docs(release): add v5.1.1 changelog for pre-stash restoration fixes

EC keys don't support DECRYPT (only AGREE_KEY for key derivation).
Without this guard, an EC DECRYPT operation creates a CipherPrimitive
that fails with a confusing JCA error instead of returning
UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE upfront.

.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Ensure shell scripts always have LF line endings, even on Windows.
+# These get packaged into flashable zips and run on Android devices.
+*.sh text eol=lf
+module/daemon text eol=lf

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@ name: Build
 on:
   push:
     branches: [ "main" ]
-    paths-ignore:
+    paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ]
-      - '**.md'
-      - '.github/**'
-      - '!.github/workflows/**'
   pull_request:
     branches: [ "main" ]
-    paths-ignore:
+    paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ]
-      - '**.md'
-      - '.github/**'
-      - '!.github/workflows/**'
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 concurrency:
@@ -22,18 +16,9 @@ concurrency:
 jobs:
   build:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
+
-      id-token: write
-      attestations: write
-      contents: read
-    
-    outputs:
-      releaseName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
-      debugName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
-    
     steps:
-      - name: Check out
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           submodules: "recursive"
           fetch-depth: 0
@@ -45,6 +30,25 @@ jobs:
           java-version: 21
           cache: 'gradle'
 
+      - name: Setup Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          targets: aarch64-linux-android,armv7-linux-androideabi,i686-linux-android,x86_64-linux-android
+
+      - name: Cache Rust artifacts
+        uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/registry
+            ~/.cargo/git
+            ~/.cargo/bin/cargo-ndk
+            native-certgen/target
+          key: rust-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('native-certgen/Cargo.lock') }}
+          restore-keys: rust-${{ runner.os }}-
+
+      - name: Install cargo-ndk
+        run: command -v cargo-ndk || cargo install cargo-ndk
+
       - name: Set up ccache
         uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2
         with:
@@ -60,72 +64,88 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build with Gradle
         run: |
           chmod +x ./gradlew
-          ./gradlew --parallel zipRelease zipDebug --stacktrace
+          ./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug -Porg.gradle.parallel=true -Porg.gradle.vfs.watch=true -Dorg.gradle.jvmargs=-Xmx2048m
 
-      - name: Prepare artifact
+      - name: Read version
-        if: success()
+        id: ver
-        id: prepareArtifact
         run: |
-          set -e
+          ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')
-          RELEASE_FILE=$(find out -name "*Release*.zip" | head -1)
+          count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
-          DEBUG_FILE=$(find out -name "*Debug*.zip" | head -1)
+          echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          
-          if [[ -z "$RELEASE_FILE" || -z "$DEBUG_FILE" ]]; then
-            echo "Error: Could not find release or debug files in out/"
-            echo "Contents of out/ directory:"
-            ls -la out/ || echo "out/ directory does not exist"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          
-          # Extract names
-          RELEASE_NAME=$(basename "$RELEASE_FILE" .zip)
-          DEBUG_NAME=$(basename "$DEBUG_FILE" .zip)
-          
-          echo "releaseName=$RELEASE_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          echo "debugName=$DEBUG_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
 
-          mkdir -p module-release module-debug
+      - name: List build artifacts
-          unzip -q "$RELEASE_FILE" -d module-release
+        run: |
-          unzip -q "$DEBUG_FILE" -d module-debug
+          echo "Release: $(ls out/*Release*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Release*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))"
-          echo "  Release: $RELEASE_NAME"
+          echo "Debug: $(ls out/*Debug*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Debug*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))"
-          echo "  Debug: $DEBUG_NAME"
 
-      - name: Upload release
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
-        if: success()
-        id: release
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
         with:
-          name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
+          name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip
-          path: "./module-release/*"
+          path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Release.zip
           retention-days: 30
-          compression-level: 6
+          compression-level: 0
 
-      - name: Upload debug
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
-        if: success()
-        id: debug
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
         with:
-          name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
+          name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
-          path: "./module-debug/*"
+          path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Debug.zip
           retention-days: 7
-          compression-level: 6
+          compression-level: 0
 
-      - name: Upload release mappings
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
-        if: success()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
         with:
-          name: release-mappings-${{ github.run_number }}
+          name: release-mappings
-          path: "./app/build/outputs/mapping/release"
+          path: app/build/outputs/mapping/release
           retention-days: 30
           compression-level: 9
 
-      - name: Summary
+  release:
-        if: always()
+    needs: build
+    if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Read version
+        id: ver
         run: |
-          echo "## Build Summary" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+          ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')
-          echo "- **Status**: ${{ job.status }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+          count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
-          echo "- **Gradle Tasks**: assembleRelease, assembleDebug" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+          echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          if [[ "${{ job.status }}" == "success" ]]; then
+
-            echo "- **Release Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
-            echo "- **Debug Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+        with:
-          fi
+          name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip
+          path: zips
+
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
+          path: zips
+
+      - name: Extract changelog
+        run: |
+          ver="${VER#v}"
+          awk "/^## TEESimulator-RS v${ver%%-*}/{flag=1; next} /^## TEESimulator-RS v/{if(flag) exit} flag" module/changelog.md > /tmp/notes.md
+          cat /tmp/notes.md
+        env:
+          VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
+
+      - name: Create release
+        run: |
+          gh release delete "$VER" --yes 2>/dev/null || true
+          RELEASE=$(ls zips/*Release*.zip | head -1)
+          DEBUG=$(ls zips/*Debug*.zip | head -1)
+          gh release create "$VER" \
+            --title "$VER" \
+            --latest \
+            --notes-file /tmp/notes.md \
+            "$RELEASE" \
+            "$DEBUG"
+        env:
+          VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,7 @@
 out
+.gradle
+.kotlin
+app/build
+build
+native-certgen/target
+app/src/main/jniLibs

README.md

@@ -1,32 +1,143 @@
-# TEESimulator – A Full TEE Emulation Framework
+<p align="center">
+  <h1 align="center">🔐 TEESimulator</h1>
+  <p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
+  <p align="center">Hardware attestation. Software keys. Zero detection.</p>
+  <p align="center">
+    <a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.2-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.2">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?style=for-the-badge&logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
+  </p>
+</p>
 
-**TEESimulator** is a system module designed to create a complete, software-based simulation of a hardware-backed Trusted Execution Environment ([TEE](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty)) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation).
+---
 
-The project's goal is to move beyond simple certificate patching and build a robust framework that can create and manage virtual, self-consistent cryptographic keys.
+> [!NOTE]
+> **This is a personal fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** with additional hardening, native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and anti-detection features. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
 
-## ✨ Core Principles
+---
 
-*   **Bypass Hardware-Backed Attestation:** The primary goal of this project is to defeat Key Attestation, a security mechanism that allows apps to verify that they are running on a secure, unmodified device. This module provides the tools to bypass these checks on rooted or modified devices.
+## 🧬 What is TEESimulator?
-*   **Stateful Emulation:** Instead of patching responses from the real TEE, the ultimate goal is to create and manage virtual keys entirely in a simulated software environment. Any request concerning a virtual key will be handled by the simulator, ensuring perfect consistency without ever touching the real hardware.
-*   **Architectural Interception:** By hooking low-level Binder IPC calls to the Keystore, the framework can transparently redirect requests for virtual keys to the software-based simulator, while allowing requests for real keys to pass through to the hardware TEE.
-*   **100% FOSS:** Licensed under GPLv3, ensuring it stays free, auditable, and compliant with open-source laws.
 
-## 📱 Requirements
+TEESimulator is a **complete software simulation** of Android's hardware-backed [Trusted Execution Environment](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation). Instead of patching certificates from the real TEE after the fact, TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level and generates entire certificate chains from scratch — signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions, indistinguishable from hardware-generated keys.
-- Android 10 or above
 
-## 📦 Installation & Configuration
+The result: **apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate, unmodified device** — even on rooted hardware with an unlocked bootloader.
 
-1.  Flash this module via (Magisk / KernelSU / APatch) and reboot. It will replace [TrickyStore](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore), [TrickyStoreOSS](https://github.com/beakthoven/TrickyStoreOSS) and their forks.
+> **This is not TrickyStore.** TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the architecture is fundamentally different: native Rust certificate generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and a multi-layer defense against detector apps.
-2.  (Optional) Place a hardware-backed `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`. This provides the cryptographic "root of trust" for the simulator.
-3.  (Optional) Customize target packages in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`.
-4.  (Optional) Customize the simulated security patch level in `/data/adb/tricky_store/security_patch.txt`.
-5.  Enjoy!
 
-**All configuration files are monitored and will take effect immediately upon saving.**
+---
+
+## 🔥 Why TEESimulator?
+
+🔐 **Native Cert Generation** — v4.0 generates X.509 certificate chains in Rust with `ring` and manual DER encoding. No BouncyCastle overhead, no Java crypto quirks, byte-perfect issuer chain linkage.
+
+🎯 **Binder-Level Interception** — Hooks `ioctl()` on `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside the `keystore2` process. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions before the HAL ever sees them.
+
+🛡️ **Detector Resistant** — Per-UID rate limiting blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding. Oversized challenges rejected with real KeyMint error codes. Chain consistency verified byte-for-byte.
+
+💾 **Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. Apps that store attestation keys (banking, biometrics) don't break after a restart.
+
+🔧 **Drop-In Replacement** — Same config paths as TrickyStore (`/data/adb/tricky_store/`). Swap the module ZIP, keep your keybox and target list.
+
+---
+
+## ✨ Features
+
+**Core Attestation Engine**
+- [x] **Full certificate chain generation** — leaf + intermediates + root, signed by your keybox
+- [x] **Native Rust certgen** — `libcertgen.so` built with `ring`, `rsa`, and manual DER assembly
+- [x] **BouncyCastle fallback** — unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519) fall back to Java
+- [x] **ASN.1 attestation extensions** — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17 with all AOSP-specified tags
+- [x] **Multi-keybox support** — different keybox files per app group via `target.txt`
+
+**Interception Layer**
+- [x] **Binder ioctl hook** — `lsplt` PLT hook on `libc.so` inside `keystore2` process
+- [x] **generateKey / importKey / getKeyEntry** — all three transaction types intercepted
+- [x] **256KB native payload cap** — oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly
+- [x] **Challenge validation** — rejects >128-byte attestation challenges with `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH`
+
+**Hardening**
+- [x] **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst window, software fallback on overflow
+- [x] **importKey eviction guard** — retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import cache attacks
+- [x] **Key persistence** — file-backed storage with file-level locking, survives reboots and keybox rotations
+- [x] **Global exception handler** — uncaught exceptions logged, daemon stays alive
+
+**Configuration**
+- [x] **Live config reload** — `FileObserver` watches all config files, changes apply immediately
+- [x] **Security patch spoofing** — per-package `system`, `vendor`, `boot` patch levels with dynamic templates
+- [x] **Lifecycle scripts** — KSU Action button clears key cache, uninstall removes all traces
+
+---
+
+## 📋 Requirements
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> TEESimulator requires root access and a valid `keybox.xml` for hardware-level attestation results. Without a keybox, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware attestation checks.
+
+**You need:**
+1. Android 10 or above
+2. A supported root manager (KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch)
+3. A hardware-backed `keybox.xml` placed at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
+
+---
+
+## 📱 Compatibility
+
+### Root Managers
+
+| Manager | Status | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| KernelSU | ✅ Tested | Full support including Action button and lifecycle scripts |
+| Magisk | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
+| APatch | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
+
+### Tested Devices
+
+| Device | Android | TEE | Status |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Redmi 14C (2409BRN2CA) | 14 (SDK 34) | Beanpod KeyMaster | ✅ Daily driver |
+
+> Tested against DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, and Key Attestation Demo. If you test on a different device, [open an issue](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/issues) with your results.
+
+---
+
+## 🚀 Quick Start
+
+1. **Download** the latest release ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases)
+2. **Install** via your root manager (KSU / Magisk / APatch) and reboot
+3. **Place your keybox** at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
+4. **Configure targets** in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
+5. **Verify** — check Play Integrity or run Key Attestation Demo
+
+TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore, TrickyStoreOSS, and their forks. Existing config files are compatible.
+
+---
+
+## 🔨 Building from Source
+
+The CI workflow builds on every push to `main`. You can also build locally or trigger a build from your own fork.
+
+**Prerequisites:** JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator.git
+cd TEESimulator
+./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
+```
+
+Output ZIPs land in `out/`. The Gradle build automatically invokes `cargo ndk` to cross-compile `libcertgen.so` before packaging.
+
+To rebuild from a fork, push to `main` or use **Actions → Build → Run workflow**. The workflow installs all toolchains (Java, Rust, cargo-ndk, ccache) and uploads Release + Debug ZIPs as artifacts.
+
+---
+
+## ⚙️ Configuration
+
+All configuration files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are monitored by `FileObserver` — changes take effect immediately without rebooting.
 
 ### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust
 
-This file provides the master cryptographic identity for the simulator. It contains a private key and a valid, hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. The simulator uses this to sign the virtual certificates it generates, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
+This file provides the master cryptographic identity. It contains a private key and a hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. TEESimulator signs all generated certificates with this key, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
 
 ```xml
 <?xml version="1.0"?>
@@ -40,48 +151,109 @@ This file provides the master cryptographic identity for the simulator. It conta
 </AndroidAttestation>
 ```
 
-### Mode and Keybox Configuration (`target.txt`)
+### Target Packages (`target.txt`)
 
-TEESimulator currently operates in two primary modes as it transitions towards full emulation.
+Controls which apps get intercepted and what simulation mode to use.
-You can control the simulation mode and the specific keybox.xml file used on a per-package basis.
 
 #### Mode Suffixes
 
-*   **`!` → Force Generation Mode:** Creates a complete, software-based virtual key. This is the foundation of the full TEE simulation.
+*   **`!` → Force Generation** — Creates a complete software-based virtual key. Full TEE simulation.
-*   **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking Mode:** A legacy mode where a real TEE key is generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and modified.
+*   **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking** — Real TEE key generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and patched.
-*   **No symbol → Automatic Mode:** The module selects the most appropriate mode for the device.
+*   **No symbol → Automatic** — Module selects the best mode for your device.
 
-#### Multi-Keybox Configuration
+#### Multi-Keybox
 
-You can specify different keybox files for different groups of applications. This is done by adding a line with the filename in square brackets (e.g., [demo_keybox.xml]).
+Specify different keybox files for different app groups. Apps listed after a `[filename.xml]` line use that keybox. Apps before any declaration use the default `keybox.xml`.
 
-All applications listed after this line will use the specified keybox file, until a new keybox is declared. Applications listed before any custom keybox declaration will use the default `keybox.xml`.
-
-For example:
 ```
-# These two apps will use the default /data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml
+# Default keybox
 com.google.android.gms!
 io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?
 
-# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps.
+# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps
-# The file must be located at /data/adb/tricky_store/aosp_keybox.xml
 [aosp_keybox.xml]
 com.google.android.gsf
 
-# Switch again to another keybox.
+# Another keybox
-# The file must be located at /data/adb/tricky_store/demo_keybox.xml
 [demo_keybox.xml]
 org.matrix.demo
 ```
 
 ### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`)
 
-This allows you to configure the security patch level that the simulator will report in its forged attestation certificates.
+Configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` reported in attestation certificates. This only affects attestation data — it does not change actual system properties.
+
+#### Global and Per-Package
+
+Settings at the top of the file are global defaults. Add `[package.name]` to override for specific apps.
+
+#### Keys
+
+| Key | Scope |
+|---|---|
+| `system` | OS patch level |
+| `vendor` | Vendor patch level |
+| `boot` | Boot/kernel patch level |
+| `all` | Shorthand — sets all three at once |
+
+#### Special Keywords
+
+| Keyword | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| `today` | Current date, dynamically resolved on each attestation |
+| `YYYY-MM-DD` templates | Semi-dynamic — `YYYY-MM-05` resolves to the 5th of the current month |
+| `no` | Omit this patch level tag entirely from the attestation |
+| `device_default` | Use the device's real hardware value |
+| `prop` | Read from `ro.build.version.security_patch` (matches what detectors see via getprop) |
+
+#### Example
 
 ```
-# Advanced Configuration
+# Global — default for all apps
-system=2025-11
+system=YYYY-MM-05
-boot=no        # Do not report a boot patch level
+vendor=device_default
-vendor=20251101 # Report a specific vendor patch level
+boot=no
+
+# Override for GMS
+[com.google.android.gms]
+system=2024-10-01
+
+# Custom config for a demo app
+[org.matrix.demo]
+all=2025-09-15
+boot=device_default
 ```
-**Note:** This only affects the Key Attestation data generated by the simulator. It does not change system properties.
+
+---
+
+## 💬 Community
+
+<p align="center">
+  <a href="https://t.me/superpowers9">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/⚡_JOIN_THE_GRID-SuperPowers_Telegram-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram&logoColor=cyan&labelColor=0d1117&color=00d4ff" alt="Telegram">
+  </a>
+</p>
+
+---
+
+## 🙏 Credits
+
+- **[JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** — original author of TEESimulator and the interception architecture
+- **[5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore)** — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception on Android
+- **[LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt)** — PLT hook library used for binder interception
+- **[ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring)** — Rust cryptography library powering native cert generation
+- **[MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd)** — AOSP compliance improvements via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157), including authorize_create enforcement, attestation extension alignment, and binder transaction filtering
+- **[fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524)** — a real contributor and collaborator on this project
+- **[huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares)** — collaborator and tester
+
+---
+
+## 📄 License
+
+This project is licensed under the [GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
+
+---
+
+<p align="center">
+  <b>🔐 Because the best attestation is the one the TEE never generated.</b>
+</p>

app/build.gradle.kts

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)
 
 val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
 val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
-val verName = "v2.1"
+val verName = "v5.1.1"
 
 android {
     namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ android {
         sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_21
         targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_21
     }
+    buildFeatures { buildConfig = true }
     externalNativeBuild {
         cmake {
             path = file("src/main/cpp/CMakeLists.txt")
@@ -70,6 +71,35 @@ dependencies {
     implementation(libs.bcpkix)
 }
 
+// --- Rust native cert gen build task ---
+val buildRustCertgen by tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
+    group = "TEESimulator-RS Native Build"
+    description = "Builds libcertgen.so via cargo-ndk for arm64-v8a."
+
+    workingDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen")
+
+    commandLine(
+        "cargo", "ndk",
+        "-t", "arm64-v8a",
+        "-o", rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs").absolutePath,
+        "build", "--release"
+    )
+
+    inputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/src"))
+    inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.toml"))
+    inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.lock"))
+    outputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs"))
+
+    environment("ANDROID_NDK_HOME", android.ndkDirectory.absolutePath)
+}
+
+// AGP auto-detects jniLibs/ as an input to mergeJniLibFolders — wire the dependency
+tasks.configureEach {
+    if (name.endsWith("JniLibFolders") && name.startsWith("merge")) {
+        dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
+    }
+}
+
 androidComponents {
     onVariants(selector().all()) { variant ->
         val capitalized = variant.name.replaceFirstChar { it.uppercase() }
@@ -78,13 +108,13 @@ androidComponents {
         // --- Define output locations and file names ---
         // Stage all files in a temporary directory inside 'build' before zipping
         val tempModuleDir = project.layout.buildDirectory.dir("module/${variant.name}")
-        val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-$capitalized.zip"
+        val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-RS-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$capitalized.zip"
 
         // Task 1: Prepare all module files in the temporary build directory.
         // Using Sync ensures that stale files from previous runs are removed.
         val prepareModuleFilesTask =
             tasks.register<Sync>("prepareModuleFiles${capitalized}") {
-                group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
+                group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
                 description = "Prepares all files for the ${variant.name} module zip."
 
                 if (isDebug) {
@@ -93,6 +123,7 @@ androidComponents {
                     dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
                 }
                 dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
+                dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
 
                 if (isDebug) {
                     from(variant.artifacts.get(SingleArtifact.APK)) {
@@ -114,8 +145,8 @@ androidComponents {
                         "intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
                     )
                 ) {
-                    into("lib") // Place them in the 'lib' subfolder of the staging directory.
+                    into("lib")
-                    include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so")
+                    include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
                 }
 
                 // Now, copy and process the files from 'module' directory.
@@ -130,8 +161,7 @@ androidComponents {
                     // Use expand() for simple key-value replacement.
                     expand(
                         "REPLACEMEVERCODE" to gitCommitCount.toString(),
-                        "REPLACEMEVER" to
+                        "REPLACEMEVER" to "$verName-$gitCommitCount",
-                            "$verName ($gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-${variant.name})",
                     )
                 }
 
@@ -142,7 +172,7 @@ androidComponents {
         // Task 2: Zip the prepared files from the temporary directory.
         val zipTask =
             tasks.register<Zip>("zip${capitalized}") {
-                group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
+                group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
                 description = "Creates the flashable zip for the ${variant.name} module."
                 dependsOn(prepareModuleFilesTask)
 
@@ -155,7 +185,7 @@ androidComponents {
         fun createInstallTasks(rootProvider: String, installCli: String) {
             val pushTask =
                 tasks.register<Exec>("push${rootProvider}Module${capitalized}") {
-                    group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
+                    group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
                     description =
                         "Pushes the ${variant.name} module to the device for $rootProvider."
                     dependsOn(zipTask)
@@ -169,7 +199,7 @@ androidComponents {
 
             val installTask =
                 tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}${capitalized}") {
-                    group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
+                    group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
                     description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider."
                     dependsOn(pushTask)
                     commandLine(
@@ -182,7 +212,7 @@ androidComponents {
                 }
 
             tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}AndReboot${capitalized}") {
-                group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
+                group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
                 description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider and reboots."
                 dependsOn(installTask)
                 commandLine("adb", "reboot")

app/proguard-rules.pro

@@ -7,3 +7,9 @@
 -keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.App {
     public static void main(java.lang.String[]);
 }
+
+-keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen {
+    native <methods>;
+    *;
+}
+-keep class org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertGenConfig { *; }

app/src/main/cpp/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 23)
 set(CMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS ON)
 set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -fno-rtti")
 set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -fno-exceptions")
+set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE} -DNDEBUG")
 
 # LSPlt configuration
 OPTION(LSPLT_BUILD_SHARED OFF)
@@ -22,6 +23,9 @@ add_executable(libinject.so inject/main.cpp inject/utils.cpp)
 target_include_directories(libinject.so PUBLIC include)
 target_link_libraries(libinject.so PRIVATE lsplt_static)
 
+add_executable(libsupervisor.so supervisor.cpp)
+target_link_libraries(libsupervisor.so PRIVATE log)
+
 add_library(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} SHARED binder_interceptor.cpp)
 target_include_directories(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PUBLIC external/linux-kernel/include include)
 target_link_libraries(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE binder lsplt_static utils)

app/src/main/cpp/binder_interceptor.cpp

@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
     struct RegistrationEntry {
         wp<IBinder> target;
         sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
+        // Transaction codes to intercept. Empty = intercept all (legacy behavior).
+        std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
     };
 
     // Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
@@ -244,10 +246,15 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
 public:
     BinderInterceptor() = default;
 
-    // Checks if a specific Binder instance is currently registered for interception
+    // Checks if a specific Binder+code combination should be intercepted.
-    bool isBinderIntercepted(const wp<BBinder> &target) const {
+    // Returns true if the binder is registered AND the code is in its filter
+    // (or the filter is empty, meaning intercept everything).
+    bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const {
         std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
-        return registry_.find(target) != registry_.end();
+        auto it = registry_.find(target);
+        if (it == registry_.end()) return false;
+        const auto &codes = it->second.filtered_codes;
+        return codes.empty() || std::find(codes.begin(), codes.end(), code) != codes.end();
     }
 
     // Main entry point for processing the "Man-in-the-Middle" logic
@@ -276,6 +283,12 @@ static sp<BinderInterceptor> g_interceptor_instance = nullptr;
 // =============================================================================================
 
 class BinderStub : public BBinder {
+public:
+    const String16& getInterfaceDescriptor() const override {
+        static const String16 kDescriptor("org.matrix.TEESimulator.BinderStub");
+        return kDescriptor;
+    }
+
 protected:
     status_t onTransact(uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) override {
         if (code != intercept::kBackdoorCode) {
@@ -342,15 +355,14 @@ static sp<BinderStub> g_stub_instance = nullptr;
 
 namespace {
 
-/**
- * @brief Analyses a binder transaction. If the target is monitored,
- *        hijacks the transaction by rewriting its destination to our BinderStub.
- * @param txn_data Pointer to the transaction data within the ioctl buffer.
- */
 void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
     if (!txn_data || txn_data->target.ptr == 0)
         return;
 
+    // Skip system transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) to avoid latency detectors
+    if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
+        return;
+
     bool hijack = false;
     ThreadTransactionInfo info;
 
@@ -359,9 +371,15 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
         info.transaction_code = intercept::kBackdoorCode;
         info.target_binder = nullptr;
         hijack = true;
-    }
+    // Check 2: Spoof uid of KeyStore requests from the daemon to bypass permission check
-    // Check 2: Normal interception based on registry of monitored binders
+    } else if (txn_data->sender_euid == 0) {
-    else {
+        // The kernel driver fills sender_euid.
+        // libbinder.so trusts this value to populate IPCThreadState.
+        txn_data->sender_euid = 1000;
+        LOGV("[Hook] Spoofing UID for transaction: 0 -> %d", txn_data->sender_euid);
+        hijack = false; // Never hijack to avoid recursion
+    // Check 3: Normal interception based on registry of monitored binders
+    } else {
         // Safe casting based on Binder driver ABI
         RefBase::weakref_type *weak_ref = reinterpret_cast<RefBase::weakref_type *>(txn_data->target.ptr);
 
@@ -370,18 +388,17 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
             // The raw pointer to the binder object itself is stored in the cookie
             BBinder *target_binder_ptr = reinterpret_cast<BBinder *>(txn_data->cookie);
 
-            // This is safe ONLY because we successfully called attemptIncStrong().
+            // Create a weak pointer for the lookup and to store in our context map.
-            // The sp<> constructor will not increment the ref count again, it just adopts the one we have.
+            // This is safe because we are holding a strong reference.
-            // When sp_target goes out of scope, it will call decStrong(), releasing our temporary reference.
+            wp<BBinder> wp_target = target_binder_ptr;
-            sp<BBinder> sp_target = sp<BBinder>::fromExisting(target_binder_ptr);
 
-            // Now we can safely use sp_target (which implicitly converts to a wp) for the lookup.
+            if (g_interceptor_instance->shouldIntercept(wp_target, txn_data->code)) {
-            if (g_interceptor_instance->isBinderIntercepted(sp_target)) {
                 info.transaction_code = txn_data->code;
-                info.target_binder = sp_target; // Assign the valid weak pointer
+                info.target_binder = wp_target; // Assign the valid weak pointer
                 hijack = true;
             }
-            // No need to manually call decStrong(); the sp destructor handles it.
+            // Manually release the temporary strong reference we acquired at the start.
+            target_binder_ptr->decStrong(nullptr);
         }
     }
 
@@ -526,12 +543,26 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
         return BAD_TYPE;
     }
 
+    // Read optional transaction code filter. If present: int32 count + count * uint32 codes.
+    // If absent or count <= 0: intercept all transaction codes (legacy behavior).
+    std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
+    int32_t code_count = 0;
+    if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
+        codes.reserve(code_count);
+        for (int32_t i = 0; i < code_count; i++) {
+            uint32_t c = 0;
+            if (data.readUint32(&c) == OK) codes.push_back(c);
+        }
+        LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p with %zu filtered codes", target.get(), codes.size());
+    } else {
+        LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p (all codes)", target.get());
+    }
+
     wp<IBinder> weak_target = target;
 
     std::unique_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
-    registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback};
+    registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback, std::move(codes)};
 
-    LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p", target.get());
     return OK;
 }
 
@@ -583,7 +614,7 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
 
     if (callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp) != OK) {
         LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed. Forwarding original call.", tx_id);
-        return false; // Callback failed, proceed as if not intercepted
+        return false;
     }
 
     int32_t action = pre_resp.readInt32();

app/src/main/cpp/inject/main.cpp

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/system_properties.h>
 #include <sys/uio.h>
 #include <sys/un.h>
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <csignal>
 #include <cstdio>
 #include <cstdlib>
+#include <fstream>
 #include <optional>
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
@@ -95,10 +97,6 @@ constexpr size_t kMagicLength = 16;
 constexpr size_t kMaxPathLength = PATH_MAX;
 // Maximum length for file paths.
 
-constexpr const char *kSystemFileContext = "u:object_r:system_file:s0";
-// SELinux context for system files,
-// used for socket creation and library file context.
-
 constexpr const char *kLibcModule = "libc.so";
 // Name of the C standard library.
 
@@ -215,8 +213,8 @@ private:
  * @brief Transfers a file descriptor from the injector process to the remote process.
  *
  * This function uses Unix domain sockets with SCM_RIGHTS to send a file descriptor.
- * It involves setting SELinux contexts, creating local and remote sockets, binding,
+ * It involves creating local and remote sockets, binding, and then coordinating
- * and then coordinating sendmsg/recvmsg calls using ptrace.
+ * sendmsg/recvmsg calls using ptrace.
  *
  * @param pid The target process ID.
  * @param lib_path The path to the library file being transferred.
@@ -233,29 +231,14 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
                                                 uintptr_t libc_return_addr) {
     LOGD("Attempting to transfer file descriptor for library: %s", lib_path);
 
-    // 1. Set SELinux context for socket creation in the injector process.
+    // Create a local Unix domain socket for FD transfer.
-    // This is crucial for Android where SELinux might prevent socket operations.
-    if (!set_sockcreate_con(constants::kSystemFileContext)) {
-        LOGE("Failed to set socket creation context.");
-        return std::nullopt;
-    }
-
-    // 2. Create a local Unix domain socket for FD transfer.
     UniqueFd local_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
     if (local_socket == -1) {
         PLOGE("Failed to create local Unix domain socket.");
         return std::nullopt;
     }
 
-    // 3. Set SELinux context for the library file if possible.
+    // Open the local library file to get a file descriptor.
-    // This might be required for the target process to open/access it later if directly opening by path.
-    // For FD transfer, this is less critical as the FD's context is inherited, but good practice.
-    if (setfilecon(lib_path, constants::kSystemFileContext) == -1) {
-        // Log a warning, but don't fail, as FD transfer might still work.
-        PLOGE("Failed to set context of library file: %s. This might cause issues.", lib_path);
-    }
-
-    // 4. Open the local library file to get a file descriptor.
     UniqueFd local_lib_fd = open(lib_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
     if (local_lib_fd == -1) {
         PLOGE("Failed to open library file: %s", lib_path);
@@ -271,7 +254,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
         void *errno_addr; // Address of __errno for getting remote errno.
     } funcs{};
 
-    // 5. Resolve required libc functions in the remote process.
+    // Resolve required libc functions in the remote process.
     funcs.socket_addr = find_func_addr(local_map, remote_map, constants::kLibcModule, "socket");
     funcs.bind_addr = find_func_addr(local_map, remote_map, constants::kLibcModule, "bind");
     funcs.recvmsg_addr = find_func_addr(local_map, remote_map, constants::kLibcModule, "recvmsg");
@@ -306,25 +289,28 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
         }
     };
 
-    // 6. Create a Unix domain socket in the remote process.
+    // Create a Unix domain socket in the remote process.
     std::vector<uintptr_t> args = {AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0};
     int remote_fd = static_cast<int>(
         remote_call(pid, regs, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(funcs.socket_addr), libc_return_addr, args));
-    if (remote_fd == -1) {
+    if (remote_fd <= 0) {
+        // remote_call returns 0 on failure.
+        // socket() returning 0 is technically possible (if stdin closed),
+        // but highly unlikely for a daemon. We treat 0 as failure here to catch the injection error.
         errno = get_remote_errno(); // Set local errno for PLOGE.
-        PLOGE("Failed to create remote socket.");
+        PLOGE("Failed to create remote socket (returned %d).", remote_fd);
         return std::nullopt;
     }
     LOGD("Successfully created remote socket with FD: %d", remote_fd);
 
-    // 7. Generate a unique magic string for the abstract Unix domain socket path.
+    // Generate a unique magic string for the abstract Unix domain socket path.
     auto magic = generateMagic(constants::kMagicLength);
     struct sockaddr_un sock_addr{.sun_family = AF_UNIX, .sun_path = {0}};
     // Abstract Unix domain sockets have sun_path[0] as null, and the name starts from sun_path[1].
     memcpy(sock_addr.sun_path + 1, magic.c_str(), magic.size());
     socklen_t addr_len = sizeof(sock_addr.sun_family) + 1 + magic.size(); // Length includes null byte and magic.
 
-    // 8. Push the sockaddr_un structure to the remote process's stack.
+    // Push the sockaddr_un structure to the remote process's stack.
     auto remote_addr = push_memory(pid, regs, &sock_addr, sizeof(sock_addr));
     if (remote_addr == 0) {
         LOGE("Failed to push socket address to remote memory.");
@@ -332,7 +318,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
         return std::nullopt;
     }
 
-    // 9. Bind the remote socket to the abstract Unix domain socket path.
+    // Bind the remote socket to the abstract Unix domain socket path.
     args = {static_cast<uintptr_t>(remote_fd), remote_addr, static_cast<uintptr_t>(addr_len)};
     auto bind_result = remote_call(pid, regs, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(funcs.bind_addr), libc_return_addr, args);
     if (bind_result == static_cast<uintptr_t>(-1)) {
@@ -346,7 +332,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
     // Prepare control message buffer for SCM_RIGHTS (file descriptor passing).
     char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0};
 
-    // 10. Push the control message buffer to the remote process's stack.
+    // Push the control message buffer to the remote process's stack.
     auto remote_cmsgbuf = push_memory(pid, regs, &cmsgbuf, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
     if (remote_cmsgbuf == 0) {
         LOGE("Failed to push control message buffer to remote memory.");
@@ -359,7 +345,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
     msg_hdr.msg_control = reinterpret_cast<void *>(remote_cmsgbuf);
     msg_hdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf);
 
-    // 11. Push the msghdr structure to the remote process's stack.
+    // Push the msghdr structure to the remote process's stack.
     auto remote_hdr = push_memory(pid, regs, &msg_hdr, sizeof(msg_hdr));
     if (remote_hdr == 0) {
         LOGE("Failed to push message header to remote memory.");
@@ -367,16 +353,16 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
         return std::nullopt;
     }
 
-    // 12. Initiate the remote recvmsg call. This will block the remote process.
+    // Initiate the remote recvmsg call. This will block the remote process.
     args = {static_cast<uintptr_t>(remote_fd), remote_hdr, MSG_WAITALL};
-    if (!remote_pre_call(pid, regs, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(funcs.recvmsg_addr), 0, args)) {
+    if (!remote_pre_call(pid, regs, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(funcs.recvmsg_addr), libc_return_addr, args)) {
         LOGE("Failed to initiate remote recvmsg call.");
         close_remote(remote_fd);
         return std::nullopt;
     }
     LOGD("Remote recvmsg initiated, waiting for FD transfer...");
 
-    // 13. Prepare the local msghdr for sending the file descriptor.
+    // Prepare the local msghdr for sending the file descriptor.
     // The msg_control and msg_name fields of the local msghdr are set up.
     msg_hdr.msg_control = &cmsgbuf; // Use local cmsgbuf for sending.
     msg_hdr.msg_name = &sock_addr;
@@ -396,7 +382,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
         *reinterpret_cast<int *>(CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = local_lib_fd; // The FD to send.
     }
 
-    // 14. Send the file descriptor from the injector to the remote process.
+    // Send the file descriptor from the injector to the remote process.
     if (sendmsg(local_socket, &msg_hdr, 0) == -1) {
         PLOGE("Failed to send file descriptor to remote process.");
         // We do not close local_lib_fd here as it might be transferred even if
@@ -407,9 +393,9 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
     }
     LOGD("Local FD %d sent to remote process.", local_lib_fd.operator const int &());
 
-    // 15. Complete the remote recvmsg call. This will retrieve the return value.
+    // Complete the remote recvmsg call. This will retrieve the return value.
     auto recvmsg_result =
-        static_cast<ssize_t>(remote_post_call(pid, regs, 0)); // No specific expected return address for recvmsg
+        static_cast<ssize_t>(remote_post_call(pid, regs, libc_return_addr));
     if (recvmsg_result == -1) {
         errno = get_remote_errno();
         PLOGE("Remote recvmsg call failed.");
@@ -418,7 +404,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
     }
     LOGD("Remote recvmsg completed with result: %zd", recvmsg_result);
 
-    // 16. Read the control message buffer back from the remote process to extract the FD.
+    // Read the control message buffer back from the remote process to extract the FD.
     if (read_proc(pid, remote_cmsgbuf, &cmsgbuf, sizeof(cmsgbuf)) != sizeof(cmsgbuf)) {
         LOGE("Failed to read control message buffer from remote process.");
         close_remote(remote_fd);
@@ -439,7 +425,7 @@ static std::optional<int> transfer_fd_to_remote(int pid, const char *lib_path, s
     LOGI("Successfully transferred FD %d to remote process, new remote FD: %d", local_lib_fd.operator const int &(),
          transferred_fd);
 
-    // 17. Close the remote socket.
+    // Close the remote socket.
     close_remote(remote_fd);
 
     return transferred_fd;
@@ -642,6 +628,130 @@ static bool remote_call_entry(int pid, struct user_regs_struct &regs, uintptr_t
     return true; // Return true if the call itself completed, regardless of its return value.
 }
 
+/**
+ * @brief RAII wrapper to ensure a temporary file is deleted (unlinked)
+ * when the object goes out of scope.
+ *
+ * This is crucial for stealth: we want the library to exist on the filesystem
+ * for the shortest time possible.
+ */
+class ScopedFileDeleter {
+public:
+    explicit ScopedFileDeleter(std::string path) : path_(std::move(path)) {}
+
+    ~ScopedFileDeleter() {
+        if (!path_.empty()) {
+            LOGD("Cleaning up staged file: %s", path_.c_str());
+            unlink(path_.c_str());
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Disable copy to prevent double-deletion issues
+    ScopedFileDeleter(const ScopedFileDeleter&) = delete;
+    ScopedFileDeleter& operator=(const ScopedFileDeleter&) = delete;
+
+private:
+    std::string path_;
+};
+
+/**
+ * @brief Copies a file from source to destination.
+ *
+ * @param src Absolute path to source file.
+ * @param dst Absolute path to destination file.
+ * @return True on success, false on failure.
+ */
+static bool copy_file(const char* src, const char* dst) {
+    std::ifstream src_file(src, std::ios::binary);
+    std::ofstream dst_file(dst, std::ios::binary);
+
+    if (!src_file) {
+        PLOGE("Failed to open source file for copying: %s", src);
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (!dst_file) {
+        PLOGE("Failed to open destination file for copying: %s", dst);
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    dst_file << src_file.rdbuf();
+    return src_file.good() && dst_file.good();
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Performs injection via the "Staging" method.
+ *
+ * This strategy is used when direct FD passing fails (e.g., due to Seccomp filters).
+ * 1. Copies the library to a world-readable location (/data/local/tmp).
+ * 2. Loads it via standard dlopen().
+ * 3. Immediately deletes the file to hide tracks.
+ *
+ * @param pid The target process ID.
+ * @param regs The target process registers (must be Red-Zone adjusted if x86_64).
+ * @param local_map Local memory map.
+ * @param remote_map Remote memory map.
+ * @param lib_path The path to the original library.
+ * @param libc_return_addr Return address for remote calls.
+ * @return The handle of the loaded library, or std::nullopt on failure.
+ */
+static std::optional<uintptr_t> inject_via_staging(int pid, struct user_regs_struct &regs,
+                                                   const std::vector<lsplt::MapInfo> &local_map,
+                                                   const std::vector<lsplt::MapInfo> &remote_map,
+                                                   const char *lib_path, uintptr_t libc_return_addr) {
+    LOGI("Initiating Staging Fallback mechanism...");
+
+    // Generate a random path in /data/local/tmp
+    // /data/local/tmp is chosen because it is traversable by most contexts.
+    std::string staged_path = "/data/local/tmp/lib" + generateMagic(8) + ".so";
+
+    // Ensure the file is deleted when this function exits (Success or Failure).
+    // The kernel keeps the inode alive for the mapped process even after unlink.
+    ScopedFileDeleter file_guard(staged_path);
+
+    LOGD("Staging library to: %s", staged_path.c_str());
+
+    //  Copy the library
+    if (!copy_file(lib_path, staged_path.c_str())) {
+        LOGE("Failed to copy library during staging.");
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    // Set Permissions to 644 (RW-R--R--)
+    // This allows the target process (likely running as a specific UID) to read the file.
+    if (chmod(staged_path.c_str(), 0644) != 0) {
+        PLOGE("Failed to chmod staged file.");
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    // Resolve 'dlopen' in the remote process
+    auto dlopen_addr = find_func_addr(local_map, remote_map, constants::kLibdlModule, "dlopen");
+    if (!dlopen_addr) {
+        LOGE("Failed to find 'dlopen' in remote process.");
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    // Push the staged path to remote memory
+    uintptr_t remote_path_addr = push_string(pid, regs, staged_path.c_str());
+    if (remote_path_addr == 0) {
+        LOGE("Failed to push staged path string to remote memory.");
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    // Call dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)
+    std::vector<uintptr_t> args = {remote_path_addr, RTLD_NOW};
+    uintptr_t handle = remote_call(pid, regs, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(dlopen_addr),
+                                   libc_return_addr, args);
+
+    if (handle == 0) {
+        std::string error_msg = get_remote_dlerror(pid, regs, local_map, remote_map, libc_return_addr);
+        LOGE("Staged dlopen failed. dlerror: %s", error_msg.c_str());
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    LOGI("Successfully loaded staged library. Handle: %p", reinterpret_cast<void*>(handle));
+    return handle;
+}
+
 /**
  * @brief RAII wrapper for ptrace attachment and detachment.
  *
@@ -694,12 +804,31 @@ private:
     bool attached_; // Flag indicating current attachment status.
 };
 
