feat(logging): per-UID forge diagnostics

The attestation dossier only fired on a successfully produced chain, so
the StrongBox/BHIM failures left nothing on the per-UID plane and had to
be reconstructed from marshalled .bin dumps offline. Add three records,
all debug- and target-gated like the existing dossier:

- keybox-pick: which keybox signs the forge (requested algo, exact match
  vs EC fail-safe, signer subject) -- makes an EC-only-keybox RSA
  fallback visible instead of silent.
- forge-fail: emit the failure reason on the per-UID plane when a forge
  throws (e.g. ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED), paired with dispatch.
- auth-shape: the emitted authorization list (count, ordered tags,
  per-auth securityLevel) -- the surface the duck generate-mode parcel
  fingerprint stride-walks, readable without offline decode.

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.kt

@@ -746,8 +746,12 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
                     }
                 }
             }
-            .getOrElse {
-                SystemLogger.error("Error during generateKey handling for UID $callingUid.", it)
+            .getOrElse { ex ->
+                SystemLogger.error("Error during generateKey handling for UID $callingUid.", ex)
+                // The dossier only fires on a produced chain; a forge that throws (e.g. a missing
+                // keybox) would otherwise leave no per-UID record. Pair this with the preceding
+                // `dispatch` line to see which request failed and why.
+                SystemLogger.uidLog(callingUid, txId, "forge-fail") { "ex=${ex.message}" }
                 InterceptorUtils.createServiceSpecificErrorReply(SECURE_HW_COMMUNICATION_FAILED)
             }
     }
@@ -914,6 +918,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
 
         val response =
             buildKeyEntryResponse(callingUid, keyData.second, parsedParams, keyDescriptor)
+        AttestationDossier.logAuthShape(callingUid, txId, response.metadata?.authorizations)
         generatedKeys[keyId] =
             GeneratedKeyInfo(keyData.first, null, keyDescriptor.nspace, response, parsedParams)
         Keystore2Interceptor.forgetDeletedKey(keyId)

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/logging/AttestationDossier.kt

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
 
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
+import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
 import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
@@ -30,4 +32,42 @@ object AttestationDossier {
         SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "chain", AttestationPatcher.formatCertChain(chain))
         SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "props", AndroidDeviceUtils.describeSources(uid))
     }
+
+    /**
+     * Records the *shape* of the emitted authorization list — count, ordered tags, and per-auth
+     * securityLevel. This is the exact surface the duck detector's generate-mode parcel fingerprint
+     * stride-walks, so logging it readably lets a "fingerprint" detection be compared against the
+     * known genuine-TEE shape without decoding the marshalled reply offline.
+     */
+    fun logAuthShape(uid: Int, txId: Long, authorizations: Array<Authorization>?) {
+        if (!SystemLogger.isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        val auths = authorizations ?: return
+        val shape = auths.joinToString(",") { "${tagName(it.keyParameter.tag)}/${it.securityLevel}" }
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "auth-shape", "n=${auths.size} [$shape]")
+    }
+
+    /** Names the authorization tags that occur in generate-mode replies; others render as numbers. */
+    private fun tagName(tag: Int): String =
+        when (tag) {
+            Tag.PURPOSE -> "PURPOSE"
+            Tag.ALGORITHM -> "ALGORITHM"
+            Tag.KEY_SIZE -> "KEY_SIZE"
+            Tag.DIGEST -> "DIGEST"
+            Tag.PADDING -> "PADDING"
+            Tag.EC_CURVE -> "EC_CURVE"
+            Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT -> "RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT"
+            Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> "NO_AUTH_REQUIRED"
+            Tag.ORIGIN -> "ORIGIN"
+            Tag.OS_VERSION -> "OS_VERSION"
+            Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL -> "OS_PATCHLEVEL"
+            Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> "VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
+            Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL -> "BOOT_PATCHLEVEL"
+            Tag.CREATION_DATETIME -> "CREATION_DATETIME"
+            Tag.ROOT_OF_TRUST -> "ROOT_OF_TRUST"
+            Tag.USER_ID -> "USER_ID"
+            Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT -> "USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT"
+            Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED -> "UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED"
+            Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME -> "ACTIVE_DATETIME"
+            else -> "tag${tag and 0x0FFFFFFF}"
+        }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/CertificateGenerator.kt

@@ -191,12 +191,21 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
         // certificate"). Mirrors the patch path's fail-safe
         // (AttestationPatcher.getKeyboxForUidAndAlgorithm) and the RSA-leaf-under-EC-keybox handling
         // in commit e6d5e4d.
-        return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
+        val matched = KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
+        val keybox =
+            matched
                 ?: KeyBoxManager.getAnyAttestationKey(keyboxFile)
                 ?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException(
                     -75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
                     "No usable attestation key in $keyboxFile",
                 )
+        // Surface which keybox actually signs the forge, so an EC-only-keybox fallback (an RSA leaf
+        // rooted under the EC key) is visible on the per-UID plane instead of silent.
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, null, "keybox-pick") {
+            "req=$algorithmName ${if (matched != null) "matched" else "fellback-to-any"} " +
+                "signer=${getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)}"
+        }
+        return keybox
     }
 
     /** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */