ActivityThread class via reflection
|
||||
val activityThreadClass = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread")
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Invoke the static currentActivityThread() method
|
||||
val currentActivityThreadMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("currentActivityThread")
|
||||
currentActivityThreadMethod.isAccessible = true
|
||||
val activityThread = currentActivityThreadMethod.invoke(null)
|
||||
|
||||
if (activityThread == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("Reflection: ActivityThread.currentActivityThread() returned null")
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Try to get the application context
|
||||
val getApplicationMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getApplication")
|
||||
getApplicationMethod.isAccessible = true
|
||||
val application = getApplicationMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
|
||||
|
||||
if (application != null) return application
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Fallback to getSystemContext() if application is null (often happens in system_server)
|
||||
val getSystemContextMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getSystemContext")
|
||||
getSystemContextMethod.isAccessible = true
|
||||
getSystemContextMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
|
||||
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Reflection failed to get global context for permission check", e)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Core permission check.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun hasPermission(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
|
||||
val context = getGlobalContext() ?: run {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("AndroidPermissionUtils: Context is null, failing permission check safely.")
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val result = context.checkPermission(permission, -1, uid)
|
||||
return result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasDeviceAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.REQUEST_UNIQUE_ID_ATTESTATION")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasManageUsersPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasDumpPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.DUMP")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -8,21 +8,6 @@ import kotlin.math.exp
|
||||
import kotlin.math.ln
|
||||
import kotlin.math.max
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Simulates realistic TEE hardware latency for software key generation.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The delay model is derived from 64+ timing measurements across QTEE (Qualcomm) and Trustonic
|
||||
* (MediaTek) hardware. It combines four independent noise sources that model different physical
|
||||
* latency origins in a real TrustZone-based TEE:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. Base crypto processing (log-normal): hardware RNG + key derivation + cert signing
|
||||
* 2. Binder/kernel transit (exponential): IPC scheduling, context switches
|
||||
* 3. TrustZone scheduler jitter (Gaussian): world-switch non-determinism
|
||||
* 4. Cold-start penalty (half-normal): first operation after idle is slower due to TEE
|
||||
* secure world re-initialization and TLB/cache warming
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Per-boot session bias models manufacturing variance between TEE hardware instances.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object TeeLatencySimulator {
|
||||
|
||||
private val rng = SecureRandom()
|
||||
@@ -56,11 +41,6 @@ object TeeLatencySimulator {
|
||||
return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Log-normal base delay. Parameters tuned to match observed hardware profiles:
|
||||
* EC P-256 on QTEE averages ~65ms, RSA-2048 ~75ms, AES ~40ms.
|
||||
* Sigma kept low (0.08) to match the tight clustering seen in real measurements.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
|
||||
val (mu, sigma) =
|
||||
when (algorithm) {
|
||||
|
||||
+18
-42
@@ -1,50 +1,26 @@
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v5.1: Interception Architecture Rewrite
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0
|
||||
|
||||
Major release. 27 files changed, 2300 lines rewritten. The entire Kotlin interception layer has been rebuilt with a clean architecture, proper AIDL alignment, and significantly lower binder overhead.
|
||||
Repository consolidation release. All tee-rebuild work merged as the new main branch.