+// RAII Class to ensure registers are always restored
+class RegisterRestorer {
+public:
+    RegisterRestorer(int pid, const struct user_regs_struct& original_regs)
+        : pid_(pid), regs_(original_regs) {}
+
+    ~RegisterRestorer() {
+        // Always restore registers when this object goes out of scope
+        if (set_regs(pid_, regs_)) {
+            LOGD("Original registers for process %d restored.", pid_);
+        } else {
+            PLOGE("Failed to restore original registers for process %d.", pid_);
+        }
+    }
+private:
+    int pid_;
+    struct user_regs_struct regs_;
+};
+
 /**
  * @brief Injects a shared library into a target process using ptrace.
  *
  * This is the main orchestration function for the library injection.
  * It handles attachment, remote memory/register manipulation, FD transfer,
- * remote dlopen/dlsym, and remote entry point execution.
+ * staging fallback, remote dlopen/dlsym, and remote entry point execution.
  *
  * @param pid The target process ID.
  * @param lib_path The absolute path to the shared library to inject.
@@ -742,6 +871,14 @@ bool inject_library(int pid, const char *lib_path, const char *entry_name) {
     backup_regs = current_regs; // Store a copy for restoration.
     LOGD("Process %d registers backed up.", pid);
 
+    // Skip the Red Zone (128 bytes) on x86_64 to prevent stack corruption
+    #if defined(__x86_64__)
+    current_regs.rsp -= 128;
+    #endif
+
+    // Ensures original state is restored even if injection fails/crashes mid-way.
+    RegisterRestorer reg_guard(pid, backup_regs);
+
     // Create a scope to ensure RAII objects are destroyed BEFORE register restoration
     {
         // 4. Scan local and remote memory maps to resolve function addresses.
@@ -760,53 +897,57 @@ bool inject_library(int pid, const char *lib_path, const char *entry_name) {
         }
         LOGD("Found libc return address: %p", reinterpret_cast<void *>(libc_return_addr));
 
-        // 6. Transfer the library's file descriptor to the remote process.
+        // 6. Attempt to transfer the library's file descriptor to the remote process.
+        int remote_fd = -1;
         auto lib_fd_opt = transfer_fd_to_remote(pid, lib_path, current_regs, local_map, remote_map,
                                                 reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
-        if (!lib_fd_opt) {
+        std::optional<RemoteLibraryHandle> remote_lib_guard;
-            LOGE("Failed to transfer library file descriptor for '%s' to target process %d.", lib_path, pid);
+        std::optional<uintptr_t> handle_opt;
-            return false;
-        }
-        RemoteLibraryHandle remote_lib_guard(pid, *lib_fd_opt);
-        LOGD("Library FD %d transferred to remote process %d.", remote_lib_guard.fd(), pid);
-        remote_lib_guard.set_libc_return_addr(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
 
-        // 7. Remotely load the library using the transferred file descriptor.
+        if (lib_fd_opt) {
-        auto handle_opt = remote_dlopen(pid, current_regs, local_map, remote_map, remote_lib_guard.fd(), lib_path,
+            remote_fd = *lib_fd_opt;
-                                        reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
+            remote_lib_guard.emplace(pid, remote_fd);
+            remote_lib_guard->set_libc_return_addr(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
+
+            LOGD("FD Transfer successful (FD: %d). Attempting android_dlopen_ext...", remote_fd);
+            handle_opt = remote_dlopen(pid, current_regs, local_map, remote_map, remote_fd, lib_path,
+                                       reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
+        } else {
+            LOGW("Failed to transfer library file descriptor for '%s' to target process %d.", lib_path, pid);
+        }
+
+        // 7. Staging Fallback (Copy-Inject-Delete) if FD transfer failed.
         if (!handle_opt) {
+            handle_opt = inject_via_staging(pid, current_regs, local_map, remote_map,
+                                            lib_path, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
+        }
+        if (!handle_opt || *handle_opt == 0) {
             LOGE("Failed to load library '%s' in remote process %d.", lib_path, pid);
             // If dlopen fails, the remote_lib_guard.fd() is still valid in the target process and needs to be closed.
             // The RemoteLibraryHandle constructor takes care of this.
             return false;
         }
-        remote_lib_guard.set_handle(*handle_opt);
+        uintptr_t handle = *handle_opt;
+        if (remote_lib_guard) remote_lib_guard->set_handle(handle);
 
         // 8. Find the entry point symbol in the remotely loaded library.
         auto entry_opt = remote_find_entry(pid, current_regs, entry_name, local_map, remote_map,
-                                           remote_lib_guard.handle(), reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
+                                           handle, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr));
         if (!entry_opt) {
             LOGE("Failed to find entry point '%s' in remote library (handle %p).", entry_name,
-                 reinterpret_cast<void *>(remote_lib_guard.handle()));
+                 reinterpret_cast<void *>(handle));
             return false;
         }
         uintptr_t entry_addr = *entry_opt;
 
         // 9. Call the remote entry point function.
-        if (!remote_call_entry(pid, current_regs, entry_addr, remote_lib_guard.handle(),
+        if (!remote_call_entry(pid, current_regs, entry_addr, handle,
                                reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(libc_return_addr))) {
             LOGE("Failed to call remote entry point '%s'.", entry_name);
             return false;
         }
     }
 
-    // 10. Restore original registers of the target process.
-    if (!set_regs(pid, backup_regs)) {
-        LOGE("Failed to restore original registers for process %d.", pid);
-        return false;
-    }
-    LOGD("Original registers for process %d restored.", pid);
-
     LOGI("Library injection completed successfully for process %d.", pid);
     return true;
 }

app/src/main/cpp/inject/utils.cpp

@@ -263,7 +263,14 @@ bool get_regs(int pid, struct user_regs_struct &regs) {
     struct iovec reg_iov = {.iov_base = &regs, .iov_len = sizeof(struct user_regs_struct)};
     if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &reg_iov) == -1) {
         PLOGE("Failed to get register set for PID %d.", pid);
+#if defined(__arm__)
+        if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, pid, 0, &regs) == -1) {
+            PLOGE("Fallback to PTRACE_GETREGS failed.");
+            return false;
+        }
+#else
         return false;
+#endif
     }
 #else
 #    error "Unsupported architecture for register access in get_regs."
@@ -296,7 +303,14 @@ bool set_regs(int pid, struct user_regs_struct &regs) {
     struct iovec reg_iov = {.iov_base = &regs, .iov_len = sizeof(struct user_regs_struct)};
     if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &reg_iov) == -1) {
         PLOGE("Failed to set register set for PID %d.", pid);
+#if defined(__arm__)
+        if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, pid, 0, &regs) == -1) {
+            PLOGE("Fallback to PTRACE_SETREGS failed.");
+            return false;
+        }
+#else
         return false;
+#endif
     }
 #else
 #    error "Unsupported architecture for register access in set_regs."
@@ -588,17 +602,10 @@ bool remote_pre_call(int pid, struct user_regs_struct &regs, uintptr_t func_addr
         size_t stack_args_size = args.size() * sizeof(uintptr_t);
         align_stack(regs, stack_args_size);
 
-        // Push all arguments onto the stack (order is important if ABI is right-to-left push).
+        // i386 cdecl expects arguments pushed Right-to-Left (stack grows down).
-        // The current implementation writes args.data() directly,
+        // Since `write_proc` writes to increasing addresses (up), a linear write
-        // assuming it's already in the correct order for push.
+        // starting at the new SP places the first argument at the lowest address.
-        // For cdecl, arguments are pushed right-to-left.
+        // This matches the ABI memory layout without needing to reverse the vector.
-        // A vector `args = {A, B, C}` means A is arg1, B is arg2 etc.
-        // So, `C` should be pushed first, then `B`, then `A`.
-        // `write_proc` copies linearly.
-        // This implies `args` should be pre-reversed for cdecl.
-        // For simplicity, we assume the remote function is compatible with how it's pushed,
-        // or that it's variadic where order doesn't matter for first args.
-        // A robust i386 implementation would need to push args in reverse order.
         if (write_proc(pid, static_cast<uintptr_t>(regs.REG_SP), args.data(), stack_args_size) !=
             static_cast<ssize_t>(stack_args_size)) {
             LOGE("Failed to push arguments for i386 remote call.");

app/src/main/cpp/supervisor.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// Fork-based supervisor for instant daemon restart
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t should_exit = 0;
+
+static void signal_handler(int sig) {
+    should_exit = 1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+    if (argc < 2) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <daemon> [args...]\n", argv[0]);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    // Forward termination signals to exit cleanly
+    signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+    signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+
+    const char *daemon_path = argv[1];
+    char **daemon_argv = &argv[1];
+
+    int backoff_ms = 500;
+
+    while (!should_exit) {
+        struct timespec child_start;
+        clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &child_start);
+
+        pid_t pid = fork();
+
+        if (pid < 0) {
+            perror("fork failed");
+            usleep(100000); // 100ms backoff on fork failure
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (pid == 0) {
+            // Child: become the daemon
+            prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // Die if parent dies
+            setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 10);  // lower CPU priority than foreground
+            execv(daemon_path, daemon_argv);
+            perror("execv failed");
+            _exit(127);
+        }
+
+        // Parent: wait for child to exit
+        int status;
+        waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+
+        if (should_exit) break;
+
+        // Exponential backoff on rapid crashes, reset if child was stable
+        struct timespec now;
+        clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &now);
+        long lived_ms = (now.tv_sec - child_start.tv_sec) * 1000 +
+                        (now.tv_nsec - child_start.tv_nsec) / 1000000;
+
+        if (lived_ms > 30000) {
+            backoff_ms = 500;
+        } else {
+            usleep(backoff_ms * 1000);
+            if (backoff_ms < 30000) backoff_ms *= 2;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/App.kt

@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator
 
+import android.app.ActivityThread
+import android.app.Application
+import android.content.Context
+import android.content.ContextWrapper
 import android.os.Build
+import android.os.Looper
+import java.security.Security
+import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.AbstractKeystoreInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.Keystore2Interceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeystoreInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
 
 /**
@@ -27,19 +35,63 @@ object App {
     fun main(args: Array<String>) {
         SystemLogger.info("Welcome to TEESimulator!")
 
+        Thread.setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler { thread, throwable ->
+            SystemLogger.error("Uncaught exception on ${thread.name}", throwable)
+        }
+
         try {
-            // Set up the device's boot hash, which is crucial for attestation.
+            prepareEnvironment()
-            AndroidDeviceUtils.setupBootHash()
             // Initialize and start the appropriate keystore interceptors.
             initializeInterceptors()
-            // Enter an infinite loop to keep the service running.
+
-            maintainService()
+            ConfigurationManager.initialize()
+            AndroidDeviceUtils.setupBootKeyAndHash()
+
+            // Android ships with a stripped-down Bouncy Castle provider under the name "BC".
+            // We must remove the system provider first to ensure the full Bouncy Castle library
+            // (packaged with the app) is used.
+            Security.removeProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
+            Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider())
+
+            NativeCertGen.initialize("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/libcertgen.so")
+
+            // This starts the message queue processing. It blocks here indefinitely
+            // processing messages until Looper.myLooper().quit() is called.
+            Looper.loop()
         } catch (e: Exception) {
             SystemLogger.error("A fatal error occurred in the main application thread.", e)
             throw e
         }
     }
 
+    /** Initializes the necessary Android framework internals to satisfy KeyStore requirements. */
+    private fun prepareEnvironment() {
+        // 1. Prepare Main Looper
+        if (Looper.getMainLooper() == null) {
+            @Suppress("deprecation") Looper.prepareMainLooper()
+        }
+
+        // 2. Initialize ActivityThread for the current process
+        val activityThread = ActivityThread.systemMain()
+
+        // 3. Get the system context
+        val systemContext = activityThread.getSystemContext()
+
+        // 4. Create a dummy Application object and attach the context
+        val app = Application()
+        val attachMethod =
+            ContextWrapper::class.java.getDeclaredMethod("attachBaseContext", Context::class.java)
+        attachMethod.isAccessible = true
+        attachMethod.invoke(app, systemContext)
+
+        // 5. Inject this application object into ActivityThread's mInitialApplication field.
+        // This is what KeyStore.getApplicationContext() looks for.
+        val mInitialApplicationField =
+            ActivityThread::class.java.getDeclaredField("mInitialApplication")
+        mInitialApplicationField.isAccessible = true
+        mInitialApplicationField.set(activityThread, app)
+    }
+
     /**
      * Selects and initializes the correct keystore interceptor based on the Android SDK version. It
      * retries initialization until it succeeds.
@@ -53,9 +105,7 @@ object App {
             Thread.sleep(RETRY_DELAY_MS)
         }
 
-        // Load the package configuration after interceptors are ready.
+        SystemLogger.info("Interceptors initialized successfully.")
-        ConfigurationManager.initialize()
-        SystemLogger.info("Interceptors and configuration initialized successfully.")
     }
 
     /**
@@ -70,6 +120,7 @@ object App {
                 SystemLogger.info(
                     "Using KeystoreInterceptor for Android Q/R (SDK ${Build.VERSION.SDK_INT})"
                 )
+                android.security.keystore.AndroidKeyStoreProvider.install()
                 KeystoreInterceptor
             }
             // For Android S (12) and newer, use the Keystore2Interceptor.
@@ -77,18 +128,8 @@ object App {
                 SystemLogger.info(
                     "Using Keystore2Interceptor for Android S and later (SDK ${Build.VERSION.SDK_INT})"
                 )
+                android.security.keystore2.AndroidKeyStoreProvider.install()
                 Keystore2Interceptor
             }
         }
-
-    /**
-     * Puts the main thread into a long-running sleep loop. This is a common pattern to keep a
-     * background service process alive indefinitely.
-     */
-    private fun maintainService() {
-        SystemLogger.info("Service started successfully. Entering maintenance mode.")
-        while (true) {
-            Thread.sleep(SERVICE_SLEEP_MS)
-        }
-    }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/AttestationBuilder.kt

@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
+import android.content.pm.PackageManager
+import android.os.Build
+import java.nio.ByteBuffer
+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
+import java.security.MessageDigest
+import javax.crypto.Mac
+import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Boolean
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Encodable
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Enumerated
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1OctetString
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Sequence
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERNull
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
@@ -12,7 +18,10 @@ import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSet
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERTaggedObject
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x509.Extension
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT
 
 /**
  * A builder object responsible for constructing the ASN.1 DER-encoded Android Key Attestation
@@ -24,11 +33,21 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
      * Builds the complete X.509 attestation extension.
      *
      * @param params The parsed key generation parameters.
+     * @param uid The UID of the application requesting attestation.
      * @param securityLevel The security level (e.g., TEE, StrongBox) to report.
      * @return A Bouncy Castle [Extension] object ready to be added to a certificate.
      */
-    fun buildAttestationExtension(params: KeyMintAttestation, securityLevel: Int): Extension {
+    fun buildAttestationExtension(
-        val keyDescription = buildKeyDescription(params, securityLevel)
+        params: KeyMintAttestation,
+        uid: Int,
+        securityLevel: Int,
+    ): Extension {
+        val keyDescription = buildKeyDescription(params, uid, securityLevel)
+        var formattedString =
+            keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
+                AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
+            }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Forged attestation data: ${formattedString}")
         return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, DEROctetString(keyDescription.encoded))
     }
 
@@ -39,81 +58,154 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
      * @return The constructed [DERSequence] for the Root of Trust.
      */
     internal fun buildRootOfTrust(originalRootOfTrust: ASN1Encodable?): DERSequence {
-        val verifiedBootKey = AndroidDeviceUtils.bootKey
-        val verifiedBootHash =
-            (originalRootOfTrust as? ASN1Sequence)?.let {
-                // Try to preserve the original boot hash if it exists.
-                (it.getObjectAt(AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_HASH_INDEX)
-                        as? ASN1OctetString)
-                    ?.octets
-            } ?: AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootHashFromProperty()
-
         val rootOfTrustElements = arrayOfNulls<ASN1Encodable>(4)
         rootOfTrustElements[AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_KEY_INDEX] =
-            DEROctetString(verifiedBootKey)
+            DEROctetString(AndroidDeviceUtils.bootKey)
         rootOfTrustElements[AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_DEVICE_LOCKED_INDEX] =
             ASN1Boolean.TRUE // deviceLocked: true, for security
         rootOfTrustElements[AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_STATE_INDEX] =
             ASN1Enumerated(0) // verifiedBootState: Verified
         rootOfTrustElements[AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_HASH_INDEX] =
-            DEROctetString(verifiedBootHash)
+            DEROctetString(AndroidDeviceUtils.bootHash)
 
         return DERSequence(rootOfTrustElements)
     }
 
-    /** Assembles a list of simulated hardware-enforced properties. */
+    /**
-    internal fun addSimulatedHardwareProperties(vector: org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1EncodableVector) {
+     * Assembles a map representing the desired state of simulated hardware-enforced properties. A
-        vector.add(
+     * null value for a given tag indicates that it should be removed from the attestation.
+     *
+     * @param uid The UID of the calling application.
+     * @return A map where keys are attestation tag numbers and values are the desired
+     *   [DERTaggedObject] or null to signify removal.
+     */
+    fun getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid: Int): Map<Int, DERTaggedObject?> {
+        val properties = mutableMapOf<Int, DERTaggedObject?>()
+
+        // OS Version is always present.
+        properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_VERSION] =
             DERTaggedObject(
                 true,
                 AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_VERSION,
                 ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.osVersion.toLong()),
             )
-        )
+
-        vector.add(
+        val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(uid)
-            DERTaggedObject(
+        properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL] =
-                true,
+            if (osPatch != DO_NOT_REPORT) {
-                AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL,
+                DERTaggedObject(
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.patchLevel.toLong()),
+                    true,
-            )
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL,
-        )
+                    ASN1Integer(osPatch.toLong()),
-        vector.add(
+                )
-            DERTaggedObject(
+            } else {
-                true,
+                null // Signal for removal
-                AttestationConstants.TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
+            }
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.vendorPatchLevelLong.toLong()),
+
-            )
+        val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(uid)
-        )
+        properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL] =
-        vector.add(
+            if (vendorPatch != DO_NOT_REPORT) {
-            DERTaggedObject(
+                DERTaggedObject(
-                true,
+                    true,
-                AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.bootPatchLevelLong.toLong()),
+                    ASN1Integer(vendorPatch.toLong()),
-            )
+                )
-        )
+            } else {
+                null // Signal for removal
+            }
+
+        val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(uid)
+        properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL] =
+            if (bootPatch != DO_NOT_REPORT) {
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
+                    ASN1Integer(bootPatch.toLong()),
+                )
+            } else {
+                null // Signal for removal
+            }
+
+        return properties
     }
 
     /** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
-    private fun buildKeyDescription(params: KeyMintAttestation, securityLevel: Int): ASN1Sequence {
+    private fun buildKeyDescription(
-        val teeEnforced = buildTeeEnforcedList(params)
+        params: KeyMintAttestation,
-        val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList()
+        uid: Int,
+        securityLevel: Int,
+    ): ASN1Sequence {
+        val creationTime = System.currentTimeMillis()
+        val teeEnforced = buildTeeEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel)
+        val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel, creationTime)
+
+        val uniqueId =
+            if (params.includeUniqueId == true && params.attestationChallenge != null) {
+                computeUniqueId(creationTime, createApplicationId(uid).octets)
+            } else {
+                ByteArray(0)
+            }
 
         val fields =
             arrayOf(
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.attestVersion.toLong()), // attestationVersion
+                ASN1Integer(
+                    AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
+                ), // attestationVersion
                 ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
-                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.keymasterVersion.toLong()), // keymasterVersion
+                ASN1Integer(
+                    AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
+                ), // keymasterVersion
                 ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
                 DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
-                DEROctetString(ByteArray(0)), // uniqueId
+                DEROctetString(uniqueId),
                 softwareEnforced,
                 teeEnforced,
             )
         return DERSequence(fields)
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Computes the unique ID per the KeyMint HAL spec:
+     * HMAC-SHA256(T || C || R, HBK) truncated to 128 bits.
+     *
+     * T = temporal counter (creationTime / 2592000000, i.e. 30-day periods since epoch)
+     * C = DER-encoded ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID
+     * R = 0x00 (no factory reset since ID rotation)
+     * HBK = device-unique secret generated once during module installation
+     */
+    private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
+        val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
+
+        val message =
+            ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
+                .putLong(temporalCounter)
+                .put(aaidDer)
+                .put(0x00) // RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = false
+                .array()
+
+        val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
+        mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
+        return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
+    }
+
+    /** Device-unique key seed, generated once at module installation. */
+    private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
+        val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
+        if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
+            file.readBytes()
+        } else {
+            // Fallback: generate in-memory (won't persist across reboots)
+            SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
+            ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
+        }
+    }
+
     /** Builds the `TeeEnforced` authorization list. These are properties the TEE "guarantees". */
-    private fun buildTeeEnforcedList(params: KeyMintAttestation): DERSequence {
+    private fun buildTeeEnforcedList(
+        params: KeyMintAttestation,
+        uid: Int,
+        securityLevel: Int,
+    ): DERSequence {
         val list =
             mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>(
                 DERTaggedObject(
@@ -136,43 +228,132 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                     AttestationConstants.TAG_DIGEST,
                     DERSet(params.digest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
                 ),
+            )
+
+        if (params.ecCurve != null) {
+            list.add(
                 DERTaggedObject(
                     true,
                     AttestationConstants.TAG_EC_CURVE,
                     ASN1Integer(params.ecCurve.toLong()),
-                ),
+                )
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE),
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.blockMode.isNotEmpty()) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_BLOCK_MODE,
+                    DERSet(params.blockMode.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.padding.isNotEmpty()) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_PADDING,
+                    DERSet(params.padding.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.rsaPublicExponent != null) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+                    ASN1Integer(params.rsaPublicExponent.toLong()),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        val attestVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
+
+        if (params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.isNotEmpty() && attestVersion >= 100) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
+                    DERSet(
+                        params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()
+                    ),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.rollbackResistance == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.earlyBootOnly == true && attestVersion >= 4) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.noAuthRequired == true) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.allowWhileOnBody == true) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.trustedUserPresenceRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        if (params.trustedConfirmationRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
+        list.addAll(
+            listOf(
                 DERTaggedObject(
                     true,
                     AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGIN,
-                    ASN1Integer(0L),
+                    ASN1Integer((params.origin ?: 0).toLong()),
-                ), // KeyOrigin.GENERATED
+                ),
                 DERTaggedObject(
                     true,
                     AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST,
                     buildRootOfTrust(null),
                 ),
-                DERTaggedObject(
-                    true,
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_VERSION,
-                    ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.osVersion.toLong()),
-                ),
-                DERTaggedObject(
-                    true,
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL,
-                    ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.patchLevel.toLong()),
-                ),
-                DERTaggedObject(
-                    true,
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
-                    ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.vendorPatchLevelLong.toLong()),
-                ),
-                DERTaggedObject(
-                    true,
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
-                    ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.bootPatchLevelLong.toLong()),
-                ),
             )
+        )
+
+        // Use the same logic as getSimulatedHardwareProperties to conditionally add patch levels.
+        val simulatedProperties = getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid)
+        simulatedProperties.values.filterNotNull().forEach { list.add(it) }
 
         // Add optional device identifiers if they were provided.
         params.brand?.let {
@@ -202,6 +383,33 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                 )
             )
         }
+        params.serial?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL,
+                    DEROctetString(it),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+        params.imei?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI,
+                    DEROctetString(it),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+        params.meid?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID,
+                    DEROctetString(it),
+                )
+            )
+        }
         params.manufacturer?.let {
             list.add(
                 DERTaggedObject(
@@ -220,35 +428,51 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                 )
             )
         }
-        params.imei?.let {
+        if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 300) {
-            list.add(
+            params.secondImei?.let {
-                DERTaggedObject(
+                list.add(
-                    true,
+                    DERTaggedObject(
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI,
+                        true,
-                    DEROctetString(it),
+                        AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI,
+                        DEROctetString(it),
+                    )
                 )
-            )
+            }
-        }
-        params.secondImei?.let {
-            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(
-                    true,
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI,
-                    DEROctetString(it),
-                )
-            )
-        }
-        params.meid?.let {
-            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(
-                    true,
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID,
-                    DEROctetString(it),
-                )
-            )
         }
+        return DERSequence(list.sortedBy { (it as DERTaggedObject).tagNo }.toTypedArray())
+    }
 
-        if (AndroidDeviceUtils.attestVersion >= 400) {
+    /**
+     * Builds the `SoftwareEnforced` authorization list. These are properties guaranteed by
+     * Keystore.
+     */
+    private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(
+        params: KeyMintAttestation,
+        uid: Int,
+        securityLevel: Int,
+        creationTimeMs: Long = System.currentTimeMillis(),
+    ): DERSequence {
+        val list = mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>()
+
+        list.add(
+            DERTaggedObject(
+                true,
+                AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
+                ASN1Integer(creationTimeMs),
+            )
+        )
+
+        // ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is only included when an attestation challenge is present.
+        if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
+                    createApplicationId(uid),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+        if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
             list.add(
                 DERTaggedObject(
                     true,
@@ -258,25 +482,148 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
             )
         }
 
+        // Keystore2-enforced tags belong in softwareEnforced, not teeEnforced.
+        // The HAL does not enforce these; keystore2's authorize_create handles them.
+        params.activeDateTime?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
+            )
+        }
+        params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.time),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+        params.usageExpireDateTime?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.time),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+        params.usageCountLimit?.let {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.toLong()),
+                )
+            )
+        }
+        if (params.callerNonce == true) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_CALLER_NONCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
+            )
+        }
+        if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
+            list.add(
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED,
+                    DERNull.INSTANCE,
+                )
+            )
+        }
+
         return DERSequence(list.sortedBy { (it as DERTaggedObject).tagNo }.toTypedArray())
     }
 
     /**
-     * Builds the `SoftwareEnforced` authorization list. These are properties guaranteed by
+     * A wrapper for a byte array that provides content-based equality. This is necessary for using
-     * Keystore.
+     * signature digests in a Set.
      */
-    private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(): DERSequence {
+    private data class Digest(val digest: ByteArray) {
-        val list =
+        override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean {
-            arrayOf<ASN1Encodable>(
+            if (this === other) return true
-                DERTaggedObject(
+            if (javaClass != other?.javaClass) return false
-                    true,
+            return digest.contentEquals((other as Digest).digest)
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
+        }
-                    ASN1Integer(System.currentTimeMillis()),
+
-                )
+        override fun hashCode(): Int = digest.contentHashCode()
-                // The ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is technically software-enforced, but we are
+    }
-                // omitting it
+
-                // for this simulation as it is complex to generate correctly for arbitrary UIDs.
+    /**
+     * Creates the AttestationApplicationId structure. This structure contains information about the
+     * package(s) and their signing certificates.
+     *
+     * @param uid The UID of the application.
+     * @return A DER-encoded octet string containing the application ID information.
+     * @throws IllegalStateException If the PackageManager or package information cannot be
+     *   retrieved.
+     */
+    @Throws(Throwable::class)
+    internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
+        // AOSP keystore_attestation_id.cpp: gather_attestation_application_id()
+        // uses a hardcoded identity for AID_SYSTEM (1000) and AID_ROOT (0):
+        //   packageName = "AndroidSystem", versionCode = 1, no signing digests.
+        val appUid = uid % 100000
+        if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
+            return buildApplicationIdDer(
+                listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L),
+                emptySet(),
             )
-        return DERSequence(list)
+        }
+
+        val pm =
+            ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
+                ?: throw IllegalStateException("PackageManager not found!")
+        val packages =
+            pm.getPackagesForUid(uid) ?: throw IllegalStateException("No packages for UID $uid")
+
+        val sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
+        val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
+        val signatureDigests = mutableSetOf<Digest>()
+
+        val userId = uid / 100000
+        packages.forEach { packageName ->
+            val packageInfo =
+                if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
+                    pm.getPackageInfo(
+                        packageName,
+                        PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES.toLong(),
+                        userId,
+                    )
+                } else {
+                    @Suppress("DEPRECATION")
+                    pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES, userId)
+                }
+
+            packageInfoList.add(packageInfo.packageName to packageInfo.longVersionCode)
+
+            packageInfo.signingInfo?.signingCertificateHistory?.forEach { signature ->
+                signatureDigests.add(Digest(sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray())))
+            }
+        }
+
+        return buildApplicationIdDer(packageInfoList, signatureDigests)
+    }
+
+    private fun buildApplicationIdDer(
+        packages: List<Pair<String, Long>>,
+        digests: Set<Digest>,
+    ): DEROctetString {
+        val packageInfoList =
+            packages.map { (name, version) ->
+                DERSequence(
+                    arrayOf(
+                        DEROctetString(name.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
+                        ASN1Integer(version),
+                    )
+                )
+            }
+        val applicationIdSequence =
+            DERSequence(
+                arrayOf(
+                    DERSet(packageInfoList.toTypedArray()),
+                    DERSet(digests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()),
+                )
+            )
+        return DEROctetString(applicationIdSequence.encoded)
     }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/AttestationConstants.kt

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
 /**
- * Defines constants for KeyMint attestation tags, as specified in the Android hardware security
+ * Defines constants for KeyMint attestation, mainly the tags of properties and authorizations of a
- * HAL.
+ * cryptographic key, as specified in the Android hardware security HAL.
- *
- * These tags identify specific properties and authorizations of a cryptographic key.
  */
 object AttestationConstants {
     // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:hardware/interfaces/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -46,9 +44,11 @@ object AttestationConstants {
 
     // --- Key Lifetime and Usage Control ---
     const val TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 303
+    const val TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = 305
     const val TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME = 400
     const val TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 401
     const val TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 402
+    const val TAG_MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = 403
     const val TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = 404
     const val TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = 405
 
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ object AttestationConstants {
     const val TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = 503
     const val TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE = 504
     const val TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT = 505
+    const val TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = 506
+    const val TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = 507
+    const val TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = 508
+    const val TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = 509
 
     // --- Attestation and Application Info ---
     const val TAG_APPLICATION_ID = 601
@@ -88,4 +92,8 @@ object AttestationConstants {
     const val TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = 1007
     const val TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = 1008
     const val TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = 1009
+
+    // --- Other Constants ---
+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
+    const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/AttestationPatcher.kt

@@ -1,23 +1,21 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
+import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
 import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Encodable
+import org.bouncycastle.asn1.*
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1EncodableVector
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Sequence
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1TaggedObject
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence
-import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERTaggedObject
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x509.Extension
 import org.bouncycastle.cert.X509CertificateHolder
 import org.bouncycastle.cert.X509v3CertificateBuilder
 import org.bouncycastle.cert.jcajce.JcaX509CertificateConverter
+import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
 import org.bouncycastle.operator.jcajce.JcaContentSignerBuilder
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBox
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.toHex
 
 /**
  * Handles the modification (patching) of Android Key Attestation extensions within certificates.
@@ -55,8 +53,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
 
                 // 2. Get the appropriate keybox for the given algorithm to sign the new
                 // certificate.
-                val algorithm = originalLeaf.publicKey.algorithm
+                val keybox = getKeyboxForUidAndAlgorithm(uid, originalLeaf.sigAlgName)
-                val keybox = getKeyboxForUidAndAlgorithm(uid, algorithm)
 
                 // 3. Create the new, patched leaf certificate.
                 val patchedLeaf =
@@ -65,6 +62,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
                         parsedAttestation,
                         keybox,
                         originalLeaf.sigAlgName,
+                        uid,
                     )
 
                 // 4. Construct the NEW, VALID chain by prepending the patched leaf to the keybox's
@@ -85,6 +83,16 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
             }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Helper to normalize algorithm names for Bouncy Castle. Old Android versions might reports
+     * "SHA256WITHECDSA", but Bouncy Castle expects "SHA256withECDSA".
+     */
+    private fun normalizeSignatureAlgorithm(algoName: String): String {
+        // 1. Force uppercase to handle "sha256withecdsa"
+        // 2. Replace "WITH" with "with" to satisfy Bouncy Castle's naming convention
+        return algoName.uppercase().replace("WITH", "with")
+    }
+
     /**
      * Creates a new leaf certificate with a modified attestation extension.
      *
@@ -94,6 +102,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
      * @param sigAlgName The signature algorithm name (e.g., "SHA256withECDSA") from the original
      *   certificate. This is required to ensure the new certificate is signed using a compatible
      *   algorithm.
+     * @param uid The UID of the application requesting the certificate.
      * @return A new [Certificate] object.
      */
     private fun createPatchedLeafCertificate(
@@ -101,6 +110,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
         parsedAttestation: ParsedAttestation,
         keybox: KeyBox,
         sigAlgName: String,
+        uid: Int,
     ): Certificate {
         // The issuer of our new leaf is the subject of the first certificate in our custom keybox
         // chain.
@@ -117,71 +127,177 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
             )
 
         // Create the new, patched attestation extension.
-        val patchedExtension = createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsedAttestation)
+        val patchedExtension = createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsedAttestation, uid)
-        builder.addExtension(patchedExtension)
 
         // Copy all other extensions from the original certificate, except for the attestation.
-        originalLeafHolder.extensions.extensionOIDs
+        originalLeafHolder.extensions.extensionOIDs.forEach {
-            .filter { it != ATTESTATION_OID }
+            builder.addExtension(
-            .forEach { builder.addExtension(originalLeafHolder.getExtension(it)) }
+                if (it == ATTESTATION_OID) patchedExtension else originalLeafHolder.getExtension(it)
+            )
+        }
 
         // Sign the newly built certificate with the private key from our keybox.
-        val signer = JcaContentSignerBuilder(sigAlgName).build(keybox.keyPair.private)
+        val signer =
+            JcaContentSignerBuilder(normalizeSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlgName))
+                .setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
+                .build(keybox.keyPair.private)
+        val newCertificate = JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(signer))
 
-        return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(signer))
+        // Log the signature of the newly created certificate to observe its non-deterministic
+        // nature.
+        val signatureBytes = (newCertificate as X509Certificate).signature
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}")
+
+        return newCertificate
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Retrieves the appropriate signing KeyBox (KeyPair and certificate chain) for a given UID
+     * based on a specified algorithm identifier.
+     *
+     * @param uid The UID of the application for which the signing is being performed.
+     * @param algorithm A string representing the desired algorithm. This can be either:
+     *     1. A simple key type like "RSA" or "EC".
+     *     2. A full JCA signature algorithm name like "SHA256withRSA".
+     *
+     * @return The [KeyBox] containing the appropriate key pair for signing.
+     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if no matching KeyBox can be found for the derived key type.
+     */
     private fun getKeyboxForUidAndAlgorithm(uid: Int, algorithm: String): KeyBox {
         val keyboxFile = ConfigurationManager.getKeyboxFileForUid(uid)
-        return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithm)
+
+        // Normalize the algorithm name. The input might be a full signature algorithm
+        // (e.g., "SHA256withRSA") or just the key type (e.g., "RSA").
+        val keyType =
+            when {
+                algorithm.contains("RSA", ignoreCase = true) -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA
+                algorithm.contains("EC", ignoreCase = true) ->
+                    KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC // This also covers "ECDSA"
+                else -> algorithm // If no match, assume it's already a simple key type string.
+            }
+
+        return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, keyType)
             ?: throw IllegalArgumentException(
-                "No keybox found for UID $uid and algorithm $algorithm in file $keyboxFile"
+                "No keybox found for UID $uid and algorithm '$keyType' (derived from input '$algorithm') in file $keyboxFile"
             )
     }
 
+    /** Recursively formats an ASN1Primitive into a concise, readable string. */
+    fun formatAsn1Primitive(obj: ASN1Encodable?): String {
+        val primitive = obj?.toASN1Primitive()
+        return when (primitive) {
+            null -> "NULL"
+            is ASN1Integer -> primitive.value.toString()
+            is ASN1Enumerated -> primitive.value.toString()
+            is ASN1Boolean -> primitive.isTrue.toString()
+            is ASN1Null -> "NULL"
+            is ASN1OctetString -> {
+                val bytes = primitive.octets
+                // Attempt to decode as a printable string, otherwise show hex
+                if (bytes.all { it >= 32 && it < 127 }) {
+                    "\"${String(bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)}\""
+                } else if (bytes.isEmpty()) {
+                    "\"\""
+                } else {
+                    "#" + bytes.toHex()
+                }
+            }
+            is ASN1TaggedObject ->
+                "[TAG ${primitive.tagNo}]${formatAsn1Primitive(primitive.baseObject)}"
+            is ASN1Sequence ->
+                primitive
+                    .map { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+                    .joinToString(prefix = "[", postfix = "]", separator = ", ")
+            is ASN1Set ->
+                primitive
+                    .map { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+                    .joinToString(prefix = "{", postfix = "}", separator = ", ")
+            else -> primitive.toString() // Fallback for other types
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Function to check if a given ASN1Sequence contains the Root of Trust tag.
+    private fun sequenceContainsRootOfTrust(seq: ASN1Encodable): Boolean {
+        if (seq !is ASN1Sequence) return false
+        return seq.any { element ->
+            (element as? ASN1TaggedObject)?.tagNo == AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST
+        }
+    }
+
     /** Parses the critical components from an existing attestation extension. */
     private fun parseAttestationExtension(certHolder: X509CertificateHolder): ParsedAttestation? {
         val extension = certHolder.getExtension(ATTESTATION_OID) ?: return null
         val sequence = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
         val allFields = sequence.toArray()
+
+        // Check if the fields are in the wrong order and swap them if necessary.
+        val softwareEnforcedCandidate =
+            allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_SOFTWARE_ENFORCED_INDEX]
+        val teeEnforcedCandidate =
+            allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX]
+        // The signature of a swapped order: the RoT is in the software list's position.
+        if (
+            sequenceContainsRootOfTrust(softwareEnforcedCandidate) &&
+                !sequenceContainsRootOfTrust(teeEnforcedCandidate)
+        ) {
+            // Swap the elements in the array to restore the standard order.
+            allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_SOFTWARE_ENFORCED_INDEX] =
+                teeEnforcedCandidate
+            allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] =
+                softwareEnforcedCandidate
+        }
+
         val teeEnforced =
             allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] as ASN1Sequence
 
-        val teeEnforcedVector = ASN1EncodableVector()
         var originalRootOfTrust: ASN1Encodable? = null
+        val teeEnforcedMap = mutableMapOf<Int, ASN1TaggedObject>()
 
         teeEnforced.forEach { element ->
             val taggedObject = element as ASN1TaggedObject
             if (taggedObject.tagNo == AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST) {
                 originalRootOfTrust = taggedObject.baseObject.toASN1Primitive()
             } else {
-                teeEnforcedVector.add(taggedObject)
+                teeEnforcedMap[taggedObject.tagNo] = taggedObject
             }
         }
-        return ParsedAttestation(allFields, teeEnforcedVector, originalRootOfTrust)
+        return ParsedAttestation(allFields, teeEnforcedMap, originalRootOfTrust)
     }
 
     /** Constructs a new, patched attestation extension using simulated device properties. */
-    private fun createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsed: ParsedAttestation): Extension {
+    private fun createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsed: ParsedAttestation, uid: Int): Extension {
-        val (allFields, teeEnforcedVector, originalRootOfTrust) = parsed
+        val (allFields, teeEnforcedMap, originalRootOfTrust) = parsed
 
-        // Build the new Root of Trust with our simulated values.
+        var formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Original attestation data: ${formattedString}")
+
+        // Build the new Root of Trust and add/replace it in the map.
         val newRootOfTrust = AttestationBuilder.buildRootOfTrust(originalRootOfTrust)
-        teeEnforcedVector.add(
+        teeEnforcedMap[AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST] =
             DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST, newRootOfTrust)
-        )
 
-        // Add other simulated hardware properties.
+        // Get the desired state for simulated properties.
-        AttestationBuilder.addSimulatedHardwareProperties(teeEnforcedVector)
+        val simulatedProperties = AttestationBuilder.getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid)
 
