fix(keystore): forge device-property attestation
The canAttestDeviceIds gate (3575c74) probed the live TEE to decide whether to honor device-property/ID attestation. That probe is gated on isTeeFunctional, which is false on every dead-TEE device the module serves, so GENERATE mode rejected all such requests with CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS, including GMS Play Integrity's hardware path, which broke BHIM and any UPI/Play-Integrity-gated app. Remove the gate. Device-property attestation (BRAND/MODEL/...) now forges unconditionally, as genuine devices universally attest it. Device-ID attestation stays governed by the pre-existing caller-permission check, the real KeyMint rule: privileged callers get it, ordinary apps do not. Drop the now-unused DeviceAttestationService.canAttestDeviceIds probe.
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@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
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package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
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import android.annotation.SuppressLint
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import android.os.Build
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import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
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import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
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import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
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@@ -61,23 +60,12 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
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// A unique alias for the key used to perform the TEE functionality check.
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private const val TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_AttestationCheck"
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// Alias for the device-ID attestation capability probe.
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private const val DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_DeviceIdCheck"
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/**
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* Lazily determines if the device's TEE is functional by attempting to generate an
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* attestation-backed key pair. The result is cached.
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*/
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val isTeeFunctional: Boolean by lazy { checkTeeFunctionality() }
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/**
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* Lazily mirrors whether the real TEE can attest device identifiers/properties (the tags added
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* by `setDevicePropertiesAttestationIncluded`). Hardware that never provisioned device IDs
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* returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS; the synthesizer consults this so it never forges a capability the
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* real silicon lacks. Cached.
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*/
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val canAttestDeviceIds: Boolean by lazy { checkDeviceIdAttestation() }
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/**
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* Lazily fetches and parses attestation data from a genuinely generated certificate. The result
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* is cached. Returns null if the TEE is not functional or parsing fails.
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@@ -118,37 +106,6 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
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}
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}
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/**
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* Probes whether the real TEE can satisfy device-ID/property attestation, mirroring its actual
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* capability. Gated behind [isTeeFunctional] so a dead TEE never triggers a second doomed
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* probe — it simply reports `false` (cannot attest), the faithful result for such hardware.
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*/
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private fun checkDeviceIdAttestation(): Boolean {
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if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < Build.VERSION_CODES.S) return false
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if (!isTeeFunctional) return false
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return try {
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val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
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val keyPairGenerator =
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KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
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val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
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val spec =
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KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
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.setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
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.setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
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.setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
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.setDevicePropertiesAttestationIncluded(true)
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.build()
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keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
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keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
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runCatching { keyStore.deleteEntry(DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS) }
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SystemLogger.info("Device-ID attestation supported by TEE.")
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true
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} catch (_: Exception) {
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SystemLogger.info("Device-ID attestation not supported by TEE; mirroring as cannot-attest.")
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false
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}
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}
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/**
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* Retrieves the attestation certificate generated during the TEE check. The key entry is
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* deleted after retrieval to clean up.
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@@ -192,7 +149,8 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
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// The extension's value is an ASN.1 sequence.
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val keyDescriptionSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
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SystemLogger.verbose {
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val formattedString = keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
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val formattedString =
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keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
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AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
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}
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"Cached attestation data: $formattedString"
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+5
-17
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationBuilder
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationConstants
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
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import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
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@@ -478,22 +477,11 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
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it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI
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}
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val hasDevicePropertyAttestation = parsedParams.brand != null ||
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parsedParams.device != null ||
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parsedParams.product != null ||
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parsedParams.manufacturer != null ||
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parsedParams.model != null
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// Mirror the real TEE's capability: hardware that never provisioned device IDs
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// returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS. Synthesizing device-ID/property attestation a chip of
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// this class cannot produce is an over-capability tell — a genuine device fails the
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// same request. Forge health, mirror capability.
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if ((hasDeviceIdAttestation || hasDevicePropertyAttestation) &&
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!DeviceAttestationService.canAttestDeviceIds) {
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SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Real TEE cannot attest device IDs; returning CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS for uid=$callingUid (mirroring hardware)")
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return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)
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}
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// Device-ID attestation mirrors a real KeyMint: privileged callers (GMS/system)
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// get it, ordinary apps get CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS. The permission check below is that
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// rule. Device-property attestation (BRAND/MODEL/...) is honored unconditionally —
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// genuine devices universally attest it, and it is what Play Integrity's hardware
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// path needs. Capability is keyed to the device we present, not the real (dead) TEE.
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if(hasDeviceIdAttestation && !AndroidPermissionUtils.hasDeviceAttestationPermission(callingUid)) {
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SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting DEVICE_ID_ATTESTATION for uid=$callingUid")
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return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)
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