|
||||
|
||||
### Interception Layer Rewrite
|
||||
- KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor completely restructured: GeneratedKeyInfo now carries full KeyMintAttestation instead of nullable stub, eliminating scattered null checks across every operation path
|
||||
- SoftwareOperation rewritten with sealed CryptoPrimitive interface separating Signer, Verifier, Encryptor, and Decryptor into isolated implementations with proper JCA algorithm mapping
|
||||
- KeystoreErrorCode centralized object replaces scattered magic numbers for all KeyMint and Keystore2 error codes
|
||||
- listEntries moved from pre-transact parameter caching to post-transact injection, eliminating a race condition where cached params could go stale
|
||||
- deleteKey now handles both APP domain (by alias) and KEY_ID domain (by nspace) resolution paths correctly
|
||||
- AuthorizeCreate and AndroidPermissionUtils removed, authorization logic consolidated into the operation dispatch path
|
||||
- DeviceAttestationService removed, attestation routing simplified into the main interceptor
|
||||
### AOSP Self-Signed Cert Compliance
|
||||
- No-challenge keys now generate self-signed certs (subject == issuer, depth 1), matching AOSP `ta/src/keys.rs:451-478`
|
||||
- Both Kotlin (BouncyCastle) and Rust (native-certgen) paths corrected
|
||||
- Eliminates attestation behavioral probes that detect keybox issuer on non-attested keys
|
||||
|
||||
### Software Crypto Operations
|
||||
- GCM nonce returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations, matching real KeyMint HAL behavior
|
||||
- updateAad correctly throws INVALID_TAG on non-AEAD operations instead of silently succeeding
|
||||
- Cipher algorithm mapping cleaned up: dropped CTR block mode and RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding that caused JCA provider mismatches
|
||||
- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes instead of raw exceptions
|
||||
### Stability
|
||||
- Binder stress crash hardening for concurrent generateKey calls
|
||||
- AUTO mode TEE race for consistent attestation on devices with working G10
|
||||
- Oversized transactions routed to software gen instead of crashing
|
||||
- Operation-time params (BLOCK_MODE, PADDING, DIGEST) passed through to CipherPrimitive
|
||||
|
||||
### Attestation & Certificate Generation
|
||||
- CertificateGenerator rewritten with clean Kotlin Pair return type instead of Android's util.Pair
|
||||
- AttestationBuilder field ordering aligned with AOSP KeyDescription ASN.1 schema
|
||||
- Unique ID computation follows KeyMint HAL spec: HMAC-SHA256(temporal_counter || AAID || reset_flag, HBK) truncated to 128 bits
|
||||
- Patch level logging removed from hot path to reduce logcat noise on every attestation
|
||||
### Banking App Compatibility
|
||||
- Bare `target.txt` entries now default to AUTO mode, resolved at config level to PATCH (working TEE) or GENERATE (broken TEE)
|
||||
- Fixes BHIM and similar banking apps that require TEE-backed attestation keys
|
||||
- Restores v5.0 behavior where AUTO was resolved before the interceptor dispatch, avoiding the non-deterministic `raceTeePatch` path
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuration & Device Properties
|
||||
- ConfigurationManager target package parsing refactored: mode/package extraction deduplicated across GENERATE/PATCH/AUTO branches
|
||||
- system=prop forced boot/vendor override removed, now respects explicit per-component patch level configuration
|
||||
- FileObserver delete handler simplified with direct file access instead of defensive null-checks
|
||||
- AndroidDeviceUtils expanded with additional device property accessors for attestation fields
|
||||
|
||||
### Binder Performance
|
||||
- Safe parcel reads at 6 deserialization sites, replacing force-unwrap NPE paths with early-return on null. A single NPE generates a full stack trace that blocks the binder thread for ~2ms
|
||||
- teeResponses cache populated on generateKey/importKey post-transact, reducing getKeyEntry from 2+ binder round-trips to 1
|
||||
- pingBinder liveness check removed from pre-transact failure path, eliminating a synchronous IPC call on every failed transaction
|
||||
- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI entirely for PING/INTERFACE/DUMP
|
||||
|
||||
### Dynamic SecurityLevel Binder Registration
|
||||
- Intercepts getSecurityLevel replies to register hooks on every new BBinder instance keystore2 returns, not just the initial one from setup
|
||||
- Identity hash deduplication prevents double-hooking when keystore2 returns the same binder across multiple calls
|
||||
- Resolves apps that call getSecurityLevel independently and receive a different binder than the one registered at startup
|
||||
|
||||
### Build & Packaging
|
||||
- Rust native build task integrated into Gradle with cargo-ndk for aarch64/armv7/x86/x86_64
|
||||
- Module ZIP includes all 4 native libraries (libTEESimulator, libsupervisor, libcertgen, libinject)
|
||||
- customize.sh extraction restored for supervisor daemon and native cert gen library
|
||||
- TeeLatencySimulator added as standalone utility for log-normal hardware latency emulation
|
||||
### Infrastructure
|
||||
- Version scheme changed to semver (v6.0.0)
|
||||
- Repository moved to TEESimulator-RS as canonical source
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-4
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"version": "v4.5",
|
||||
"versionCode": 111,
|
||||
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.5/TEESimulator-v4.5-Release.zip",
|
||||
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
|
||||
"version": "v6.0.0",
|
||||
"versionCode": 155,
|
||||
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/latest/download/TEESimulator-RS-Release.zip",
|
||||
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,9 +14,69 @@ const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11];
|
||||
// Extension OIDs
|
||||
const OID_KEY_USAGE: &[u64] = &[2, 5, 29, 15];
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge = self-signed leaf, chain depth 1
|
||||
pub fn build_self_signed_cert(