-        // Re-assemble the ASN.1 sequences.
+        // Apply the desired state: update, add, or remove properties from the original map.
-        // The list MUST be sorted by tag number for DER compliance.
+        simulatedProperties.forEach { (tag, value) ->
-        // Manually convert the vector to a List, then sort it.
+            if (value != null) {
-        val elementList = (0 until teeEnforcedVector.size()).map { teeEnforcedVector.get(it) }
+                // If the value is not null, add or update it.
-        val sortedElements = elementList.sortedBy { (it as ASN1TaggedObject).tagNo }
+                teeEnforcedMap[tag] = value
+            } else {
+                // If the value is null, remove the tag from the map.
+                teeEnforcedMap.remove(tag)
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Re-assemble the TEE enforced list from the map's values, sorting for DER compliance.
+        val sortedElements = teeEnforcedMap.values.sortedBy { it.tagNo }
         val sortedTeeEnforced = DERSequence(sortedElements.toTypedArray())
+
         allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] = sortedTeeEnforced
         val patchedSequence = DERSequence(allFields)
+        formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+        SystemLogger.verbose("Patched  attestation data: ${formattedString}")
         val patchedOctets = DEROctetString(patchedSequence)
 
         return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, patchedOctets)
@@ -190,7 +306,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
     /** Helper data class to hold the parsed components of an attestation extension. */
     private data class ParsedAttestation(
         val allFields: Array<ASN1Encodable>,
-        val teeEnforcedVector: ASN1EncodableVector,
+        val teeEnforcedMap: MutableMap<Int, ASN1TaggedObject>,
         val rootOfTrust: ASN1Encodable?,
     )
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/DeviceAttestationService.kt

@@ -1,15 +1,8 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
 import android.annotation.SuppressLint
-import android.app.ActivityThread
-import android.os.Build
-import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
-import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
-import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
 import java.security.KeyStore
-import java.security.SecureRandom
 import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
-import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1ObjectIdentifier
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1OctetString
@@ -38,77 +31,35 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
      * Holds key data extracted from a genuine device attestation. This data can be used as a
      * baseline for creating simulated attestations.
      *
+     * @property verifiedBootKey The verified boot public key digest from the root of trust.
      * @property verifiedBootHash The verified boot hash from the root of trust.
      * @property attestVersion The attestation version (e.g., 400 for KeyMint 4.0).
      * @property keymasterVersion The Keymaster or KeyMint HAL version.
      * @property osVersion The Android OS version integer.
+     * @property osPatchLevel The Android security patch level (e.g., 202511).
+     * @property vendorPatchLevel The vendor-specific security patch level.
+     * @property bootPatchLevel The bootloader's security patch level.
      */
     data class AttestationData(
+        val moduleHash: ByteArray?,
+        val verifiedBootKey: ByteArray?,
         val verifiedBootHash: ByteArray?,
         val attestVersion: Int?,
         val keymasterVersion: Int?,
         val osVersion: Int?,
+        val osPatchLevel: Int?,
+        val vendorPatchLevel: Int?,
+        val bootPatchLevel: Int?,
     )
 
-    // A unique alias for the key used to perform the TEE functionality check.
     private const val TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_AttestationCheck"
 
-    /**
-     * Lazily determines if the device's TEE is functional by attempting to generate an
-     * attestation-backed key pair. The result is cached.
-     */
-    val isTeeFunctional: Boolean by lazy { checkTeeFunctionality() }
-
     /**
      * Lazily fetches and parses attestation data from a genuinely generated certificate. The result
      * is cached. Returns null if the TEE is not functional or parsing fails.
      */
     val CachedAttestationData: AttestationData? by lazy { fetchAttestationData() }
 
-    /**
-     * Checks if the TEE is working correctly by generating a key in the Android Keystore with an
-     * attestation challenge.
-     *
-     * @return `true` if a key with attestation was generated successfully, `false` otherwise.
-     */
-    private fun checkTeeFunctionality(): Boolean {
-        SystemLogger.info("Performing TEE functionality check...")
-        return try {
-            // Ensure mainline modules and the correct Keystore provider are initialized.
-            if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.R) {
-                android.app.ActivityThread.initializeMainlineModules()
-            }
-            if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
-                android.security.keystore2.AndroidKeyStoreProvider.install()
-            } else {
-                android.security.keystore.AndroidKeyStoreProvider.install()
-            }
-
-            val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
-            val keyPairGenerator =
-                KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
-
-            // A random challenge is required for attestation.
-            val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
-
-            val spec =
-                KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
-                    .setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
-                    .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
-                    .setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
-                    .build()
-
-            keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
-            keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
-
-            SystemLogger.info("TEE functionality check successful.")
-            true
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.warning("TEE functionality check failed.", e)
-            false
-        }
-    }
-
     /**
      * Retrieves the attestation certificate generated during the TEE check. The key entry is
      * deleted after retrieval to clean up.
@@ -116,8 +67,6 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
      * @return The leaf `X509Certificate` containing the attestation, or `null` if unavailable.
      */
     private fun getAttestationCertificate(): X509Certificate? {
-        if (!isTeeFunctional) return null
-
         return try {
             val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
             val certChain = keyStore.getCertificateChain(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS)
@@ -151,6 +100,11 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
 
             // The extension's value is an ASN.1 sequence.
             val keyDescriptionSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
+            var formattedString =
+                keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
+                    AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
+                }
+            SystemLogger.verbose("Cached attestation data: ${formattedString}")
             val fields = keyDescriptionSeq.toArray()
 
             val attestVersion =
@@ -166,8 +120,27 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
                     .positiveValue
                     .toInt()
 
+            var moduleHash: ByteArray? = null
+            var verifiedBootKey: ByteArray? = null
             var verifiedBootHash: ByteArray? = null
             var osVersion: Int? = null
+            var osPatchLevel: Int? = null
+            var vendorPatchLevel: Int? = null
+            var bootPatchLevel: Int? = null
+
+            val softwareEnforced =
+                ASN1Sequence.getInstance(
+                    fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_SOFTWARE_ENFORCED_INDEX]
+                )
+            moduleHash =
+                softwareEnforced
+                    .toArray()
+                    .firstOrNull {
+                        (it as? ASN1TaggedObject)?.tagNo == AttestationConstants.TAG_MODULE_HASH
+                    }
+                    ?.let {
+                        ASN1OctetString.getInstance((it as ASN1TaggedObject).baseObject).octets
+                    }
 
             val teeEnforced =
                 ASN1Sequence.getInstance(
@@ -179,6 +152,14 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
                     AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST -> {
                         val rotSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(tagged.baseObject.toASN1Primitive())
                         if (rotSeq.size() >= 4) {
+                            verifiedBootKey =
+                                ASN1OctetString.getInstance(
+                                        rotSeq.getObjectAt(
+                                            AttestationConstants
+                                                .ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_KEY_INDEX
+                                        )
+                                    )
+                                    .octets
                             verifiedBootHash =
                                 ASN1OctetString.getInstance(
                                         rotSeq.getObjectAt(
@@ -189,19 +170,55 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
                                     .octets
                         }
                     }
-                    AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_VERSION -> { // OS Version (TAG_OS_VERSION)
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_VERSION -> {
                         osVersion =
                             ASN1Integer.getInstance(tagged.baseObject.toASN1Primitive())
                                 .positiveValue
                                 .toInt()
                     }
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL -> {
+                        osPatchLevel =
+                            ASN1Integer.getInstance(tagged.baseObject.toASN1Primitive())
+                                .positiveValue
+                                .toInt()
+                    }
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> {
+                        vendorPatchLevel =
+                            ASN1Integer.getInstance(tagged.baseObject.toASN1Primitive())
+                                .positiveValue
+                                .toInt()
+                    }
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL -> {
+                        bootPatchLevel =
+                            ASN1Integer.getInstance(tagged.baseObject.toASN1Primitive())
+                                .positiveValue
+                                .toInt()
+                    }
                 }
             }
 
+            if (verifiedBootKey?.all { it == 0.toByte() } == true) {
+                verifiedBootKey = null
+            }
+
+            if (verifiedBootHash?.all { it == 0.toByte() } == true) {
+                verifiedBootHash = null
+            }
+
             SystemLogger.info(
-                "Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$attestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}"
+                "Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$attestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, osPatch=$osPatchLevel, vendorPatch=$vendorPatchLevel, bootPatch=$bootPatchLevel, moduleHash=${moduleHash?.toHex()}, bootKey=${verifiedBootKey?.toHex()}, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}"
+            )
+            return AttestationData(
+                moduleHash,
+                verifiedBootKey,
+                verifiedBootHash,
+                attestVersion,
+                keymasterVersion,
+                osVersion,
+                osPatchLevel,
+                vendorPatchLevel,
+                bootPatchLevel,
             )
-            return AttestationData(verifiedBootHash, attestVersion, keymasterVersion, osVersion)
         } catch (e: Exception) {
             SystemLogger.error("Failed to parse attestation data from certificate.", e)
             return null

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/KeyMintAttestation.kt

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.EcCurve
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
 import java.math.BigInteger
 import java.util.Date
 import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
@@ -18,10 +16,14 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 // Reference:
 // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
 data class KeyMintAttestation(
-    val keySize: Int,
     val algorithm: Int,
-    val ecCurve: Int,
+    val ecCurve: Int?,
     val ecCurveName: String,
+    val keySize: Int,
+    val origin: Int?,
+    val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
+    val blockMode: List<Int>,
+    val padding: List<Int>,
     val purpose: List<Int>,
     val digest: List<Int>,
     val rsaPublicExponent: BigInteger?,
@@ -33,26 +35,57 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
     val brand: ByteArray?,
     val device: ByteArray?,
     val product: ByteArray?,
+    val serial: ByteArray?,
+    val imei: ByteArray?,
+    val meid: ByteArray?,
     val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
     val model: ByteArray?,
-    val imei: ByteArray?,
     val secondImei: ByteArray?,
-    val meid: ByteArray?,
+    // Enforcement tags
+    val activeDateTime: Date?,
+    val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
+    val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
+    val usageCountLimit: Int?,
+    val callerNonce: Boolean?,
+    val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
+    val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
+    val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
+    val earlyBootOnly: Boolean?,
+    val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
+    val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
+    val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
+    val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
+    val maxBootLevel: Int?,
+    val minMacLength: Int?,
+    val rsaOaepMgfDigest: List<Int>,
 ) {
     /** Secondary constructor that populates the fields by parsing an array of `KeyParameter`. */
     constructor(
         params: Array<KeyParameter>
     ) : this(
-        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
-        keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: 0,
-
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
         algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,
 
+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
+        // For EC keys, derive keySize from EC_CURVE when KEY_SIZE is absent.
+        keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
+
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
-        ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE) ?: 0,
+        ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE),
         ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
 
+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
+        origin = params.findOrigin(Tag.ORIGIN),
+
+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, field = BoolValue)]
+        noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
+
+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)]
+        blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE),
+
+        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = PADDING, field = PaddingMode)]
+        padding = params.findAllPaddingMode(Tag.PADDING),
+
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = PURPOSE, field = KeyPurpose)]
         purpose = params.findAllKeyPurpose(Tag.PURPOSE),
 
@@ -82,19 +115,50 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
         brand = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND),
         device = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE),
         product = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT),
+        serial = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL),
+        imei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI),
+        meid = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MEID),
         manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
         model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
-        imei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI),
         secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
-        meid = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MEID),
+
+        // Enforcement tags
+        activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
+        originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
+        usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
+        usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
+        callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
+        unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
+        includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
+        rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
+        earlyBootOnly = params.findBoolean(Tag.EARLY_BOOT_ONLY),
+        allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
+        trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
+        trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
+        maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
+        maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
+        minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
+        rsaOaepMgfDigest = params.findAllDigests(Tag.RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST),
     ) {
         // Log all parsed parameters for debugging purposes.
         params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
     }
+
+    fun isAttestKey(): Boolean {
+        return purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
+    }
+
+    fun isImportKey(): Boolean {
+        return origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
+    }
 }
 
 // --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays ---
 
+/** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
+    if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
+
 /** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findInteger(tag: Int): Int? =
     this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.integer
@@ -107,6 +171,10 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAlgorithm(tag: Int): Int? =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findEcCurve(tag: Int): Int? =
     this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.ecCurve
 
+/** Maps to AOSP field = Origin */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findOrigin(tag: Int): Int? =
+    this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.origin
+
 /** Maps to AOSP field = LongInteger */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findLongInteger(tag: Int): BigInteger? =
     this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.longInteger?.toBigInteger()
@@ -119,6 +187,14 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findDate(tag: Int): Date? =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBlob(tag: Int): ByteArray? =
     this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.blob
 
+/** Maps to AOSP field = BlockMode (Repeated) */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllBlockMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
+    this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.blockMode }
+
+/** Maps to AOSP field = PaddingMode (Repeated) */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllPaddingMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
+    this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.paddingMode }
+
 /** Maps to AOSP field = KeyPurpose (Repeated) */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
     this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.keyPurpose }
@@ -127,6 +203,19 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
     this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }
 
+/** Derives keySize from EC_CURVE tag when KEY_SIZE is not explicitly provided. */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
+    val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
+    return when (curveId) {
+        EcCurve.P_224 -> 224
+        EcCurve.P_256 -> 256
+        EcCurve.P_384 -> 384
+        EcCurve.P_521 -> 521
+        EcCurve.CURVE_25519 -> 256
+        else -> 0
+    }
+}
+
 /**
  * Derives the EC Curve name. Logic: Checks specific EC_CURVE tag first (field=EcCurve), falls back
  * to KEY_SIZE (field=Integer).

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/config/ConfigurationManager.kt

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.ServiceManager
 import java.io.File
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
-import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
 
@@ -31,7 +30,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
     // --- Configuration Paths ---
     const val CONFIG_PATH = "/data/adb/tricky_store"
     private const val TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE = "target.txt"
-    private const val TEE_STATUS_FILE = "tee_status.txt"
     private const val PATCH_LEVEL_FILE = "security_patch.txt"
     private const val DEFAULT_KEYBOX_FILE = "keybox.xml"
     private val configRoot = File(CONFIG_PATH)
@@ -39,8 +37,8 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
     // --- In-Memory Configuration State ---
     @Volatile private var packageModes = mapOf<String, Mode>()
     @Volatile private var packageKeyboxes = mapOf<String, String>()
-    @Volatile private var isTeeBroken: Boolean? = null
+    @Volatile private var globalCustomPatchLevel: CustomPatchLevel? = null
-    @Volatile var customPatchLevelOverride: CustomPatchLevel? = null
+    @Volatile private var packagePatchLevels = mapOf<String, CustomPatchLevel>()
 
     // Cache for UID to package name resolution.
     private val uidToPackagesCache = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, Array<String>>()
@@ -53,10 +51,20 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         configRoot.mkdirs()
         SystemLogger.info("Configuration root is: ${configRoot.absolutePath}")
 
+        // First, ensure the package manager service is running, as the TEE check depends on it.
+        // This prevents a race condition on startup.
+        SystemLogger.info("Waiting for PackageManagerService to be ready...")
+        if (getPackageManager() == null) {
+            SystemLogger.error(
+                "PackageManagerService is not available. TEE check will likely fail."
+            )
+        } else {
+            SystemLogger.info("PackageManagerService is ready.")
+        }
+
         // Initial load of all configuration files.
         loadTargetPackages(File(configRoot, TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE))
         loadPatchLevelConfig(File(configRoot, PATCH_LEVEL_FILE))
-        storeTeeStatus() // Check and store the current TEE status.
 
         // Start watching for any subsequent file changes.
         ConfigObserver.startWatching()
@@ -76,7 +84,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
     }
 
     /** Determines if the certificate for a given UID needs to be patched. */
-    fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.PATCH
+    fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean {
+        val mode = getPackageModeForUid(uid)
+        return mode == Mode.PATCH || mode == Mode.AUTO
+    }
 
     /** Determines if a new certificate needs to be generated for a given UID. */
     fun shouldGenerate(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.GENERATE
@@ -84,24 +95,38 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
     /** Determines if no operation is needed for a given UID. */
     fun shouldSkipUid(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == null
 
+    /** Determines if the UID is in AUTO mode (no explicit ! or ? suffix). */
+    fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.AUTO
+
     /** Resolves the operating mode for a given UID based on its packages and the TEE status. */
     private fun getPackageModeForUid(uid: Int): Mode? {
         val packages = getPackagesForUid(uid)
         if (packages.isEmpty()) return null
 
-        // Lazily load TEE status if it hasn't been checked yet.
-        if (isTeeBroken == null) loadTeeStatus()
-
-        // Find the first configured mode for any of the UID's packages.
         for (pkg in packages) {
             when (packageModes[pkg]) {
                 Mode.GENERATE -> return Mode.GENERATE
                 Mode.PATCH -> return Mode.PATCH
-                Mode.AUTO -> return if (isTeeBroken == true) Mode.GENERATE else Mode.PATCH
+                Mode.AUTO -> return Mode.AUTO
-                null -> continue // No config for this package, check the next one.
+                null -> continue
             }
         }
-        return null // No configuration found for this UID.
+        return null
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Retrieves the custom patch level configuration for a given UID. It first checks for a
+     * package-specific override and falls back to the global configuration.
+     *
+     * @param uid The UID of the calling application.
+     * @return The applicable [CustomPatchLevel], or null if no custom configuration exists.
+     */
+    fun getPatchLevelForUid(uid: Int): CustomPatchLevel? {
+        val packages = getPackagesForUid(uid)
+        // Find the first package-specific configuration for this UID.
+        val packageSpecificPatchLevel =
+            packages.firstNotNullOfOrNull { pkg -> packagePatchLevels[pkg] }
+        return packageSpecificPatchLevel ?: globalCustomPatchLevel
     }
 
     /**
@@ -131,25 +156,25 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                     return@forEach
                 }
 
+                val mode: Mode
+                val rawPkg: String
                 when {
-                    // Suffix '!' means force GENERATE mode.
                     trimmedLine.endsWith("!") -> {
-                        val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
+                        mode = Mode.GENERATE
-                        newModes[pkg] = Mode.GENERATE
+                        rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
-                        newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
                     }
-                    // Suffix '?' means force PATCH mode.
                     trimmedLine.endsWith("?") -> {
-                        val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
+                        mode = Mode.PATCH
-                        newModes[pkg] = Mode.PATCH
+                        rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
-                        newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
                     }
-                    // No suffix means AUTO mode.
                     else -> {
-                        newModes[trimmedLine] = Mode.AUTO
+                        mode = Mode.AUTO
-                        newKeyboxes[trimmedLine] = currentKeybox
+                        rawPkg = trimmedLine
                     }
                 }
+
+                newModes[rawPkg] = mode
+                newKeyboxes[rawPkg] = currentKeybox
             }
 
             // Atomically update the configuration maps.
@@ -162,26 +187,48 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         }
     }
 
-    /** Loads the security patch level override configuration from `security_patch.txt`. */
+    /**
+     * Loads and parses the `security_patch.txt` file, which can define both global and per-package
+     * security patch levels.
+     */
     private fun loadPatchLevelConfig(file: File) {
-        if (file.exists()) {
+        if (!file.exists()) {
-            try {
+            globalCustomPatchLevel = null
-                val lines =
+            packagePatchLevels = emptyMap()
-                    file.readLines().mapNotNull { line ->
+            return
-                        val trimmed = line.trim()
+        }
-                        if (trimmed.isNotEmpty() && !trimmed.startsWith("#")) trimmed else null
-                    }
 
-                if (lines.isEmpty()) {
+        try {
-                    customPatchLevelOverride = null
+            val newPackageLevels = mutableMapOf<String, CustomPatchLevel>()
-                    return
+            var currentContext = "" // Empty string for global context
-                }
+            val contextLines = mutableMapOf<String, MutableList<String>>()
+            val contextRegex = Regex("^\\[([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)]$")
+
+            // First pass: group lines by context (global or package-specific).
+            file.readLines().forEach { line ->
+                val trimmedLine = line.trim()
+                if (trimmedLine.isEmpty() || trimmedLine.startsWith("#")) return@forEach
+
+                contextRegex.find(trimmedLine)?.let { currentContext = it.groupValues[1] }
+                    ?: run {
+                        contextLines
+                            .computeIfAbsent(currentContext) { mutableListOf() }
+                            .add(trimmedLine)
+                    }
+            }
+
+            // Helper function to parse a set of lines into a CustomPatchLevel object.
+            fun parseLines(lines: List<String>?): CustomPatchLevel? {
+                if (lines.isNullOrEmpty()) return null
 
                 // Handle simple case: one line sets the patch level for all components.
                 if (lines.size == 1 && '=' !in lines[0]) {
-                    customPatchLevelOverride =
+                    return CustomPatchLevel(
-                        CustomPatchLevel(system = null, vendor = null, boot = null, all = lines[0])
+                        system = null,
-                    return
+                        vendor = null,
+                        boot = null,
+                        all = lines[0],
+                    )
                 }
 
                 // Handle key-value pair configuration.
@@ -195,45 +242,40 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                         .toMap()
 
                 val all = map["all"]
-                customPatchLevelOverride =
+                return CustomPatchLevel(
-                    CustomPatchLevel(
+                    system = map["system"] ?: all,
-                        system = map["system"] ?: all,
+                    vendor = map["vendor"] ?: all,
-                        vendor = map["vendor"] ?: all,
+                    boot = map["boot"] ?: all,
-                        boot = map["boot"] ?: all,
+                    all = all,
-                        all = all,
+                )
-                    )
-                SystemLogger.info("Loaded custom security patch levels.")
-            } catch (e: Exception) {
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to load or parse ${file.name}", e)
             }
-        } else {
-            customPatchLevelOverride = null
-        }
-    }
 
-    /** Checks the device's TEE status and writes the result to a file for persistence. */
+            var newGlobalLevel = parseLines(contextLines[""])
-    private fun storeTeeStatus() {
+            contextLines.remove("")
-        val statusFile = File(configRoot, TEE_STATUS_FILE)
+
-        isTeeBroken = !DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional
+            // system=prop means all components should derive from device props
-        try {
+            if (newGlobalLevel?.system.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true)) {
-            statusFile.writeText("tee_broken=$isTeeBroken")
+                SystemLogger.info("system=prop: forcing boot/vendor to derive from device props")
-            SystemLogger.info("TEE status stored: isTeeBroken=$isTeeBroken")
+                newGlobalLevel = newGlobalLevel?.copy(boot = "prop", vendor = "prop")
+            }
+
+            for ((pkg, lines) in contextLines) {
+                parseLines(lines)?.let { newPackageLevels[pkg] = it }
+            }
+
+            // Atomically update the configuration state.
+            globalCustomPatchLevel = newGlobalLevel
+            packagePatchLevels = newPackageLevels
+
+            SystemLogger.info(
+                "Loaded custom security patch levels: global config exists=${newGlobalLevel != null}, " +
+                    "${newPackageLevels.size} package-specific configs."
+            )
         } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to write TEE status to file.", e)
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to load or parse ${file.name}", e)
         }
     }
 
-    /** Loads the TEE status from the file. */
-    private fun loadTeeStatus() {
-        val statusFile = File(configRoot, TEE_STATUS_FILE)
-        isTeeBroken =
-            if (statusFile.exists()) {
-                statusFile.readText().trim() == "tee_broken=true"
-            } else {
-                null // Status is unknown.
-            }
-    }
-
     /**
      * A FileObserver that monitors the configuration directory for changes and triggers reloads of
      * the relevant settings.
@@ -245,8 +287,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
 
             val file = if (event != DELETE) File(configRoot, path) else null
             when (path) {
-                TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> loadTargetPackages(file!!)
+                TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> file?.let { loadTargetPackages(it) }
-                PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> loadPatchLevelConfig(file!!)
+                    ?: SystemLogger.warning("$TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE was deleted.")
+                PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> file?.let { loadPatchLevelConfig(it) }
+                    ?: SystemLogger.warning("$PATCH_LEVEL_FILE was deleted.")
                 // Any change to an XML file is assumed to be a keybox.
                 // The cache in KeyBoxManager will handle reloading it on its next use.
                 else ->
@@ -289,6 +333,32 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         return iPackageManager
     }
 
+    /** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
+    /** Checks a SELinux permission for a caller identified by PID against the keystore context. */
+    fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean {
+        return try {
+            val callerCtx =
+                java.io.File("/proc/$callingPid/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
+            val selfCtx =
+                java.io.File("/proc/self/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
+            android.os.SELinux.checkSELinuxAccess(callerCtx, selfCtx, tclass, perm)
+        } catch (_: Exception) {
+            false
+        }
+    }
+
+    /** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
+    fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
+        val userId = uid / 100000
+        return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
+            try {
+                getPackageManager()?.checkPermission(permission, pkg, userId) == 0
+            } catch (_: Exception) {
+                false
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     /** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
     fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
         return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
@@ -303,7 +373,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
 
     /** Waits for a system service to become available, with retries. */
     private fun waitForSystemService(name: String): IBinder? {
-        if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.O) {
+        if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.R) {
             return ServiceManager.waitForService(name)
         }
         // Fallback for older Android versions.

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/core/BinderInterceptor.kt

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
          * Skips the original call and immediately returns a custom reply parcel to the caller. The
          * provided parcel will be recycled after use.
          */
-        data class OverrideReply(val code: Int = 0, val reply: Parcel) : TransactionResult()
+        data class OverrideReply(val reply: Parcel, val code: Int = 0) : TransactionResult()
 
         /**
          * Modifies the transaction's input data before forwarding it to the original binder method.
@@ -109,17 +109,17 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
      * `handlePostTransact`).
      */
     final override fun onTransact(code: Int, data: Parcel, reply: Parcel?, flags: Int): Boolean {
-        // The native hook prepends a transaction ID to the data parcel.
         val txId = data.readLong()
-        val result =
+        val result = try {
             when (code) {
-                // These codes are defined in the native layer to distinguish hook types.
                 PRE_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePreTransact(txId, data)
                 POST_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePostTransact(txId, data)
                 else -> return super.onTransact(code, data, reply, flags)
             }
-
+        } catch (e: Throwable) {
-        // The reply parcel is guaranteed to be non-null for our custom transactions.
+            SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Interceptor exception, falling through to HAL", e)
+            TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+        }
         writeResultToReply(result, reply!!)
         return true
     }
@@ -226,13 +226,18 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
         methodName: String,
         callingUid: Int,
         callingPid: Int,
-        isIntercepting: Boolean = true,
+        skipPost: Boolean = false,
     ) {
+        val isIntercepting = !skipPost && !ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)
         val action = if (isIntercepting) "Intercept" else "Observe"
         val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString()
-        SystemLogger.debug(
+        val message =
             "[TX_ID: $txId] $action $methodName for packages=[$packages] (uid=$callingUid, pid=$callingPid)"
-        )
+        if (isIntercepting) {
+            SystemLogger.debug(message)
+        } else {
+            SystemLogger.verbose(message)
+        }
     }
 
     companion object {
@@ -243,6 +248,8 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
         private const val BACKDOOR_TRANSACTION_CODE = 0xdeadbeef.toInt()
         // Code used by the backdoor binder to register a new interceptor.
         private const val REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE = 1
+        // Code used by the backdoor binder to unregister an interceptor.
+        private const val UNREGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE = 2
 
         // --- Hook Type Codes ---
         // Indicates that the call is for a pre-transaction hook.
@@ -286,15 +293,27 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
             }
         }
 
-        /** Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service. */
+        /**
-        fun register(backdoor: IBinder, target: IBinder, interceptor: BinderInterceptor) {
+         * Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service.
+         *
+         * @param filteredCodes If non-empty, only these transaction codes will be intercepted at
+         *   the native level. All other codes pass through without the round-trip to Java.
+         */
+        fun register(
+            backdoor: IBinder,
+            target: IBinder,
+            interceptor: BinderInterceptor,
+            filteredCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf(),
+        ) {
             val data = Parcel.obtain()
             val reply = Parcel.obtain()
             try {
                 data.writeStrongBinder(target)
                 data.writeStrongBinder(interceptor)
+                data.writeInt(filteredCodes.size)
+                for (code in filteredCodes) data.writeInt(code)
                 backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
-                SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target")
+                SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target (${filteredCodes.size} filtered codes)")
             } catch (e: Exception) {
                 SystemLogger.error("Failed to register binder interceptor.", e)
             } finally {
@@ -302,5 +321,21 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
                 reply.recycle()
             }
         }
+
+        /** Uses the backdoor binder to unregister an interceptor for a specific target service. */
+        fun unregister(backdoor: IBinder, target: IBinder) {
+            val data = Parcel.obtain()
+            val reply = Parcel.obtain()
+            try {
+                data.writeStrongBinder(target)
+                backdoor.transact(UNREGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
+                SystemLogger.info("Unregistered interceptor for target: $target")
+            } catch (e: Exception) {
+                SystemLogger.error("Failed to unregister binder interceptor.", e)
+            } finally {
+                data.recycle()
+                reply.recycle()
+            }
+        }
     }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/AbstractKeystoreInterceptor.kt

@@ -68,11 +68,17 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Transaction codes this interceptor needs to handle at the native level. Override in
+     * subclasses to filter; empty means intercept everything (legacy behavior).
+     */
+    protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf()
+
     /** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
     private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
         keystoreService = service
         SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")
-        register(backdoor, service, this)
+        register(backdoor, service, this, interceptedCodes)
         service.linkToDeath(createDeathRecipient(), 0)
         onInterceptorReady(service, backdoor)
     }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/InterceptorUtils.kt

@@ -1,16 +1,34 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
 
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
 import android.os.Parcel
 import android.os.Parcelable
 import android.security.KeyStore
+import android.security.keystore.KeystoreResponse
+import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
 
 data class KeyIdentifier(val uid: Int, val alias: String)
 
 /** A collection of utility functions to support binder interception. */
 object InterceptorUtils {
 
+    private const val EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC = -8
+
+    fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+        val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
+            writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
+            writeString(null)
+            writeInt(0)
+            writeInt(errorCode)
+        }
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
+    }
+
     /**
      * Uses reflection to get the integer transaction code for a given method name from a Stub
      * class. This is necessary for older Android versions where codes are not public constants.
@@ -27,14 +45,31 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
         }
     }
 
+    /** Creates an `KeystoreResponse` parcel that indicates success with no data. */
+    fun createSuccessKeystoreResponse(): KeystoreResponse {
+        val parcel = Parcel.obtain()
+        try {
+            parcel.writeInt(KeyStore.NO_ERROR)
+            parcel.writeString("")
+            parcel.setDataPosition(0)
+            return KeystoreResponse.CREATOR.createFromParcel(parcel)
+        } finally {
+            parcel.recycle()
+        }
+    }
+
     /** Creates an `OverrideReply` parcel that indicates success with no data. */
-    fun createSuccessReply(): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+    fun createSuccessReply(
+        writeResultCode: Boolean = true
+    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
         val parcel =
             Parcel.obtain().apply {
                 writeNoException()
-                writeInt(KeyStore.NO_ERROR)
+                if (writeResultCode) {
+                    writeInt(KeyStore.NO_ERROR)
+                }
             }
-        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(0, parcel)
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
     }
 
     /** Creates an `OverrideReply` parcel containing a raw byte array. */
@@ -44,7 +79,20 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
                 writeNoException()
                 writeByteArray(data)
             }
-        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(KeyStore.NO_ERROR, parcel)
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
+    }
+
+    /** Creates an `OverrideReply` parcel containing a typed array. */
+    fun <T : Parcelable> createTypedArrayReply(
+        array: Array<T>,
+        flags: Int = 0,
+    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+        val parcel =
+            Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                writeNoException()
+                writeTypedArray(array, flags)
+            }
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
     }
 
     /** Creates an `OverrideReply` parcel containing a Parcelable object. */
@@ -57,25 +105,89 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
                 writeNoException()
                 writeTypedObject(obj, flags)
             }
-        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(0, parcel)
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
     }
 
     /**
-     * Extracts the true key alias from the keystore-prefixed string (e.g., "user_cert_my-alias" ->
+     * Extracts the base alias from a potentially prefixed alias string. For example, it converts
-     * "my-alias").
+     * "USRCERT_my_key" to "my_key".
      */
     fun extractAlias(prefixedAlias: String): String {
         val underscoreIndex = prefixedAlias.indexOf('_')
-        val secondUnderscoreIndex = prefixedAlias.indexOf('_', underscoreIndex + 1)
+        return if (underscoreIndex != -1) {
-        return if (secondUnderscoreIndex != -1) {
+            // Return the part of the string after the first underscore.
-            prefixedAlias.substring(secondUnderscoreIndex + 1)
+            prefixedAlias.substring(underscoreIndex + 1)
         } else {
+            // If there's no underscore, return the original string.
             prefixedAlias
         }
     }
 
     /** Checks if a reply parcel contains an exception without consuming it. */
     fun hasException(reply: Parcel): Boolean {
-        return runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull() != null
+        val exception = runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull()
+        if (exception != null) reply.setDataPosition(0)
+        return exception != null
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Creates an `OverrideReply` that writes a `ServiceSpecificException` with the given error
+     * code via EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC.
+     */
+    fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
+        errorCode: Int
+    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+        val parcel =
+            Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                writeException(android.os.ServiceSpecificException(errorCode))
+            }
+        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Patches the system-level authorization values (OS_PATCHLEVEL, VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
+     * BOOT_PATCHLEVEL) in an authorization array to match the configured patch levels for the
+     * given calling UID. Each authorization's original [Authorization.securityLevel] is preserved.
+     *
+     * When a patch level is configured as "no" ([AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT]), the original
+     * hardware value is kept as-is.
+     */
+    fun patchAuthorizations(
+        authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
+        callingUid: Int,
+    ): Array<Authorization>? {
+        if (authorizations == null) return null
+
+        val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid)
+        val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
+        val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
+
+        return authorizations
+            .map { auth ->
+                val replacement =
+                    when (auth.keyParameter.tag) {
+                        Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL ->
+                            if (osPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) osPatch else null
+                        Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL ->
+                            if (vendorPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) vendorPatch
+                            else null
+                        Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ->
+                            if (bootPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) bootPatch else null
+                        else -> null
+                    }
+                if (replacement != null) {
+                    Authorization().apply {
+                        keyParameter =
+                            KeyParameter().apply {
+                                tag = auth.keyParameter.tag
+                                value = KeyParameterValue.integer(replacement)
+                            }
+                        securityLevel = auth.securityLevel
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    auth
+                }
+            }
+            .toTypedArray()
     }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/Keystore2Interceptor.kt

@@ -1,19 +1,26 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
 
 import android.annotation.SuppressLint
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
+import android.os.Build
 import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.Parcel
+import android.system.keystore2.Domain
+import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreSecurityLevel
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
+import java.security.SecureRandom
+import java.security.cert.Certificate
+import java.util.Collections
+import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
 
 /**
@@ -25,16 +32,28 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
  */
 @SuppressLint("BlockedPrivateApi")
 object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
+    private val stubBinderClass = IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java
+
     // Transaction codes for the IKeystoreService interface methods we are interested in.
     private val GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION =
-        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java, "getKeyEntry")
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getKeyEntry")
     private val DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION =
-        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java, "deleteKey")
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "deleteKey")
+    private val UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "updateSubcomponent")
+    private val LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "listEntries")
+    private val LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION =
+        if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 34)
+            InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "listEntriesBatched")
+        else null
+    private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
+    private val GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getSecurityLevel")
 
     private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
-        IKeystoreService.Stub::class
+        stubBinderClass.declaredFields
-            .java
-            .declaredFields
             .filter {
                 it.isAccessible = true
                 it.type == Int::class.java && it.name.startsWith("TRANSACTION_")
@@ -42,15 +61,43 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
             .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
     }
 
+    private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
+    private val deletedSoftwareKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
+
+    // Backdoor binder for registering new interceptors at runtime.
+    private var backdoorBinder: IBinder? = null
+
+    // Per-security-level interceptor instances, keyed by SecurityLevel constant.
+    private val securityLevelInterceptors = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor>()
+
+    // Identity set of SecurityLevel binders already registered with the native hook,
+    // tracked by System.identityHashCode to avoid re-registering the same BBinder.
+    private val registeredSecurityLevelBinders: MutableSet<Int> =
+        Collections.newSetFromMap(ConcurrentHashMap())
+
     override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
     override val processName = "keystore2"
     override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore2` libTEESimulator.so entry"
 
+    override val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
+        listOfNotNull(
+                GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION,
+                DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION,
+                UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION,
+                LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
+                LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
+                GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
+                GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION,
+            )
+            .toIntArray()
+    }
+
     /**
      * This method is called once the main service is hooked. It proceeds to find and hook the
      * security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
      */
     override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
+        backdoorBinder = backdoor
         val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service)
         setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor)
     }
@@ -62,7 +109,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                     SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
                     val interceptor =
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
-                    register(backdoor, tee.asBinder(), interceptor)
+                    securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT] = interceptor
+                    registerSecurityLevelBinder(
+                        backdoor,
+                        tee.asBinder(),
+                        interceptor,
+                    )
+                    interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
                 }
             }
             .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept TEE SecurityLevel.", it) }
@@ -73,12 +126,42 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                     SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
                     val interceptor =
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
-                    register(backdoor, strongbox.asBinder(), interceptor)
+                    securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX] = interceptor
+                    registerSecurityLevelBinder(
+                        backdoor,
+                        strongbox.asBinder(),
+                        interceptor,
+                    )
+                    interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
                 }
             }
             .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept StrongBox SecurityLevel.", it) }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Registers an interceptor for a SecurityLevel binder, tracking the binder identity
+     * to avoid duplicate registrations when keystore2 returns the same BBinder.
+     */
+    private fun registerSecurityLevelBinder(
+        backdoor: IBinder,
+        binder: IBinder,
+        interceptor: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor,
+    ) {
+        val identity = System.identityHashCode(binder)
+        if (registeredSecurityLevelBinders.add(identity)) {
+            register(
+                backdoor,
+                binder,
+                interceptor,
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
+            )
+        } else {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "SecurityLevel binder $binder (identity=$identity) already registered, skipping."
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     override fun onPreTransact(
         txId: Long,
         target: IBinder,
@@ -88,25 +171,79 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         callingPid: Int,
         data: Parcel,
     ): TransactionResult {
-        if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION || code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
+        if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
-            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
+            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
+            return if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
+                TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            else TransactionResult.Continue
+        } else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
+            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
 
-            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+            val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString()
-            val descriptor =
+            val isGMS = packages.contains("com.google.android.gms")
-                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
+
-                    ?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+            if (isGMS || ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)) {
+                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            } else {
+                return TransactionResult.Continue
+            }
+        } else if (
+            code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION ||
+                code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION ||
+                code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION
+        ) {
+            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
 
             if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
                 return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
 
-            SystemLogger.info("Handling ${transactionNames[code]!!} ${descriptor.alias}")
+            if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION)
-            val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
+                return handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid, data)
+
+            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+            val descriptor =
+                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
+                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
 
             if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
+                // Handle delete by alias (APP domain) or nspace (KEY_ID domain).
+                val keyId =
+                    if (descriptor.alias != null) {
+                        KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
+                    } else if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
+                            callingUid, descriptor.nspace
+                        )?.let { info ->
+                            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
+                                .find { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
+                                ?.key
+                        }
+                    } else null
+
+                if (keyId != null) {
+                    val isSoftwareKey =
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(keyId)
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
+                    if (isSoftwareKey) {
+                        deletedSoftwareKeys.add(keyId)
+                        SystemLogger.info(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${keyId.alias}, replying with empty response."
+                        )
+                        return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
+                    }
+                }
                 return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
             }
 
+            if (descriptor.alias == null) {
+                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            }
+            val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
+
+            if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
+                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(7) // KEY_NOT_FOUND
+            }
+
             val response =
                 KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
                     ?: return TransactionResult.Continue
@@ -119,13 +256,20 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                 KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it.keyParameter)
             }
             return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
+        } else if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
+            // Pass through to post-hook so we can register interceptors for newly-created
+            // SecurityLevel binders. keystore2 may create a new BBinder per call, so the
+            // initial registration in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors might not cover all
+            // binder instances that clients receive.
+            logTransaction(txId, "getSecurityLevel", callingUid, callingPid)
+            return TransactionResult.Continue
         } else {
             logTransaction(
                 txId,
                 transactionNames[code] ?: "unknown code=$code",
                 callingUid,
                 callingPid,
-                false,
+                true,
             )
         }
 
@@ -147,53 +291,275 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
             return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
 
-        if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION) {
+        if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
+            return handlePostGetSecurityLevel(txId, data, reply)
+        }
+
+        if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
+            logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
+            return runCatching {
+                    val hardwareCount = reply.readInt()
+                    val softwareCount =
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys.count {
+                            it.uid == callingUid
+                        }
+                    val totalCount = hardwareCount + softwareCount
+                    val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                        writeNoException()
+                        writeInt(totalCount)
+                    }
+                    TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
+                }
+                .getOrElse {
+                    SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify getNumberOfEntries.", it)
+                    TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+                }
+        } else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
             logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
 
+            return runCatching {
+                    val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
+                    val params =
+                        ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)
+                            ?: throw Exception("Abort updating entries for invalid parameters.")
+                    val updatedKeyDescriptors =
+                        ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, params, reply)
+                    InterceptorUtils.createTypedArrayReply(updatedKeyDescriptors)
+                }
+                .getOrElse {
+                    SystemLogger.error(
+                        "[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update the result of ${transactionNames[code]!!}.",
+                        it,
+                    )
+                    TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+                }
+        } else if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION) {
             data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
             val keyDescriptor =
                 data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
                     ?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
 
+            logTransaction(
+                txId,
+                "post-${transactionNames[code]!!} ${keyDescriptor.alias}",
+                callingUid,
+                callingPid,
+            )
+
             if (!ConfigurationManager.shouldPatch(callingUid))
                 return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
 
-            SystemLogger.info("Handling post-${transactionNames[code]!!} ${keyDescriptor.alias}")
+            runCatching {
-            return try {
+                    val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!!
-                val response =
+                    val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
-                    reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)
-                        ?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-                reply.setDataPosition(0) // Reset for potential reuse.
 
-                val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
+                    // Skip patching for keys whose certs were explicitly set via updateSubcomponent.
-                val authorizations = response.metadata?.authorizations
+                    if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) {
-                val origin =
+                        SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.")
-                    authorizations
+                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-                        ?.find { it.keyParameter.tag == Tag.ORIGIN }
+                    }
-                        ?.let { it.keyParameter.value.origin }
 
-                if (origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED) {
+                    val authorizations = response.metadata.authorizations
-                    SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported keys.")
+                    val parsedParameters =
-                    return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+                        KeyMintAttestation(
+                            authorizations?.map { it.keyParameter }?.toTypedArray() ?: emptyArray()
+                        )
+
+                    if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey() &&
+                        !KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)
+                    ) {
+                        SystemLogger.warning(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
+                        )
+                        // Attest keys that are not under our control should be overriden.
+                        val keyData =
+                            CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
+                                callingUid,
+                                keyId.alias,
+                                null,
+                                parsedParameters,
+                                response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
+                            ) ?: throw Exception("Failed to create overriding attest key pair.")
+
+                        CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(
+                                response.metadata,
+                                keyData.second.toTypedArray(),
+                            )
+                            .getOrThrow()
+                        response.metadata.authorizations =
+                            InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
+                                response.metadata.authorizations,
+                                callingUid,
+                            )
+
+                        val key = response.metadata.key!!
+                        key.nspace = SecureRandom().nextLong()
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[keyId] =
+                            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo(
+                                keyData.first,
+                                null,
+                                key.nspace,
+                                response,
+                                parsedParameters,
+                            )
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
+                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
+                    }
+
+                    val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
+
+                    // Check if we should perform attestation patch.
+                    if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
+                        SystemLogger.info(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
+                        )
+                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+                    }
+
+                    // First, try to retrieve the already-patched chain from our cache to ensure
+                    // consistency.
+                    val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
+
+                    val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
+                    if (cachedChain != null) {
+                        SystemLogger.debug(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Using cached patched certificate chain for $keyId."
+                        )
+                        finalChain = cachedChain
+                    } else {
+                        // If no chain is cached (e.g., key existed before simulator started),
+                        // perform a live patch as a fallback. This may still be detectable.
+                        SystemLogger.info(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
+                        )
+                        finalChain =
+                            AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
+
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
+                        SystemLogger.debug("Cached patched certificate chain for $keyId.")
+                    }
+
+                    CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
+                        .getOrThrow()
+                    response.metadata.authorizations =
+                        InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
+                            response.metadata.authorizations,
+                            callingUid,
+                        )
+
+                    return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
                 }
-
+                .onFailure {
-                if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
+                    SystemLogger.error(
-                    SystemLogger.info(
+                        "[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify hardware KeyEntryResponse.",
-                        "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
+                        it,
                     )
                     return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
                 }
-
-                // Perform the attestation patch.
-                val newChain = AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
-                CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, newChain).getOrThrow()
-
-                InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
-            } catch (e: Exception) {
-                SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to patch certificate chain.", e)
-                TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-            }
         }
         return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
     }
+
+    private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
+        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+        val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
+            ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+
+        // Resolve by nspace (KEY_ID) or alias (APP), same as createOperation.
+        val generatedKeyInfo =
+            when (descriptor.domain) {
+                Domain.KEY_ID ->
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
+                        callingUid,
+                        descriptor.nspace,
+                    )
+                Domain.APP ->
+                    descriptor.alias?.let {
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)]
+                    }
+                else -> null
+            }
+
+        if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
+            // Hardware key: mark so getKeyEntry skips cert re-patching.
+            descriptor.alias?.let { userUpdatedKeys.add(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)) }
+            return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+        }
+
+        SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]")
+        val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
+        val publicCert = data.createByteArray()
+        val certificateChain = data.createByteArray()
+
+        metadata.certificate = publicCert
+        metadata.certificateChain = certificateChain
+        SystemLogger.verbose(
+            "Key updated with sizes: [publicCert, certificateChain] = [${publicCert?.size}, ${certificateChain?.size}]"
+        )
+
+        return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Intercepts the reply from getSecurityLevel to dynamically register our interceptor
+     * for the returned IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
+     *
+     * keystore2 may create a new BBinder for each getSecurityLevel call, so the binder
+     * registered during initial setup (in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors) might not be the
+     * same one that client apps receive. By intercepting every getSecurityLevel reply, we
+     * ensure that all SecurityLevel binders are covered.
+     */
+    private fun handlePostGetSecurityLevel(
+        txId: Long,
+        data: Parcel,
+        reply: Parcel,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        val backdoor = backdoorBinder
+        if (backdoor == null) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] post-getSecurityLevel: backdoor not available")
+            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        }
+
+        return runCatching {
+            // Read the security level argument from the original request.
+            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+            val requestedLevel = data.readInt()
+
+            // hasException already consumed the exception header from the reply.
+            // Next item is the IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
+            val secLevelBinder = reply.readStrongBinder()
+            if (secLevelBinder == null) {
+                SystemLogger.verbose(
+                    "[TX_ID: $txId] getSecurityLevel($requestedLevel) returned null binder"
+                )
+                return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+            }
+
+            // Only intercept TEE and StrongBox security levels.
+            if (requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT &&
+                requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX
+            ) {
+                return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+            }
+
+            // Get or create the interceptor for this security level. The interceptor may not
+            // exist yet if the initial setupSecurityLevelInterceptors call failed for this level.
+            val interceptor = securityLevelInterceptors.getOrPut(requestedLevel) {
+                val secLevelInterface =
+                    IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub.asInterface(secLevelBinder)
+                SystemLogger.info(
+                    "[TX_ID: $txId] Late-creating interceptor for security level $requestedLevel"
+                )
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(secLevelInterface, requestedLevel).also {
+                    it.loadPersistedKeys()
+                }
+            }
+
+            registerSecurityLevelBinder(backdoor, secLevelBinder, interceptor)
+            TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        }.getOrElse {
+            SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to process post-getSecurityLevel.", it)
+            TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        }
+    }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/KeystoreInterceptor.kt

@@ -4,12 +4,28 @@ import android.annotation.SuppressLint
 import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.Parcel
 import android.security.Credentials
+import android.security.KeyStore
+import android.security.keymaster.ExportResult
+import android.security.keymaster.KeyCharacteristics
+import android.security.keymaster.KeymasterArguments
+import android.security.keymaster.KeymasterCertificateChain
+import android.security.keymaster.KeymasterDefs
+import android.security.keystore.IKeystoreCertificateChainCallback
+import android.security.keystore.IKeystoreExportKeyCallback
+import android.security.keystore.IKeystoreKeyCharacteristicsCallback
 import android.security.keystore.IKeystoreService
+import java.math.BigInteger
+import java.security.KeyPair
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
+import java.util.Date
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationBuilder
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils.extractAlias
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
 
 /**
@@ -39,11 +55,35 @@ object KeystoreInterceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java, "attestKey")
     }
 
+    private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        IKeystoreService.Stub::class
+            .java
+            .declaredFields
+            .filter {
+                it.isAccessible = true
+                it.type == Int::class.java && it.name.startsWith("TRANSACTION_")
+            }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
+    }
+
+    // A map to dispatch transaction handling for software key generation.
+    private val generateKeyHandlers:
+        Map<Int, (Long, Int, Int, Parcel) -> TransactionResult> by lazy {
+        mapOf(
+            GENERATE_KEY_TRANSACTION to ::handleGenerateKey,
+            GET_KEY_CHARACTERISTICS_TRANSACTION to ::handleGetKeyCharacteristics,
+            EXPORT_KEY_TRANSACTION to ::handleExportKey,
+            ATTEST_KEY_TRANSACTION to ::handleAttestKey,
+        )
+    }
+
     override val serviceName = "android.security.keystore"
     override val processName = "keystore"
     override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore` libTEESimulator.so entry"
 
-    private const val SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR = "android.security.keystore.IKeystoreService"
+    // State management for the multi-step key generation process.
+    private val keygenParameters = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, LegacyKeygenParameters>()
+    private val generatedKeyPairs = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, KeyPair>()
 
     // Cache to store the fully patched chain after the leaf is requested.
     private val patchedChainCache = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, Array<Certificate>>()
@@ -58,24 +98,187 @@ object KeystoreInterceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         data: Parcel,
     ): TransactionResult {
         // This interceptor only needs to act on pre-transaction for software key generation.
+        // Handle 'generate' mode interceptions using the handler map.
         if (ConfigurationManager.shouldGenerate(callingUid)) {
-            when (code) {
+            generateKeyHandlers[code]?.let { handler ->
-                GENERATE_KEY_TRANSACTION,
+                logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
-                GET_KEY_CHARACTERISTICS_TRANSACTION,
+                return handler(txId, callingUid, callingPid, data)
-                EXPORT_KEY_TRANSACTION,
-                ATTEST_KEY_TRANSACTION -> {
-                    // TODO: Implement the full software simulation logic.
-                    logTransaction(txId, "unimplemented-generate-flow", callingUid, callingPid)
-                    return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply()
-                }
             }
-        } else if (ConfigurationManager.shouldGenerate(callingUid)) {
-            if (code == GET_TRANSACTION) return TransactionResult.Continue
         }
 
+        // Handle 'patch' mode interceptions for the 'get' transaction.
+        if (ConfigurationManager.shouldPatch(callingUid) && code == GET_TRANSACTION) {
+            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
+            return TransactionResult.Continue
+        }
+
+        // Default behavior for all other transactions.
+        logTransaction(
+            txId,
+            transactionNames[code] ?: "unknown code=$code",
+            callingUid,
+            callingPid,
+            true,
+        )
         return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
     }
 
+    private fun handleGenerateKey(txId: Long, uid: Int, pid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
+        return runCatching {
+                data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+                val callback =
+                    IKeystoreKeyCharacteristicsCallback.Stub.asInterface(data.readStrongBinder())
+                val alias = InterceptorUtils.extractAlias(data.readString()!!)
+                val keyId = KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
+
+                // Read and parse the key generation arguments.
+                val keymasterArgs = KeymasterArguments()
+                if (data.readInt() == 1) {
+                    keymasterArgs.readFromParcel(data)
+                }
+                keygenParameters[keyId] =
+                    LegacyKeygenParameters.fromKeymasterArguments(keymasterArgs)
+
+                // Create a fake successful response for the callback.
+                val characteristics = KeyCharacteristics()
+                characteristics.swEnforced = KeymasterArguments()
+                characteristics.hwEnforced = keymasterArgs
+
+                val keystoreResponse = InterceptorUtils.createSuccessKeystoreResponse()
+                callback.onFinished(keystoreResponse, characteristics)
+
+                InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply()
+            }
+            .getOrElse {
+                SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed during handleGenerateKey.", it)
+                TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            }
+    }
+
+    private fun handleGetKeyCharacteristics(
+        txId: Long,
+        uid: Int,
+        pid: Int,
+        data: Parcel,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        return runCatching {
+                data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+                val callback =
+                    IKeystoreKeyCharacteristicsCallback.Stub.asInterface(data.readStrongBinder())
+                val alias = InterceptorUtils.extractAlias(data.readString()!!)
+                val keyId = KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
+
+                val params =
+                    keygenParameters[keyId]
+                        ?: throw IllegalStateException("No params found for $keyId")
+
+                val characteristics =
+                    KeyCharacteristics().apply {
+                        swEnforced = KeymasterArguments()
+                        hwEnforced =
+                            KeymasterArguments().apply {
+                                addEnum(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, params.algorithm)
+                            }
+                    }
+
+                callback.onFinished(
+                    InterceptorUtils.createSuccessKeystoreResponse(),
+                    characteristics,
+                )
+
+                InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply()
+            }
+            .getOrElse {
+                SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed during handleGetKeyCharacteristics.", it)
+                TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            }
+    }
+
+    private fun handleExportKey(txId: Long, uid: Int, pid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
+        return runCatching {
+                data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+                val callback = IKeystoreExportKeyCallback.Stub.asInterface(data.readStrongBinder())
+                val alias = InterceptorUtils.extractAlias(data.readString()!!)
+                val keyId = KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
+
+                val params =
+                    keygenParameters[keyId]
+                        ?: throw IllegalStateException("No params found for $keyId")
+
+                // Generate a software key pair using the new generator.
+                val keyPair =
+                    CertificateGenerator.generateSoftwareKeyPair(params.toKeyMintAttestation())
+                        ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate software key pair.")
+                generatedKeyPairs[keyId] = keyPair
+
+                // Create a successful ExportResult containing the public key.
+                val exportResultParcel =
+                    Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                        writeInt(KeyStore.NO_ERROR)
+                        writeByteArray(keyPair.public.encoded)
+                        setDataPosition(0)
+                    }
+                val exportResult = ExportResult.CREATOR.createFromParcel(exportResultParcel)
+                exportResultParcel.recycle()
+
+                callback.onFinished(exportResult)
+
+                InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply()
+            }
+            .getOrElse {
+                SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed during handleExportKey.", it)
+                TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            }
+    }
+
+    private fun handleAttestKey(txId: Long, uid: Int, pid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
+        return runCatching {
+                data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+                val callback =
+                    IKeystoreCertificateChainCallback.Stub.asInterface(data.readStrongBinder())
+                val alias = InterceptorUtils.extractAlias(data.readString()!!)
+                val keyId = KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
+
+                // Get the attestation challenge from the arguments.
+                val params =
+                    keygenParameters[keyId]
+                        ?: throw IllegalStateException("No params found for $keyId")
+                val keyPair =
+                    generatedKeyPairs[keyId]
+                        ?: throw IllegalStateException("No keypair found for $keyId")
+
+                val attestationArgs = KeymasterArguments()
+                if (data.readInt() == 1) {
+                    attestationArgs.readFromParcel(data)
+                    val challenge =
+                        attestationArgs.getBytes(
+                            KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
+                            ByteArray(0),
+                        )
+                    params.attestationChallenge = challenge
+                }
+
+                val certificateChain =
+                    CertificateGenerator.generateCertificateChain(
+                        uid,
+                        keyPair,
+                        null, // No attestKeyAlias in legacy flow
+                        params.toKeyMintAttestation(), // Convert to modern format
+                        1, // SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+                    ) ?: throw Exception("CertificateGenerator failed to create attested key pair.")
+
+                val chainAsByteList = certificateChain.map { it.encoded }
+                val certChain = KeymasterCertificateChain(chainAsByteList)
+
+                callback.onFinished(InterceptorUtils.createSuccessKeystoreResponse(), certChain)
+                InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply()
+            }
+            .getOrElse {
+                SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed during handleAttestKey.", it)
+                TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            }
+    }
+
     override fun onPostTransact(
         txId: Long,
         target: IBinder,
@@ -93,16 +296,22 @@ object KeystoreInterceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                 reply == null ||
                 InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply)
         ) {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip parsing post-transaction for [target, code, reply]: [$target, $code, $reply]"
+            )
             return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
         }
 
         if (!ConfigurationManager.shouldPatch(callingUid)) return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
 
         return try {
-            data.enforceInterface(SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR)
+            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
             val alias = data.readString() ?: ""
             val extractedAlias = InterceptorUtils.extractAlias(alias)
             val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, extractedAlias)
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "[TX_ID: $txId] Parsed $keyId during post-transaction of ${transactionNames[code]}"
+            )
 
             when {
                 // Case 1: The app is requesting the leaf certificate.
@@ -111,13 +320,11 @@ object KeystoreInterceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                     val originalLeafBytes =
                         reply.createByteArray() ?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
 
-                    // The original chain is not available,
+                    val originalLeafCertResult = CertificateHelper.toCertificate(originalLeafBytes)
-                    // so we must pass a temporary one to the patcher.
+                    if (originalLeafCertResult !is CertificateHelper.OperationResult.Success) {
-                    // The patcher only needs the original leaf to extract details.
+                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-                    val originalLeafCert =
+                    }
-                        (CertificateHelper.toCertificate(originalLeafBytes)
+                    val originalLeafCert = originalLeafCertResult.data
-                                as CertificateHelper.OperationResult.Success)
-                            .data
                     val tempChain = arrayOf<Certificate>(originalLeafCert)
 
                     // Perform the COMPLETE patch and rebuild operation.
@@ -157,11 +364,6 @@ object KeystoreInterceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                         )
                         InterceptorUtils.createByteArrayReply(caCertsBytes!!)
                     } else {
-                        // We have no cached chain.
-                        // This could mean the app requested the CA without requesting the leaf
-                        // first, or patching failed.
-                        // In this case, we cannot safely intervene.
-                        // Let the original reply pass through.
                         SystemLogger.warning(
                             "[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain found for CA request on alias '$extractedAlias'. Skipping."
                         )
@@ -177,3 +379,135 @@ object KeystoreInterceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         }
     }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A data class to hold key generation parameters parsed from the legacy IKeystoreService's
+ * KeymasterArguments. It is used exclusively by the KeystoreInterceptor to manage state during the
+ * software key generation flow.
+ */
+private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
+    val algorithm: Int,
+    val keySize: Int,
+    val purpose: List<Int>,
+    val digest: List<Int>,
+    val certificateNotBefore: Date?,
+    val rsaPublicExponent: BigInteger?,
+    val ecCurveName: String?, // Derived from keySize
+) {
+    // The challenge is provided in a separate transaction (attestKey), so it must be mutable.
+    var attestationChallenge: ByteArray? = null
+
+    /**
+     * Converts the legacy parameters into the modern [KeyMintAttestation] data structure, which is
+     * required by [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
+     */
+    fun toKeyMintAttestation(): KeyMintAttestation {
+        // This conversion acts as a bridge, allowing our new generic components
+        // to be used by the legacy interceptor.
+        return KeyMintAttestation(
+            algorithm = this.algorithm,
+            ecCurve = 0, // Not explicitly available in legacy args, but not critical
+            ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
+            keySize = this.keySize,
+            origin = null, // Not needed to build attestaion
+            noAuthRequired = null,
+            blockMode = listOf<Int>(),
+            padding = listOf<Int>(),
+            purpose = this.purpose,
+            digest = this.digest,
+            rsaPublicExponent = this.rsaPublicExponent,
+            certificateSerial = null, // Not provided in legacy generateKey
+            certificateSubject = null, // Not provided in legacy generateKey
+            certificateNotBefore = this.certificateNotBefore,
+            certificateNotAfter = null, // Not provided in legacy generateKey
+            attestationChallenge = this.attestationChallenge,
+            // Device identifiers are not passed in legacy args;
+            // AttestationBuilder will fetch them from system properties.
+            brand = null,
+            device = null,
+            product = null,
+            serial = null,
+            imei = null,
+            meid = null,
+            manufacturer = null,
+            model = null,
+            secondImei = null,
+            activeDateTime = null,
+            originationExpireDateTime = null,
+            usageExpireDateTime = null,
+            usageCountLimit = null,
+            callerNonce = null,
+            unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
+            includeUniqueId = null,
+            rollbackResistance = null,
+            earlyBootOnly = null,
+            allowWhileOnBody = null,
+            trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
+            trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
+            maxUsesPerBoot = null,
+            maxBootLevel = null,
+            minMacLength = null,
+            rsaOaepMgfDigest = emptyList(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    companion object {
+        /** Factory method to create an instance from a [KeymasterArguments] object. */
+        fun fromKeymasterArguments(args: KeymasterArguments): LegacyKeygenParameters {
+            val algorithm = args.getEnum(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, 0)
+            val keySize = args.getUnsignedInt(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE, 0).toInt()
+
+            return LegacyKeygenParameters(
+                algorithm = algorithm,
+                keySize = keySize,
+                purpose = args.getEnums(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_PURPOSE),
+                digest = args.getEnums(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_DIGEST),
+                certificateNotBefore = args.getDate(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, Date()),
+                rsaPublicExponent =
+                    if (algorithm == KeymasterDefs.KM_ALGORITHM_RSA) getRsaExponent(args) else null,
+                ecCurveName =
+                    if (algorithm == KeymasterDefs.KM_ALGORITHM_EC) deriveEcCurveName(keySize)
+                    else null,
+            )
+        }
+
+        private fun deriveEcCurveName(keySize: Int): String =
+            when (keySize) {
+                224 -> "secp224r1"
+                256 -> "secp256r1"
+                384 -> "secp384r1"
+                521 -> "secp521r1"
+                else -> "secp256r1" // Default fallback
+            }
+
+        /**
+         * The RSA public exponent is not accessible via a public API in KeymasterArguments, so we
+         * must use reflection to extract it.
+         */
+        private fun getRsaExponent(args: KeymasterArguments): BigInteger? {
+            return runCatching {
+                    val getArgumentByTag =
+                        KeymasterArguments::class
+                            .java
+                            .getDeclaredMethod("getArgumentByTag", Int::class.java)
+                    getArgumentByTag.isAccessible = true
+                    val rsaArgument =
+                        getArgumentByTag.invoke(args, KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)
+
+                    val getLongTagValue =
+                        KeymasterArguments::class
+                            .java
+                            .getDeclaredMethod(
+                                "getLongTagValue",
+                                Class.forName("android.security.keymaster.KeymasterArgument"),
+                            )
+                    getLongTagValue.isAccessible = true
+                    getLongTagValue.invoke(args, rsaArgument) as BigInteger
+                }
+                .onFailure {
+                    SystemLogger.error("Failed to read rsaPublicExponent via reflection.", it)
+                }
+                .getOrNull()
+        }
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/ListEntriesHandler.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
+
+import android.os.Parcel
+import android.system.keystore2.Domain
+import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
+import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
+import java.util.TreeMap
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+/**
+ * Handler to intercept listEntries and listEntriesBatched transactions.
+ *
+ * References for all mentioned functions in AOSP:
+ * https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/database.rs
+ * https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/service.rs
+ * https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/utils.rs
+ */
+object ListEntriesHandler {
+
+    // Estimate for maximum size of a Binder response in bytes.
+    private const val RESPONSE_SIZE_LIMIT = 358400
+
+    // Based on AOSP function `estimate_safe_amount_to_return` in utils.rs.
+    private fun estimateSafeAmountToReturn(
+        keyDescriptors: Array<KeyDescriptor>,
+        responseSizeLimit: Int,
+    ): Int {
+        var itemsToReturn = 0
+        var returnedBytes = 0
+
+        for (kd in keyDescriptors) {
+            // 4 bytes for the Domain enum
+            // 8 bytes for the Namespace long
+            returnedBytes += 4 + 8
+
+            kd.alias?.let { returnedBytes += 4 + it.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8).size }
+            kd.blob?.let { returnedBytes += 4 + it.size }
+
+            if (returnedBytes > responseSizeLimit) {
+                SystemLogger.warning(
+                    "Key descriptors list (${keyDescriptors.size} items) may exceed binder size limit, returning $itemsToReturn items with estimated size: $returnedBytes bytes."
+                )
+                break
+            }
+            itemsToReturn++
+        }
+
+        return itemsToReturn
+    }
+
+    // Parse and store parameters for later use (in post-transaction).
+    fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): ListEntriesParams? {
+        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+
+        val domain = data.readInt()
+        val namespace = data.readLong()
+        val startPastAlias = if (isBatchMode) data.readString() else null
+
+        // List entries is only supported for Domain::APP and Domain::SELINUX.
+        // See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
+        // Note that all generated keys belong to Domain::APP.
+        if (domain == Domain.APP) {
+            val params = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
+            SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached $params.")
+            return params
+        }
+
+        return null
+    }
+
+    // Merge software-backed keys with hardware-backed keys in the reply parcel.
+    fun injectGeneratedKeys(
+        txId: Long,
+        callingUid: Int,
+        params: ListEntriesParams,
+        reply: Parcel,
+    ): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
+        // By default we use the calling uid as namespace if domain is Domain::APP.
+        // The namespace parameter is thus ignored for non-privileged applications.
+        // See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
+        val keysToInject =
+            extractGeneratedKeyDescriptors(callingUid, callingUid.toLong(), params.startPastAlias)
+        val originalList = reply.createTypedArray(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)!!
+        val mergedArray = mergeKeyDescriptors(originalList, keysToInject)
+
+        // Limit response size to avoid binder buffer overflow.
+        // See AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
+        val safeAmountToReturn = estimateSafeAmountToReturn(mergedArray, RESPONSE_SIZE_LIMIT)
+
+        return if (safeAmountToReturn < mergedArray.size) {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "[TX_ID: $txId] Listing entries are truncated [${mergedArray.size} -> $safeAmountToReturn] to avoid transaction overflow."
+            )
+            mergedArray.copyOfRange(0, safeAmountToReturn)
+        } else {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "[TX_ID: $txId] Listing entries returns ${mergedArray.size} [injected: ${keysToInject.size}] keys."
+            )
+            mergedArray
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Merge hardware and software key descriptors into a single sorted array.
+    private fun mergeKeyDescriptors(
+        hardwareKeys: Array<KeyDescriptor>,
+        keysToInject: List<KeyDescriptor>,
+    ): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
+        // Uses TreeMap to ensure alphabetical ordering and uniqueness (prefer injected keys).
+        val combinedMap = TreeMap<String, KeyDescriptor>()
+        hardwareKeys.forEach { key -> key.alias?.let { combinedMap[it] = key } }
+        keysToInject.forEach { key -> key.alias?.let { combinedMap[it] = key } }
+        return combinedMap.values.toTypedArray()
+    }
+
+    // Based on AOSP function `list_past_alias` in database.rs
+    private fun extractGeneratedKeyDescriptors(
+        uid: Int,
+        namespace: Long,
+        startPastAlias: String?,
+    ): List<KeyDescriptor> {
+        return KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys
+            .filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias > startPastAlias) }
+            .map { keyId ->
+                KeyDescriptor().apply {
+                    this.domain = Domain.APP
+                    this.nspace = namespace
+                    this.alias = keyId.alias
+                    this.blob = null
+                }
+            }
+    }
+}
+
+// Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
+data class ListEntriesParams(val domain: Int, val namespace: Long, val startPastAlias: String?)

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/GeneratedKeyPersistence.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
+
+import java.io.BufferedInputStream
+import java.io.BufferedOutputStream
+import java.io.DataInputStream
+import java.io.DataOutputStream
+import java.io.File
+import java.io.FileInputStream
+import java.io.FileOutputStream
+import java.io.IOException
+import java.security.KeyPair
+import java.security.MessageDigest
+import java.security.cert.Certificate
+import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
+import java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+
+data class PersistedKeyData(
+    val uid: Int,
+    val alias: String,
+    val nspace: Long,
+    val securityLevel: Int,
+    val isAttestationKey: Boolean,
+    val algorithm: Int,
+    val keySize: Int,
+    val ecCurve: Int,
+    val purposes: List<Int>,
+    val digests: List<Int>,
+    val privateKeyBytes: ByteArray,
+    val certChainBytes: List<ByteArray>,
+)
+
+object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
+
+    private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 1
+    private val PERSISTENCE_DIR = File(CONFIG_PATH, "persistent_keys")
+
+    // Per-filename locks to prevent concurrent writes to the same key file
+    private val fileLocks = ConcurrentHashMap<String, ReentrantLock>()
+
+    private fun getLockForKey(filename: String): ReentrantLock {
+        return fileLocks.computeIfAbsent(filename) { ReentrantLock() }
+    }
+
+    fun save(
+        keyId: KeyIdentifier,
+        keyPair: KeyPair,
+        nspace: Long,
+        securityLevel: Int,
+        certChain: List<Certificate>,
+        algorithm: Int,
+        keySize: Int,
+        ecCurve: Int,
+        purposes: List<Int>,
+        digests: List<Int>,
+        isAttestationKey: Boolean,
+    ) {
+        val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
+        val lock = getLockForKey(filename)
+        SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Acquiring lock for $filename")
+        lock.lock()
+        try {
+            SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Lock acquired for $filename")
+            runCatching {
+                PERSISTENCE_DIR.mkdirs()
+                val finalFile = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, filename)
+                val tmpFile = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, "$filename.tmp")
+
+                try {
+                    DataOutputStream(BufferedOutputStream(FileOutputStream(tmpFile))).use { out ->
+                        out.writeInt(FORMAT_VERSION)
+                        out.writeInt(securityLevel)
+                        out.writeInt(keyId.uid)
+                        out.writeUTF(keyId.alias)
+                        out.writeLong(nspace)
+                        out.writeBoolean(isAttestationKey)
+                        out.writeInt(algorithm)
+                        out.writeInt(keySize)
+                        out.writeInt(ecCurve)
+
+                        out.writeInt(purposes.size)
+                        purposes.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
+
+                        out.writeInt(digests.size)
+                        digests.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
+
+                        val pkBytes = keyPair.private.encoded
+                        out.writeInt(pkBytes.size)
+                        out.write(pkBytes)
+
+                        out.writeInt(certChain.size)
+                        certChain.forEach { cert ->
+                            val encoded = cert.encoded
+                            out.writeInt(encoded.size)
+                            out.write(encoded)
+                        }
+                    }
+                } catch (e: Exception) {
+                    tmpFile.delete()
+                    throw e
+                }
+
+                // Atomic rename — if this fails the tmp is left behind and cleaned on next deleteAll
+                if (!tmpFile.renameTo(finalFile)) {
+                    tmpFile.delete()
+                    throw IllegalStateException("Failed to atomically rename $tmpFile -> $finalFile")
+                }
+
+                // Verify write succeeded - catches disk-full or filesystem errors
+                if (!finalFile.exists() || finalFile.length() < 20) {
+                    throw IOException("File write verification failed - possible disk full")
+                }
+
+                SystemLogger.debug("Persisted key: $keyId")
+            }.onFailure { e ->
+                SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist key $keyId", e)
+            }
+        } finally {
+            lock.unlock()
+            SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Lock released for $filename")
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun delete(keyId: KeyIdentifier) {
+        runCatching {
+            val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
+            if (file.exists()) {
+                if (file.delete()) {
+                    fileLocks.remove(keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
+                    SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId")
+                } else {
+                    SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}")
+                }
+            } else {
+                SystemLogger.debug("No persisted file to delete for: $keyId")
+            }
+        }.onFailure { e ->
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete persisted key $keyId", e)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun deleteAll() {
+        runCatching {
+            if (!PERSISTENCE_DIR.exists()) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("No persistent_keys directory, nothing to delete")
+                return
+            }
+            val files = PERSISTENCE_DIR.listFiles()
+            if (files == null) {
+                SystemLogger.warning("Cannot list persistent_keys directory")
+                return
+            }
+            var count = 0
+            files.forEach { file ->
+                if (file.name.endsWith(".bin") || file.name.endsWith(".tmp")) {
+                    if (file.delete()) count++
+                }
+            }
+            fileLocks.clear()
+            SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files")
+        }.onFailure { e ->
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun loadAll(securityLevel: Int): List<PersistedKeyData> {
+        if (!PERSISTENCE_DIR.exists()) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("No persistent_keys directory, nothing to load")
+            return emptyList()
+        }
+        val files = PERSISTENCE_DIR.listFiles { _, name -> name.endsWith(".bin") }
+        if (files == null) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("Cannot read persistent_keys directory")
+            return emptyList()
+        }
+        if (files.isEmpty()) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("No persisted key files found")
+            return emptyList()
+        }
+        SystemLogger.info("Found ${files.size} persisted key files to process")
+
+        val result = mutableListOf<PersistedKeyData>()
+
+        for (file in files) {
+            runCatching {
+                DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(file))).use { input ->
+                    val version = input.readInt()
+                    if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
+                        SystemLogger.warning(
+                            "Skipping ${file.name}: unknown format version $version"
+                        )
+                        return@runCatching
+                    }
+
+                    val storedSecLevel = input.readInt()
+                    val uid = input.readInt()
+                    val alias = input.readUTF()
+                    val nspace = input.readLong()
+                    val isAttestKey = input.readBoolean()
+                    val algo = input.readInt()
+                    val kSize = input.readInt()
+                    val curve = input.readInt()
+
+                    val purposeCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "purposeCount")
+                    val purposes = (0 until purposeCount).map { input.readInt() }
+
+                    val digestCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "digestCount")
+                    val digests = (0 until digestCount).map { input.readInt() }
+
+                    val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
+                    val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
+                    input.readFully(pkBytes)
+
+                    val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
+                    val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
+                        val certLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 65536, "certLen")
+                        val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
+                        input.readFully(certBytes)
+                        certBytes
+                    }
+
+                    if (storedSecLevel == securityLevel) {
+                        result.add(
+                            PersistedKeyData(
+                                uid = uid,
+                                alias = alias,
+                                nspace = nspace,
+                                securityLevel = storedSecLevel,
+                                isAttestationKey = isAttestKey,
+                                algorithm = algo,
+                                keySize = kSize,
+                                ecCurve = curve,
+                                purposes = purposes,
+                                digests = digests,
+                                privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
+                                certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
+                            )
+                        )
+                    }
+                }
+            }.onFailure { e ->
+                SystemLogger.warning("Skipping corrupted persisted key file: ${file.name}", e)
+            }
+        }
+
+        SystemLogger.info("Loaded ${result.size} persisted keys for security level $securityLevel")
+        return result
+    }
+
+    private fun requireBounds(value: Int, max: Int, name: String): Int {
+        require(value in 0..max) { "$name out of bounds: $value (max $max)" }
+        return value
+    }
+
+    private fun keyFileName(uid: Int, alias: String): String {
+        val digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
+            .digest("$uid:$alias".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
+        return digest.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) } + ".bin"
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/OperationInterceptor.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
+
+import android.os.IBinder
+import android.os.Parcel
+import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils
+
+/**
+ * Intercepts calls to an `IKeystoreOperation` service. This is used to log the data manipulation
+ * methods of a cryptographic operation.
+ */
+class OperationInterceptor(
+    private val original: IKeystoreOperation,
+    private val backdoor: IBinder,
+) : BinderInterceptor() {
+
+    override fun onPreTransact(
+        txId: Long,
+        target: IBinder,
+        code: Int,
+        flags: Int,
+        callingUid: Int,
+        callingPid: Int,
+        data: Parcel,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        val methodName = transactionNames[code] ?: "unknown code=$code"
+        logTransaction(txId, methodName, callingUid, callingPid, true)
+
+        if (code == FINISH_TRANSACTION || code == ABORT_TRANSACTION) {
+            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.removeOperationInterceptor(target, backdoor)
+        }
+
+        return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+    }
+
+    companion object {
+        private val UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION =
+            InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "updateAad")
+        private val UPDATE_TRANSACTION =
+            InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "update")
+        private val FINISH_TRANSACTION =
+            InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "finish")
+        private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
+            InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")
+
+        /** Only intercept finish/abort for cleanup. Other ops pass through without round-trip. */
+        val INTERCEPTED_CODES = intArrayOf(FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
+
+        private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+            IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class
+                .java
+                .declaredFields
+                .filter {
+                    it.isAccessible = true
+                    it.type == Int::class.java && it.name.startsWith("TRANSACTION_")
+                }
+                .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
+        }
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/SoftwareOperation.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Digest
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
+import android.os.RemoteException
+import android.os.ServiceSpecificException
+import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
+import android.system.keystore2.KeyParameters
+import java.security.KeyPair
+import java.security.Signature
+import java.security.SignatureException
+import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
+import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException
+import javax.crypto.Cipher
+import javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+internal object KeystoreErrorCode {
+    val INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28) }
+    val VERIFICATION_FAILED: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30) }
+    val UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -2) }
+    val INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -3) }
+    val INVALID_ARGUMENT: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38) }
+    val INVALID_TAG: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -40) }
+    val INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21) }
+    val INCOMPATIBLE_KEY: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31) }
+    val INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18) }
+    val KEY_EXPIRED: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -25) }
+    val KEY_NOT_YET_VALID: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -24) }
+    val CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55) }
+    val UNKNOWN_ERROR: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000) }
+    val SYSTEM_ERROR: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "SYSTEM_ERROR", 4, keystore = true) }
+    val TOO_MUCH_DATA: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21, keystore = true) }
+    val PERMISSION_DENIED: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "PERMISSION_DENIED", 6, keystore = true) }
+    val KEY_NOT_FOUND: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "KEY_NOT_FOUND", 7, keystore = true) }
+
+    private fun resolve(enumName: String, field: String, fallback: Int, keystore: Boolean = false): Int {
+        val pkg = if (keystore) "android.system.keystore2" else "android.hardware.security.keymint"
+        return runCatching { Class.forName("$pkg.$enumName").getField(field).getInt(null) }
+            .getOrDefault(fallback)
+    }
+}
+
+// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
+private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
+    fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?)
+
+    fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
+
+    fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
+
+    fun abort()
+
+    /** Returns parameters from the begin phase (e.g. GCM nonce), or null if none. */
+    fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? = null
+}
+
+// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
+private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
+    fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
+        val digest =
+            when (params.digest.firstOrNull()) {
+                Digest.SHA_2_256 -> "SHA256"
+                Digest.SHA_2_384 -> "SHA384"
+                Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
+                else -> "NONE"
+            }
+        val keyAlgo =
+            when (params.algorithm) {
+                Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
+                Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
+                else ->
+                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                        KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
+                        "Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
+                    )
+            }
+        return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
+    }
+
+    fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
+        val keyAlgo =
+            when (params.algorithm) {
+                Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
+                Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
+                else ->
+                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                        KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
+                        "Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
+                    )
+            }
+        val blockMode =
+            when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) {
+                BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB"
+                BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC"
+                BlockMode.CTR -> "CTR"
+                BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM"
+                else -> "ECB"
+            }
+        val padding =
+            when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) {
+                PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
+                PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
+                PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
+                PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
+                else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
+            }
+        return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
+    }
+}
+
+// Concrete implementation for Signing.
+private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
+    private val signature: Signature =
+        Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
+            initSign(keyPair.private)
+        }
+
+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+    }
+
+    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        if (data != null) signature.update(data)
+        return null
+    }
+
+    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray {
+        if (data != null) update(data)
+        return this.signature.sign()
+    }
+
+    override fun abort() {}
+}
+
+// Concrete implementation for Verification.
+private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
+    private val signature: Signature =
+        Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
+            initVerify(keyPair.public)
+        }
+
+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+    }
+
+    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        if (data != null) signature.update(data)
+        return null
+    }
+
+    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        if (data != null) update(data)
+        if (signature == null)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+                "Signature to verify is null",
+            )
+        if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+                "Signature/MAC verification failed",
+            )
+        }
+        return null
+    }
+
+    override fun abort() {}
+}
+
+// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
+private class CipherPrimitive(
+    cryptoKey: java.security.Key,
+    params: KeyMintAttestation,
+    private val opMode: Int,
+) : CryptoPrimitive {
+    private val cipher: Cipher =
+        Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
+            init(opMode, cryptoKey)
+        }
+    private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
+
+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+        if (data != null) cipher.updateAAD(data)
+    }
+
+    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
+        if (data != null) cipher.update(data) else null
+
+    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
+        if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()
+
+    override fun abort() {}
+
+    /** Returns the cipher IV as a NONCE parameter for GCM operations. */
+    override fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? {
+        val iv = cipher.iv ?: return null
+        return arrayOf(
+            KeyParameter().apply {
+                tag = Tag.NONCE
+                value = KeyParameterValue.blob(iv)
+            }
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+// Concrete implementation for ECDH Key Agreement.
+private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
+    private val agreement: javax.crypto.KeyAgreement =
+        javax.crypto.KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH").apply { init(keyPair.private) }
+
+    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
+    }
+
+    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = null
+
+    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        if (data == null)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+                "Peer public key required for key agreement",
+            )
+        val peerKey =
+            java.security.KeyFactory.getInstance("EC")
+                .generatePublic(java.security.spec.X509EncodedKeySpec(data))
+        agreement.doPhase(peerKey, true)
+        return agreement.generateSecret()
+    }
+
+    override fun abort() {}
+}
+
+/**
+ * A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
+ * delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
+ *
+ * Tracks operation lifecycle: once [finish] or [abort] is called, subsequent calls throw
+ * [ServiceSpecificException] with [KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE].
+ */
+class SoftwareOperation(
+    private val txId: Long,
+    keyPair: KeyPair?,
+    secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
+    params: KeyMintAttestation,
+    private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L,
+    var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null,
+) {
+    private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
+
+    @Volatile var isFinalized = false
+        private set
+
+    init {
+        val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
+        val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
+        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
+
+        primitive =
+            when (purpose) {
+                KeyPurpose.SIGN -> Signer(keyPair!!, params)
+                KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> Verifier(keyPair!!, params)
+                KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> {
+                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair!!.public
+                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
+                }
+                KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> {
+                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair!!.private
+                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
+                }
+                KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair!!)
+                else ->
+                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                        KeystoreErrorCode.UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
+                        "Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
+                    )
+            }
+    }
+
+    /** Parameters produced during begin (e.g. GCM nonce), to populate CreateOperationResponse. */
+    val beginParameters: KeyParameters?
+        get() {
+            val params = primitive.getBeginParameters() ?: return null
+            if (params.isEmpty()) return null
+            return KeyParameters().apply { keyParameter = params }
+        }
+
+    private fun checkActive() {
+        if (isFinalized)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE,
+                "Operation already finalized.",
+            )
+    }
+
+    fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+        checkActive()
+        try {
+            primitive.updateAad(data)
+        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
+            isFinalized = true
+            throw e
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            isFinalized = true
+            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to updateAad.", e)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        checkActive()
+        try {
+            return primitive.update(data)
+        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
+            isFinalized = true
+            throw e
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            isFinalized = true
+            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
+            throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        checkActive()
+        val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
+        try {
+            val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
+            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
+            if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
+                val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
+                val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
+                if (delayMs > 0) LockSupport.parkNanos(delayMs * 1_000_000)
+            }
+            onFinishCallback?.invoke()
+            return result
+        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
+            throw e
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
+            throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
+        } finally {
+            isFinalized = true
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
+        is ServiceSpecificException -> e
+        is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED, e.message)
+        is BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT, e.message)
+        is IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, e.message)
+        is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INCOMPATIBLE_KEY, e.message)
+        else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.UNKNOWN_ERROR, e.message)
+    }
+
+    fun abort() {
+        checkActive()
+        isFinalized = true
+        primitive.abort()
+        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
+    }
+}
+
+/** Binder interface for [SoftwareOperation]. Synchronized and input-length validated. */
+class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
+    IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
+
+    private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
+        if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA)
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.TOO_MUCH_DATA)
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
+        synchronized(this) {
+            checkInputLength(aadInput)
+            operation.updateAad(aadInput)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        synchronized(this) {
+            checkInputLength(input)
+            return operation.update(input)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        synchronized(this) {
+            checkInputLength(input)
+            checkInputLength(signature)
+            return operation.finish(input, signature)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
+    override fun abort() {
+        synchronized(this) { operation.abort() }
+    }
+
+    companion object {
+        private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/logging/KeyMintParameterLogger.kt