|
||||
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
|
||||
params: &CertGenParams,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
|
||||
let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
|
||||
serial.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
vec![1u8]
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
|
||||
subject.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
|
||||
let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
|
||||
// No keybox fallback available; use far-future (year 9999)
|
||||
OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(253402300799)
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365 * 30))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let extensions_der = build_extensions(None, ¶ms.purposes)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
|
||||
let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
|
||||
let validity_der = encode_validity(¬_before, ¬_after);
|
||||
let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
|
||||
|
||||
// issuer == subject (self-signed, per AOSP ta/src/cert.rs:111-114)
|
||||
let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&version_der,
|
||||
&serial_der,
|
||||
&sig_alg_der,
|
||||
&subject_dn_der,
|
||||
&validity_der,
|
||||
&subject_dn_der,
|
||||
&spki_der,
|
||||
&extensions_tagged,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
|
||||
let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&tbs_der,
|
||||
&sig_alg_der,
|
||||
&signature_bit_string,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(vec![cert_der])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn build_certificate_chain(
|
||||
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
|
||||
attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
|
||||
attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
|
||||
params: &CertGenParams,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
@@ -33,7 +93,7 @@ pub fn build_certificate_chain(
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_leaf_cert(
|
||||
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
|
||||
attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
|
||||
attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
|
||||
params: &CertGenParams,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +123,6 @@ fn build_leaf_cert(
|
||||
timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Extensions
|
||||
let extensions_der = build_extensions(attestation_ext_der, ¶ms.purposes)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// TBS Certificate
|
||||
@@ -256,19 +315,19 @@ fn extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: &[u8], purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>, purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut extensions: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// KeyUsage extension (critical)
|
||||
let ku_byte = map_key_usage_byte(purposes);
|
||||
if ku_byte != 0 {
|
||||
let ku_ext = build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte);
|
||||
extensions.push(ku_ext);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attestation extension (non-critical)
|
||||
let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attestation_ext_der);
|
||||
extensions.push(attest_ext);
|
||||
if let Some(attest_der) = attestation_ext_der {
|
||||
let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attest_der);
|
||||
extensions.push(attest_ext);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence_of(&extensions))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -62,14 +62,13 @@ fn generate_attested_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<jbyteAr
|
||||
|
||||
let keybox = keybox::parse_keybox(¶ms.keybox_cert_chain, ¶ms.keybox_private_key)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(¶ms)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let cert_chain = certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(
|
||||
&key_pair,
|
||||
&attest_ext,
|
||||
&keybox,
|
||||
¶ms,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let cert_chain = if params.attestation_challenge.is_some() {
|
||||
let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(¶ms)?;
|
||||
certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(&key_pair, Some(&attest_ext), &keybox, ¶ms)?
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
tracing::info!("no attestation challenge, generating self-signed cert (depth 1)");
|
||||
certbuilder::build_self_signed_cert(&key_pair, ¶ms)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let blob = assemble_result(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, &cert_chain);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package android.hardware.security.keymint;
|
||||
|
||||
public @interface HardwareAuthenticatorType {
|
||||
int NONE = 0;
|
||||
int PASSWORD = 1;
|
||||
int FINGERPRINT = 2;
|
||||
int ANY = -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
package android.os;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Stub for android.os.SELinux. */
|
||||
public class SELinux {
|
||||
public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
|
||||
String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,21 +1,14 @@
|
||||
package android.os;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Stub for android.os.ServiceSpecificException.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* <p>Used by AIDL-generated binder stubs to report service-specific errors with numeric codes.
|
||||
* The binder framework serializes this as EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC on the wire, preserving the integer
|
||||
* error code for the client.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
|
||||
public final int errorCode;
|
||||
|
||||
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
|
||||
this.errorCode = errorCode;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
|
||||
super(message);
|
||||
this.errorCode = errorCode;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
|
||||
this(errorCode, null);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user