@@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
 
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Digest
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.EcCurve
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
 import java.math.BigInteger
 import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
 import java.util.Date
@@ -34,7 +29,39 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
             .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
     }
 
-    private val purposeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+    val blockModeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        BlockMode::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
+    }
+
+    val hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        HardwareAuthenticatorType::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
+    }
+
+    val keyOriginNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        KeyOrigin::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
+    }
+
+    val paddingNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        PaddingMode::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
+    }
+
+    val purposeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
         KeyPurpose::class
             .java
             .fields
@@ -69,21 +96,34 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
         val formattedValue: String =
             when (param.tag) {
                 Tag.ALGORITHM -> algorithmNames[value.algorithm]
-                Tag.EC_CURVE -> ecCurveNames[value.ecCurve]
+                Tag.BLOCK_MODE -> blockModeNames[value.blockMode]
-                Tag.PURPOSE -> purposeNames[value.keyPurpose]
                 Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
+                Tag.EC_CURVE -> ecCurveNames[value.ecCurve]
+                Tag.ORIGIN -> keyOriginNames[value.origin]
+                Tag.PADDING -> paddingNames[value.paddingMode]
+                Tag.PURPOSE -> purposeNames[value.keyPurpose]
+                Tag.USER_AUTH_TYPE ->
+                    hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames[value.hardwareAuthenticatorType]
                 Tag.AUTH_TIMEOUT,
+                Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
                 Tag.KEY_SIZE,
-                Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH -> value.integer.toString()
+                Tag.MAC_LENGTH,
+                Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+                Tag.OS_VERSION,
+                Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL,
+                Tag.USER_ID,
+                Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> value.integer.toString()
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_SERIAL -> BigInteger(value.blob).toString()
                 Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME,
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER,
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE,
+                Tag.CREATION_DATETIME,
                 Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
                 Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME -> Date(value.dateTime).toString()
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT -> X500Name(X500Principal(value.blob).name).toString()
+                Tag.USER_SECURE_ID,
                 Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT -> value.longInteger.toString()
-                Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> "true"
+                Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> value.boolValue.toString()
                 Tag.ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
                 Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND,
                 Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE,

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/logging/SystemLogger.kt

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
 
 import android.util.Log
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.BuildConfig
 
 /**
  * A centralized logging utility for the TEESimulator application. This object provides a consistent
@@ -10,12 +11,15 @@ object SystemLogger {
     // The tag used for all log messages from this application.
     private const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
 
+    private val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
+
     /**
      * Logs a debug message. Use this for fine-grained information that is useful for debugging.
      *
      * @param message The message to log.
      */
     fun debug(message: String) {
+        if (!isDebugBuild) return
         Log.d(TAG, message)
     }
 
@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ object SystemLogger {
      * @param message The message to log.
      */
     fun verbose(message: String) {
+        if (!isDebugBuild) return
         Log.v(TAG, message)
     }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/CertificateGenerator.kt

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki
 
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
 import android.os.Build
 import android.util.Pair
 import java.math.BigInteger
 import java.security.KeyPair
 import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
-import java.security.Security
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
-import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
 import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
 import java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
 import java.util.Date
@@ -21,6 +20,7 @@ import org.bouncycastle.cert.jcajce.JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder
 import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
 import org.bouncycastle.operator.jcajce.JcaContentSignerBuilder
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationBuilder
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationConstants
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier
@@ -35,13 +35,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
  */
 object CertificateGenerator {
 
-    init {
+    // RFC 5280 GeneralizedTime maximum: 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (millis since epoch).
-        // Android ships with a stripped-down Bouncy Castle provider under the name "BC".
+    private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L
-        // We must remove the system provider first to ensure the full Bouncy Castle library
-        // (packaged with the app) is used.
-        Security.removeProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
-        Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider())
-    }
 
     /**
      * Generates a software-based cryptographic key pair.
@@ -56,7 +51,10 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
                         Algorithm.EC -> "EC" to ECGenParameterSpec(params.ecCurveName)
                         Algorithm.RSA ->
                             "RSA" to
-                                RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(params.keySize, params.rsaPublicExponent)
+                                RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(
+                                    params.keySize,
+                                    params.rsaPublicExponent ?: RSAKeyGenParameterSpec.F4,
+                                )
                         else ->
                             throw IllegalArgumentException(
                                 "Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
@@ -72,36 +70,32 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
     }
 
     /**
-     * Generates a new key pair and a corresponding certificate chain containing a simulated
+     * Generates a certificate chain for a given key pair. This is the primary function for creating
-     * attestation.
+     * attested certificates.
      *
      * @param uid The UID of the application requesting the key.
-     * @param alias The alias for the new key.
+     * @param subjectKeyPair The key pair for which the certificate will be generated.
      * @param attestKeyAlias Optional alias of a key to use for attestation signing.
      * @param params The parameters for the new key and its attestation.
      * @param securityLevel The security level to embed in the attestation.
-     * @return A [Pair] containing the new [KeyPair] and its certificate chain, or `null` on
+     * @return A [List] of [Certificate] forming the new chain, or `null` on failure.
-     *   failure.
      */
-    fun generateAttestedKeyPair(
+    fun generateCertificateChain(
         uid: Int,
-        alias: String,
+        subjectKeyPair: KeyPair,
         attestKeyAlias: String?,
         params: KeyMintAttestation,
         securityLevel: Int,
-    ): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
+    ): List<Certificate>? {
-        return runCatching {
+        val challenge = params.attestationChallenge
-                SystemLogger.info(
+        if (challenge != null && challenge.size > AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT)
-                    "Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)"
+            throw IllegalArgumentException(
-                )
+                "Attestation challenge exceeds length limit (${challenge.size} > ${AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT})"
-                val newKeyPair =
+            )
-                    generateSoftwareKeyPair(params)
-                        ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate underlying software key pair.")
 
+        return try {
                 val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
 
-                // Determine the signing key and issuer. If an attestKey is provided, use it.
-                // Otherwise, fall back to the root key from the keybox.
                 val (signingKey, issuer) =
                     if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
                         getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second }
@@ -110,31 +104,58 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
                         keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)
                     }
 
-                // Build the new leaf certificate with the simulated attestation.
                 val leafCert =
-                    buildCertificate(newKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, securityLevel)
+                    buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)
+
+                if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
+                    listOf(leafCert)
+                } else {
+                    listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
+                }
+            } catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
+                throw e
+            } catch (e: Exception) {
+                SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", e)
+                null
+            }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * A convenience function that combines key pair generation and certificate chain generation.
+     * Primarily used by the modern Keystore2 interceptor where generation is a single step.
+     */
+    fun generateAttestedKeyPair(
+        uid: Int,
+        alias: String,
+        attestKeyAlias: String?,
+        params: KeyMintAttestation,
+        securityLevel: Int,
+    ): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
+        return try {
+                SystemLogger.info(
+                    "Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)"
+                )
+                val newKeyPair =
+                    generateSoftwareKeyPair(params)
+                        ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate underlying software key pair.")
 
-                // If not self-attesting, the chain is just the leaf. Otherwise, append the keybox
-                // chain.
                 val chain =
-                    if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
+                    generateCertificateChain(uid, newKeyPair, attestKeyAlias, params, securityLevel)
-                        listOf(leafCert)
+                        ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate certificate chain for new key pair.")
-                    } else {
-                        listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
-                    }
 
                 SystemLogger.info(
                     "Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'."
                 )
                 Pair(newKeyPair, chain)
+            } catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
+                throw e
+            } catch (e: Exception) {
+                SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", e)
+                null
             }
-            .onFailure {
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", it)
-            }
-            .getOrNull()
     }
 
-    private fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) =
+    fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) =
         X509CertificateHolder(keybox.certificates[0].encoded).subject
 
     private fun getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid: Int, algorithm: Int): KeyBox {
@@ -146,7 +167,10 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
                 else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm ID: $algorithm")
             }
         return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
-            ?: throw Exception("Could not load keybox for UID $uid and algorithm $algorithmName")
+            ?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException(
+                -75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
+                "No attestation key for algorithm $algorithmName in $keyboxFile",
+            )
     }
 
     /** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */
@@ -171,41 +195,74 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
         }
     }
 
+    /** Maps KeyPurpose values to X.509 KeyUsage bits per KeyCreationResult.aidl spec */
+    private fun buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(purposes: List<Int>): Int {
+        var bits = 0
+        for (purpose in purposes) {
+            bits =
+                bits or
+                    when (purpose) {
+                        KeyPurpose.SIGN -> KeyUsage.digitalSignature
+                        KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeyUsage.dataEncipherment
+                        KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyEncipherment
+                        KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyAgreement
+                        KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY -> KeyUsage.keyCertSign
+                        else -> 0
+                    }
+        }
+        return bits
+    }
+
     /** Constructs a new X.509 certificate with a simulated attestation extension. */
     private fun buildCertificate(
         subjectKeyPair: KeyPair,
         signingKeyPair: KeyPair,
         issuer: X500Name,
         params: KeyMintAttestation,
+        uid: Int,
         securityLevel: Int,
     ): Certificate {
-        val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android KeyStore Key")
+        val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
-        val leafNotAfter =
+
-            (signingKeyPair.public as? X509Certificate)?.notAfter
+        // Default validity: epoch to 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (matches add_required_parameters).
-                ?: Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + 31536000000L)
+        val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
+        val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
 
         val builder =
             JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
                 issuer,
                 params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
-                params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(),
+                notBefore,
-                params.certificateNotAfter ?: leafNotAfter,
+                notAfter,
                 subject,
                 subjectKeyPair.public,
             )
 
-        // Add standard extensions.
+        // Add KeyUsage extension only if purposes map to valid bits
-        builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(KeyUsage.keyCertSign))
+        val keyUsageBits = buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(params.purpose)
+        if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
+            builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
+        }
         // Add our custom, simulated attestation extension.
-        builder.addExtension(AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, securityLevel))
+        builder.addExtension(
+            AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
+        )
 
+        // The signature algorithm must match the SIGNING key, not the subject key.
+        // An EC attestation key may sign an RSA subject key's certificate (or vice versa).
         val signerAlgorithm =
-            when (params.algorithm) {
+            when (signingKeyPair.private) {
-                Algorithm.EC -> "SHA256withECDSA"
+                is java.security.interfaces.ECKey -> "SHA256withECDSA"
-                Algorithm.RSA -> "SHA256withRSA"
+                is java.security.interfaces.RSAKey -> "SHA256withRSA"
-                else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}")
+                else ->
+                    throw IllegalArgumentException(
+                        "Unsupported signing key type: ${signingKeyPair.private.javaClass}"
+                    )
             }
-        val contentSigner = JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm).build(signingKeyPair.private)
+        val contentSigner =
+            JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
+                .setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
+                .build(signingKeyPair.private)
 
         return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
     }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/KeyBoxManager.kt

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki
 import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
 import java.io.File
 import java.io.StringReader
+import java.security.interfaces.ECPrivateKey
+import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
@@ -51,6 +53,9 @@ object KeyBoxManager {
         // If it's not in the cache, the `getOrPut` block is executed to parse and store it.
         val keyMap =
             keyStoreCache.getOrPut(keyStoreFileName) { parseKeyStoreFile(keyStoreFileName) }
+        SystemLogger.verbose(
+            "Fetching attestation key in $keyStoreFileName with $algorithm algorithm."
+        )
         return keyMap[algorithm]
     }
 
@@ -157,10 +162,10 @@ object KeyBoxManager {
                             // Use runCatching to ensure one malformed key doesn't stop the whole
                             // process.
                             runCatching {
-                                    val algorithm = currentAlgorithm
+                                    val xmlAlgorithm = currentAlgorithm
                                     val keyPem = currentPrivateKeyPem
                                     if (
-                                        algorithm != null &&
+                                        xmlAlgorithm != null &&
                                             keyPem != null &&
                                             currentCertificatePems.isNotEmpty()
                                     ) {
@@ -176,21 +181,42 @@ object KeyBoxManager {
                                                     .data
                                             }
 
-                                        // Normalize the algorithm name for consistent lookups.
+                                        // Derive the TRUE algorithm from the key object itself.
-                                        val normalizedAlgorithm =
+                                        // This is our source of truth.
-                                            when (algorithm.lowercase()) {
+                                        val derivedAlgorithm =
-                                                "ecdsa" -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC
+                                            when (keyPair.private) {
-                                                "rsa" -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA
+                                                is RSAPrivateKey -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA
-                                                else -> algorithm
+                                                is ECPrivateKey -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC
+                                                else ->
+                                                    throw IllegalArgumentException(
+                                                        "Unsupported key type found: ${keyPair.private.javaClass.name}"
+                                                    )
                                             }
 
-                                        if (foundKeys.containsKey(normalizedAlgorithm)) {
+                                        // Normalize the algorithm from the XML tag to compare it
+                                        // fairly with the derived algorithm.
+                                        val normalizedXmlAlgorithm =
+                                            when {
+                                                xmlAlgorithm.contains("RSA", ignoreCase = true) ==
+                                                    true -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA
+                                                xmlAlgorithm.contains("EC", ignoreCase = true) ==
+                                                    true -> KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC
+                                                else -> xmlAlgorithm
+                                            }
+
+                                        // Warn the user if the XML tag was misleading.
+                                        if (normalizedXmlAlgorithm != derivedAlgorithm) {
                                             SystemLogger.warning(
-                                                "Duplicate key found for algorithm '$normalizedAlgorithm'. The later one in the file will be used."
+                                                "Key algorithm mismatch in XML file. Tag said '$xmlAlgorithm' but key is actually '$derivedAlgorithm'. Using the correct derived algorithm."
                                             )
                                         }
-                                        foundKeys[normalizedAlgorithm] =
+
-                                            KeyBox(keyPair, certificates)
+                                        if (foundKeys.containsKey(derivedAlgorithm)) {
+                                            SystemLogger.warning(
+                                                "Duplicate key found for algorithm '$derivedAlgorithm'. The later one in the file will be used."
+                                            )
+                                        }
+                                        foundKeys[derivedAlgorithm] = KeyBox(keyPair, certificates)
                                     }
                                 }
                                 .onFailure {

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/NativeCertGen.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki
+
+import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
+import java.nio.ByteBuffer
+import java.nio.ByteOrder
+import java.security.KeyFactory
+import java.security.KeyPair
+import java.security.cert.Certificate
+import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
+import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+data class CertGenConfig(
+    val algorithm: Int,
+    val keySize: Int,
+    val ecCurve: Int,
+    val rsaPublicExponent: Long,
+    val attestationChallenge: ByteArray?,
+    val purposes: IntArray,
+    val digests: IntArray,
+    val certSerial: ByteArray?,
+    val certSubject: ByteArray?,
+    val certNotBefore: Long,
+    val certNotAfter: Long,
+    val keyboxPrivateKey: ByteArray,
+    val keyboxCertChain: ByteArray,
+    val securityLevel: Int,
+    val attestVersion: Int,
+    val keymasterVersion: Int,
+    val osVersion: Int,
+    val osPatchLevel: Int,
+    val vendorPatchLevel: Int,
+    val bootPatchLevel: Int,
+    val bootKey: ByteArray,
+    val bootHash: ByteArray,
+    val creationDatetime: Long,
+    val attestationApplicationId: ByteArray,
+    val moduleHash: ByteArray?,
+    val idBrand: ByteArray?,
+    val idDevice: ByteArray?,
+    val idProduct: ByteArray?,
+    val idSerial: ByteArray?,
+    val idImei: ByteArray?,
+    val idMeid: ByteArray?,
+    val idManufacturer: ByteArray?,
+    val idModel: ByteArray?,
+    val idSecondImei: ByteArray?,
+    val activeDatetime: Long = -1L,
+    val originationExpireDatetime: Long = -1L,
+    val usageExpireDatetime: Long = -1L,
+    val usageCountLimit: Int = -1,
+    val callerNonce: Boolean = false,
+    val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean = false,
+    val noAuthRequired: Boolean = true,
+)
+
+object NativeCertGen {
+
+    private const val LOG_DIR = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs"
+
+    @Volatile
+    var isAvailable: Boolean = false
+        private set
+
+    fun initialize(libraryPath: String) {
+        try {
+            System.load(libraryPath)
+            initLogging(false, LOG_DIR)
+            isAvailable = true
+            SystemLogger.info("NativeCertGen: loaded libcertgen.so successfully")
+        } catch (e: UnsatisfiedLinkError) {
+            SystemLogger.error("NativeCertGen: failed to load libcertgen.so, falling back to BouncyCastle", e)
+        }
+    }
+
+    external fun generateAttestedKeyPair(config: CertGenConfig): ByteArray?
+
+    private external fun initLogging(verbose: Boolean, logDir: String): Boolean
+
+    private external fun dumpLogs(): String?
+
+    fun dump(): String? = if (isAvailable) dumpLogs() else null
+
+    fun parseNativeResult(bytes: ByteArray): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>> {
+        val buf = ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes).order(ByteOrder.BIG_ENDIAN)
+
+        val pkLen = buf.getInt()
+        if (pkLen < 0 || pkLen > buf.remaining()) {
+            throw IllegalStateException("Invalid private key length: $pkLen")
+        }
+        val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
+        buf.get(pkBytes)
+
+        val numCerts = buf.getInt()
+        if (numCerts < 0 || numCerts > buf.remaining()) {
+            throw IllegalStateException("Invalid cert count: $numCerts")
+        }
+        val certs = mutableListOf<Certificate>()
+        val certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509")
+        repeat(numCerts) {
+            val certLen = buf.getInt()
+            if (certLen < 0 || certLen > buf.remaining()) {
+                throw IllegalStateException("Invalid cert length: $certLen")
+            }
+            val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
+            buf.get(certBytes)
+            certs.add(certFactory.generateCertificate(ByteArrayInputStream(certBytes)))
+        }
+
+        if (certs.isEmpty()) {
+            throw IllegalStateException("No certificates in native result")
+        }
+
+        val algorithmName = when (certs[0].publicKey.algorithm) {
+            "EC", "ECDSA" -> "EC"
+            "RSA" -> "RSA"
+            else -> certs[0].publicKey.algorithm
+        }
+        val keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance(algorithmName)
+        val privateKey = keyFactory.generatePrivate(PKCS8EncodedKeySpec(pkBytes))
+        val publicKey = certs[0].publicKey
+        return Pair(KeyPair(publicKey, privateKey), certs)
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/AndroidDeviceUtils.kt

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
 
-import android.content.pm.PackageManager
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.SystemProperties
+import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
+import java.io.File
+import java.io.FileInputStream
 import java.security.MessageDigest
+import java.time.LocalDate
 import java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom
+import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1EncodableVector
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence
@@ -18,117 +23,234 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
  */
 object AndroidDeviceUtils {
 
-    /** A randomly generated boot key, used as a fallback for attestation. */
+    /**
-    val bootKey: ByteArray by lazy { generateRandomBytes(32) }
+     * Internal constant to signify that a patch level should not be included in the attestation.
+     */
+    internal const val DO_NOT_REPORT = -1
+
+    // --- Boot Key and Verified Boot Hash ---
 
     /**
-     * Initializes the verified boot hash (`ro.boot.vbmeta.digest`). It attempts to read from system
+     * Lazily initializes and retrieves the verified boot key digest. The value is sourced in the
-     * properties first, then from a real TEE attestation, and finally falls back to a random value
+     * following order:
-     * if neither is available.
+     * 1. From the `ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest` system property.
+     * 2. From a cached TEE attestation record.
+     * 3. As a randomly generated 32-byte value (fallback).
      */
-    fun setupBootHash() {
+    val bootKey: ByteArray by lazy {
-        getBootHashFromProperty()?.also {
+        initializeBootProperty(
-            SystemLogger.debug("Using boot hash from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
+            propertyName = "ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest",
-        }
+            attestationValueProvider = {
-            ?: getBootHashFromAttestation()?.also {
+                DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.verifiedBootKey
-                SystemLogger.debug("Using boot hash from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
+            },
-                setBootHashProperty(it)
+            expectedSize = 32,
-            }
+        )
-            ?: generateRandomBytes(32).also {
-                SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated boot hash: ${it.toHex()}")
-                setBootHashProperty(it)
-            }
     }
 
     /**
-     * Retrieves the verified boot meta digest from system properties.
+     * Lazily initializes and retrieves the verified boot hash (vbmeta digest). The value is sourced
+     * in the following order:
+     * 1. From the `ro.boot.vbmeta.digest` system property.
+     * 2. From a cached TEE attestation record.
+     * 3. As a randomly generated 32-byte value (fallback).
+     */
+    val bootHash: ByteArray by lazy {
+        initializeBootProperty(
+            propertyName = "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest",
+            attestationValueProvider = {
+                DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.verifiedBootHash
+            },
+            expectedSize = 32,
+        )
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Public function to explicitly trigger the initialization of the boot key and hash. Accessing
+     * these properties here ensures they are set up before they might be needed elsewhere.
+     */
+    fun setupBootKeyAndHash() {
+        SystemLogger.debug("Triggering initialization of boot key and hash...")
+        // Accessing the properties will trigger their `lazy` initialization logic.
+        bootKey
+        bootHash
+        SystemLogger.debug("Boot key and hash initialization complete.")
+    }
+
+    private fun initializeBootProperty(
+        propertyName: String,
+        attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?,
+        expectedSize: Int,
+    ): ByteArray {
+        getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
+            SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
+            persistToFile(propertyName, it)
+            return it
+        }
+
+        try {
+            attestationValueProvider()?.let {
+                SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
+                setProperty(propertyName, it)
+                persistToFile(propertyName, it)
+                return it
+            }
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to get $propertyName from attestation.", e)
+        }
+
+        readFromFile(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
+            SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from persistent file: ${it.toHex()}")
+            setProperty(propertyName, it)
+            return it
+        }
+
+        return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also {
+            SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}")
+            setProperty(propertyName, it)
+            persistToFile(propertyName, it)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Retrieves a system property and validates its format.
      *
-     * @return The boot hash as a ByteArray, or null if not found or invalid.
+     * @param name The name of the system property.
+     * @param expectedSize The expected byte length of the property (e.g., 32 for a 64-char hex
+     *   string).
+     * @return The property value as a ByteArray, or null if not found or invalid.
      */
     @OptIn(ExperimentalStdlibApi::class)
-    fun getBootHashFromProperty(): ByteArray? {
+    private fun getProperty(name: String, expectedSize: Int): ByteArray? {
-        val digest = SystemProperties.get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", null)
+        val value = SystemProperties.get(name, null)
-        if (digest.isNullOrBlank()) {
+        if (value.isNullOrBlank()) {
             return null
         }
-        // A valid digest is 64 hex characters (32 bytes).
+        // A valid digest is (2 * size) hex characters.
-        return if (digest.length == 64) digest.hexToByteArray() else null
+        return if (value.length == expectedSize * 2) value.hexToByteArray() else null
     }
 
     /**
-     * Retrieves the verified boot hash from a cached TEE attestation record.
+     * Sets a system property using the `resetprop` command.
      *
-     * @return The verified boot hash, or null if not available.
+     * @param name The name of the property to set.
+     * @param bytes The value to set, which will be converted to a hex string.
      */
-    private fun getBootHashFromAttestation(): ByteArray? {
+    private fun setProperty(name: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
-        return try {
-            DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.verifiedBootHash
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to get boot hash from attestation.", e)
-            null
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Sets the `ro.boot.vbmeta.digest` system property using the `resetprop` command.
-     *
-     * @param bytes The 32-byte digest to set.
-     */
-    private fun setBootHashProperty(bytes: ByteArray) {
         val hex = bytes.toHex()
         try {
-            SystemLogger.debug("Setting system property 'ro.boot.vbmeta.digest' to: $hex")
+            SystemLogger.debug("Setting system property '$name' to: $hex")
-
+            val command = arrayOf("resetprop", name, hex)
-            // Construct the command to be executed
-            val command = arrayOf("resetprop", "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", hex)
-
-            // Execute the command
             val process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command)
-
-            // Wait for the process to complete and check the exit code for errors
             val exitCode = process.waitFor()
 
             if (exitCode != 0) {
                 val errorOutput = process.errorStream.bufferedReader().readText()
                 SystemLogger.error(
-                    "resetprop command failed with exit code $exitCode: $errorOutput"
+                    "resetprop for '$name' failed with exit code $exitCode: $errorOutput"
                 )
             }
         } catch (e: Exception) {
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to set vbmeta digest property by executing resetprop.", e)
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to set '$name' property via resetprop.", e)
         }
     }
 
-    /** Generates a cryptographically random byte array of a specified length. */
     private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray =
         ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) }
 
+    private val PERSIST_DIR = File("/data/adb/tricky_store")
+
+    private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File = when (propertyName) {
+        "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
+        "ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
+        else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
+    }
+
+    private fun persistToFile(propertyName: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
+        try {
+            fileForProperty(propertyName).writeBytes(bytes)
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist $propertyName to file.", e)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun readFromFile(propertyName: String, expectedSize: Int): ByteArray? {
+        return try {
+            val file = fileForProperty(propertyName)
+            if (!file.exists()) return null
+            val bytes = file.readBytes()
+            if (bytes.size == expectedSize) bytes else null
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to read $propertyName from file.", e)
+            null
+        }
+    }
+
     // --- Patch Level Properties ---
 
-    val patchLevel: Int
+    fun getPatchLevel(uid: Int): Int {
-        get() =
+        val custom = getCustomPatchLevelFor(uid, "system", isLong = false)
-            getCustomPatchLevelFor("system", isLong = false)
+        return custom ?: getRealDevicePatchLevelInt("system", isLong = false)
-                ?: Build.VERSION.SECURITY_PATCH.toPatchLevelInt(isLong = false)
+    }
 
-    val vendorPatchLevelLong: Int
+    fun getVendorPatchLevelLong(uid: Int): Int {
-        get() =
+        val custom = getCustomPatchLevelFor(uid, "vendor", isLong = true)
-            getCustomPatchLevelFor("vendor", isLong = true)
+        return custom ?: getRealDevicePatchLevelInt("vendor", isLong = true)
-                ?: Build.VERSION.SECURITY_PATCH.toPatchLevelInt(isLong = true)
+    }
 
-    val bootPatchLevelLong: Int
+    fun getBootPatchLevelLong(uid: Int): Int {
-        get() =
+        val custom = getCustomPatchLevelFor(uid, "boot", isLong = true)
-            getCustomPatchLevelFor("boot", isLong = true)
+        return custom ?: getRealDevicePatchLevelInt("boot", isLong = true)
-                ?: Build.VERSION.SECURITY_PATCH.toPatchLevelInt(isLong = true)
+    }
 
     /**
-     * Retrieves a custom patch level from the configuration if available.
+     * Retrieves the definitive device patch level integer for a given component. This function
+     * encapsulates the entire fallback chain and guarantees a non-null return.
      *
+     * Fallback Priority:
+     * 1. Cached TEE attestation data.
+     * 2. Specific system property (e.g., ro.vendor.build.security_patch).
+     * 3. Default system patch level from Build.VERSION.SECURITY_PATCH.
+     *
+     * @param component The component ("system", "vendor", "boot").
+     * @param isLong Whether the final integer should be in YYYYMMDD format.
+     * @return The patch level as a guaranteed non-null Integer.
+     */
+    private fun getRealDevicePatchLevelInt(component: String, isLong: Boolean): Int {
+        // Get value from cached TEE attestation data
+        DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.let { data ->
+            val value =
+                when (component) {
+                    "system" -> data.osPatchLevel
+                    "vendor" -> data.vendorPatchLevel
+                    "boot" -> data.bootPatchLevel
+                    else -> null
+                }
+            if (value != null) return value
+        }
+
+        // We only check the specific vendor property, as the boot one is non-existent.
+        if (component == "vendor") {
+            val propValue = SystemProperties.get("ro.vendor.build.security_patch", "")
+            if (!propValue.isNullOrBlank()) {
+                parsePatchLevelValue(propValue, isLong)?.let { parsedValue ->
+                    return parsedValue
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        return Build.VERSION.SECURITY_PATCH.toPatchLevelInt(isLong)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Retrieves a custom patch level from the configuration if available for a specific UID.
+     *
+     * @param uid The UID of the calling application.
      * @param component The component to get the patch level for ("system", "vendor", "boot").
      * @param isLong Whether to return the patch level in `YYYYMMDD` or `YYYYMM` format.
      * @return The custom patch level, or null if not configured.
      */
-    private fun getCustomPatchLevelFor(component: String, isLong: Boolean): Int? {
+    private fun getCustomPatchLevelFor(uid: Int, component: String, isLong: Boolean): Int? {
-        val config = ConfigurationManager.customPatchLevelOverride ?: return null
+        val config = ConfigurationManager.getPatchLevelForUid(uid) ?: return null
         val value =
             when (component) {
                 "system" -> config.system ?: config.all
@@ -137,11 +259,47 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                 else -> config.all
             } ?: return null
 
-        // "prop" or "no" indicates falling back to the system default.
+        // First, resolve dynamic keywords and templates into a concrete date string.
-        if (value.equals("no", ignoreCase = true) || value.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true)) {
+        val resolvedValue = resolveDateKeywords(value)
-            return null
+
+        return when {
+            resolvedValue.equals("device_default", ignoreCase = true) -> null
+            resolvedValue.equals("no", ignoreCase = true) -> DO_NOT_REPORT
+            resolvedValue.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true) ->
+                parsePatchLevelValue(SystemProperties.get("ro.build.version.security_patch", ""), isLong)
+            else -> parsePatchLevelValue(resolvedValue, isLong)
         }
-        return parsePatchLevelValue(value, isLong)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Resolves special date keywords and templates into a concrete "YYYY-MM-DD" date string.
+     *
+     * @param value The configuration value string (e.g., "today", "YYYY-MM-01").
+     * @return A concrete date string, or the original value if it's not a dynamic date keyword.
+     */
+    private fun resolveDateKeywords(value: String): String {
+        // Handle the "today" keyword.
+        if (value.equals("today", ignoreCase = true)) {
+            return LocalDate.now().toString() // Returns "YYYY-MM-DD" format
+        }
+
+        // Handle date templates like "YYYY-MM-01" or "2025-MM-DD".
+        if (
+            value.contains("YYYY", ignoreCase = true) ||
+                value.contains("MM", ignoreCase = true) ||
+                value.contains("DD", ignoreCase = true)
+        ) {
+
+            val now = LocalDate.now()
+            // Chain replacements for YYYY, MM, and DD placeholders.
+            return value
+                .replace("YYYY", now.year.toString(), ignoreCase = true)
+                .replace("MM", String.format("%02d", now.monthValue), ignoreCase = true)
+                .replace("DD", String.format("%02d", now.dayOfMonth), ignoreCase = true)
+        }
+
+        // If it's not a dynamic keyword or template, return the original value.
+        return value
     }
 
     /** Parses a patch level string (e.g., "2025-11-01") into an integer format. */
@@ -205,54 +363,236 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
             Build.VERSION_CODES.BAKLAVA to 400, // KeyMint 4.0
         )
 
-    val attestVersion: Int
+    /**
-        get() =
+     * Retrieves the attestation version based on security level and OS version. StrongBox (level 2)
-            DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
+     * requires version 300.
-                ?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
+     *
-                ?: 400 // Default to a recent version
+     * @param securityLevel The security level of the attestation (1 for TEE, 2 for StrongBox).
+     * @return The appropriate attestation version number.
+     */
+    fun getAttestVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
+        // StrongBox security level requires an attestation version of at least 300.
+        if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) {
+            return 300
+        }
+        return DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
+            ?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
+            ?: 400 // Default to a recent version
+    }
 
-    val keymasterVersion: Int
+    /**
-        get() =
+     * Retrieves the Keymaster/KeyMint version based on the attestation version.
-            DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.keymasterVersion
+     *
-                ?: if (attestVersion >= 100) attestVersion
+     * @param securityLevel The security level, used to determine the correct attestation version.
-                else 41 // Keymaster 4.1 for older versions
+     * @return The appropriate Keymaster or KeyMint version number.
+     */
+    fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
+        val attestVersion = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
+        return if (attestVersion >= 100) attestVersion else 41 // Keymaster 4.1 for older versions
+    }
 
     // --- APEX and Module Hash Properties ---
 
-    private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/android-latest-release:system/apex/proto/apex_manifest.proto
-        runCatching {
+    // --- Minimal Protobuf Parser for ApexManifest ---
-                val pm = ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
+    // Field 1: name (string)
-                val packages =
+    // Field 2: version (int64)
-                    if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
+    private class MinimalApexManifestParser(private val data: ByteArray) {
-                        pm?.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.MATCH_APEX.toLong(), 0)
+        var pos = 0
-                    } else {
+
-                        @Suppress("DEPRECATION")
+        fun parse(): Pair<String, Long>? {
-                        pm?.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.MATCH_APEX, 0)
+            var name: String? = null
+            var version: Long? = null
+
+            while (pos < data.size) {
+                val tag = readVarint()
+                val fieldNum = tag ushr 3
+                val wireType = (tag and 0x07).toInt()
+
+                when (fieldNum) {
+                    1L -> { // name
+                        val length = readVarint().toInt()
+                        if (pos + length > data.size) return null
+                        name = String(data, pos, length, Charsets.UTF_8)
+                        pos += length
                     }
-                packages
+                    2L -> { // version
-                    ?.list
+                        version = readVarint()
-                    .orEmpty()
+                    }
-                    .map { it.packageName to it.longVersionCode }
+                    else -> skipField(wireType)
-                    .sortedBy { it.first }
+                }
             }
-            .getOrElse {
+
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to get APEX package information.", it)
+            return if (name != null && version != null) {
-                emptyList()
+                name to version
+            } else {
+                null
             }
+        }
+
+        private fun readVarint(): Long {
+            var value = 0L
+            var shift = 0
+            while (pos < data.size) {
+                val b = data[pos++].toInt()
+                value = value or ((b and 0x7F).toLong() shl shift)
+                if ((b and 0x80) == 0) return value
+                shift += 7
+            }
+            return value
+        }
+
+        private fun skipField(wireType: Int) {
+            when (wireType) {
+                0 -> readVarint() // Varint
+                1 -> pos += 8 // 64-bit
+                2 -> { // Length-delimited
+                    val len = readVarint().toInt()
+                    pos += len
+                }
+                5 -> pos += 4 // 32-bit
+                else -> throw IllegalStateException("Unknown wire type $wireType")
+            }
+        }
     }
 
+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/apex/libs/libapexutil/apexutil.cpp
+    private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
+        val results = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
+        val apexRoot = File("/apex")
+
+        if (!apexRoot.exists() || !apexRoot.isDirectory) {
+            return@lazy emptyList()
+        }
+
+        // Logic from: GetActivePackages in apexutil.cpp
+        apexRoot.listFiles()?.forEach { file ->
+            if (!file.isDirectory) return@forEach
+            val name = file.name
+
+            // 1. Ignore "." (and implicitly "..")
+            if (name.startsWith(".")) return@forEach
+
+            // 2. Ignore directories containing '@' (active mounts usually don't have version in
+            // path)
+            if (name.contains("@")) return@forEach
+
+            // 3. Ignore "sharedlibs"
+            if (name == "sharedlibs") return@forEach
+
+            // 4. Parse apex_manifest.pb
+            val manifestFile = File(file, "apex_manifest.pb")
+            if (manifestFile.exists()) {
+                runCatching {
+                    val bytes = FileInputStream(manifestFile).use { it.readBytes() }
+                    val parser = MinimalApexManifestParser(bytes)
+                    parser.parse()?.let { (pkgName, version) -> results.add(pkgName to version) }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Ensure uniqueness (though filesystem scan usually prevents exact dupes,
+        // strictly speaking we want to behave like a Map keyed by package name)
+        results.distinctBy { it.first }
+    }
+
+    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
     val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy {
-        runCatching {
+        DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash
-                val encodables =
+            ?: runCatching {
-                    apexInfos.flatMap { (packageName, versionCode) ->
+                    // 1. Create a container to hold the sort key (name encoded) and the full data
-                        listOf(DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray()), ASN1Integer(versionCode))
+                    // (sequence encoded)
-                    }
+                    data class ModuleEntry(
-                val sequence = DERSequence(encodables.toTypedArray())
+                        val nameEncoded: ByteArray, // The sort key
-                MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(sequence.encoded)
+                        val fullEncoded: ByteArray, // The data to hash
+                    )
+
+                    val modules =
+                        apexInfos.map { (packageName, versionCode) ->
+                            // Create the components
+                            val nameOctet = DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
+                            val versionInt = ASN1Integer(versionCode)
+
+                            // Create the Sequence: SEQUENCE { packageName, version }
+                            val vec = ASN1EncodableVector()
+                            vec.add(nameOctet)
+                            vec.add(versionInt)
+                            val sequence = DERSequence(vec)
+
+                            // We store the encoded name separately because Rust sorts ONLY by this
+                            ModuleEntry(
+                                nameEncoded = nameOctet.encoded,
+                                fullEncoded = sequence.encoded,
+                            )
+                        }
+
+                    // 2. Sort manually based on the encoded Package Name (lexicographically)
+                    // This mimics the Rust 'impl DerOrd for ModuleInfo' which delegates to
+                    // 'self.name'
+                    val sortedModules =
+                        modules.sortedWith { m1, m2 ->
+                            compareByteArrays(m1.nameEncoded, m2.nameEncoded)
+                        }
+
+                    // 3. Concatenate the full sequences in the specific sorted order
+                    val payloadStream = ByteArrayOutputStream()
+                    sortedModules.forEach { payloadStream.write(it.fullEncoded) }
+                    val payload = payloadStream.toByteArray()
+
+                    // 4. Wrap manually in a DER SET tag (0x31)
+                    // We cannot use DERSet(vector) because it would re-sort incorrectly.
+                    val finalDerSet = encodeAsDerSet(payload)
+
+                    // 5. Compute SHA-256
+                    MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(finalDerSet)
+                }
+                .getOrElse {
+                    SystemLogger.error("Failed to compute module hash.", it)
+                    ByteArray(32)
+                }
+    }
+
+    /** Compares two byte arrays lexicographically (unsigned). */
+    private fun compareByteArrays(a: ByteArray, b: ByteArray): Int {
+        val length = minOf(a.size, b.size)
+        for (i in 0 until length) {
+            val byteA = a[i].toInt() and 0xFF
+            val byteB = b[i].toInt() and 0xFF
+            if (byteA != byteB) {
+                return byteA - byteB
             }
-            .getOrElse {
+        }
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to compute module hash.", it)
+        return a.size - b.size
-                ByteArray(32) // Return empty hash on failure
+    }
+
+    /** Manually wraps the payload in an ASN.1 SET (0x31) tag with correct length encoding. */
+    private fun encodeAsDerSet(payload: ByteArray): ByteArray {
+        val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
+        out.write(0x31) // ASN.1 Tag for SET
+        writeDerLength(out, payload.size)
+        out.write(payload)
+        return out.toByteArray()
+    }
+
+    /** Writes the ASN.1 length field to the stream. */
+    private fun writeDerLength(out: ByteArrayOutputStream, length: Int) {
+        if (length < 128) {
+            // Short form
+            out.write(length)
+        } else {
+            // Long form
+            var size = length
+            val bytes = ArrayList<Byte>()
+            while (size > 0) {
+                bytes.add((size and 0xFF).toByte())
+                size = size ushr 8
             }
+            // First byte: 0x80 | number of length bytes
+            out.write(0x80 or bytes.size)
+            // Write length bytes in big-endian (reverse of how we extracted them)
+            for (i in bytes.indices.reversed()) {
+                out.write(bytes[i].toInt())
+            }
+        }
     }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/Extensions.kt

@@ -6,7 +6,11 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
  *
  * @return A new string with each line individually trimmed.
  */
-fun String.trimLines(): String = this.trim().lines().joinToString("\n") { it.trim() }
+fun String.trimLines(): String =
+    this.trim()
+        .lines()
+        .filter { !it.trim().startsWith("<!--") }
+        .joinToString("\n") { it.trim() }
 
 /**
  * Converts a ByteArray to its hexadecimal string representation.

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/TeeLatencySimulator.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
+import java.security.SecureRandom
+import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
+import kotlin.math.abs
+import kotlin.math.exp
+import kotlin.math.ln
+import kotlin.math.max
+
+/**
+ * Simulates realistic TEE hardware latency for software key generation.
+ *
+ * The delay model is derived from 64+ timing measurements across QTEE (Qualcomm) and Trustonic
+ * (MediaTek) hardware. It combines four independent noise sources that model different physical
+ * latency origins in a real TrustZone-based TEE:
+ *
+ * 1. Base crypto processing (log-normal): hardware RNG + key derivation + cert signing
+ * 2. Binder/kernel transit (exponential): IPC scheduling, context switches
+ * 3. TrustZone scheduler jitter (Gaussian): world-switch non-determinism
+ * 4. Cold-start penalty (half-normal): first operation after idle is slower due to TEE
+ *    secure world re-initialization and TLB/cache warming
+ *
+ * Per-boot session bias models manufacturing variance between TEE hardware instances.
+ */
+object TeeLatencySimulator {
+
+    private val rng = SecureRandom()
+
+    private val sessionBiasMs: Double by lazy { rng.nextGaussian() * 5.0 }
+    private val coldPenaltyMs: Double by lazy { abs(rng.nextGaussian() * 12.0) }
+
+    @Volatile private var firstCall = true
+
+    fun simulateGenerateKeyDelay(algorithm: Int, elapsedNanos: Long) {
+        val elapsedMs = elapsedNanos / 1_000_000.0
+        val targetMs = sampleTotalDelay(algorithm)
+        val remainingMs = targetMs - elapsedMs
+
+        if (remainingMs > 1.0) {
+            LockSupport.parkNanos((remainingMs * 1_000_000).toLong())
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun sampleTotalDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
+        val base = sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm)
+        val transit = sampleExponential(2.5)
+        val jitter = (rng.nextGaussian() * 2.5).coerceIn(-8.0, 12.0)
+
+        var cold = 0.0
+        if (firstCall) {
+            firstCall = false
+            cold = coldPenaltyMs
+        }
+
+        return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Log-normal base delay. Parameters tuned to match observed hardware profiles:
+     * EC P-256 on QTEE averages ~65ms, RSA-2048 ~75ms, AES ~40ms.
+     * Sigma kept low (0.08) to match the tight clustering seen in real measurements.
+     */
+    private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
+        val (mu, sigma) =
+            when (algorithm) {
+                Algorithm.EC -> ln(60.0) to 0.08
+                Algorithm.RSA -> ln(70.0) to 0.08
+                Algorithm.AES -> ln(35.0) to 0.10
+                else -> ln(40.0) to 0.10
+            }
+        return sampleLogNormal(mu, sigma)
+    }
+
+    private fun sampleLogNormal(mu: Double, sigma: Double): Double {
+        return exp(mu + sigma * rng.nextGaussian())
+    }
+
+    private fun sampleExponential(mean: Double): Double {
+        var u = rng.nextDouble()
+        while (u == 0.0) u = rng.nextDouble()
+        return -mean * ln(u)
+    }
+}

gradle/libs.versions.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 [versions]
-agp = "8.13.1"
+agp = "8.13.2"
 annotation = "1.9.1"
 jdk18on = "1.83"
-kotlin = "2.2.21"
+kotlin = "2.3.0"
 ktfmt = "0.25.0"
 
 [libraries]

module/action.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/system/bin/sh
+MODDIR=${0%/*}
+CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store
+
+if [ -d "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" ]; then
+    rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
+    mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
+    echo "Persistent key storage cleared"
+else
+    echo "No persistent key storage found"
+fi

module/changelog.md

@@ -1,14 +1,260 @@
-🚀 **TEESimulator v2.1 Hotfix Release is Live!** 🚀
+## TEESimulator-RS v5.1.1: Pre-Stash Restoration
 
-This urgent hotfix addresses several critical issues identified in the previous v2.0 release.
+Restores all custom hardening fixes that were lost during the PR #157 migration. These were working in pre-stash builds but never carried over to the post-stash codebase, causing user-reported regressions (boot hash instability, DuckDetector score regression, config crash on file deletion).
 
-The v2.0 update, a significant refactoring effort, unfortunately introduced a few unexpected behaviors and bugs that we are now rectifying.
+- **Boot hash persistence** restored: 4-step fallback (sysprop, TEE, file, random) with file writes at every step. Fixes "Boot: Unavailable" where boot hash randomized every reboot on devices without `ro.boot.vbmeta.digest`
+- **Presence-based findBoolean** for KeyMint tags: boolean tags are presence-based per AIDL spec, `.boolValue` field isn't reliably populated across Android versions
+- **noAuthRequired** defaults to true when not explicitly false, matching AOSP KeyMint behavior
+- **callerNonce** tag now flows through to software-enforced attestation list
+- **CTR block mode** restored in cipher algorithm mapping (was dropped in PR #157)
+- **AEAD guard** on updateAad: non-GCM operations throw INVALID_TAG
+- **Error code resolution** via lazy reflection with correct KeyMint AIDL fallback values
+- **Latency floor** on SoftwareOperation.finish() for StrongBox timing simulation
+- **FileObserver NPE** fixed: null-safe handling on config file DELETE events
+- **system=prop** consistency: forces boot/vendor patch levels to derive from device props
+- **StrongBox simulation** restored: capability checks (RSA<=2048, EC=P256), concurrent op limits (4 max), keygen latency floor (250ms), op latency floor (80ms)
+- **Binder buffer guard**: MAX_ALIAS_LENGTH (256KB) rejects oversized aliases before processing
+- **Key lifecycle tracking**: deletedSoftwareKeys set prevents ghost key responses after deletion
+- **Per-UID operation limits**: 15 TEE, 4 StrongBox with LRU eviction
+- **EC+DECRYPT rejection** in createOperation, matching AOSP unsupported purpose check
+- **Attest key nspace update** aligned with upstream PR #169
 
-**Key fixes in this release include:**
+---
-1.  **Google Play Integrity:** Resolved an issue preventing the attainment of STRONG integrity for Google Play verdicts, caused by an incorrect vendor patch level format. ✅
-2.  **Application Stability:** Fixed a critical crash related to an incorrect signature for the `SystemProperties.set` stub method. 🐛
-3.  **Stealth Enhancement:** Implemented a fix to bypass detection by the `Android Native Detector`. 👻
 
-🔬 We are actively investigating a recent detection method to further enhance stealth capabilities.
+## TEESimulator-RS v5.1: Interception Architecture Rewrite
 
-🙏 Support for TEE-broken devices and Android 10/11 remains an area of ongoing improvement. We highly encourage you to submit any issues you encounter to help us refine these aspects! 🤝
+Major release. 27 files changed, 2300 lines rewritten. The entire Kotlin interception layer has been rebuilt with a clean architecture, proper AIDL alignment, and significantly lower binder overhead.
+
+### Interception Layer Rewrite
+- KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor completely restructured: GeneratedKeyInfo now carries full KeyMintAttestation instead of nullable stub, eliminating scattered null checks across every operation path
+- SoftwareOperation rewritten with sealed CryptoPrimitive interface separating Signer, Verifier, Encryptor, and Decryptor into isolated implementations with proper JCA algorithm mapping
+- KeystoreErrorCode centralized object replaces scattered magic numbers for all KeyMint and Keystore2 error codes
+- listEntries moved from pre-transact parameter caching to post-transact injection, eliminating a race condition where cached params could go stale
+- deleteKey now handles both APP domain (by alias) and KEY_ID domain (by nspace) resolution paths correctly
+- AuthorizeCreate and AndroidPermissionUtils removed, authorization logic consolidated into the operation dispatch path
+- DeviceAttestationService removed, attestation routing simplified into the main interceptor
+
+### Software Crypto Operations
+- GCM nonce returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations, matching real KeyMint HAL behavior
+- updateAad correctly throws INVALID_TAG on non-AEAD operations instead of silently succeeding
+- Cipher algorithm mapping cleaned up: dropped CTR block mode and RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding that caused JCA provider mismatches
+- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes instead of raw exceptions
+
+### Attestation & Certificate Generation
+- CertificateGenerator rewritten with clean Kotlin Pair return type instead of Android's util.Pair
+- AttestationBuilder field ordering aligned with AOSP KeyDescription ASN.1 schema
+- Unique ID computation follows KeyMint HAL spec: HMAC-SHA256(temporal_counter || AAID || reset_flag, HBK) truncated to 128 bits
+- Patch level logging removed from hot path to reduce logcat noise on every attestation
+
+### Configuration & Device Properties
+- ConfigurationManager target package parsing refactored: mode/package extraction deduplicated across GENERATE/PATCH/AUTO branches
+- system=prop forced boot/vendor override removed, now respects explicit per-component patch level configuration
+- FileObserver delete handler simplified with direct file access instead of defensive null-checks
+- AndroidDeviceUtils expanded with additional device property accessors for attestation fields
+
+### Binder Performance
+- Safe parcel reads at 6 deserialization sites, replacing force-unwrap NPE paths with early-return on null. A single NPE generates a full stack trace that blocks the binder thread for ~2ms
+- teeResponses cache populated on generateKey/importKey post-transact, reducing getKeyEntry from 2+ binder round-trips to 1
+- pingBinder liveness check removed from pre-transact failure path, eliminating a synchronous IPC call on every failed transaction
+- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI entirely for PING/INTERFACE/DUMP
+
+### Dynamic SecurityLevel Binder Registration
+- Intercepts getSecurityLevel replies to register hooks on every new BBinder instance keystore2 returns, not just the initial one from setup
+- Identity hash deduplication prevents double-hooking when keystore2 returns the same binder across multiple calls
+- Resolves apps that call getSecurityLevel independently and receive a different binder than the one registered at startup
+
+### Build & Packaging
+- Rust native build task integrated into Gradle with cargo-ndk for aarch64/armv7/x86/x86_64
+- Module ZIP includes all 4 native libraries (libTEESimulator, libsupervisor, libcertgen, libinject)
+- customize.sh extraction restored for supervisor daemon and native cert gen library
+- TeeLatencySimulator added as standalone utility for log-normal hardware latency emulation
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v5.0: AOSP Compliance Overhaul
+
+Major release integrating 30+ AOSP compliance improvements from upstream PR #157 analysis, layered on top of our StrongBox hardening and native cert gen architecture.
+
+### Attestation Extension Alignment
+- 17 enforcement tags added to KeyMintAttestation (ACTIVE_DATETIME, ORIGINATION_EXPIRE, USAGE_EXPIRE, USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, CALLER_NONCE, UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, MAX_BOOT_LEVEL, MIN_MAC_LENGTH, RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST)
+- BLOCK_MODE encoded as SET OF INTEGER per AOSP attestation_record.h
+- Version-guarded tags (RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST >=100, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE >=3, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY >=4)
+- INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID computed via HMAC-SHA256 per KeyMint HAL spec using device HBK
+- AAID gated on attestation challenge presence
+- Certificate validity defaults aligned with AOSP (epoch notBefore, 9999-12-31 notAfter)
+
+### Binder Infrastructure
+- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI for non-intercepted codes
+- getNumberOfEntries includes software-generated key count
+- deleteKey resolves KEY_ID domain via generatedKeys lookup
+- patchAuthorizations for OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels in authorization arrays
+
+### Software Operation AOSP Conformance
+- updateAad on non-AEAD operations returns INVALID_TAG (-76), matching AOSP operation.rs
+- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes
+- GCM IV returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations
+- SoftwareOperationBinder methods @Synchronized, matching AOSP Mutex per operation
+- authorize_create enforcement: PURPOSE validation, algorithm-purpose compatibility, temporal constraints, CALLER_NONCE prohibition, WRAP_KEY rejection
+
+### Security and Configuration
+- SELinux permission checks via /proc/pid/attr/current
+- Per-UID permission verification through IPackageManager.checkPermission
+- Imported key tracking prevents stale attest-key overrides in getKeyEntry
+- nspace consistency fix in attest-key override path
+- TeeLatencySimulator with log-normal distribution matching real hardware profiles
+- Device-unique HBK seed generated on install (32 bytes from /dev/random)
+
+### Preserved from v4.8
+- StrongBox op limits (4 concurrent max, TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS rejection)
+- LRU operation pruning per security level
+- Hardware keygen rate limiting (2/30s sliding window, 2 concurrent cap)
+- Native Rust cert generation with BouncyCastle fallback
+- Key persistence across reboots
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v4.8.1: StrongBox Op Rejection Fix
+
+- **StrongBox op limit gate fix** — `trackAndEnforceOpLimit` was only called in the `Domain.KEY_ID` not-found path, so software-generated keys (found via `Domain.APP`) bypassed `STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4` entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU pruning instead of being rejected with `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)`. Now enforced for all StrongBox createOperation paths.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v4.8: StrongBox Hardening & LRU Pruning
+
+Tested against DuckDetector on OnePlus (Android 16, KSU). Tamper score dropped from 32 to 8.
+
+- **LRU operation pruning** — Concurrent software operations capped at 15 per UID (TEE) and 4 per UID (StrongBox), with oldest-first eviction. Pruned operations return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)`, matching AOSP keystore2 malus-based pruning.
+- **StrongBox param guard** — Unsupported StrongBox params (RSA >2048-bit, non-P256 EC curves) forwarded to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software.
+- **StrongBox timing** — Key generation floors at 250ms, signing at 80ms on StrongBox security level to match real secure element latency.
+- **StrongBox op limit** — Sliding-window enforcer caps concurrent StrongBox operations for both software and hardware key paths, returning `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)` when exceeded.
+- **ECDSA algorithm alias** — Accept "ECDSA" in addition to "EC" as JCA private key algorithm name. Fixes SIGSEGV crash on Android 10 devices where the provider reports EC keys as "ECDSA". Closes #4.
+- **createOperation domain handling** — Software-generated keys now found via both `Domain.APP` (alias) and `Domain.KEY_ID` (nspace) lookup paths.
+- **Permission guards** — Device ID attestation tags (IMEI, MEID, serial) require caller permission checks.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v4.7: Operation & Attestation Fixes
+
+Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) and [Key Attestation](https://github.com/nickel-lang/nickel) on OnePlus (Android 16) and Xiaomi Redmi 14C (Android 14).
+
+- **PADDING encoding** — Fixed ASN.1 encoding of PADDING tag in attestation extension from individual `[6] INTEGER` entries to `[6] SET OF INTEGER`, matching AOSP `attestation_record.h` schema. Broke all RSA key attestation since v4.6.
+- **Operation error-path conformance** — Software operations now track finalized state and return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)` on post-abort calls. Input length guard (32KB) returns `TOO_MUCH_DATA` matching AOSP `operation.rs`. Passes KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker.
+- **updateAad support** — Added `updateAad` to `SoftwareOperationBinder`, fixing `AbstractMethodError` on Android 16 where the runtime Stub declares it abstract.
+- **Algorithm inference** — `createOperation` now infers algorithm from the stored key pair when operation params omit the ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v4.6: Rebrand & Detection Fix
+
+- **RTT normalization rework** — Replaced Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms) with a 15ms floor fence. The old approach triggered Chunqiu Native Check 2.8 timing analysis; the floor-only approach satisfies the minimum RTT threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern.
+- **Cross-algorithm attestation** — Signing algorithm now derived from the attestation key's actual type, not the generated key's algorithm. Fixes BouncyCastle crash when signing RSA keys with EC attestation keys (Shizuku attestation flow).
+- **Device ID attestation** — Serial/IMEI/MEID/secondImei tags now flow through to software cert gen instead of blanket rejection. Only DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is rejected, matching AOSP keystore2 policy.
+- **Rebrand to TEESimulator-RS** — Distinguishes this fork from upstream. Version scheme simplified to v{major}.{minor}-{commitCount}.
+- **CI streamlined** — Release pipeline uses Gradle-generated filenames directly, eliminating the rename step.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator v4.5: Detection Hardening
+
+Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) (23-check attestation validator). All keystore-level checks now pass.
+
+- **Key deletion consistency** — After deleting a software-generated key, `getKeyEntry` now correctly returns `KEY_NOT_FOUND` instead of falling through to a stale live-patch fallback. Fixes binder consistency checks that detect ghost key responses.
+- **generateKey timing normalization** — Software key generation RTT now matches real TEE latency profile (Gaussian distribution, mean=55ms, floor=15ms). Previously completed in ~4ms, which is an immediate timing side-channel.
+- **Delete cleanup scope** — `deleteKey` now clears all cached state (patched chains, attestation keys) regardless of whether the key was software or hardware-generated.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator v4.4: AOSP Conformance
+
+- **Binder error reply format** — Aligned EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire layout with AOSP Status.cpp, including the remote stack trace header field.
+- **Key enumeration** — Corrected list_past_alias pagination order to match AOSP database.rs semantics.
+- **KeyMetadata fields** — Generated key responses now include modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, and normalized KeyDescriptor fields per AOSP Keystore2.
+- **Parcel handling** — hasException() preserves reply position for downstream consumers.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator v4.3: Performance & Reliability
+
+- **Debug log gating** — `SystemLogger.debug()` now skipped entirely in release builds, eliminating unnecessary logcat syscalls on every intercepted transaction.
+- **Supervisor backoff** — Exponential restart delay (500ms → 30s cap) prevents CPU spin if the daemon crashes repeatedly. Resets automatically once stable.
+- **Process priority** — Daemon runs at nice=10, yielding CPU to foreground apps on constrained devices.
+- **Map eviction** — Rate limiter and file lock maps now evict stale entries instead of growing unbounded.
+- **CI pipeline** — Single-trigger build→release pipeline with proper changelog extraction and correctly sized artifacts.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator v4.2: Detection Evasion Hardening
+
+Fixes 6 detection vectors flagged by attestation validator apps.
+
+### Attestation Policy Enforcement
+
+Replicate AOSP keystore2's `add_required_parameters()` validation that our software keygen path was bypassing:
+
+- **CREATION_DATETIME** — Reject caller-provided input with `INVALID_ARGUMENT (20)`, matching `security_level.rs:424`. Our cert gen still adds its own timestamp, same as real keystore2.
+- **Device ID attestation** — Reject ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, IMEI, MEID, SECOND_IMEI, and DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION with `CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66)`. No consumer app has READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE.
+- **Error reply format** — Fixed AIDL ServiceSpecificException parcel write order (was errorCode→message, now message→errorCode).
+
+### Certificate Fix
+
+Leaf certificate Subject CN corrected from "Android KeyStore Key" to "Android Keystore Key" (lowercase s), matching AOSP `KeyGenParameterSpec.java:282`. Both Kotlin and Rust paths.
+
+### Binder Timing
+
+Skip interception for system transaction codes (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) above LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION. Eliminates the JNI round-trip that inflated binder ping ratio to 3.85x (detector threshold: 3.0x).
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator v4.1: Boot Identity Persistence
+
+Bugfix release. The vbmeta boot key digest was randomizing on every reboot, producing a different RootOfTrust in attestation certificates each boot.
+
+On devices where the kernel doesn't set `ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest`, the fallback chain hit random generation every boot because `resetprop` overrides for `ro.boot.*` props don't survive reboots. Added file-based persistence (`boot_hash.bin`, `boot_key.bin`) between the TEE cache and random fallback. Once determined, boot identity values persist across reboots.
+
+Verified on Redmi 14C: second boot reads from persistent file instead of regenerating.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator v4.0: Native Rust Cert Generation
+
+Major release. Certificate chain generation rebuilt from the ground up in Rust, replacing the BouncyCastle Java path for EC and RSA keys. Hardened against every known detector app.
+
+### Native Cert Generation
+
+The headline feature. `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 certificate chains using `ring` (EC-P256/P384) and `rsa` (RSA-2048/4096) with manual DER assembly. No more BouncyCastle quirks — issuer/subject DN bytes are injected directly from the keybox, ensuring byte-perfect chain linkage. BouncyCastle remains as fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
+
+### Anti-Detection Hardening
+
+- **Challenge validation** — Oversized attestation challenges (>128 bytes) now return `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH (-21)`, matching real KeyMint behavior. Previously accepted silently — DuckDetector exploited this.
+- **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst, 2 concurrent max. Overflow falls back to software certs. Blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding that starves GMS.
+- **importKey eviction guard** — Retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import attacks that evict cached attestation data.
+- **256KB native payload cap** — Oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly instead of stalling threads.
+- **Alias size rejection** — Oversized key aliases rejected before they hit the binder buffer.
+
+### Key Persistence
+
+Generated keys now survive reboots. File-backed storage with file-level locking, preserved across keybox rotations. Banking and biometric apps that cache attestation keys no longer break after restart.
+
+### Attestation Fixes
+
+- Null out all-zero `verifiedBootHash` from TEE cache (fingerprinting vector)
+- Correct `module_hash` field to match AOSP Keystore2 format
+- Override pre-existing attest keys instead of skipping them
+- Strip HTML comments from PEM blocks in keybox parsing
+- Security patch consistency — `system=prop` forces boot/vendor to match
+
+### Module Lifecycle
+
+- Supervisor daemon keeps the interceptor alive
+- KSU Action button clears persistent key cache
+- Clean uninstall removes all traces (persistent keys, TEE status, daemon)
+
+### Stability
+
+- FileObserver NPE on config deletion fixed
+- Global uncaught exception handler — daemon stays alive on unexpected errors
+- PEM parsing hardened against malformed keybox files
+
+### Tested Against
+
+DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, Key Attestation Demo — all passing on Redmi 14C (Android 14, Beanpod KeyMaster, KSU).

module/customize.sh

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ fi
 
 # --- Version Info ---
 VERSION=$(grep_prop version "${TMPDIR}/module.prop")
-ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator $VERSION"
+ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator-RS $VERSION"
 ui_print ""
 
 # --- Architecture Handling ---
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ install_file() {
 
 # --- Installation ---
 ui_print "- Extracting module files"
-for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon; do
+for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh uninstall.sh; do
   install_file "$file" "$MODPATH"
 done
 
@@ -67,10 +67,14 @@ ui_print ""
 ui_print "- Extracting $ARCH libraries"
 install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libTEESimulator.so" "$MODPATH"
 install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libinject.so" "$MODPATH"
+install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libsupervisor.so" "$MODPATH"
+install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libcertgen.so" "$MODPATH"
 ui_print ""
 
 mv "$MODPATH/libinject.so" "$MODPATH/inject"
+mv "$MODPATH/libsupervisor.so" "$MODPATH/supervisor"
 chmod 755 "$MODPATH/inject"
+chmod 755 "$MODPATH/supervisor"
 
 # --- Configuration Files ---
 if [ ! -d "$CONFIG_DIR" ]; then
@@ -87,3 +91,10 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/target.txt" ]; then
   ui_print "- Adding default target scope"
   install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR"
 fi
+
+rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
+
+if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk" ]; then
+  ui_print "- Generating device-unique hardware-bound key seed"
+  head -c 32 /dev/random > "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk"
+fi

module/module.prop

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 id=tricky_store
-name=TEESimulator
+name=TEESimulator-RS
 version=${REPLACEMEVER}
 versionCode=${REPLACEMEVERCODE}
-author=JingMatrix
+author=JingMatrix, Enginex0
 description=Software simulation for Android hardware-backed key pairs with key attestation
-updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/main/module/update.json
+updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/update.json

module/sepolicy.rule

@@ -1,4 +1,2 @@
-allow keystore system_file unix_dgram_socket *
+allow keystore {adb_data_file shell_data_file} file *
-allow system_file keystore unix_dgram_socket *
-allow keystore system_file file *
 allow crash_dump keystore process *

module/service.sh

@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@
-DEBUG=false
-
 MODDIR=${0%/*}
-
 cd $MODDIR
 
-while true; do
+# Fork-based supervisor for instant restart
-  ./daemon "$MODDIR" || exit 1
+./supervisor ./daemon "$MODDIR" &
-  # ensure keystore initialized
-  sleep 2
-done &

module/uninstall.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/system/bin/sh
+MODDIR=${0%/*}
+CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store
+
+# Kill daemon and supervisor
+for pid in $(pidof TEESimulator) $(pidof supervisor) $(pidof daemon); do
+    kill -9 "$pid" 2>/dev/null
+done
+
+rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
+rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
+rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_hash.bin" "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_key.bin"

module/update.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
-	"version": "v2.1",
+	"version": "v4.5",
-	"versionCode": 20,
+	"versionCode": 111,
-	"zipUrl": "https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/releases/download/v2.1/TEESimulator-v2.1-20-release.zip",
+	"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.5/TEESimulator-v4.5-Release.zip",
-	"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
+	"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
 }

native-certgen/.cargo/config.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[target.aarch64-linux-android]
+linker = "aarch64-linux-android29-clang"
+
+[target.armv7-linux-androideabi]
+linker = "armv7a-linux-androideabi29-clang"
+
+[target.i686-linux-android]
+linker = "i686-linux-android29-clang"
+
+[target.x86_64-linux-android]
+linker = "x86_64-linux-android29-clang"

native-certgen/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+[package]
+name = "certgen"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+publish = false
+
+[lib]
+crate-type = ["cdylib"]
+
+[dependencies]
+jni = { version = "0.21.1", default-features = false }
+ring = "0.17.14"
+rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
+pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["alloc"] }
+rand = "0.8"
+der = { version = "0.7.10", features = ["alloc", "oid"] }
+const-oid = "0.9.6"
+x509-cert = { version = "0.2.5", features = ["pem"] }
+time = { version = "0.3", features = ["std"] }
+anyhow = "1.0"
+tracing = "0.1"
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
+libc = "0.2"
+zip = { version = "2.2", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
+serde_json = "1.0"
+
+[profile.release]
+opt-level = "z"
+lto = true
+codegen-units = 1
+strip = "symbols"
+panic = "abort"

native-certgen/rust-toolchain.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[toolchain]
+channel = "stable"
+targets = [
+  "aarch64-linux-android",
+  "armv7-linux-androideabi",
+  "i686-linux-android",
+  "x86_64-linux-android",
+]

native-certgen/src/attestation.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,721 @@
+use crate::error::Result;
+use crate::types::CertGenParams;
+
+const DO_NOT_REPORT: i32 = -1;
+
+pub fn build_attestation_extension(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let sw = build_software_enforced(params)?;
+    let tee = build_tee_enforced(params)?;
+
+    let mut inner = Vec::new();
+    // attestationVersion — INTEGER
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_integer(params.attest_version as i64));
+    // attestationSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED, not INTEGER
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(params.security_level));
+    // keymintVersion — INTEGER
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_integer(params.keymaster_version as i64));
+    // keymintSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED, not INTEGER
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(params.security_level));
+    // attestationChallenge — OCTET STRING
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(
+        params.attestation_challenge.as_deref().unwrap_or(&[]),
+    ));
+    // uniqueId — OCTET STRING (always empty)
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&[]));
+    // softwareEnforced
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&sw);
+    // teeEnforced
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&tee);
+
+    Ok(enc_sequence(&inner))
+}
+
+fn build_software_enforced(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut fields: Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
+
+    // Tag 303: CALLER_NONCE — NULL (presence = true)
+    if params.caller_nonce {
+        fields.push((303, enc_null()));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 400: ACTIVE_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
+    if params.active_datetime >= 0 {
+        fields.push((400, enc_integer(params.active_datetime)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 401: ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
+    if params.origination_expire_datetime >= 0 {
+        fields.push((401, enc_integer(params.origination_expire_datetime)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 402: USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
+    if params.usage_expire_datetime >= 0 {
+        fields.push((402, enc_integer(params.usage_expire_datetime)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 405: USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT — INTEGER
+    if params.usage_count_limit >= 0 {
+        fields.push((405, enc_integer(params.usage_count_limit as i64)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 509: UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED — NULL
+    if params.unlocked_device_required {
+        fields.push((509, enc_null()));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 701: CREATION_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
+    fields.push((701, enc_integer(params.creation_datetime)));
+
+    // Tag 709: ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID — OCTET STRING
+    // The bytes are already the DER-encoded AttestationApplicationId wrapped in OCTET STRING
+    // by the Kotlin layer. We wrap them in an EXPLICIT tag.
+    if !params.attestation_application_id.is_empty() {
+        fields.push((709, enc_octet_string(&params.attestation_application_id)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 724: MODULE_HASH — OCTET STRING (only if attestVersion >= 400)
+    if params.attest_version >= 400 {
+        if let Some(ref hash) = params.module_hash {
+            fields.push((724, enc_octet_string(hash)));
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(build_authorization_list(&mut fields))
+}
+
+fn build_tee_enforced(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut fields: Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
+
+    // Tag 1: PURPOSE — SET OF INTEGER
+    if !params.purposes.is_empty() {
+        fields.push((1, build_set_of_integer(&params.purposes)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 2: ALGORITHM — INTEGER
+    fields.push((2, enc_integer(params.algorithm as i32 as i64)));
+
+    // Tag 3: KEY_SIZE — INTEGER
+    fields.push((3, enc_integer(params.key_size as i64)));
+
+    // Tag 5: DIGEST — SET OF INTEGER
+    if !params.digests.is_empty() {
+        fields.push((5, build_set_of_integer(&params.digests)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 10: EC_CURVE — INTEGER (only for EC keys)
+    if let Some(curve) = params.ec_curve {
+        fields.push((10, enc_integer(curve as i32 as i64)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 503: NO_AUTH_REQUIRED — NULL (conditional)
+    if params.no_auth_required {
+        fields.push((503, enc_null()));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 702: ORIGIN — INTEGER 0 (GENERATED)
+    fields.push((702, enc_integer(0)));
+
+    // Tag 704: ROOT_OF_TRUST — SEQUENCE
+    fields.push((704, build_root_of_trust(params)));
+
+    // Tag 705: OS_VERSION — INTEGER
+    if params.os_version != DO_NOT_REPORT {
+        fields.push((705, enc_integer(params.os_version as i64)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 706: OS_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
+    if params.os_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
+        fields.push((706, enc_integer(params.os_patch_level as i64)));
+    }
+
+    // Tags 710-717: ATTESTATION_ID_* — OCTET STRING (optional)
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_brand {
+        fields.push((710, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_device {
+        fields.push((711, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_product {
+        fields.push((712, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_serial {
+        fields.push((713, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_imei {
+        fields.push((714, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_meid {
+        fields.push((715, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_manufacturer {
+        fields.push((716, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+    if let Some(ref v) = params.id_model {
+        fields.push((717, enc_octet_string(v)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 718: VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
+    if params.vendor_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
+        fields.push((718, enc_integer(params.vendor_patch_level as i64)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 719: BOOT_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
+    if params.boot_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
+        fields.push((719, enc_integer(params.boot_patch_level as i64)));
+    }
+
+    // Tag 723: ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI — OCTET STRING (only if attestVersion >= 300)
+    if params.attest_version >= 300 {
+        if let Some(ref v) = params.id_second_imei {
+            fields.push((723, enc_octet_string(v)));
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(build_authorization_list(&mut fields))
+}
+
+fn build_root_of_trust(params: &CertGenParams) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut inner = Vec::new();
+    // verifiedBootKey — OCTET STRING (32 bytes)
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&params.boot_key));
+    // deviceLocked — BOOLEAN TRUE (0xFF, not 0x01)
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_boolean(true));
+    // verifiedBootState — ENUMERATED 0 (Verified), not INTEGER
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(0));
+    // verifiedBootHash — OCTET STRING (32 bytes)
+    inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&params.boot_hash));
+    enc_sequence(&inner)
+}
+
+fn build_authorization_list(fields: &mut Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)>) -> Vec<u8> {
+    fields.sort_by_key(|(tag, _)| *tag);
+    let mut inner = Vec::new();
+    for (tag, value) in fields.iter() {
+        inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_explicit_tag(*tag, value));
+    }
+    enc_sequence(&inner)
+}
+
+fn build_set_of_integer(values: &[i32]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // DER SET OF: elements sorted by encoded byte value
+    let mut encoded: Vec<Vec<u8>> = values.iter().map(|v| enc_integer(*v as i64)).collect();
+    encoded.sort();
+    let mut inner = Vec::new();
+    for e in &encoded {
+        inner.extend_from_slice(e);
+    }
+    enc_set(&inner)
+}
+
+// --- DER primitives ---
+
+fn enc_length(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
+    if len < 0x80 {
+        vec![len as u8]
+    } else if len <= 0xFF {
+        vec![0x81, len as u8]
+    } else if len <= 0xFFFF {
+        vec![0x82, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
+    } else if len <= 0xFF_FFFF {
+        vec![0x83, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
+    } else {
+        vec![
+            0x84,
+            (len >> 24) as u8,
+            (len >> 16) as u8,
+            (len >> 8) as u8,
+            len as u8,
+        ]
+    }
+}
+
+fn enc_integer(value: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // DER INTEGER: tag 0x02, minimal two's complement big-endian
+    let bytes = integer_bytes(value);
+    let mut out = vec![0x02];
+    out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(bytes.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
+    out
+}
+
+fn integer_bytes(value: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
+    if value == 0 {
+        return vec![0x00];
+    }
+    let raw = value.to_be_bytes();
+    // Find first significant byte
+    let mut start = 0;
+    if value > 0 {
+        while start < 7 && raw[start] == 0x00 {
+            start += 1;
+        }
+        // If high bit set, need leading 0x00 to keep positive
+        if raw[start] & 0x80 != 0 {
+            let mut out = vec![0x00];
+            out.extend_from_slice(&raw[start..]);
+            return out;
+        }
+    } else {
+        while start < 7 && raw[start] == 0xFF {
+            start += 1;
+        }
+        // If high bit clear, need leading 0xFF to keep negative
+        if raw[start] & 0x80 == 0 {
+            let mut out = vec![0xFF];
+            out.extend_from_slice(&raw[start..]);
+            return out;
+        }
+    }
+    raw[start..].to_vec()
+}
+
+fn enc_enumerated(value: i32) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // DER ENUMERATED: tag 0x0A, same value encoding as INTEGER
+    let bytes = integer_bytes(value as i64);
+    let mut out = vec![0x0A];
+    out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(bytes.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
+    out
+}
+
+fn enc_octet_string(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = vec![0x04];
+    out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(data.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(data);
+    out
+}
+
+fn enc_null() -> Vec<u8> {
+    vec![0x05, 0x00]
+}
+
+fn enc_boolean(value: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // DER BOOLEAN: TRUE = 0xFF, FALSE = 0x00
+    vec![0x01, 0x01, if value { 0xFF } else { 0x00 }]
+}
+
+fn enc_sequence(contents: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = vec![0x30];
+    out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(contents.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(contents);
+    out
+}
+
+fn enc_set(contents: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = vec![0x31];
+    out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(contents.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(contents);
+    out
+}
+
+fn enc_explicit_tag(tag_number: u32, inner: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // EXPLICIT context-specific constructed tag
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    if tag_number < 31 {
+        // Short form: single byte 0xA0 | tag_number
+        out.push(0xA0 | tag_number as u8);
+    } else {
+        // Long form: 0xBF followed by base-128 encoding of tag number
+        out.push(0xBF);
+        enc_base128_tag(&mut out, tag_number);
+    }
+    out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(inner.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(inner);
+    out
+}
+
+fn enc_base128_tag(out: &mut Vec<u8>, tag: u32) {
+    // Base-128 with continuation bits: MSB first, bit 7 set on all but last byte
+    let mut digits = Vec::new();
+    let mut val = tag;
+    digits.push((val & 0x7F) as u8);
+    val >>= 7;
+    while val > 0 {
+        digits.push((val & 0x7F) as u8 | 0x80);
+        val >>= 7;
+    }
+    // Written MSB first
+    for b in digits.iter().rev() {
+        out.push(*b);
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::types::{Algorithm, EcCurve};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_integer_zero() {
+        assert_eq!(enc_integer(0), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x00]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_integer_small_positive() {
+        assert_eq!(enc_integer(3), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x03]);
+        assert_eq!(enc_integer(127), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x7F]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_integer_needs_leading_zero() {
+        // 128 = 0x80, high bit set so needs 0x00 prefix
+        assert_eq!(enc_integer(128), vec![0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x80]);
+        assert_eq!(enc_integer(256), vec![0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_integer_multi_byte() {
+        // 140000 = 0x02_22_E0
+        assert_eq!(enc_integer(140000), vec![0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x22, 0xE0]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_integer_large() {
+        // 20250301 = 0x01_34_FE_BD
+        assert_eq!(
+            enc_integer(20250301),
+            vec![0x02, 0x04, 0x01, 0x34, 0xFE, 0xBD]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_enumerated() {
+        // SecurityLevel TEE = 1
+        assert_eq!(enc_enumerated(1), vec![0x0A, 0x01, 0x01]);
+        // VerifiedBootState Verified = 0
+        assert_eq!(enc_enumerated(0), vec![0x0A, 0x01, 0x00]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_boolean_true() {
+        // DER: TRUE = 0xFF
+        assert_eq!(enc_boolean(true), vec![0x01, 0x01, 0xFF]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_null() {
+        assert_eq!(enc_null(), vec![0x05, 0x00]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_octet_string_empty() {
+        assert_eq!(enc_octet_string(&[]), vec![0x04, 0x00]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_short() {
+        // Tag 1 wrapping INTEGER 2: A1 03 02 01 02
+        let inner = enc_integer(2);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(1, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(tagged, vec![0xA1, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_10() {
+        // Tag 10: 0xAA
+        let inner = enc_integer(1);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(10, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(tagged[0], 0xAA);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_503() {
+        // Tag 503: 0xBF 0x83 0x77
+        // 503 = 3*128 + 119 => 0x83 0x77
+        let inner = enc_null();
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(503, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x83, 0x77]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_704() {
+        // Tag 704: 0xBF 0x85 0x40
+        // 704 = 5*128 + 64 => 0x85 0x40
+        let inner = enc_sequence(&[]);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(704, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x40]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_718() {
+        // Tag 718: 0xBF 0x85 0x4E
+        let inner = enc_integer(20250301);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(718, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x4E]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_719() {
+        // Tag 719: 0xBF 0x85 0x4F
+        let inner = enc_integer(20250301);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(719, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x4F]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_701() {
+        // Tag 701: 0xBF 0x85 0x3D
+        let inner = enc_integer(1000);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(701, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x3D]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enc_explicit_tag_709() {
+        // Tag 709: 0xBF 0x85 0x45
+        let inner = enc_octet_string(&[0x01]);
+        let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(709, &inner);
+        assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x45]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_build_set_of_integer_sorted() {
+        // SET OF INTEGER must sort by encoded bytes
+        let result = build_set_of_integer(&[3, 2]);
+        // Expect sorted: INTEGER 2 before INTEGER 3
+        let expected = enc_set(&[0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03]);
+        assert_eq!(result, expected);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_root_of_trust_structure() {
+        let params = make_test_params();
+        let rot = build_root_of_trust(&params);
+        // Should be a SEQUENCE (0x30)
+        assert_eq!(rot[0], 0x30);
+        // Find BOOLEAN TRUE inside
+        let rot_inner = &rot[2..]; // skip tag+length
+        // First: OCTET STRING (32 bytes boot key)
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[0], 0x04);
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[1], 0x20); // 32 bytes
+        // After boot key (34 bytes): BOOLEAN TRUE
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[34], 0x01); // BOOLEAN tag
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[35], 0x01); // length 1
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[36], 0xFF); // TRUE = 0xFF
+        // Then ENUMERATED 0 (verifiedBootState)
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[37], 0x0A); // ENUMERATED tag, not 0x02
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[38], 0x01);
+        assert_eq!(rot_inner[39], 0x00);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_do_not_report_omits_fields() {
+        let mut params = make_test_params();
+        params.os_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
+        params.vendor_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
+        params.boot_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
+        let tee = build_tee_enforced(&params).unwrap();
+        let hex = hex_string(&tee);
+        // Tags 706, 718, 719 should not appear
+        // Tag 706 = BF 85 42, 718 = BF 85 4E, 719 = BF 85 4F
+        assert!(!hex.contains("bf8542"), "os_patch_level should be omitted");
+        assert!(
+            !hex.contains("bf854e"),
+            "vendor_patch_level should be omitted"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !hex.contains("bf854f"),
+            "boot_patch_level should be omitted"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_key_description_security_level_is_enumerated() {
+        let params = make_test_params();
+        let ext = build_attestation_extension(&params).unwrap();
+        // KeyDescription is a SEQUENCE: 0x30 ...
+        assert_eq!(ext[0], 0x30);
+        // Skip SEQUENCE tag + length to get to inner fields
+        let inner = skip_tlv_header(&ext);
+        // Field 0: attestationVersion — INTEGER (0x02)
+        assert_eq!(inner[0], 0x02);
+        let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(inner);
+        // Field 1: attestationSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED (0x0A)
+        assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x0A, "attestationSecurityLevel must be ENUMERATED");
+        let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(rest);
+        // Field 2: keymintVersion — INTEGER (0x02)
+        assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x02);
+        let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(rest);
+        // Field 3: keymintSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED (0x0A)
+        assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x0A, "keymintSecurityLevel must be ENUMERATED");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_authorization_list_sorted_by_tag() {
+        let params = make_test_params();
+        let tee = build_tee_enforced(&params).unwrap();
+        let inner = skip_tlv_header(&tee);
+        let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
+        let mut sorted = tags.clone();
+        sorted.sort();
+        assert_eq!(tags, sorted, "AuthorizationList fields must be sorted by tag number");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enforcement_tags_in_software_enforced() {
+        let mut params = make_test_params();
+        params.usage_count_limit = 3;
+        params.unlocked_device_required = true;
+        params.caller_nonce = true;
+        params.active_datetime = 1709913600000;
+        let sw = build_software_enforced(&params).unwrap();
+        let inner = skip_tlv_header(&sw);
+        let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
+        assert!(tags.contains(&303), "CALLER_NONCE (303) must be in softwareEnforced");
+        assert!(tags.contains(&400), "ACTIVE_DATETIME (400) must be in softwareEnforced");
+        assert!(tags.contains(&405), "USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT (405) must be in softwareEnforced");
+        assert!(tags.contains(&509), "UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED (509) must be in softwareEnforced");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_no_auth_required_conditional() {
+        let mut params = make_test_params();
+        params.no_auth_required = false;
+        let tee = build_tee_enforced(&params).unwrap();
+        let inner = skip_tlv_header(&tee);
+        let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
+        assert!(!tags.contains(&503), "NO_AUTH_REQUIRED (503) must be absent when false");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_enforcement_tags_omitted_when_unset() {
+        let params = make_test_params();
+        let sw = build_software_enforced(&params).unwrap();
+        let inner = skip_tlv_header(&sw);
+        let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
+        assert!(!tags.contains(&303), "CALLER_NONCE should be absent when false");
+        assert!(!tags.contains(&400), "ACTIVE_DATETIME should be absent when -1");
+        assert!(!tags.contains(&405), "USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT should be absent when -1");
+        assert!(!tags.contains(&509), "UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED should be absent when false");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_full_extension_roundtrip() {
+        let params = make_test_params();
+        let ext = build_attestation_extension(&params).unwrap();
+        // Must be valid DER: starts with SEQUENCE tag
+        assert_eq!(ext[0], 0x30);
+        // Length must account for all inner bytes
+        let (header_len, total_content_len) = parse_tlv_lengths(&ext);
+        assert_eq!(ext.len(), header_len + total_content_len);
+    }
+
+    // --- test helpers ---
+
+    fn make_test_params() -> CertGenParams {
+        CertGenParams {
+            algorithm: Algorithm::Ec,
+            key_size: 256,
+            ec_curve: Some(EcCurve::P256),
+            rsa_public_exponent: 0,
+            attestation_challenge: Some(vec![0xAB; 32]),
+            purposes: vec![2, 3],
+            digests: vec![4],
+            cert_serial: None,
+            cert_subject: None,
+            cert_not_before: -1,
+            cert_not_after: -1,
+            keybox_private_key: vec![],
+            keybox_cert_chain: vec![],
+            security_level: 1,
+            attest_version: 200,
+            keymaster_version: 200,
+            os_version: 140000,
+            os_patch_level: 202503,
+            vendor_patch_level: 20250301,
+            boot_patch_level: 20250301,
+            boot_key: vec![0x01; 32],
+            boot_hash: vec![0x02; 32],
+            creation_datetime: 1709913600000,
+            attestation_application_id: vec![0xDE, 0xAD],
+            module_hash: None,
+            id_brand: None,
+            id_device: None,
+            id_product: None,
+            id_serial: None,
+            id_imei: None,
+            id_meid: None,
+            id_manufacturer: None,
+            id_model: None,
+            id_second_imei: None,
+            active_datetime: -1,
+            origination_expire_datetime: -1,
+            usage_expire_datetime: -1,
+            usage_count_limit: -1,
+            caller_nonce: false,
+            unlocked_device_required: false,
+            no_auth_required: true,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn hex_string(data: &[u8]) -> String {
+        data.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
+    }
+
+    fn skip_tlv_header(data: &[u8]) -> &[u8] {
+        let (header_len, _) = parse_tlv_lengths(data);
+        &data[header_len..]
+    }
+
+    fn skip_one_tlv(data: &[u8]) -> (usize, &[u8]) {
+        let (header_len, content_len) = parse_tlv_lengths(data);
+        let total = header_len + content_len;
+        (total, &data[total..])
+    }
+
+    fn parse_tlv_lengths(data: &[u8]) -> (usize, usize) {
+        // Returns (header_bytes, content_bytes)
+        let tag_len = tag_byte_len(data);
+        let len_start = tag_len;
+        if data[len_start] < 0x80 {
+            (len_start + 1, data[len_start] as usize)
+        } else {
+            let num_len_bytes = (data[len_start] & 0x7F) as usize;
+            let mut content_len = 0usize;
+            for i in 0..num_len_bytes {
+                content_len = (content_len << 8) | data[len_start + 1 + i] as usize;
+            }
+            (len_start + 1 + num_len_bytes, content_len)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn tag_byte_len(data: &[u8]) -> usize {
+        if data[0] & 0x1F != 0x1F {
+            1
+        } else {
+            let mut i = 1;
+            while data[i] & 0x80 != 0 {
+                i += 1;
+            }
+            i + 1
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn extract_tag_numbers(mut data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u32> {
+        let mut tags = Vec::new();
+        while !data.is_empty() {
+            let tag = read_tag_number(data);
+            tags.push(tag);
+            let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(data);
+            data = rest;
+        }
+        tags
+    }
+
+    fn read_tag_number(data: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+        if data[0] & 0x1F != 0x1F {
+            (data[0] & 0x1F) as u32
+        } else {
+            let mut val = 0u32;
+            let mut i = 1;
+            loop {
+                val = (val << 7) | (data[i] & 0x7F) as u32;
+                if data[i] & 0x80 == 0 {
+                    break;
+                }
+                i += 1;
+            }
+            val
+        }
+    }
+}

native-certgen/src/certbuilder.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,523 @@
+use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
+use crate::keybox::ParsedKeybox;
+use crate::types::{Algorithm, CertGenParams, GeneratedKeyPair};
+
+use time::OffsetDateTime;
+
+const ATTESTATION_OID: &[u64] = &[1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 1, 17];
+
+// Signature algorithm OIDs
+const OID_SHA256_WITH_ECDSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2];
+const OID_SHA384_WITH_ECDSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3];
+const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11];
+
+// Extension OIDs
+const OID_KEY_USAGE: &[u64] = &[2, 5, 29, 15];
+
+pub fn build_certificate_chain(
+    key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
+    attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
+    keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
+    params: &CertGenParams,
+) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
+    let leaf_der = build_leaf_cert(key_pair, attestation_ext_der, keybox, params)?;
+
+    let mut chain = Vec::with_capacity(1 + keybox.cert_chain_ders.len());
+    chain.push(leaf_der);
+    for cert_der in &keybox.cert_chain_ders {
+        chain.push(cert_der.clone());
+    }
+
+    Ok(chain)
+}
+
+fn build_leaf_cert(
+    key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
+    attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
+    keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
+    params: &CertGenParams,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
+    let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&keybox.signing_key_der, params.algorithm)?;
+
+    // Serial number
+    let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
+        serial.clone()
+    } else {
+        vec![1u8]
+    };
+
+    // Subject DN
+    let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
+        subject.clone()
+    } else {
+        encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
+    };
+
+    // Validity
+    let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
+    let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
+        OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(keybox.leaf_not_after)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365))
+    } else {
+        timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
+    };
+
+    // Extensions
+    let extensions_der = build_extensions(attestation_ext_der, &params.purposes)?;
+
+    // TBS Certificate
+    let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
+    let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
+    let validity_der = encode_validity(&not_before, &not_after);
+    let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
+
+    let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
+        &version_der,
+        &serial_der,
+        &sig_alg_der,
+        &keybox.issuer_dn_der, // RAW bytes — no re-encoding
+        &validity_der,
+        &subject_dn_der,
+        &spki_der,
+        &extensions_tagged,
+    ]);
+
+    // Sign the TBS
+    let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &keybox.signing_key_der, params.algorithm)?;
+    let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
+
+    // Final certificate: SEQUENCE { TBS, sigAlgorithm, signature }
+    let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
+        &tbs_der,
+        &sig_alg_der,
+        &signature_bit_string,
+    ]);
+
+    Ok(cert_der)
+}
+
+fn sign_tbs(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8], algorithm: Algorithm) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    match algorithm {
+        Algorithm::Ec => sign_tbs_ec(tbs_der, signing_key_der),
+        Algorithm::Rsa => sign_tbs_rsa(tbs_der, signing_key_der),
+    }
+}
+
+fn sign_tbs_ec(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    // Determine EC curve from the signing key's PKCS8 AlgorithmIdentifier
+    let alg = detect_ec_signing_algorithm(signing_key_der)?;
+
+    let key_pair = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(alg, signing_key_der, &ring::rand::SystemRandom::new())
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC key parse: {e}")))?;
+
+    let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
+    let sig = key_pair.sign(&rng, tbs_der)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC sign: {e}")))?;
+
+    Ok(sig.as_ref().to_vec())
+}
+
+fn detect_ec_signing_algorithm(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<&'static ring::signature::EcdsaSigningAlgorithm> {
+    use der::Decode;
+    let info = pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(pkcs8_der)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("PKCS8 parse: {e}")))?;
+
+    let params_oid = info.algorithm.parameters_oid()
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC curve OID: {e}")))?;
+
+    let p256_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".parse()
+        .map_err(|_| CertGenError::SigningFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
+    let p384_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.3.132.0.34".parse()
+        .map_err(|_| CertGenError::SigningFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
+
+    if params_oid == p256_oid {
+        Ok(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING)
+    } else if params_oid == p384_oid {
+        Ok(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING)
+    } else {
+        Err(CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("unsupported EC curve OID: {params_oid}")))
+    }
+}
+
+fn sign_tbs_rsa(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
+    use rsa::signature::{SignatureEncoding, SignerMut};
+    use rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey;
+    use rsa::sha2::Sha256;
+
+    let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(signing_key_der)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("RSA key parse: {e}")))?;
+
+    let mut signing_key = SigningKey::<Sha256>::new(private_key);
+    let signature = signing_key.sign(tbs_der);
+
+    Ok(signature.to_vec())
+}
+
+fn signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(signing_key_der: &[u8], algorithm: Algorithm) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    match algorithm {
+        Algorithm::Ec => {
+            let ring_alg = detect_ec_signing_algorithm(signing_key_der)?;
+            // Determine OID from the algorithm used
+            let oid = if std::ptr::eq(ring_alg, &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING) {
+                OID_SHA384_WITH_ECDSA
+            } else {
+                OID_SHA256_WITH_ECDSA
+            };
+            let oid_der = encode_der_oid(oid);
+            Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der]))
+        }
+        Algorithm::Rsa => {
+            let oid_der = encode_der_oid(OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA);
+            let null_der = vec![0x05, 0x00];
+            Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der, &null_der]))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn extract_spki_from_pkcs8(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    use der::Decode;
+
+    let info = pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(pkcs8_der)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("PKCS8 parse for SPKI: {e}")))?;
+
+    // Reconstruct SPKI from AlgorithmIdentifier + public key
+    // For EC: derive public key from private key via ring
+    // For RSA: derive from rsa crate
+    let alg_id_oid = info.algorithm.oid;
+    let ec_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.2.1".parse()
+        .map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
+
+    if alg_id_oid == ec_oid {
+        extract_ec_spki(pkcs8_der, &info)
+    } else {
+        extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der)
+    }
+}
+
+fn extract_ec_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8], info: &pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    use ring::signature::KeyPair as _;
+    let params_oid = info.algorithm.parameters_oid()
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("EC curve OID: {e}")))?;
+
+    let p256_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".parse()
+        .map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
+    let p384_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.3.132.0.34".parse()
+        .map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
+
+    let (ring_alg, curve_oid_der): (&ring::signature::EcdsaSigningAlgorithm, Vec<u8>) = if params_oid == p256_oid {
+        (&ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING, encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7]))
+    } else if params_oid == p384_oid {
+        (&ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING, encode_der_oid(&[1, 3, 132, 0, 34]))
+    } else {
+        return Err(CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("unsupported EC curve: {params_oid}")));
+    };
+
+    let kp = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(
+        ring_alg,
+        pkcs8_der,
+        &ring::rand::SystemRandom::new(),
+    ).map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("EC key parse: {e}")))?;
+    let ec_kp = kp.public_key().as_ref().to_vec();
+
+    // SPKI = SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING (public key) }
+    // AlgorithmIdentifier = SEQUENCE { ecPublicKey OID, curve OID }
+    let ec_oid_der = encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1]);
+    let alg_id = encode_der_sequence(&[&ec_oid_der, &curve_oid_der]);
+    let pub_key_bits = encode_der_bit_string(&ec_kp);
+
+    Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
+}
+
+fn extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
+
+    let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(pkcs8_der)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("RSA key parse: {e}")))?;
+
+    let public_key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from(&private_key);
+
+    // Encode RSA public key as DER: SEQUENCE { n INTEGER, e INTEGER }
+    use rsa::traits::PublicKeyParts;
+    let n_bytes = public_key.n().to_bytes_be();
+    let e_bytes = public_key.e().to_bytes_be();
+    let rsa_pub_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
+        &encode_der_integer(&n_bytes),
+        &encode_der_integer(&e_bytes),
+    ]);
+
+    // SPKI = SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING (DER-encoded RSAPublicKey) }
+    let rsa_oid_der = encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1]);
+    let null_der = vec![0x05, 0x00];
+    let alg_id = encode_der_sequence(&[&rsa_oid_der, &null_der]);
+    let pub_key_bits = encode_der_bit_string(&rsa_pub_der);
+
+    Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
+}
+
+fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: &[u8], purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut extensions: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
+
+    // KeyUsage extension (critical)
+    let ku_byte = map_key_usage_byte(purposes);
+    if ku_byte != 0 {
+        let ku_ext = build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte);
+        extensions.push(ku_ext);
+    }
+
+    // Attestation extension (non-critical)
+    let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attestation_ext_der);
+    extensions.push(attest_ext);
+
+    Ok(encode_der_sequence_of(&extensions))
+}
+
+fn build_extension(oid_der: &[u8], critical: bool, value_der: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let value_octet_string = encode_der_octet_string(value_der);
+    if critical {
+        let critical_der = encode_der_boolean(true);
+        encode_der_sequence(&[oid_der, &critical_der, &value_octet_string])
+    } else {
+        encode_der_sequence(&[oid_der, &value_octet_string])
+    }
+}
+
+fn build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // DER BIT STRING: minimal encoding requires trimming trailing zero bits
+    let unused_bits = ku_byte.trailing_zeros().min(7) as u8;
+
+    // BIT STRING = tag (0x03) + length(2) + unused_bits + byte
+    let bit_string = vec![0x03, 0x02, unused_bits, ku_byte];
+
+    let oid_der = encode_der_oid(OID_KEY_USAGE);
+    let value_octet_string = encode_der_octet_string(&bit_string);
+    let critical_der = encode_der_boolean(true);
+
+    encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der, &critical_der, &value_octet_string])
+}
+
+// KeyUsage BIT STRING byte layout (RFC 5280):
+//   byte[0] bit 7 = digitalSignature (0x80)
+//   byte[0] bit 6 = nonRepudiation   (0x40)
+//   byte[0] bit 5 = keyEncipherment  (0x20)
+//   byte[0] bit 4 = dataEncipherment (0x10)
+//   byte[0] bit 3 = keyAgreement     (0x08)
+//   byte[0] bit 2 = keyCertSign      (0x04)
+//   byte[0] bit 1 = cRLSign          (0x02)
+//   byte[0] bit 0 = encipherOnly     (0x01)
+//   byte[1] bit 7 = decipherOnly     (0x80)
+fn map_key_usage_byte(purposes: &[i32]) -> u8 {
+    let mut bits: u8 = 0;
+    for &purpose in purposes {
+        match purpose {
+            2 => bits |= 0x80, // SIGN -> digitalSignature
+            1 => bits |= 0x10, // DECRYPT -> dataEncipherment
+            5 => bits |= 0x20, // WRAP_KEY -> keyEncipherment
+            6 => bits |= 0x08, // AGREE_KEY -> keyAgreement
+            7 => bits |= 0x04, // ATTEST_KEY -> keyCertSign
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    bits
+}
+
+fn encode_validity(not_before: &OffsetDateTime, not_after: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let nb = encode_time(not_before);
+    let na = encode_time(not_after);
+    encode_der_sequence(&[&nb, &na])
+}
+
+fn encode_time(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let year = dt.year();
+    if (1950..2050).contains(&year) {
+        encode_utctime(dt)
+    } else {
+        encode_gentime(dt)
+    }
+}
+
+fn encode_utctime(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+    let year = dt.year() % 100;
+    let s = format!(
+        "{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}Z",
+        year, dt.month() as u8, dt.day(), dt.hour(), dt.minute(), dt.second()
+    );
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + s.len());
+    out.push(0x17); // UTCTime tag
+    out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(s.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
+    out
+}
+
+fn encode_gentime(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+    let s = format!(
+        "{:04}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}Z",
+        dt.year(), dt.month() as u8, dt.day(), dt.hour(), dt.minute(), dt.second()
+    );
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + s.len());
+    out.push(0x18); // GeneralizedTime tag
+    out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(s.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
+    out
+}
+
+fn encode_simple_cn_dn(cn: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // Name = SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+    // RDN = SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue
+    // ATV = SEQUENCE { OID, UTF8String }
+    let cn_oid = encode_der_oid(&[2, 5, 4, 3]);
+    let cn_value = encode_der_utf8string(cn);
+    let atv = encode_der_sequence(&[&cn_oid, &cn_value]);
+    let rdn = encode_der_set(&[&atv]);
+    encode_der_sequence(&[&rdn])
+}
+
+fn timestamp_to_datetime(ts: i64) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
+    if ts == -1 {
+        return Ok(OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
+    }
+    OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(ts / 1000)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("invalid timestamp {ts}: {e}")))
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// DER encoding primitives
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn encode_der_length_bytes(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
+    if len < 0x80 {
+        vec![len as u8]
+    } else if len <= 0xFF {
+        vec![0x81, len as u8]
+    } else if len <= 0xFFFF {
+        vec![0x82, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
+    } else if len <= 0xFF_FFFF {
+        vec![0x83, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
+    } else {
+        vec![0x84, (len >> 24) as u8, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
+    }
+}
+
+fn encode_der_tag_length_value(tag: u8, content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 4 + content.len());
+    out.push(tag);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(content.len()));
+    out.extend_from_slice(content);
+    out
+}
+
+fn encode_der_sequence(items: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
+    let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
+    for item in items {
+        content.extend_from_slice(item);
+    }
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x30, &content)
+}
+
+fn encode_der_sequence_of(items: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
+    let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
+    for item in items {
+        content.extend_from_slice(item);
+    }
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x30, &content)
+}
+
+fn encode_der_set(items: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
+    let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
+    for item in items {
+        content.extend_from_slice(item);
+    }
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x31, &content)
+}
+
+fn encode_der_explicit_tag(tag_num: u8, content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0xA0 | tag_num, content)
+}
+
+fn encode_der_integer(value: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // DER INTEGER must have minimal encoding and leading 0x00 if high bit set
+    if value.is_empty() {
+        return encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, &[0x00]);
+    }
+
+    // Strip leading zeros (but keep at least one byte)
+    let mut start = 0;
+    while start < value.len() - 1 && value[start] == 0 {
+        start += 1;
+    }
+    let trimmed = &value[start..];
+
+    // Add leading 0x00 if high bit is set (positive integer)
+    if trimmed[0] & 0x80 != 0 {
+        let mut padded = Vec::with_capacity(1 + trimmed.len());
+        padded.push(0x00);
+        padded.extend_from_slice(trimmed);
+        encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, &padded)
+    } else {
+        encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, trimmed)
+    }
+}
+
+fn encode_der_bit_string(bits: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    // BIT STRING: tag 0x03, length, unused_bits (0), content
+    let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(1 + bits.len());
+    content.push(0x00); // 0 unused bits
+    content.extend_from_slice(bits);
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x03, &content)
+}
+
+fn encode_der_octet_string(content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x04, content)
+}
+
+fn encode_der_utf8string(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x0C, s.as_bytes())
+}
+
+fn encode_der_boolean(val: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x01, &[if val { 0xFF } else { 0x00 }])
+}
+
+fn encode_der_oid(components: &[u64]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    if components.len() < 2 {
+        return encode_der_tag_length_value(0x06, &[]);
+    }
+
+    let mut content = Vec::new();
+    // First two components encoded as 40 * c[0] + c[1]
+    content.push((components[0] * 40 + components[1]) as u8);
+
+    for &c in &components[2..] {
+        encode_oid_subidentifier(&mut content, c);
+    }
+
+    encode_der_tag_length_value(0x06, &content)
+}
+
+fn encode_oid_subidentifier(buf: &mut Vec<u8>, mut value: u64) {
+    if value == 0 {
+        buf.push(0);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Encode in base-128 with continuation bits
+    let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+    while value > 0 {
+        bytes.push((value & 0x7F) as u8);
+        value >>= 7;
+    }
+    bytes.reverse();
+
+    // Set high bit on all but the last byte
+    for i in 0..bytes.len() - 1 {
+        bytes[i] |= 0x80;
+    }
+
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
+}

native-certgen/src/error.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum CertGenError {
+    Jni(String),
+    NullParam(&'static str),
+    UnsupportedAlgorithm(i32),
+    UnsupportedEcCurve(i32),
+    KeyGenFailed(String),
+    CertBuildFailed(String),
+    KeyboxParseFailed(String),
+    AttestationBuildFailed(String),
+    DerError(der::Error),
+    EmptyKeyboxChain,
+    ChallengeTooLong(usize),
+    InvalidParameter(String),
+    SigningFailed(String),
+    SerializationFailed(String),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for CertGenError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Jni(msg) => write!(f, "JNI error: {}", msg),
+            Self::NullParam(name) => write!(f, "null required parameter: {}", name),
+            Self::UnsupportedAlgorithm(v) => write!(f, "unsupported algorithm: {}", v),
+            Self::UnsupportedEcCurve(v) => write!(f, "unsupported EC curve: {}", v),
+            Self::KeyGenFailed(msg) => write!(f, "key generation failed: {}", msg),
+            Self::CertBuildFailed(msg) => write!(f, "certificate build failed: {}", msg),
+            Self::KeyboxParseFailed(msg) => write!(f, "keybox parse failed: {}", msg),
+            Self::AttestationBuildFailed(msg) => write!(f, "attestation build failed: {}", msg),
+            Self::DerError(e) => write!(f, "DER error: {}", e),
+            Self::EmptyKeyboxChain => write!(f, "keybox certificate chain is empty"),
+            Self::ChallengeTooLong(len) => write!(f, "attestation challenge too long: {} bytes (max 128)", len),
+            Self::InvalidParameter(msg) => write!(f, "invalid parameter: {}", msg),
+            Self::SigningFailed(msg) => write!(f, "signing failed: {}", msg),
+            Self::SerializationFailed(msg) => write!(f, "serialization failed: {}", msg),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for CertGenError {}
+
+impl From<jni::errors::Error> for CertGenError {
+    fn from(e: jni::errors::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::Jni(e.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<der::Error> for CertGenError {
+    fn from(e: der::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::DerError(e)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<ring::error::Unspecified> for CertGenError {
+    fn from(e: ring::error::Unspecified) -> Self {
+        Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<ring::error::KeyRejected> for CertGenError {
+    fn from(e: ring::error::KeyRejected) -> Self {
+        Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<rsa::Error> for CertGenError {
+    fn from(e: rsa::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+
+pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, CertGenError>;

native-certgen/src/keybox.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
+use der::{Decode, Encode};
+use x509_cert::Certificate;
+
+pub struct ParsedKeybox {
+    pub signing_key_der: Vec<u8>,
+    pub issuer_dn_der: Vec<u8>,
+    pub cert_chain_ders: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub leaf_not_after: i64,
+}
+
+pub fn parse_keybox(cert_chain_bytes: &[u8], private_key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<ParsedKeybox> {
+    let certs = split_der_certificates(cert_chain_bytes)?;
+    if certs.is_empty() {
+        return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("no certificates found".into()));
+    }
+
+    let leaf = Certificate::from_der(&certs[0])
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(format!("leaf cert parse: {e}")))?;
+
+    let issuer_dn_der = leaf.tbs_certificate.subject.to_der()
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(format!("subject DN encode: {e}")))?;
+
+    let not_after = leaf.tbs_certificate.validity.not_after;
+    let leaf_not_after = not_after.to_unix_duration().as_secs() as i64;
+
+    Ok(ParsedKeybox {
+        signing_key_der: private_key_bytes.to_vec(),
+        issuer_dn_der,
+        cert_chain_ders: certs,
+        leaf_not_after,
+    })
+}
+
+fn split_der_certificates(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
+    let mut certs = Vec::new();
+    let mut offset = 0;
+
+    while offset < data.len() {
+        if data[offset] != 0x30 {
+            return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
+                format!("expected SEQUENCE tag 0x30 at offset {offset}, got 0x{:02x}", data[offset])
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let (content_len, header_len) = parse_der_length(&data[offset + 1..])?;
+        let total_len = 1 + header_len + content_len;
+
+        if offset + total_len > data.len() {
+            return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
+                format!("cert at offset {offset} extends beyond buffer: need {total_len}, have {}", data.len() - offset)
+            ));
+        }
+
+        certs.push(data[offset..offset + total_len].to_vec());
+        offset += total_len;
+    }
+
+    if certs.is_empty() {
+        return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("no certificates in chain".into()));
+    }
+
+    Ok(certs)
+}
+
+// Returns (content_length, number_of_length_bytes_consumed)
+fn parse_der_length(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(usize, usize)> {
+    if data.is_empty() {
+        return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("truncated DER length".into()));
+    }
+
+    let first = data[0];
+
+    if first < 0x80 {
+        // Short form: length is the byte itself
+        return Ok((first as usize, 1));
+    }
+
+    // Long form: low 7 bits = number of subsequent length bytes
+    let num_bytes = (first & 0x7f) as usize;
+    if num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4 {
+        return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
+            format!("unsupported DER length encoding: 0x{first:02x}")
+        ));
+    }
+    if 1 + num_bytes > data.len() {
+        return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("truncated multi-byte DER length".into()));
+    }
+
+    let mut len: usize = 0;
+    for i in 0..num_bytes {
+        len = (len << 8) | (data[1 + i] as usize);
+    }
+
+    Ok((len, 1 + num_bytes))
+}

native-certgen/src/keygen.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
+use crate::types::{Algorithm, EcCurve, GeneratedKeyPair};
+
+pub fn generate_key_pair(
+    algorithm: Algorithm,
+    key_size: u32,
+    ec_curve: Option<EcCurve>,
+    rsa_public_exponent: u64,
+) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
+    match algorithm {
+        Algorithm::Ec => {
+            let curve = ec_curve.ok_or_else(|| CertGenError::InvalidParameter("ec_curve required for EC".into()))?;
+            generate_ec_key_pair(curve)
+        }
+        Algorithm::Rsa => generate_rsa_key_pair(key_size, rsa_public_exponent),
+    }
+}
+
+fn generate_ec_key_pair(curve: EcCurve) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
+    let alg = match curve {
+        EcCurve::P256 => &ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING,
+        EcCurve::P384 => &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING,
+        _ => return Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedEcCurve(curve as i32)),
+    };
+
+    let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
+    let pkcs8_doc = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::generate_pkcs8(alg, &rng)?;
+
+    Ok(GeneratedKeyPair {
+        private_key_pkcs8: pkcs8_doc.as_ref().to_vec(),
+    })
+}
+
+fn generate_rsa_key_pair(key_size: u32, rsa_public_exponent: u64) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
+    use pkcs8::EncodePrivateKey;
+
+    if !matches!(key_size, 2048 | 3072 | 4096) {
+        return Err(CertGenError::InvalidParameter(
+            format!("RSA key size must be 2048, 3072, or 4096; got {key_size}")
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let exp = if rsa_public_exponent == 0 {
+        rsa::BigUint::from(65537u64)
+    } else {
+        rsa::BigUint::from(rsa_public_exponent)
+    };
+
+    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+    let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::new_with_exp(&mut rng, key_size as usize, &exp)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    let pkcs8_der = private_key.to_pkcs8_der()
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::SerializationFailed(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    Ok(GeneratedKeyPair {
+        private_key_pkcs8: pkcs8_der.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+    })
+}

native-certgen/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+#![deny(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
+
+mod error;
+mod types;
+mod keygen;
+pub mod keybox;
+pub mod attestation;
+pub mod certbuilder;
+pub mod logging;
+
+use jni::objects::{JByteArray, JClass, JIntArray, JObject, JString};
+use jni::sys::{jboolean, jbyteArray, jstring};
+use jni::JNIEnv;
+
+use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
+use crate::types::{Algorithm, CertGenParams, EcCurve};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// JNI entry: generateAttestedKeyPair
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_generateAttestedKeyPair(
+    mut env: JNIEnv,
+    _class: JClass,
+    config: JObject,
+) -> jbyteArray {
+    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+        generate_attested_inner(&mut env, &config)
+    }));
+
+    match result {
+        Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
+        Ok(Err(e)) => {
+            tracing::error!(%e, "generateAttestedKeyPair failed");
+            let _ = env.throw_new(
+                "java/lang/RuntimeException",
+                format!("NativeCertGen: {e}"),
+            );
+            std::ptr::null_mut()
+        }
+        Err(_) => {
+            tracing::error!("generateAttestedKeyPair panicked");
+            let _ = env.throw_new(
+                "java/lang/RuntimeException",
+                "NativeCertGen: internal panic",
+            );
+            std::ptr::null_mut()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn generate_attested_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<jbyteArray> {
+    let params = extract_config(env, config)?;
+
+    let key_pair = keygen::generate_key_pair(
+        params.algorithm,
+        params.key_size,
+        params.ec_curve,
+        params.rsa_public_exponent,
+    )?;
+
+    let keybox = keybox::parse_keybox(&params.keybox_cert_chain, &params.keybox_private_key)?;
+
+    let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(&params)?;
+
+    let cert_chain = certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(
+        &key_pair,
+        &attest_ext,
+        &keybox,
+        &params,
+    )?;
+
+    let blob = assemble_result(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, &cert_chain);
+
+    let out = env.byte_array_from_slice(&blob)?;
+    Ok(out.into_raw())
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// JNI entry: initLogging
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_initLogging(
+    mut env: JNIEnv,
+    _class: JClass,
+    verbose: jboolean,
+    log_dir: JString,
+) -> jboolean {
+    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+        init_logging_inner(&mut env, verbose, &log_dir)
+    }));
+
+    match result {
+        Ok(Ok(())) => 1,
+        Ok(Err(e)) => {
+            let _ = env.throw_new(
+                "java/lang/RuntimeException",
+                format!("NativeCertGen initLogging: {e}"),
+            );
+            0
+        }
+        Err(_) => {
+            let _ = env.throw_new(
+                "java/lang/RuntimeException",
+                "NativeCertGen initLogging: internal panic",
+            );
+            0
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn init_logging_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, verbose: jboolean, log_dir: &JString) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir: String = env.get_string(log_dir)?.into();
+    logging::init(verbose != 0, &dir, 2, 3)
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("logging init failed: {e}")))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// JNI entry: dumpLogs
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_dumpLogs(
+    mut env: JNIEnv,
+    _class: JClass,
+) -> jstring {
+    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
+        dump_logs_inner(&mut env)
+    }));
+
+    match result {
+        Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
+        Ok(Err(e)) => {
+            tracing::error!(%e, "dumpLogs failed");
+            std::ptr::null_mut()
+        }
+        Err(_) => {
+            tracing::error!("dumpLogs panicked");
+            std::ptr::null_mut()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn dump_logs_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv) -> Result<jstring> {
+    logging::dump::execute_dump()
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("dump failed: {e}")))?;
+
+    // Read the dump path written by execute_dump
+    let path = std::fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path")
+        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("read dump path: {e}")))?;
+
+    let jpath = env.new_string(&path)?;
+    Ok(jpath.into_raw())
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Config extraction from Java CertGenConfig object
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn extract_config(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<CertGenParams> {
+    let algorithm = get_int(env, config, "algorithm")?;
+    let key_size = get_int(env, config, "keySize")?;
+    let ec_curve_raw = get_int(env, config, "ecCurve")?;
+    let rsa_pub_exp = get_long(env, config, "rsaPublicExponent")?;
+
+    let cert_not_before = get_long(env, config, "certNotBefore")?;
+    let cert_not_after = get_long(env, config, "certNotAfter")?;
+    let security_level = get_int(env, config, "securityLevel")?;
+    let attest_version = get_int(env, config, "attestVersion")?;
+    let keymaster_version = get_int(env, config, "keymasterVersion")?;
+    let os_version = get_int(env, config, "osVersion")?;
+    let os_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "osPatchLevel")?;
+    let vendor_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "vendorPatchLevel")?;
+    let boot_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "bootPatchLevel")?;
+    let creation_datetime = get_long(env, config, "creationDatetime")?;
+
+    let attestation_challenge = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "attestationChallenge")?;
+    let purposes = get_int_array(env, config, "purposes")?;
+    let digests = get_int_array(env, config, "digests")?;
+    let cert_serial = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "certSerial")?;
+    let cert_subject = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "certSubject")?;
+    let keybox_private_key = get_byte_array(env, config, "keyboxPrivateKey")?;
+    let keybox_cert_chain = get_byte_array(env, config, "keyboxCertChain")?;
+    let boot_key = get_byte_array(env, config, "bootKey")?;
+    let boot_hash = get_byte_array(env, config, "bootHash")?;
+    let attestation_app_id = get_byte_array(env, config, "attestationApplicationId")?;
+    let module_hash = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "moduleHash")?;
+
+    let id_brand = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idBrand")?;
+    let id_device = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idDevice")?;
+    let id_product = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idProduct")?;
+    let id_serial = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idSerial")?;
+    let id_imei = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idImei")?;
+    let id_meid = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idMeid")?;
+    let id_manufacturer = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idManufacturer")?;
+    let id_model = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idModel")?;
+    let id_second_imei = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idSecondImei")?;
+
+    let active_datetime = get_long(env, config, "activeDatetime")?;
+    let origination_expire_datetime = get_long(env, config, "originationExpireDatetime")?;
+    let usage_expire_datetime = get_long(env, config, "usageExpireDatetime")?;
+    let usage_count_limit = get_int(env, config, "usageCountLimit")?;
+    let caller_nonce = get_boolean(env, config, "callerNonce")?;
+    let unlocked_device_required = get_boolean(env, config, "unlockedDeviceRequired")?;
+    let no_auth_required = get_boolean(env, config, "noAuthRequired")?;
+
+    Ok(CertGenParams {
+        algorithm: Algorithm::try_from(algorithm)?,
+        key_size: key_size as u32,
+        ec_curve: if algorithm == 3 {
+            Some(EcCurve::try_from(ec_curve_raw)?)
+        } else {
+            None
+        },
+        rsa_public_exponent: rsa_pub_exp as u64,
+        attestation_challenge,
+        purposes,
+        digests,
+        cert_serial,
+        cert_subject,
+        cert_not_before,
+        cert_not_after,
+        keybox_private_key,
+        keybox_cert_chain,
+        security_level,
+        attest_version,
+        keymaster_version,
+        os_version,
+        os_patch_level,
+        vendor_patch_level,
+        boot_patch_level,
+        boot_key,
+        boot_hash,
+        creation_datetime,
+        attestation_application_id: attestation_app_id,
+        module_hash,
+        id_brand,
+        id_device,
+        id_product,
+        id_serial,
+        id_imei,
+        id_meid,
+        id_manufacturer,
+        id_model,
+        id_second_imei,
+        active_datetime,
+        origination_expire_datetime,
+        usage_expire_datetime,
+        usage_count_limit,
+        caller_nonce,
+        unlocked_device_required,
+        no_auth_required,
+    })
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// JNI field accessor helpers — called 35+ times, justifies the abstraction
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn get_int(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<i32> {
+    Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "I")?.i()?)
+}
+
+fn get_long(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<i64> {
+    Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "J")?.j()?)
+}
+
+fn get_boolean(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+    Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "Z")?.z()?)
+}
+
+fn get_byte_array(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &'static str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[B")?.l()?;
+    if field.is_null() {
+        return Err(CertGenError::NullParam(name));
+    }
+    let arr: JByteArray = field.into();
+    let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
+    let mut buf = vec![0i8; len as usize];
+    env.get_byte_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
+    env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
+    Ok(buf.into_iter().map(|b| b as u8).collect())
+}
+
+fn get_nullable_byte_array(
+    env: &mut JNIEnv,
+    obj: &JObject,
+    name: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+    let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[B")?.l()?;
+    if field.is_null() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let arr: JByteArray = field.into();
+    let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
+    let mut buf = vec![0i8; len as usize];
+    env.get_byte_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
+    env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
+    Ok(Some(buf.into_iter().map(|b| b as u8).collect()))
+}
+
+fn get_int_array(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<Vec<i32>> {
+    let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[I")?.l()?;
+    if field.is_null() {
+        return Ok(vec![]);
+    }
+    let arr: JIntArray = field.into();
+    let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
+    let mut buf = vec![0i32; len as usize];
+    env.get_int_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
+    env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
+    Ok(buf)
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Binary result assembly (doc 09 section 4.1)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn assemble_result(private_key: &[u8], cert_chain: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let total = 4 + private_key.len()
+        + 4
+        + cert_chain.iter().map(|c| 4 + c.len()).sum::<usize>();
+
+    let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(total);
+
+    // Private key segment
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&(private_key.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    buf.extend_from_slice(private_key);
+
+    // Cert count
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&(cert_chain.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+
+    // Each cert: length-prefixed DER
+    for cert in cert_chain {
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&(cert.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+        buf.extend_from_slice(cert);
+    }
+
+    buf
+}

native-certgen/src/logging/dump.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+use std::fs::{self, File};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::process::Command;
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+const DUMP_DIR: &str = "/sdcard/Download";
+const LOCK_PATH: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_lock";
+const DUMP_PATH_FILE: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path";
+const LOG_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs";
+const BASE_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store";
+const LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+struct FlockGuard {
+    _file: File,
+}
+
+impl FlockGuard {
+    fn acquire() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+        if let Some(parent) = Path::new(LOCK_PATH).parent() {
+            fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
+        }
+        let file = File::create(LOCK_PATH)?;
+        let fd = {
+            use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
+            file.as_raw_fd()
+        };
+        let ret = unsafe { libc::flock(fd, libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) };
+        if ret != 0 {
+            return Err("dump already in progress".into());
+        }
+        Ok(Self { _file: file })
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for FlockGuard {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        // flock released automatically when file descriptor closes
+    }
+}
+
+fn random_name(len: usize) -> String {
+    use rand::Rng;
+    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+    (0..len)
+        .map(|_| {
+            let idx = rng.gen_range(0..36u8);
+            if idx < 10 {
+                (b'0' + idx) as char
+            } else {
+                (b'a' + idx - 10) as char
+            }
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+fn collect_logcat(tag: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let output = Command::new("logcat")
+        .args(["-d", "-s", tag])
+        .output();
+
+    match output {
+        Ok(o) => {
+            let mut data = o.stdout;
+            data.truncate(LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT);
+            data
+        }
+        Err(_) => Vec::new(),
+    }
+}
+
+fn collect_device_info() -> String {
+    let mut info = String::new();
+
+    if let Ok(output) = Command::new("uname").arg("-a").output() {
+        info.push_str(&format!(
+            "uname={}\n",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
+        ));
+    }
+
+    for (key, prop) in [
+        ("device", "ro.product.device"),
+        ("build", "ro.build.display.id"),
+        ("android", "ro.build.version.release"),
+    ] {
+        if let Ok(output) = Command::new("getprop").arg(prop).output() {
+            info.push_str(&format!(
+                "{}={}\n",
+                key,
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    // KSU version
+    if let Ok(ver) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/ksu/version") {
+        info.push_str(&format!("ksu={}\n", ver.trim()));
+    }
+
+    // Module version from module.prop
+    if let Ok(prop) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/module.prop") {
+        for line in prop.lines() {
+            if let Some(ver) = line.strip_prefix("version=") {
+                info.push_str(&format!("module={}\n", ver.trim()));
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    info
+}
+
+fn read_file_bytes(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    File::open(path).ok()?.read_to_end(&mut buf).ok()?;
+    Some(buf)
+}
+
+fn epoch_millis() -> u64 {
+    SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
+pub fn execute_dump() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let _lock = FlockGuard::acquire()?;
+
+    let _ = fs::create_dir_all(DUMP_DIR);
+    let zip_name = format!("{}.zip", random_name(8));
+    let zip_path = format!("{}/{}", DUMP_DIR, zip_name);
+
+    let zip_file = File::create(&zip_path)?;
+    let mut zip = zip::ZipWriter::new(zip_file);
+    let options =
+        zip::write::SimpleFileOptions::default().compression_method(zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated);
+
+    let mut file_count = 0u32;
+
+    // Log files
+    let log_files = [
+        "certgen.log",
+        "certgen.log.1",
+        "certgen.log.2",
+        "certgen.log.3",
+        "certgen.log.4",
+    ];
+    for name in &log_files {
+        let path = format!("{}/{}", LOG_DIR, name);
+        if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
+            zip.start_file(*name, options)?;
+            zip.write_all(&data)?;
+            file_count += 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Logcat
+    let logcat = collect_logcat("TEESimulator");
+    if !logcat.is_empty() {
+        zip.start_file("logcat-teesimulator.log", options)?;
+        zip.write_all(&logcat)?;
+        file_count += 1;
+    }
+
+    // Config files
+    for name in ["tee_status.txt", "security_patch.txt"] {
+        let path = format!("{}/{}", BASE_DIR, name);
+        if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
+            zip.start_file(name, options)?;
+            zip.write_all(&data)?;
+            file_count += 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Device info
+    let device_info = collect_device_info();
+    if !device_info.is_empty() {
+        zip.start_file("device-info.txt", options)?;
+        zip.write_all(device_info.as_bytes())?;
+        file_count += 1;
+    }
+
+    // Manifest
+    let manifest = serde_json::json!({
+        "timestamp": epoch_millis(),
+        "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+        "files": file_count,
+    });
+    zip.start_file("manifest.json", options)?;
+    zip.write_all(manifest.to_string().as_bytes())?;
+
+    zip.finish()?;
+
+    let zip_size = fs::metadata(&zip_path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+    fs::write(DUMP_PATH_FILE, &zip_path)?;
+
+    let result = serde_json::json!({
+        "zip": zip_path,
+        "size": zip_size,
+        "files": file_count + 1, // +1 for manifest
+    });
+    println!("{}", result);
+
+    tracing::info!(path = %zip_path, size = zip_size, "diagnostic dump created");
+
+    Ok(())
+}

native-certgen/src/logging/kmsg.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+use tracing::field::{Field, Visit};
+use tracing::{Event, Level, Subscriber};
+use tracing_subscriber::layer::Context;
+use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
+
+const KMSG_PATH: &str = "/dev/kmsg";
+const TAG: &str = "TEESimulator";
+
+pub struct KmsgLayer {
+    writer: Mutex<Option<File>>,
+}
+
+impl KmsgLayer {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        let file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(KMSG_PATH).ok();
+        Self {
+            writer: Mutex::new(file),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn syslog_priority(level: &Level) -> u8 {
+    match *level {
+        Level::ERROR => 3,
+        Level::WARN => 4,
+        Level::INFO => 6,
+        Level::DEBUG | Level::TRACE => 7,
+    }
+}
+
+struct MessageVisitor {
+    message: String,
+    fields: String,
+}
+
+impl MessageVisitor {
+    fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            message: String::new(),
+            fields: String::new(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Visit for MessageVisitor {
+    fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &Field, value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
+        if field.name() == "message" {
+            let raw = format!("{:?}", value);
+            // Strip surrounding debug quotes if present
+            self.message = raw
+                .strip_prefix('"')
+                .and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('"'))
+                .unwrap_or(&raw)
+                .to_string();
+        } else {
+            if !self.fields.is_empty() {
+                self.fields.push(' ');
+            }
+            self.fields.push_str(&format!("{}={:?}", field.name(), value));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<S: Subscriber> Layer<S> for KmsgLayer {
+    fn on_event(&self, event: &Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
+        let mut guard = match self.writer.lock() {
+            Ok(g) => g,
+            Err(_) => return,
+        };
+        let file = match guard.as_mut() {
+            Some(f) => f,
+            None => return,
+        };
+
+        let priority = syslog_priority(event.metadata().level());
+        let mut visitor = MessageVisitor::new();
+        event.record(&mut visitor);
+
+        let line = if visitor.fields.is_empty() {
+            format!("<{}>{}: {}\n", priority, TAG, visitor.message)
+        } else {
+            format!(
+                "<{}>{}: {} {}\n",
+                priority, TAG, visitor.message, visitor.fields
+            )
+        };
+
+        let _ = file.write_all(line.as_bytes());
+    }
+}

native-certgen/src/logging/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+mod kmsg;
+mod rotating;
+pub mod sysfs;
+pub mod dump;
+
+use std::path::Path;
+use tracing_subscriber::{layer::SubscriberExt, util::SubscriberInitExt, EnvFilter};
+
+const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
+
+pub fn init(
+    verbose_flag: bool,
+    log_dir: &str,
+    max_size_mb: u64,
+    max_files: usize,
+) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let verbose = verbose_flag || Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists();
+
+    let (max_size, max_files) = if verbose {
+        (5 * 1024 * 1024, 5)
+    } else {
+        (max_size_mb * 1024 * 1024, max_files)
+    };
+
+    let level = if verbose { "trace" } else { "info" };
+    let filter = EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| EnvFilter::new(level));
+
+    let kmsg_layer = kmsg::KmsgLayer::new();
+    let rotating_layer = rotating::RotatingFileLayer::new(log_dir, max_size, max_files);
+    let stderr_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr);
+
+    // Idempotent — second call returns Ok instead of propagating SetGlobalDefaultError
+    let _ = tracing_subscriber::registry()
+        .with(filter)
+        .with(kmsg_layer)
+        .with(rotating_layer)
+        .with(stderr_layer)
+        .try_init();
+
+    Ok(())
+}

native-certgen/src/logging/rotating.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+use tracing::field::{Field, Visit};
+use tracing::{Event, Level, Subscriber};
+use tracing_subscriber::layer::Context;
+use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
+
+struct RotatingState {
+    dir: PathBuf,
+    current: Option<File>,
+    current_size: u64,
+    max_size: u64,
+    max_files: usize,
+}
+
+pub struct RotatingFileLayer {
+    state: Mutex<RotatingState>,
+}
+
+impl RotatingFileLayer {
+    pub fn new(dir: &str, max_size: u64, max_files: usize) -> Self {
+        let dir = PathBuf::from(dir);
+        let _ = fs::create_dir_all(&dir);
+        let (file, size) = open_current_log(&dir);
+        Self {
+            state: Mutex::new(RotatingState {
+                dir,
+                current: file,
+                current_size: size,
+                max_size,
+                max_files,
+            }),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn open_current_log(dir: &Path) -> (Option<File>, u64) {
+    let path = dir.join("certgen.log");
+    let size = fs::metadata(&path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+    let file = OpenOptions::new()
+        .create(true)
+        .append(true)
+        .open(&path)
+        .ok();
+    (file, size)
+}
+
+fn rotate(state: &mut RotatingState) {
+    // Close current handle before renaming
+    state.current.take();
+
+    let dir = &state.dir;
+    // Delete the oldest rotated file before shifting
+    let oldest = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", state.max_files));
+    if oldest.exists() {
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(&oldest);
+    }
+    // Shift older files up: .{N} -> .{N+1}
+    for i in (1..state.max_files).rev() {
+        let from = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", i));
+        let to = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", i + 1));
+        if from.exists() {
+            let _ = fs::rename(&from, &to);
+        }
+    }
+    // Current -> .1
+    let current_path = dir.join("certgen.log");
+    let first_rotated = dir.join("certgen.log.1");
+    if current_path.exists() {
+        let _ = fs::rename(&current_path, &first_rotated);
+    }
+
+    let (file, size) = open_current_log(dir);
+    state.current = file;
+    state.current_size = size;
+}
+
+fn epoch_secs() -> u64 {
+    SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map(|d| d.as_secs())
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
+fn level_str(level: &Level) -> &'static str {
+    match *level {
+        Level::ERROR => "ERROR",
+        Level::WARN => "WARN",
+        Level::INFO => "INFO",
+        Level::DEBUG => "DEBUG",
+        Level::TRACE => "TRACE",
+    }
+}
+
+struct LogVisitor {
+    message: String,
+    fields: String,
+}
+
+impl LogVisitor {
+    fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            message: String::new(),
+            fields: String::new(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Visit for LogVisitor {
+    fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &Field, value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
+        if field.name() == "message" {
+            let raw = format!("{:?}", value);
+            self.message = raw
+                .strip_prefix('"')
+                .and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('"'))
+                .unwrap_or(&raw)
+                .to_string();
+        } else {
+            if !self.fields.is_empty() {
+                self.fields.push(' ');
+            }
+            self.fields.push_str(&format!("{}={:?}", field.name(), value));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<S: Subscriber> Layer<S> for RotatingFileLayer {
+    fn on_event(&self, event: &Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
+        let mut state = match self.state.lock() {
+            Ok(s) => s,
+            Err(_) => return,
+        };
+
+        if state.current_size >= state.max_size {
+            rotate(&mut state);
+        }
+
+        let file = match state.current.as_mut() {
+            Some(f) => f,
+            None => return,
+        };
+
+        let ts = epoch_secs();
+        let lvl = level_str(event.metadata().level());
+        let target = event.metadata().target();
+
+        let mut visitor = LogVisitor::new();
+        event.record(&mut visitor);
+
+        let line = if visitor.fields.is_empty() {
+            format!("{} [{}] {}: {}\n", ts, lvl, target, visitor.message)
+        } else {
+            format!(
+                "{} [{}] {}: {} {}\n",
+                ts, lvl, target, visitor.message, visitor.fields
+            )
+        };
+
+        if file.write_all(line.as_bytes()).is_ok() {
+            state.current_size += line.len() as u64;
+        }
+    }
+}

native-certgen/src/logging/sysfs.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+use std::fs;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
+
+pub fn is_verbose() -> bool {
+    Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists()
+}
+
+pub fn set_verbose_marker(enabled: bool) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    if enabled {
+        if let Some(parent) = Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).parent() {
+            fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
+        }
+        fs::write(VERBOSE_MARKER, "")?;
+    } else if Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists() {
+        fs::remove_file(VERBOSE_MARKER)?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn enable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    set_verbose_marker(true)?;
+    tracing::info!("verbose logging enabled via marker file");
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn disable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    set_verbose_marker(false)?;
+    tracing::info!("verbose logging disabled, marker file removed");
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn status() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let state = if is_verbose() { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
+    tracing::info!(verbose = state, "verbose marker status");
+    Ok(())
+}

native-certgen/src/types.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+use crate::error::CertGenError;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+pub enum Algorithm {
+    Rsa = 1,
+    Ec = 3,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<i32> for Algorithm {
+    type Error = CertGenError;
+    fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            1 => Ok(Self::Rsa),
+            3 => Ok(Self::Ec),
+            _ => Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(value)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+pub enum EcCurve {
+    P224 = 0,
+    P256 = 1,
+    P384 = 2,
+    P521 = 3,
+    Curve25519 = 4,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<i32> for EcCurve {
+    type Error = CertGenError;
+    fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            0 => Ok(Self::P224),
+            1 => Ok(Self::P256),
+            2 => Ok(Self::P384),
+            3 => Ok(Self::P521),
+            4 => Ok(Self::Curve25519),
+            _ => Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedEcCurve(value)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct CertGenParams {
+    pub algorithm: Algorithm,
+    pub key_size: u32,
+    pub ec_curve: Option<EcCurve>,
+    pub rsa_public_exponent: u64,
+
+    pub attestation_challenge: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub purposes: Vec<i32>,
+    pub digests: Vec<i32>,
+
+    pub cert_serial: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub cert_subject: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub cert_not_before: i64,
+    pub cert_not_after: i64,
+
+    pub keybox_private_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub keybox_cert_chain: Vec<u8>,
+
+    pub security_level: i32,
+    pub attest_version: i32,
+    pub keymaster_version: i32,
+
+    pub os_version: i32,
+    pub os_patch_level: i32,
+    pub vendor_patch_level: i32,
+    pub boot_patch_level: i32,
+
+    pub boot_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub boot_hash: Vec<u8>,
+
+    pub creation_datetime: i64,
+    pub attestation_application_id: Vec<u8>,
+    pub module_hash: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+
+    pub id_brand: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_device: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_product: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_serial: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_imei: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_meid: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_manufacturer: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_model: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub id_second_imei: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+
+    pub active_datetime: i64,
+    pub origination_expire_datetime: i64,
+    pub usage_expire_datetime: i64,
+    pub usage_count_limit: i32,
+    pub caller_nonce: bool,
+    pub unlocked_device_required: bool,
+    pub no_auth_required: bool,
+}
+
+pub struct GeneratedKeyPair {
+    pub private_key_pkcs8: Vec<u8>,
+}

scripts/package.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Build, package, deploy, and verify TEESimulator module ZIPs.
+# Usage: ./scripts/package.sh [flags]
+#
+# Examples:
+#   ./scripts/package.sh --release                    # build release ZIP
+#   ./scripts/package.sh --all --clean                # clean build, both variants
+#   ./scripts/package.sh --release --deploy --reboot  # build, push, install, reboot
+#   ./scripts/package.sh --deploy --verify            # deploy latest ZIP + verify via logcat
+#   ./scripts/package.sh --rust --release             # build Rust crate first, then release
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
+OUT_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/out"
+
+VARIANT=""
+CLEAN=false
+DEPLOY=false
+REBOOT=false
+VERIFY=false
+BUILD_RUST=false
+CLEAR_KEYS=false
+TRACE=false
+ROOT_PROVIDER="ksu"
+
+red()    { printf '\033[0;31m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
+green()  { printf '\033[0;32m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
+yellow() { printf '\033[0;33m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
+bold()   { printf '\033[1m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
+
+usage() {
+    cat <<EOF
+Usage: $(basename "$0") [options]
+
+Build variants (pick one, or --all):
+  --release          Build release variant (default if none specified)
+  --debug            Build debug variant
+  --all              Build both debug and release
+
+Build options:
+  --clean            Run gradle clean before building
+  --rust             Build native-certgen Rust crate before Gradle
+
+Deploy options:
+  --deploy           Push ZIP to device and install
+  --reboot           Reboot device after install
+  --clear-keys       Clear persistent_keys before deploy
+  --verify           Run logcat verification after deploy
+  --root PROVIDER    Root provider: ksu (default), magisk, apatch
+
+Misc:
+  -v, --verbose      Print every command as it runs (set -x)
+  --help             Show this help
+EOF
+    exit 0
+}
+
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+    case "$1" in
+        --release)    VARIANT="release"; shift ;;
+        --debug)      VARIANT="debug"; shift ;;
+        --all)        VARIANT="all"; shift ;;
+        --clean)      CLEAN=true; shift ;;
+        --deploy)     DEPLOY=true; shift ;;
+        --reboot)     REBOOT=true; shift ;;
+        --verify)     VERIFY=true; shift ;;
+        --rust)       BUILD_RUST=true; shift ;;
+        --clear-keys) CLEAR_KEYS=true; shift ;;
+        -v|--verbose) TRACE=true; shift ;;
+        --root)       ROOT_PROVIDER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        --help|-h)    usage ;;
+        *)            red "Unknown flag: $1"; usage ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+[[ -z "$VARIANT" ]] && VARIANT="release"
+[[ "$TRACE" == true ]] && set -x
+
+case "$ROOT_PROVIDER" in
+    ksu)     INSTALL_CMD="ksud module install" ;;
+    magisk)  INSTALL_CMD="magisk --install-module" ;;
+    apatch)  INSTALL_CMD="/data/adb/apd module install" ;;
+    *)       red "Unknown root provider: $ROOT_PROVIDER"; exit 1 ;;
+esac
+
+build_rust() {
+    local cargo_toml="$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen/Cargo.toml"
+    if [[ ! -f "$cargo_toml" ]]; then
+        red "native-certgen/Cargo.toml not found — skipping Rust build"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    bold "==> Building native-certgen (aarch64)"
+
+    if ! command -v cargo-ndk &>/dev/null; then
+        red "cargo-ndk not found. Install: cargo install cargo-ndk"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    (cd "$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen" && \
+        cargo ndk -t arm64-v8a --platform 29 -- build --release)
+
+    local so="$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen/target/aarch64-linux-android/release/libcertgen.so"
+    if [[ -f "$so" ]]; then
+        local size
+        size=$(du -h "$so" | cut -f1)
+        green "    libcertgen.so built ($size)"
+    else
+        red "    libcertgen.so not found after build"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+gradle_build() {
+    local tasks=()
+
+    [[ "$CLEAN" == true ]] && tasks+=(clean)
+
+    case "$VARIANT" in
+        release) tasks+=(zipRelease) ;;
+        debug)   tasks+=(zipDebug) ;;
+        all)     tasks+=(zipDebug zipRelease) ;;
+    esac
+
+    bold "==> Gradle: ${tasks[*]}"
+    (cd "$PROJECT_ROOT" && ./gradlew "${tasks[@]}")
+}
+
+find_latest_zip() {
+    local pattern="$1"
+    ls -t "$OUT_DIR"/$pattern 2>/dev/null | head -1
+}
+
+deploy_zip() {
+    local zip="$1"
+    local name
+    name=$(basename "$zip")
+
+    if ! adb get-state &>/dev/null; then
+        red "No ADB device connected"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    if [[ "$CLEAR_KEYS" == true ]]; then
+        bold "==> Clearing persistent_keys"
+        adb shell "rm -rf /data/adb/tricky_store/persistent_keys/*" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+
+    bold "==> Deploying $name"
+    adb push "$zip" /data/local/tmp/module.zip
+    adb shell "su -c '$INSTALL_CMD /data/local/tmp/module.zip'"
+    green "    Installed via $ROOT_PROVIDER"
+
+    if [[ "$REBOOT" == true ]]; then
+        bold "==> Rebooting"
+        adb reboot
+        echo "    Waiting for device..."
+        adb wait-for-device
+        sleep 10
+        local pid
+        pid=$(adb shell "pidof TEESimulator" 2>/dev/null || true)
+        if [[ -n "$pid" ]]; then
+            green "    Daemon alive (PID $pid)"
+        else
+            yellow "    Daemon not yet started — check logcat"
+        fi
+    fi
+}
+
+verify_device() {
+    bold "==> Verification"
+
+    if ! adb get-state &>/dev/null; then
+        red "No ADB device connected"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    local pid
+    pid=$(adb shell "pidof TEESimulator" 2>/dev/null || true)
+    if [[ -n "$pid" ]]; then
+        green "    Daemon: running (PID $pid)"
+    else
+        red "    Daemon: not running"
+    fi
+
+    local tee_status
+    tee_status=$(adb shell "cat /data/adb/tricky_store/tee_status.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A")
+    echo "    TEE status: $tee_status"
+
+    local sec_patch
+    sec_patch=$(adb shell "cat /data/adb/tricky_store/security_patch.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A")
+    echo "    Security patch config: $(echo "$sec_patch" | head -1)"
+
+    local errors
+    errors=$(adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator 2>/dev/null | \
+        grep -iE "error|exception" | \
+        grep -v "StrongBox\|SurfaceRuntime\|ClassLoader\|HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE" | \
+        wc -l)
+    if [[ "$errors" -eq 0 ]]; then
+        green "    Logcat errors: 0"
+    else
+        yellow "    Logcat errors: $errors (run: adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator | grep -iE 'error|exception')"
+    fi
+
+    local throttle_events
+    throttle_events=$(adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator 2>/dev/null | \
+        grep -cE "RATE_LIMITED|CONCURRENT_LIMITED" || true)
+    echo "    Rate limit events: $throttle_events"
+}
+
+print_summary() {
+    echo ""
+    bold "==> Build Summary"
+
+    local variants=()
+    case "$VARIANT" in
+        release) variants=(Release) ;;
+        debug)   variants=(Debug) ;;
+        all)     variants=(Debug Release) ;;
+    esac
+
+    for v in "${variants[@]}"; do
+        local zip
+        zip=$(find_latest_zip "*-${v}.zip")
+        if [[ -n "$zip" ]]; then
+            local size
+            size=$(du -h "$zip" | cut -f1)
+            green "    $v: $(basename "$zip") ($size)"
+        else
+            red "    $v: ZIP not found"
+        fi
+    done
+}
+
+# --- Main ---
+echo ""
+bold "TEESimulator-RS package pipeline"
+echo ""
+
+[[ "$BUILD_RUST" == true ]] && build_rust
+
+gradle_build
+print_summary
+
+if [[ "$DEPLOY" == true ]]; then
+    local_variant="$VARIANT"
+    [[ "$local_variant" == "all" ]] && local_variant="release"
+
+    cap="${local_variant^}"
+    zip=$(find_latest_zip "*-${cap}.zip")
+    if [[ -z "$zip" ]]; then
+        red "No $cap ZIP found to deploy"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    deploy_zip "$zip"
+fi
+
+[[ "$VERIFY" == true ]] && verify_device
+
+echo ""
+green "Done."

settings.gradle.kts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ dependencyResolutionManagement {
     }
 }
 
-rootProject.name = "TEESimulator"
+rootProject.name = "TEESimulator-RS"
 
 include(":stub")
 

stub/src/main/java/android/app/ActivityThread.java

@@ -4,4 +4,12 @@ public class ActivityThread {
     public static void initializeMainlineModules() {
         throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
     }
+
+    public static ActivityThread systemMain() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public ContextImpl getSystemContext() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
 }

stub/src/main/java/android/app/ContextImpl.java

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+package android.app;
+
+public class ContextImpl {
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/content/pm/IPackageManager.java

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ public interface IPackageManager {
 
     ParceledListSlice<PackageInfo> getInstalledPackages(long flags, int userId);
 
+    int checkPermission(String permName, String pkgName, int userId);
+
     class Stub {
         public static IPackageManager asInterface(IBinder binder) {
             throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");

stub/src/main/java/android/hardware/security/keymint/BlockMode.java

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+public @interface BlockMode {
+    public static final int ECB = 1;
+    public static final int CBC = 2;
+    public static final int CTR = 3;
+    public static final int GCM = 32;
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/hardware/security/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.java

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+public @interface HardwareAuthenticatorType {
+    int NONE = 0;
+    int PASSWORD = 1;
+    int FINGERPRINT = 2;
+    int ANY = -1;
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.java

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+public @interface PaddingMode {
+    public static final int NONE = 1;
+    public static final int RSA_OAEP = 2;
+    public static final int RSA_PSS = 3;
+    public static final int RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT = 4;
+    public static final int RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN = 5;
+    public static final int PKCS7 = 64;
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/os/SELinux.java

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+package android.os;
+
+/** Stub for android.os.SELinux. */
+public class SELinux {
+    public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
+            String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/os/ServiceManager.java

@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ public class ServiceManager {
         throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
     }
 
+    public static boolean isDeclared(String name) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
     public static String[] listServices() {
         throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
     }

stub/src/main/java/android/os/ServiceSpecificException.java

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+package android.os;
+
+/**
+ * Stub for android.os.ServiceSpecificException.
+ *
+ * <p>Used by AIDL-generated binder stubs to report service-specific errors with numeric codes.
+ * The binder framework serializes this as EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC on the wire, preserving the integer
+ * error code for the client.
+ */
+public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
+    public final int errorCode;
+
+    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.errorCode = errorCode;
+    }
+
+    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
+        this(errorCode, null);
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keymaster/ExportResult.java

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package android.security.keymaster;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+public class ExportResult implements Parcelable {
+    public final byte[] exportData;
+    public final int resultCode;
+
+    public ExportResult(int resultCode) {
+        this.resultCode = resultCode;
+        this.exportData = new byte[0];
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel dest, int flags) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public static final Creator<ExportResult> CREATOR = new Creator<ExportResult>() {
+        @Override
+        public ExportResult createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public ExportResult[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keymaster/KeyCharacteristics.java

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+package android.security.keymaster;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+public class KeyCharacteristics implements Parcelable {
+    public KeymasterArguments hwEnforced;
+    public KeymasterArguments swEnforced;
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel dest, int flags) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public static final Creator<KeyCharacteristics> CREATOR = new Creator<KeyCharacteristics>() {
+        @Override
+        public KeyCharacteristics createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public KeyCharacteristics[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keymaster/KeymasterArgument.java

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package android.security.keymaster;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+abstract class KeymasterArgument implements Parcelable {
+    public final int tag;
+
+    protected KeymasterArgument(int tag) {
+        this.tag = tag;
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel dest, int flags) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public static final Creator<KeymasterArgument> CREATOR = new Creator<KeymasterArgument>() {
+        @Override
+        public KeymasterArgument createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public KeymasterArgument[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keymaster/KeymasterArguments.java

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+package android.security.keymaster;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+import java.math.BigInteger;
+import java.util.Date;
+import java.util.List;
+
+public class KeymasterArguments implements Parcelable {
+
+    private static final long UINT32_RANGE = 1L << 32;
+    public static final long UINT32_MAX_VALUE = UINT32_RANGE - 1;
+
+    private static final BigInteger UINT64_RANGE = BigInteger.ONE.shiftLeft(64);
+    public static final BigInteger UINT64_MAX_VALUE = UINT64_RANGE.subtract(BigInteger.ONE);
+
+    private List<KeymasterArgument> mArguments;
+
+    public static final @NonNull Parcelable.Creator<KeymasterArguments> CREATOR = new Parcelable.Creator<KeymasterArguments>() {
+        @Override
+        public KeymasterArguments createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public KeymasterArguments[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+
+    public KeymasterArguments() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    private KeymasterArguments(Parcel in) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addEnum(int tag, int value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addEnums(int tag, int... values) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public int getEnum(int tag, int defaultValue) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public List<Integer> getEnums(int tag) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    private void addEnumTag(int tag, int value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    private int getEnumTagValue(KeymasterArgument arg) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addUnsignedInt(int tag, long value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public long getUnsignedInt(int tag, long defaultValue) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addUnsignedLong(int tag, BigInteger value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public List<BigInteger> getUnsignedLongs(int tag) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    private void addLongTag(int tag, BigInteger value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    private BigInteger getLongTagValue(KeymasterArgument arg) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addBoolean(int tag) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public boolean getBoolean(int tag) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addBytes(int tag, byte[] value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public byte[] getBytes(int tag, byte[] defaultValue) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addDate(int tag, Date value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void addDateIfNotNull(int tag, Date value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public Date getDate(int tag, Date defaultValue) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    private KeymasterArgument getArgumentByTag(int tag) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public boolean containsTag(int tag) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public int size() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(Parcel out, int flags) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public void readFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public static BigInteger toUint64(long value) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keymaster/KeymasterCertificateChain.java

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package android.security.keymaster;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+import java.util.List;
+
+public class KeymasterCertificateChain implements Parcelable {
+    private List<byte[]> mCertificates;
+
+    public KeymasterCertificateChain() {
+        this.mCertificates = null;
+    }
+
+    public KeymasterCertificateChain(List<byte[]> mCertificates) {
+        this.mCertificates = mCertificates;
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel dest, int flags) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public static final Creator<KeymasterCertificateChain> CREATOR = new Creator<KeymasterCertificateChain>() {
+        @Override
+        public KeymasterCertificateChain createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public KeymasterCertificateChain[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keymaster/KeymasterDefs.java

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+package android.security.keymaster;
+
+import java.util.HashMap;
+import java.util.Map;
+
+public final class KeymasterDefs {
+
+    private KeymasterDefs() {
+    }
+
+    // Tag types.
+    public static final int KM_INVALID = 0 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_ENUM = 1 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_ENUM_REP = 2 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_UINT = 3 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_UINT_REP = 4 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_ULONG = 5 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_DATE = 6 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_BOOL = 7 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_BIGNUM = 8 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_BYTES = 9 << 28;
+    public static final int KM_ULONG_REP = 10 << 28;
+
+    // Tag values.
+    public static final int KM_TAG_INVALID = KM_INVALID | 0;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_PURPOSE = KM_ENUM_REP | 1;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ALGORITHM = KM_ENUM | 2;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE = KM_UINT | 3;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_BLOCK_MODE = KM_ENUM_REP | 4;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_DIGEST = KM_ENUM_REP | 5;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_PADDING = KM_ENUM_REP | 6;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_CALLER_NONCE = KM_BOOL | 7;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = KM_UINT | 8;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_RESCOPING_ADD = KM_ENUM_REP | 101;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_RESCOPING_DEL = KM_ENUM_REP | 102;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = KM_ENUM | 705;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = KM_ULONG | 200;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = KM_BOOL | 202;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME = KM_DATE | 400;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = KM_DATE | 401;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = KM_DATE | 402;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = KM_UINT | 403;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = KM_UINT | 404;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ALL_USERS = KM_BOOL | 500;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_USER_ID = KM_UINT | 501;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID = KM_ULONG_REP | 502;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = KM_BOOL | 503;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE = KM_ENUM | 504;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT = KM_UINT | 505;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = KM_BOOL | 506;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = KM_BOOL | 507;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = KM_BOOL | 508;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = KM_BOOL | 509;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ALL_APPLICATIONS = KM_BOOL | 600;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_APPLICATION_ID = KM_BYTES | 601;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_CREATION_DATETIME = KM_DATE | 701;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ORIGIN = KM_ENUM | 702;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT = KM_BOOL | 703;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST = KM_BYTES | 704;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_UNIQUE_ID = KM_BYTES | 707;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = KM_BYTES | 708;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = KM_BYTES | 710;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = KM_BYTES | 711;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = KM_BYTES | 712;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = KM_BYTES | 713;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = KM_BYTES | 714;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = KM_BYTES | 715;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = KM_BYTES | 716;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = KM_BYTES | 717;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = KM_BOOL | 720;
+
+    public static final int KM_TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA = KM_BYTES | 1000;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_NONCE = KM_BYTES | 1001;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_AUTH_TOKEN = KM_BYTES | 1002;
+    public static final int KM_TAG_MAC_LENGTH = KM_UINT | 1003;
+
+    // Algorithm values.
+    public static final int KM_ALGORITHM_RSA = 1;
+    public static final int KM_ALGORITHM_EC = 3;
+    public static final int KM_ALGORITHM_AES = 32;
+    public static final int KM_ALGORITHM_3DES = 33;
+    public static final int KM_ALGORITHM_HMAC = 128;
+
+    // Block modes.
+    public static final int KM_MODE_ECB = 1;
+    public static final int KM_MODE_CBC = 2;
+    public static final int KM_MODE_CTR = 3;
+    public static final int KM_MODE_GCM = 32;
+
+    // Padding modes.
+    public static final int KM_PAD_NONE = 1;
+    public static final int KM_PAD_RSA_OAEP = 2;
+    public static final int KM_PAD_RSA_PSS = 3;
+    public static final int KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT = 4;
+    public static final int KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN = 5;
+    public static final int KM_PAD_PKCS7 = 64;
+
+    // Digest modes.
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_NONE = 0;
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_MD5 = 1;
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_SHA1 = 2;
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_224 = 3;
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256 = 4;
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_384 = 5;
+    public static final int KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_512 = 6;
+
+    // Key origins.
+    public static final int KM_ORIGIN_GENERATED = 0;
+    public static final int KM_ORIGIN_IMPORTED = 2;
+    public static final int KM_ORIGIN_UNKNOWN = 3;
+    public static final int KM_ORIGIN_SECURELY_IMPORTED = 4;
+
+    // Key usability requirements.
+    public static final int KM_BLOB_STANDALONE = 0;
+    public static final int KM_BLOB_REQUIRES_FILE_SYSTEM = 1;
+
+    // Operation Purposes.
+    public static final int KM_PURPOSE_ENCRYPT = 0;
+    public static final int KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT = 1;
+    public static final int KM_PURPOSE_SIGN = 2;
+    public static final int KM_PURPOSE_VERIFY = 3;
+    public static final int KM_PURPOSE_WRAP = 5;
+
+    // Key formats.
+    public static final int KM_KEY_FORMAT_X509 = 0;
+    public static final int KM_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8 = 1;
+    public static final int KM_KEY_FORMAT_RAW = 3;
+
+    // User authenticators.
+    public static final int HW_AUTH_PASSWORD = 1 << 0;
+    public static final int HW_AUTH_BIOMETRIC = 1 << 1;
+
+    // Error codes.
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_OK = 0;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_ROOT_OF_TRUST_ALREADY_SET = -1;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE = -2;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE = -3;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM = -4;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM = -5;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE = -6;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE = -7;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE = -8;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH = -9;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE = -10;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE = -11;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST = -12;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST = -13;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME = -14;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_USER_ID = -15;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT = -16;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT = -17;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT = -18;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM = -19;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_ALGORITHM = -20;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH = -21;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_KEY_EXPORT_OPTIONS_INVALID = -22;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_DELEGATION_NOT_ALLOWED = -23;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_KEY_NOT_YET_VALID = -24;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_KEY_EXPIRED = -25;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED = -26;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_OUTPUT_PARAMETER_NULL = -27;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE = -28;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER_SPACE = -29;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_VERIFICATION_FAILED = -30;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS = -31;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER = -32;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB = -33;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_ENCRYPTED = -34;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_IMPORTED_KEY_DECRYPTION_FAILED = -35;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_IMPORTED_KEY_NOT_SIGNED = -36;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_IMPORTED_KEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED = -37;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT = -38;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_TAG = -39;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG = -40;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED = -41;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_RESCOPING = -42;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH = -44;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_SECURE_HW_ACCESS_DENIED = -45;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_OPERATION_CANCELLED = -46;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_CONCURRENT_ACCESS_CONFLICT = -47;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_SECURE_HW_BUSY = -48;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED = -49;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD = -50;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_MISSING_NONCE = -51;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_NONCE = -52;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_MISSING_MAC_LENGTH = -53;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED = -54;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED = -55;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED = -56;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_INVALID_MAC_LENGTH = -57;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = -58;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH = -59;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS = -66;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_DEVICE_LOCKED = -72;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED = -100;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_VERSION_MISMATCH = -101;
+    public static final int KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR = -1000;
+
+    public static final Map<Integer, String> sErrorCodeToString = new HashMap<Integer, String>();
+    static {
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_OK, "OK");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, "Unsupported purpose");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE, "Incompatible purpose");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, "Unsupported algorithm");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM, "Incompatible algorithm");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, "Unsupported key size");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE, "Unsupported block mode");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE, "Incompatible block mode");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH,
+                "Unsupported MAC or authentication tag length");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, "Unsupported padding mode");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, "Incompatible padding mode");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST, "Unsupported digest");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, "Incompatible digest");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_EXPIRATION_TIME, "Invalid expiration time");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_USER_ID, "Invalid user ID");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_TIMEOUT,
+                "Invalid user authorization timeout");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, "Unsupported key format");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_FORMAT, "Incompatible key format");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, "Invalid input length");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_KEY_NOT_YET_VALID, "Key not yet valid");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_KEY_EXPIRED, "Key expired");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED, "Key user not authenticated");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, "Invalid operation handle");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_VERIFICATION_FAILED, "Signature/MAC verification failed");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS, "Too many operations");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB, "Invalid key blob");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, "Invalid argument");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_TAG, "Unsupported tag");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG, "Invalid tag");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED, "Memory allocation failed");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_FIELD, "Unsupported EC field");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_MISSING_NONCE, "Required IV missing");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_NONCE, "Invalid IV");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED,
+                "Caller-provided IV not permitted");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_INVALID_MAC_LENGTH,
+                "Invalid MAC or authentication tag length");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS, "Unable to attest device ids");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_DEVICE_LOCKED, "Device locked");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED, "Not implemented");
+        sErrorCodeToString.put(KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, "Unknown error");
+    }
+
+    public static int getTagType(int tag) {
+        return tag & (0xF << 28);
+    }
+
+    public static String getErrorMessage(int errorCode) {
+        String result = sErrorCodeToString.get(errorCode);
+        if (result != null) {
+            return result;
+        }
+        return String.valueOf(errorCode);
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreCertificateChainCallback.java

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+package android.security.keystore;
+
+import android.os.IBinder;
+import android.os.RemoteException;
+import android.security.keymaster.KeymasterCertificateChain;
+
+public interface IKeystoreCertificateChainCallback {
+    void onFinished(KeystoreResponse keystoreResponse, KeymasterCertificateChain keymasterCertificateChain)
+            throws RemoteException;
+
+    public static abstract class Stub {
+        public static IKeystoreCertificateChainCallback asInterface(IBinder b) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreExportKeyCallback.java

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package android.security.keystore;
+
+import android.os.IBinder;
+import android.os.RemoteException;
+import android.security.keymaster.ExportResult;
+
+public interface IKeystoreExportKeyCallback {
+    void onFinished(ExportResult exportResult) throws RemoteException;
+
+    public static abstract class Stub {
+        public static IKeystoreExportKeyCallback asInterface(IBinder b) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreKeyCharacteristicsCallback.java

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+package android.security.keystore;
+
+import android.os.IBinder;
+import android.os.IInterface;
+import android.os.RemoteException;
+import android.security.keymaster.KeyCharacteristics;
+
+public interface IKeystoreKeyCharacteristicsCallback extends IInterface {
+    void onFinished(KeystoreResponse keystoreResponse, KeyCharacteristics keyCharacteristics) throws RemoteException;
+
+    public static abstract class Stub {
+        public static IKeystoreKeyCharacteristicsCallback asInterface(IBinder b) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.java

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 package android.security.keystore;
 
+import java.lang.String;
+
 public interface IKeystoreService {
+    public static final String DESCRIPTOR = "android.security.keystore.IKeystoreService";
+
     class Stub {
     }
 }
-

stub/src/main/java/android/security/keystore/KeystoreResponse.java

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package android.security.keystore;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+public class KeystoreResponse implements Parcelable {
+    public final int error_code_;
+    public final String error_msg_;
+
+    protected KeystoreResponse(int error_code, String error_msg) {
+        this.error_code_ = error_code;
+        this.error_msg_ = error_msg;
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel dest, int flags) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    public static final Creator<KeystoreResponse> CREATOR = new Creator<KeystoreResponse>() {
+        @Override
+        public KeystoreResponse createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public KeystoreResponse[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/system/keystore2/CreateOperationResponse.java

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package android.system.keystore2;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+public class CreateOperationResponse implements Parcelable {
+    public IKeystoreOperation iOperation;
+
+    public OperationChallenge operationChallenge;
+
+    public KeyParameters parameters;
+
+    public byte[] upgradedBlob;
+
+    public static final Creator<CreateOperationResponse> CREATOR = new Creator<CreateOperationResponse>() {
+        @Override
+        public CreateOperationResponse createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public CreateOperationResponse[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel parcel, int i) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/system/keystore2/Domain.java

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+package android.system.keystore2;
+
+public @interface Domain {
+    public static final int APP = 0;
+    public static final int GRANT = 1;
+    public static final int SELINUX = 2;
+    public static final int BLOB = 3;
+    public static final int KEY_ID = 4;
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/system/keystore2/IKeystoreOperation.java

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+package android.system.keystore2;
+
+import android.os.IBinder;
+import android.os.Binder;
+import android.os.IInterface;
+
+public interface IKeystoreOperation extends IInterface {
+    public static final java.lang.String DESCRIPTOR = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation";
+
+    public void updateAad(byte[] aadInput);
+
+    public byte[] update(byte[] input);
+
+    public byte[] finish(byte[] input, byte[] signature);
+
+    public void abort() throws android.os.RemoteException;
+
+    abstract class Stub extends Binder implements IKeystoreOperation {
+        public static IKeystoreOperation asInterface(IBinder b) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public IBinder asBinder() {
+            return this;
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public void updateAad(byte[] aadInput) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    }
+}

stub/src/main/java/android/system/keystore2/KeyParameters.java

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+package android.system.keystore2;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+public class KeyParameters implements Parcelable {
+    public KeyParameter[] keyParameter;
+
+    public static final Creator<KeyParameters> CREATOR = new Creator<KeyParameters>() {
+        @Override
+        public KeyParameters createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public KeyParameters[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel parcel, int i) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+}
+

stub/src/main/java/android/system/keystore2/OperationChallenge.java

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+package android.system.keystore2;
+
+import android.os.Parcel;
+import android.os.Parcelable;
+
+import androidx.annotation.NonNull;
+
+public class OperationChallenge implements Parcelable {
+    public long challenge = 0L;
+
+    public static final Creator<OperationChallenge> CREATOR = new Creator<OperationChallenge>() {
+        @Override
+        public OperationChallenge createFromParcel(Parcel in) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+
+        @Override
+        public OperationChallenge[] newArray(int size) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    };
+
+    @Override
+    public int describeContents() {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+
+    @Override
+    public void writeToParcel(@NonNull Parcel parcel, int i) {
+        throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+    }
+}